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# **Strategic Review for Southern Africa**

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The journal publishes two regular issues a year (May/June and November/ December) with a possibility of one additional guest special issue per year as need justifies, subject to editorial group approval. Issues are available mainly as an open access online platform licensed under creative commons. Printed copies can be ordered. All submissions are subject to double-blind peer review by at least two appropriately qualified reviewers.

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#### **Editorial**

### **Henning Melber and Heather Thuynsma**

Co-Managing Editors, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v46i1.5352

This year, citizens in many countries head to the polls to elect governments. In many cases, the choices at hand reflect various strategic policy priorities. The main conundrum for many voters and parties is forging a degree of political stability. Geostrategic and security issues have increasingly emerged as burning issues, affecting most bi- and multilateral relations. The relevance of such perspectives is acknowledged by most of the articles in this issue as they explore a variety of critical security-related challenges. From the geopolitical effects of civil strife and coups to the pressing concerns around economic development, to the shifting dynamics of regional integration and growing migration, our contributors explore these themes and provide thought-provoking perspectives that are essential for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners alike.

Theo Neethling details how thirty years of underfunding has hindered both internal and external operations of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The SANDF has had to balance peacekeeping missions in places such as Lesotho, the DRC, and Burundi with domestic security tasks, but with an outdated force design and significant operational shortcomings. According to Neethling, these competing priorities are compromising the SANDF's effectiveness and sustainability.

Sonja Theron raises at a broader level some of the concerns illustrated by Neethling in his specific case study. The issue of an outdated force design can also be the result of an inadequate understanding of the complex dynamics that underpin conflict across the continent. For Theron, current theories in the field of war studies are insufficient to explain and address conflicts. She calls for a re-framing of war and strategic thinking to emphasise context-dependent approaches and innovative strategies that address the continent's unique complexities.

The recent military coups in the Sahel region are an example of these complexities. To illustrate the political instability and the regional implications that can result, Frederick Appiah Afriyie examines the case of Niger. He explores the causes, such as democratic backsliding and terrorism, and highlights the impact of U.S. security assistance and diplomatic relations. To counter these dynamics, the study emphasises the need for decisive action by international and regional organisations.

However, Russia's influential operations in West Africa, particularly the Sahel, should not be overlooked. *Lukas Horak, Kristyna Drmotova, Petr Stodola* and *Libor Kutej* explore Moscow's tactics to counter Western presence and strengthen ties with local governments. They use Mali as a case study and examine how Russia has used historical and modern information-psychological warfare, as well as non-military tools like economic collaborations and mining investments, to assert dominance and reshape military and diplomatic relations. A recent reminder that this remains a matter of life and death was illustrated by the widely reported killing of Malian soldiers and those from the former Wagner group who were ambushed by fighters from an ethnically Tuareg separatist group. In response, Mali's government accused Ukraine of aiding the attackers and violating Malian sovereignty before cutting diplomatic ties. This illustrates the implications of conflicts beyond a local dimension. The article, therefore, also considers Russia's broader involvement in Africa and the potential partnerships with North African countries.

At the same time, China's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa is expanding through connectivity, institutional arrangements, and power dynamics to position Beijing as a central player in the region's political economy. The country's economic activities, infrastructure projects, and resource acquisition are significant, and challenge Western dominance. *Inesta Brunel Lendzoumbou* explores these dynamics and focuses on China's debt diplomacy and global power shifts.

Farrukh Ahmad Aman and Muhammad Shoaih Pervez exemplify this with another South African case study. They examine Pakistan's foreign policy shift towards Africa as a sign of the continent's growing trade and military importance. They argue that the close bilateral political, economic, and military relations with South Africa benefit from the growing impact of the Pakistani diaspora in South Africa.

Pressing concerns around economic development are a key factor that contributes to political instability across the region. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and its promise to reinvigorate trade has raised hope as well as criticism. Lincoln Cave highlights the critical role of regulatory compliance in the success of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and addresses challenges like security threats, climate change, and infrastructure deficits. He uses South African case studies to underscore the importance of governance and accountability in PPPs. He recommends adopting a compliance management program, fostering a culture of accountability, and enforcing consequences for failures to manage PPPs effectively in Africa.

Successfully promoting regional integration also includes understanding the rise in African migration, particularly intra-African movements. As a research report, Sergio Carciotto, Daniel Adeoluwa Adeniyi, and Mulugeta Dinbabo emphasise the need for a new narrative on migration in Africa to inform better decision-making at the regional level. The annotated bibliography covers various pillars of the African Union's Migration Policy Framework, highlighting topics such as migration governance, labour migration, diaspora engagement, border governance, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration, and migration diplomacy. They identify future research directions across various thematic areas like migration governance, labour migration, diaspora engagement, border governance, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration, migration and trade, and migration diplomacy.

Masilo Lepuru completes this issue with a review of uMbuso weNkosi's These Potatoes Look Like Humans: The Contested Future of Land, Home and Death in South Africa. The book discusses the historic injustice of land dispossession in South Africa through the lens of African spirituality, adding to the ongoing debate on land ownership and justice in post-apartheid South Africa. The spiritual connection between the land, the living, the dead, and the yet-to-be-born, highlights the need to understand land beyond its material value.

We hope this issue serves not only as a scholarly resource but also as a catalyst for meaningful dialogue and action. As always, the Strategic Review for Southern Africa remains committed to fostering informed debate and contributing to the region's development through rigorous research and analysis. We welcome scholarly comments and exchanges promoting relevant discourses further.

Henning Melber and Heather Thuynsma

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<sup>1</sup> Christopher Michael Faulkner, 'Wagner Group setback in Mali challenges Moscow's strategy in Africa and the region's faith in Russian mercenaries', *The Conversation*, 9 August 2024, https://theconversation.com/wagner-group-setback-in-mali-challenges-moscows-strategy-in-africa-and-the-regions-faith-in-russian-mercenaries-236285.

<sup>2</sup> Shola Lawal, 'Mali's spat with Kyiv: Is the Russia-Ukraine war spilling over into Africa?', Al Jazeera, 8 August 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/8/malis-spat-with-kyiv-is-the-russia-ukraine-war-spilling-over-into-africa.

# The SANDF after 30 Years: Walking the Tightrope between **External and Internal Operations on a Shoestring Budget**

### Theo Neethling

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#### **Abstract**

Since 1994 the South African government's commitment to peace and security in Africa inexorably drew the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) into extensive involvement in multinational peacekeeping operations. These external operations clearly aligned the South African government with its articulated objectives concerning the pursuit of peace on the African continent and its (moral) intention and responsibility to act in a leading role on the continent. However, a dwindling defence budget and the burden of a high-tech force design increasingly impacted negatively on the SANDF to maintain and develop a sustainable capability geared for regional external operations. Yet, in the domestic context the government also increasingly expected the SANDF to render support to the SAPS as murder and death rates are comparable and, in some instances, even higher than death rates in high-intensity war zones in the international community. This simply means that the SANDF has the almost impossible task of balancing its demanding regional deployments with ongoing appeals by politicians and elements of the public for the SANDF to be of assistance in hotspots of high levels of criminality where the SAPS is unable to protect South Africans in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. In the final analysis, the article concludes that there is a mismatch between what has been expected of the SANDF in the past three decades from its political masters on the one side, and its budget and related capabilities on the other.

Keywords: South African National Defence Force, peacekeeping operations, internal security challenges, budgetary constraints, foreign policy instrument



#### 1. Introduction

Since 1994 the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) gradually re-emerged as a prominent fixture or instrument of South Africa's foreign policy, following the country's political transition of 1994. It also followed the creation of a new South African military after the monumental multi-party negotiations culminated in the adoption of a new South African Constitution in 1993.

The SANDF started to feature prominently as an instrument in South Africa's foreign policy after 1998, specifically in relation to the country's participation in multinational peacekeeping operations (Du Plessis 2003: 106, 117-118). This was anchored in Chapter Four of the South African Defence Review 1998, which alluded to 'South Africa's new status in Southern Africa' and that '[f]or political, strategic and geographic reasons, the government regards security and defence co-operation in Southern Africa as a priority' (Department of Defence 1996: 18).

The post-apartheid South African government demonstrated its firm commitment to regional peace and security by involving the SANDF in peacekeeping operations, first in Lesotho (1998), followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1999) and Burundi (2001). These operations prompted Du Plessis (2003: 132-134) to state that since 1998 the use of the South African military in South Africa's foreign policy 'has become more salient, most notably in the form of peacekeeping operations of varying types in support of diplomatic initiatives to resolve conflict'.

However, since 1998 it became evident that the SANDF found it increasingly difficult to conduct operations as a declining budget started to constrain the SANDF. This is linked to the fact that between 1995 and 1998 the defence budget was cut by 11.1%, which eventually resulted in a growing mismatch between policy intent and execution. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) South African defence spending had been reduced to less than 3 per cent in the mid-1990s, which boiled down to less than 10 per cent of total government spending. The defence budget then further decreased to 1.54 per cent of GDP in 2004/05 and levelled out in 2014/15 at around 1.2 per cent to 1.1 per cent of GDP (Defence Review Team 2015: 9-1-9-2).

Given these constraints and the changing global and regional geo-political landscape in which the SANDF operated, the Department of Defence appointed a task team to draft a second defence review (following the South African Defence Review 1998), which was finally published as the South African Defence Review 2015. This document remains the most recent and most significant defence policy document.

The task team made it clear that the decrease in funding levels was highly problematic and that inadequate funding would eventually severely compromise the defence capabilities of the SANDF. They emphasized that the government had to decide on one of two options: approving a greater budget allocation to the SANDF or opting for a 'significantly scaled-down level of ambition and commitment which is aligned to the current budget allocation'. One thing was clear: South Africa's spending of less than 1.2 per cent of its GDP on defence (Defence Review Team 2015: vii) was low in terms of comparative international military spending practice. Since 2015, defence spending in South Africa has declined even further to about 0,7 per cent of GDP, which is way below the international norm (Martin 2024).

It could be argued that the South African government demonstrated no political will to alleviate the SANDF's financial challenges. However, it is also true that growing fiscal challenges and dire socioeconomic challenges locally left the government in no position to increase its defence budget substantially. Moreover, the SANDF increasingly found itself in a further predicament, namely to respond to political calls to assist the South African Police Service (SAPS) in maintaining internal security—which should be understood in the context of growing levels of poverty and criminality in the South African state.

This article aims to examine and discuss the SANDF over thirty years in terms of defence policy and budgetary support, and the capabilities and employment of the force in support of government policy. The article will revisit the constitutional mandate of the SANDF and its external deployments post-1994 as a key foreign policy instrument, including its most recent external deployments. The focus will then shift to the internal role of the SANDF and specifically focus on political appeals in recent years for the involvement of the country's military in fighting crime, and the impact of all the above-mentioned political demands and insufficient budgetary support on the SANDF. It should be stated that much could also be said about other areas of great concern in the SANDF, including personnel, performance, discipline, management and accountability, but these matters will not be discussed.

## 2. Constitutional mandate and post-1994 defence planning

The South African Constitution states that the primary object of the SANDF is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people. The President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the SANDF (Republic of South Africa 1996)

- in co-operation with the SAPS
- in defence of the Republic or
- in fulfilment of an international obligation.

The South African Constitution, as well as the South African White Paper on Defence 1996 and the South African Defence Review 1998 commit the SANDF to a primary function, namely, the defence and protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Williams (1998: 23) rightly describes this as the raison d'etre for the existence as well as the maintenance and funding of the post-1994 South African military. In this context, the ultimate and primary responsibility of the state and its military was regarded as that of the security of South African citizens against external attack. In addition, the South African White Paper on Defence 1996 also made it clear that the SANDF "shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture" (Department of Defence 1996: 4).

However, Williams (1998: 34-35) questioned the view of defence planners who regarded and promoted the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity as the primary function of the SANDF. He argued and anticipated that the South African military would over time increasingly be configured around non-conventional or nontraditional roles and that these roles would encompass roles beyond or in addition to its "primary function", that is, the defence of the country's territorial integrity. His view was thus that the SANDF of the future would be increasingly faced with 'threats' relating to the 'secondary function' arena or non-traditional roles. Such non-traditional roles would typically be involvement in regional peacekeeping operations, maritime protection, border protection, a variety of internal stability tasks and protection of civil power against unconstitutional action. He further expressed concern that the SANDF would experience growing (political) pressure to become active in the 'secondary function' arena and that the military would then be without the required equipment and personnel to play a meaningful and sustainable role. Williams (1998: 30) opined that when conflict manifests in general and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular it is, with very few exceptions, intra-state conflict either between opposing political or civil groups or between central governments and secessionist or guerrilla groups.

Le Roux (1999: 58) similarly argued that in a world where conventional threats in the form of inter-state wars are almost absent, governments tend to look for more 'peacetime utility' from their defence forces. He further argued that the end of the Cold

War brought new uncertainties in a volatile and unpredictable international landscape marked by new threat patterns such as:

- · organised transnational crime
- the re-emergence of piracy on the high seas
- · new forms of terrorism by non-state actors
- · information warfare
- threats to embassies, ships, aircraft and offshore assets
- mass migrations due to internal conflict or economic collapse

The above-mentioned threats highlight a non-conventional (secondary function) response. Le Roux (1999: 60) further argued that defence policy should position the SANDF to play a supportive and meaningful role in the South African government's commitment to the advancement of an African Renaissance, which was premised on the building of a more peaceful African political landscape. In addition, the SANDF also had a constitutional commitment to play a role in border control (land, sea and air), as well as supporting the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order domestically. Williams (1998: 37) likewise appealed for a force design that would increasingly be 'suited to African contingencies'—practically requiring a force design that should shift from fighter aircraft and heavy armour to an armed force that would be suitable for deployment in the so-called secondary functions arena.

The above arguments coincided with the issuing of the White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, as approved by the Cabinet on 21 October 1998. This policy document was a clear indication of the South African government's commitment to the SANDF's future participation in peacekeeping operations as a secondary function. It also acknowledged that since 1994, expectations internationally have steadily grown that as 'a responsible and respected member of the international community', the SANDF would play a leading role in peacekeeping operations on the African continent (Department of Foreign Affairs 1999: 3-5).

The above arguments were the main reasons why the post-1994 government's project of re-equipping the SANDF with new arms, called the Strategic Arms Package (SAP), precipitated fierce and sustained criticism from several defence analysts and scholars (Seegers 2008: 52-53). According to a Cabinet decision of 18 November 1998, South Africa would procure the following military equipment from foreign arms manufacturers:

 nine dual-seater Gripen and 12 Hawk aircraft from British Aerospace/ SAAB to replace the SAAF's ageing Cheetah and Impala aircraft. A further

- option was taken on the balance of 12 Hawk aircraft and 19 single-seater Gripens
- thirty light utility helicopters from the Italian helicopter manufacturer, Agusta, which would replace the Alouette helicopters (which had been in service since 1962)
- four patrol corvettes from a German frigate consortium to replace the ageing strike craft of the South African Navy (which had been in service since 1979)
- · three submarines from a German submarine consortium to replace the ageing Daphne submarines (which had been in service since 1971).

As much as the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the maritime domain specifically required an upgrading of naval platforms, critics felt that the corvettes, submarines and jet fighters could be regarded as offensive weapons; weapons that would not be suitable to supporting South Africa's foreign policy as a policy of cooperative defence, and also equipping the SANDF for the 'most improbable of primary missions' (Sylvester and Seegers 2008: 52). The argument that the purchasing of the above-mentioned equipment did not cater for or recognise the growing importance of the SANDF's secondary roles (Sylvester and Seegers 2008, 52) soon proved to be of substance when President Nelson Mandela first and then his successor President Thabo Mbeki involved the SANDF in external operations in the realm of regional peace and security. This will be discussed in the section below. At the same time, it should be noted that the discussion below provides a cursory overview of the SANDF's most important activities and that a detailed analysis is not practical and feasible here.

# 3. The SANDF's major external deployments since 1994

South Africa's foreign policy since 1994 has gone through a major transformation. South Africa, once a state oriented to the West and seeking to impose its will and domination upon its Southern African neighbours, took on a foreign policy approach that was increasingly Africa-centered and focused on cooperative relations with its neighbous. Under Mbeki (1999-2008) South Africa actively pursued a leadership role on the African continent, notably through the African Union (AU) and the promotion of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as a macroeconomic development programme of the AU. NEPAD explicitly linked Africa's future and development prospects to the resolution of conflicts on the continent and the promotion of peace. The activism of the South African government and its commitment to peace and security inexorably drew the country and specifically the SANDF into extensive involvement in peacekeeping operations (Southall 2006, 23).

The SANDF's first external operation in the realm of peace and security of major significance was South Africa's dispatch of troops to Lesotho in 1998. Du Plessis (2003: 130) views the case of Lesotho as a case of the intrusive use of the SANDF in the form of military intervention, although the South African government denied that it was an invasion but a peace support operation. In short, elections were scheduled for 23 May 1998. After the elections opposition parties in the country objected to the results, and the South African government was requested to become involved in the problem and ensure stability in Lesotho politics. South Africa's facilitation did not help much to prevent the situation from becoming more unstable and protest action degenerated into violence and civil disorder that was intensified by a mutiny within the ranks of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF).

In a historical event, on 22 September 1998, about 600 members of the SANDF, mandated as a regional Combined Task Force, crossed the border from South Africa into Lesotho. They were backed by 200 troops from the Botswana Defence Force who arrived shortly after the South African intervention (Du Plessis 2003: 130; Kagwanja 2006: 33). In South Africa, the operation was known as Operation Boleas and the aim was to restore order and stabilise the situation, as well as to pave the way for political negotiations. Although the members of the SANDF encountered strong opposition from mutinying members of the Lesotho Defence Force, the task force eventually succeeded in taking control of the capital Maseru and other areas controlled by the mutineers. Initially, the task force was unable to impose crowd control and prevent acts of looting and burning, but it did not take too long before they were able to take control of military bases of the Lesotho Defence Force and the highly strategic Katse Dam, which feeds South Africa's economic heartland, the Gauteng province. The Combined Task Force remained in Lesotho until April 1999 after which it was replaced by a team from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), consisting of 300 soldiers from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe who acted as military trainers up to May 2000 (Du Plessis 2003: 131).

In research conducted afterwards (see Williams 2019), it transpired that the SANDF was ill-prepared for Operation Boleas and its soldiers were sent to Lesotho without the necessary training. As such, the SANDF was put under enormous pressure to act as an instrument of foreign policy in its first external post-1994 operation. Major General Roland de Vries, the then deputy chief of the Army, afterwards stated that he was 'hopping mad' when he was told about the deployment to Lesotho and even queried the political heads of the defence portfolio. The SANDF's report to parliament afterwards also noted that lack of training and preparation relating to the unique challenges and demands of peacekeeping operations was a problem, stating that, '[b]ecause of South Africa's minimal previous exposure to this sort of operation, certain specialised staff were limited in their experience' (Williams 2019: 36). In brief, the SANDF felt politically rushed into being deployed to Lesotho without having properly trained soldiers or even a clear plan to carry out a major operation (Williams 2019: 36).

The SANDF's external involvement in Lesotho was followed by deployments to the conflicts in the DRC and Burundi-militarily speaking both in the realm of the so-called secondary functions of the SANDF. As far as the latter is concerned, a civil war broke out in Burundi in 1993 between Tutsi-dominated and Hutu-dominated political parties. A peace process was brokered by the now-defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, as the chief mediator. After Nyerere's death, former president Nelson Mandela was appointed to succeed Nyerere as the key mediator. Vigorous diplomacy resulted in the Arusha Accord in August 2000, providing for a three-year transitional government of both belligerent sides and a transfer from a Tutsi to a Hutu president halfway through the three years (Southall 2006: 13). Internal strife and fighting between the forces making up the transitional government continued while external mediation also continued with a view to brokering a cease-fire. External mediators at that point included President Yoweri Museveni from Uganda and Deputy President Jacob Zuma from South Africa. Two cease-fire agreements were concluded as well as a protocol on power sharing (Du Plessis 2003:127) that required external military protection and monitoring.

The SANDF's intervention in Burundi was described by Du Plessis (2023: 126) as a case of non-traditional peacekeeping where it was agreed that a maximum of two battalions would be deployed following the initial deployment of one battalion. The operation was mainly financed by the European Union (EU) and was AU-sanctioned with United Nations (UN) endorsement. In May 2003, 1 600 members of the SANDF were deployed to Burundi, while 845 of 1 300 soldiers pledged by Ethiopia and the first 20 of 228 soldiers pledged by Mozambique arrived in October 2003 to form the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Du Plessis 2003: 128). AMIB was a one-year peacekeeping operation which was transitioned into the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) after a year (Accord 2023: 19).

Accord (2003:19) rightly describes the case of Burundi as pioneering and a politically motivated, security-related engagement for the SANDF. It was an operation that South Africa conducted in collaboration with the governments and defence forces of Mozambique and Ethiopia. The SANDF's deployment was the first under the newly endorsed White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions (Accord 2003: 19). What is also of interest is that the SANDF's involvement in Burundi, through Mandela, came when South Africa was still emerging from its post-apartheid transitional process. Having gone through a process of political negotiations and pursuing peace and a new constitutional order, South Africa's aim and response to the case of Burundi was aimed at finding a political solution (Accord 2003:19), and utilising the SANDF as a foreign policy instrument. As such the SANDF's role was described by Du Plessis (2003: 128) as a case of the restorative use of the military instrument. The role of the SANDF also coincided with South Africa's commitment to and support for NEPAD with the ending of violent conflicts that troubled the continent for several decades as a precondition (Accord 2003: 19).

Perhaps the most important peacekeeping operation where the SANDF has been involved as an instrument of foreign policy is the DRC, which was described by Du Plessis (2003:128) as the restorative use of the military instrument in a traditional UN peacekeeping operation to advance a peacemaking process. Since 1998, South Africa has become involved in efforts to end the conflict that plagued the DRC following the collapse of the post-colonial Zairean state under Mobuto Sese Seko. Initially, the South African government showed a reluctance to get militarily drawn into the civil war which became regionalised in 1996. In 1998 the conflict saw several SADC member states, specifically Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe lining up in support of Sese Seko, while the rebel movements were supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Eventually, South Africa emerged as the principal peace broker and the peace process resulted in the drawing up of a transitional constitution, and plans for elections (Southall 2006: 13–14).

South Africa desired a quick end to the war in the DRC and an important leap forward came with the signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement of July 1999. Importantly, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation was part of the peace accords and the SANDF was one of the first defence forces to contribute soldiers to the peacekeeping operation, dubbed Operation Mistral in the South African military establishment. About 1 400 SANDF soldiers were deployed as part of the international force, the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or

Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC). The latter would eventually grow to about 20 000 UN peacekeepers (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2018: 176).

Ten years after the SANDF's deployment in the DRC, South African troops still formed part of the ongoing UN peacekeeping efforts in the DRC, which was renamed as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO). Allision (2013) rightly points out that the DRC 'has really been the place where our government has tried to assume the mantle of African leadership, and, for better or worse, they have backed up their commitment with boots on the ground'. Since 2014, the SANDF's role in MONUSCO evolved from peacekeeping to intervention when the SANDF took a leading role in what was established as MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), using the SA Air Force's (SAAF) Rooivalk attack helicopters, deploying Special Forces and taking on a more offensive role against rebel groups in the eastern DRC. This became necessary after one of the strongest rebel groups, the March 23 Movement or M23, captured the regional capital of Goma in November 2012, and posed a threat to state authority and civilian security with other rebel groups (Allison: 2023).

Another important peacekeeping contribution of the SANDF was made after a humanitarian crisis erupted in Darfur, Sudan, in 2003, where there was a clear aspiration for an African response to the conflict dynamics. The government of Sudan had the obligation and the mandate and showed willingness to disarm the Janjaweed, a Sudanese Arab militia group in the country, particularly western Darfur, as well as other militias, but the need arose for an external peacekeeping force to create safety and security in the area (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2005). The SANDF joined the defence forces of 15 other core countries, namely, Algeria, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal as part of an AU peacekeeping operation, the African Mission in Darfur (AMIS) (Kagwanja 2003: 52). However, Kagwanja (2006: 54) also notes that South Africa started to feel the 'heavy budgetary weight imposed by its peacekeeping efforts' and in his briefing to Parliament on 15 February 2005, Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota in no uncertain terms made it clear that South Africa had more than 3 000 soldiers deployed in peacekeeping operations of the AU and the UN and that the country was unable to shoulder this burden financially. Moreover, the Mbeki government started to face a political challenge of convincing critics in South Africa that investing heavily in other African states was in the best interest of the country.

Internationally, a UN takeover of AMIS was pushed as an alternative to the challenging situation in Sudan and the UN increasingly came under pressure to exercise its own institutional agency for better civilian protection in Darfur. This eventually paved the way for the establishment of a hybrid peacekeeping operation, the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). UNAMID was mandated to assemble a force of close to 20 000 military personnel along with more than 3 772 police and nineteen uniformed police units. An important condition was that UNAMID should be a force with a predominantly 'African character' and its members were, as far as possible, to be sourced from African countries (Mickler 2013: 498–500).

In February 2016, President Jacob Zuma made a surprise announcement that a decision was taken to withdraw the SANDF with its 800-odd soldiers serving in Darfur. Zuma provided no particular motivation or reason for his decision, but it was observed by analysts that political and financial motivations played a role. South African military expert Helmoed Römer Heitman, for instance, stated that '[t]he SANDF is already overstretched financially and in troop strength, and might again be needed in areas of greater priority closer to home', and that '[t]he Darfur deployment is not of direct strategic relevance' to South Africa. He also described the operation as 'largely futile as a result of its forces being matched if not overmatched by the weaponry available to the various militias, and the Khartoum government has made sustaining the force difficult and irritating' (as quoted by Fabricius 2016). Cornish (2016) likewise reported that Zuma's brief official statement provided no reasons for the move, but it could be believed that the motivation was mainly budgetary and that former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir from Sudan insisted on a withdrawal of the UN presence in Darfur.

From the above, it is clear that the SANDF has not only assumed an important role as a key South African foreign policy instrument but also a significant actor in peacekeeping operations on the continent. However, increasingly SANDF deployments became troubled by budgetary constraints. At that point, the SANDF was approximately 24 per cent underfunded in terms of its size and shape (Defence Review Team 2015: 9-2). What is further alarming is that the trend of lower spending on defence has continued as recent data shows that spending in 2022/23 was 8,4 per cent lower than in 2021 and 21 per cent lower than in 2013 (defence Web 2023b), which will be further analysed in the following section.

# 4. External deployments of recent years and budgetary constraints

After more than two decades of deployment in the DRC, the DRC is still not at peace and some 960 members of the SANDF remained an important part of the intervention brigade (Gibson 2021). All in all, in 2023, the SANDF still counted among the five top troop-contributing UN member states (United Nations, 2023). At the same time, it should be noted that the South African Rooivalk attack helicopters—which played a pivotal role in MONUSCO's FIB—have increasingly been part of a 'continued emasculation' of the SANDF. In an answer to a parliamentary question, the Minister of Defence, Thandi Modise admitted in October 2023 that a large part of the SAAF is grounded due to 'a lack of spares or budget constraints to conduct the necessary repairs', with aircraft serviceability generally as low as 20 per cent. Modise specifically cited the SAAF 11 Rooivalk combat support helicopters as an example; three of these helicopters were listed as serviceable with the remaining eight in need of 'major repairs/ rebuilds' (Martin 2023b).

The SANDF was also involved in other external operations of which a controversial operation in the Central African Republic in 2013 should be mentioned briefly. Since 2010 a contingent of the SANDF has been involved in the Central African Republic aimed at providing training assistance to the programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the country (Römer Heitman 2013: 23). Three years later, in March 2013, a battle occurred when a small contingent of South African soldiers engaged a force of 7 000 rebels in the Central African Republic to stem their advance on the capital, Bangui. The operation was a political and military disaster as 15 SANDF members died although from a South African point of view the battle 'was also filled with heroism, camaraderie, terror, sorrow and triumph over adversity'. Still, several strategic, tactical and logistical blunders were cited by military analysts and at the political level secret diplomatic and commercial deals were also part of the dynamics that underpinned South Africa's involvement (Kleynhans 2021: 133–144).

Operationally, it is of interest to note that before tragedy struck in Bangui, the force commander requested more equipment and firepower, specifically requesting light armoured vehicles, as well as at least one Cessna Caravan aircraft with day-night cameras to provide basic reconnaissance. Oryx helicopters were also requested for casualty evacuation as well as some Rooivalk attack helicopters for fire-power. None of this was provided, with various reasons offered, varying from a lack of airlift from South Africa to fear of escalation (Römer Heitman 2013: 17).

At this point, it was crystal clear that the SANDF was at a tipping point as far as its budgetary constraints were concerned. The South African Defence Review 2015 articulated the SANDF's predicament in no uncertain terms:

The persistent disconnect between the defence mandate, South Africa's growing defence commitments and the resource allocation has eroded defence capabilities to the point where the Defence Force is unable to fully fulfil its constitutional responsibility to defend and protect South Africa and its people, and is hard pressed even to maintain its current modest level of Commitments... The Defence Force is in a critical state of decline... Left unchecked, and at present funding levels, this decline will severely compromise and further fragment South Africa's defence capability (Defence Review Team 2015: 9-9).

But there was also another issue that increasingly posed a serious challenge to the SANDF in the execution of its functions, as alluded to in the preceding discussion. Dr Jakkie Cilliers, former executive director of the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies, highlighted this in 2006, that is, more than a decade after the creation of a new South African military when he pointed out that SANDF's force design was based on "an incorrect interpretation of the primary function", and that the chosen force design did not suit the operational requirements and challenges of the SANDF. In the words of Cilliers (2006: 9): 'I have often argued, and continue to believe that the core orientation of the SANDF should be to serve as "a force for crisis prevention and crisis intervention", not conventional defence'. He pointed out that some defence analysts correctly argued in the late 1990s that the anticipated or future tasks of the SANDF would not involve participation in conventional operations, but rather involvement in operations of low intensity and of counter-insurgency in a multilateral environment (Cilliers 2006: 9). As explained above, defence planners concluded in the 1990s that the SANDF should be designed for its 'primary object', namely, the protection of the RSA's sovereignty and territorial integrity and that other tasks or functions should be executed 'by means of the collateral utility inherent in the design for the primary task' (Le Roux 1999: 59).

Regardless of the budgetary and other challenges experienced by the SANDF as a predicament of the SANDF in its role as a foreign policy instrument, the South African government decided to involve its military in yet another external multinational operation in 2021. This followed the Extraordinary Summit of SADC in Maputo, Mozambique, on 23 June 2021, in connection with the bloodshed and infrastructural devastation in Mozambique's northern Cabo Delgado province. The summit authorised the formation of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and the SANDF then launched Operation Vikela as the SANDF's contribution to the deployment of SAMIM in the Cabo Delgado area. The aim and mandate of SAMIM was to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in northern Mozambique as carried out by Al Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ) and affiliated insurgent entities. Apart from the SANDF, the armed forces from seven other troop-contributing countries were also deployed shortly after the SADC summit to work in collaboration with the Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique in the Cabo Delgado area under the invitation of the host country, in addition to the deployment of a military contingent from Rwanda that also operated in Cabo Delgado (Basch 2022). It should be noted that Operation Vikela is not the only SANDF operation in Mozambique. Also to be mentioned is Operation Copper, a maritime operation in the region of northern Mozambique and along the southern African coast of the Indian Ocean, launched in 2011. This relates to the task and responsibility of the SA Navy (SAN) to monitor and deter piracy activities in the region, specifically the expansion of Somali piracy towards the Mozambican channel (Martin 2023a).

In April 2023 President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that it was decided to extend the SANDF's deployments in northern Mozambique, eastern DRC and the Mozambique Channel for another year, from 16 April 2023 to 15 April 2024, while Operation Copper was extended from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, consisting of 200 members of the SANDF. In this regard, it should be noted that Operation Copper deployments have been intermittent in recent years due to a lack of resources with costs that varied significantly from year to year. Over and above, the most significant external involvement of the SANDF until now was Operation Mistral in the DRC, aimed at supporting MONUSCO which is tasked to disarm, neutralise and prevent the expansion of armed groups in the eastern provinces of the country (Martin 2023a). At the same time, it should be noted that at the time of writing MONUSCO is in the process of withdrawal from the DRC and will be replaced by the newly created SADC Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). South Africa is strongly committed to SAMIDRC and has pledged a contribution in the form of an SANDF component of close to 3 000 troops at an estimated cost of more than R2 billion for 2024/5 (defenceWeb 2024). Of much concern is that this deployment has the potential to become open-ended with serious implications for South Africa's defence budget. Cilliers and Esterhuyse (2023) rightly argue that in both the cases of the DRC and Mozambique

... there is a vast difference between deployment and impact. No discussions have been had on the operational or strategic effectiveness of these efforts. The SANDF (and government as a whole) seems to struggle to deliver any meaningful outcomes... due to a lack of defence resources – sometimes troops in the field don't receive logistical support – and poor coordination with the international relations department, the country is often left embarrassed by these endeavours.

It should also be understood that both SADC operations in the DRC and Mozambique put the financial burden on the contributing countries, including South Africa—unlike UN peacekeeping operations where contributing countries get reimbursed for their expenses.

As much as the SANDF's footprint on the African continent has been growing since 1994 and is still significantly evident, sustainability challenges escalated as a result of the country's ongoing dwindling defence budget. In this regard, defence spending is currently about 0,7 per cent of GDP, which is far below the international norm of 2 per cent of GDP (Martin 2024). The critical state of decline of the SANDF became evident in a recent parliamentary question on the serviceability and functionality of equipment. In a shocking revelation towards the end of 2023, the Minister of Defence, Thandi Modise, disclosed a dire state of affairs within the SAAF. She acknowledged that a staggering 85 per cent of the SAAF's aircraft fleet was out of action, leaving South Africa vulnerable to external security threats. Of the high-tech equipment that was purchased since the end of the 1990s, two of the 26 Gripen fighter aircraft and three of the 24 Hawk aircraft were available for service. Another issue of great concern is that 233 aircraft were grounded for reasons such as lack of spares or constraints to undertake the required repairs. This represents more than half of the SAAF's fleet—in fact, a staggering 53%. It means that, in the unfortunate event of a national security crisis, at least half of the SAAF cannot be deployed to protect the country's sovereignty or be deployed domestically (Democratic Alliance 2023). The funding crisis is so severe that some defence analysts are now proposing the unthinkable—to reduce the SAAF to a mere Air Wing (Leitch 2023).

The SAN is in no better position than the SAAF. Already in 2013, three of the SAN's frigates were broken or dysfunctional in one or other way, while a fourth had

been cannibalised for parts. All frigates are in urgent need of repairs and their weapon systems must be replaced or repaired. The three submarines that were part of the arms deal in the 1990s also came with a limited number of spares, like the frigates. Scheduled and regular maintenance on submarines is even more critical than on frigates. One of the submarines has already been cannibalised and sometimes none of the submarines are serviceable (Gibson 2023).

At this point of the discussion it would be useful to note a brief reference to the fact that Defence Review 2015 identified five planning milestones for the restoration of South Africa's defence capability. Planning milestone 1—as the very first action step to be taken—simply states: 'Arrest the decline in critical capabilities through immediate, directed interventions' (Defence Review Team 2015: 9–15). Yet, in 2024 milestone 1 still remains underfunded—despite statements and acknowledgements at the highest political level that South Africa's defence capability is substantially lacking (Mapisa-Nqakula 2018).

In short, a discrepancy developed between what politicians want the SANDF to undertake and the resources available for the execution of tasks. Notwithstanding the SANDF's dwindling defence budget and related sustainability challenges, the South African government has also increasingly used the military for domestic security and policing tasks—thus expecting the SANDF to handle a multitude of tasks externally and internally (Mandrup 2024). In this regard, South Africa's domestic security landscape has been a growing political concern—placing the SANDF under further budgetary and organisational pressure. This will be discussed in the section below.

# 5. Domestic security challenges and internal operations

From the above discussion, it is clear that the responsibilities of the SANDF extend well beyond defence against external aggression—which is constitutionally described as the 'primary object' of the SANDF. Apart from involving the SANDF as a foreign policy instrument in external operations of various kinds, especially operations in the realm of peace and regional security, the SANDF has also been tasked with a variety of domestic deployments. These have notably included support for the SAPS as the South African murder and death rates are comparable and, in some instances, even higher than death rates in high-intensity war zones in the international community (Esterhuyse 2019: 4). What is of particular interest is that the South African White Paper on Defence 1996 clearly stated that '[p]ublic order policing is primarily the responsibility

of the South African Police Service (SAPS). However, given the relative shortage of police personnel, large numbers of troops are currently deployed to assist them. This tendency is undesirable' (Department of Defence 1996). The choice of the word 'undesirable' should be understood against the backdrop of the controversial history of the former South African Defence Force in the 1980s in a domestic deployment role. Ideally, one can argue that the military should be utilised only in extreme situations, such as a pertinent threat to the constitutional order or a state of emergency. However, the reality of recent years is that service to the SAPS in crime-related operations and support to civil authorities or government departments has become an ongoing military activity.

What is more is that the SANDF was also ordered to retake charge of border control in South Africa in 2010, after a hiatus of several years. This includes patrolling a little less than 4 500km of land borders and almost 4 000 km of coastline (De Wet 2012). Since 2010, the SANDF has conducted Operation Corona in accordance with the mandate of the SANDF with members of the military that are permanently deployed for border safeguarding, involving land, air and maritime borderline domains as well as the cyberspace domain. Since 2023, the SANDF received assistance from the newly established Border Management Agency (BMA), currently incubated in the Department of Home Affairs, but this only concerns responsibility for the border law enforcement functions at the land, air and maritime ports of entry. Several challenges are facing the SANDF, ranging from challenges pertaining to a lack of adequate mobility (land, air and sea), to transport capabilities, to poor borderline infrastructure (border fences, patrol roads and access routes), legislative constraints and many more (BMA 2024; Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2022).

In view of the above, Cilliers and Esterhuyse (2023) critically argue that border protection and support to the SAPS can now even be regarded as the primary role of the SANDF. Tasks and operations in this regard have put the spotlight even more on the military's ever-dwindling budget. In fact, budgetary challenges have increasingly been recognised as key to the SANDF's decline and growing concerns pertaining to its ability to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the Constitution—although leadership and organisational culture were also cited as factors (Bailie 2023). A particularly striking and controversial example illustrating the SANDF's internal role was the deployment of soldiers in July 2019 to gang-ridden Cape Town suburbs, known as the Cape Flats, where high rates of unemployment and drug abuse have been prevalent for many years and fuelled gangsterism as a social phenomenon. The aim was to help the authorities and the SAPS to quell escalating violence 'that has killed hundreds' (Reuters Staff 2019). This deployment followed ongoing bloodshed over a period of seven months where gang-related violence and other forms of criminality led to the deaths of more than 2 000 people, mainly poor black and mixed-race (Reuters Staff 2019).

In response to the instruction from its political masters, the SANDF announced that it would deploy a battalion with support elements to communities in the Cape Flats. The deployment of soldiers was immediately welcomed by community leaders (Reuters Staff 2019) but the use of the military to perform law and order functions once again sparked a debate on whether SANDF members are trained for law enforcement and crime prevention. The argument was even raised that South Africa needs a gendarmerie—a hybrid police-military force that would be more suited for the maintenance of public order functions, rather than involving the military in law-andorder duties (Heinecken 2019).

Nine years prior to its deployment on the Cape Flats, the support rendered by the SANDF to secure events relating to the 2010 Soccer World Cup in South Africa saw the reactivation of the military in domestic security affairs (Esterhuyse 2019: 4). In recent years, the SANDF was even instructed to clean up the Vaal River and deployed to assist with measures to curb the spread of Covid-19, to assist in anti-poaching activities in the Kruger National Park, to be on 'election duty', among others (Bailie 2022)—all linked to the political requirement to render support to other government departments and maintaining domestic security.

A significant case of internal deployment pertains to the widespread July 2021 unrest in South Africa when parts of the country, mostly the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, experienced unprecedented violent protests. The July 2021 unrest coincided with colossal economic damage to the country as a result of widespread looting of shops and businesses, as well as theft, burning and destruction of public facilities and private properties. The unrest and violence were ignited by low-intensity protests against the arrest of former President Jacob Zuma and a Constitutional Court decision on his imprisonment for 15 months (Vhumbunu 2021). In view of the above, for more than a year the SANDF continued to be on standby in support of the SAPS, specifically to protect all national key points as well as economic corridors of the country from the potentially devastating impact of civil unrest. In this case, the SANDF was deployed in a security landscape where the government's intelligence institutions not only failed to conduct timely risk assessments and forewarn the police and government of the impending violence but where the SAPS also lacked the required capacity to deal with and contain the rioting and looting (defenceWeb 2022). The SANDF moved as fast as they could, but it transpired that they were not equipped for riot control and they were unable to meet all the expectations that the public had of them (Africa, Sokupa and Gumbi 2021).

Another recent example of internal deployment was the government's decision in May 2023 to deploy the SANDF to safeguard the coal power plants of South Africa's major power utility, Eskom. In this regard, President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that '[m]embers of the SANDF will assist police to protect Eskom power stations around the country where sabotage, theft and other crimes may threaten the functioning of stations and supply of electricity'. This came after Eskom complained about high levels of corruption and criminality at its power stations which contributed to power shortages and high levels of power outages or load-shedding (Nyathi 2023).

In August 2023, violence ascribed to illegal miners, better known as zama zamas, attracted the attention of the South African public. It transpired that especially communities living on Johannesburg's gold belt lived in fear as ruthless gang wars between zama zamas broke out in the form of turf battles for gold buried deep at abandoned gold shafts across the southern parts of the city. These zama zamas are heavily armed and ruthless and the brazen activities suddenly caught the attention of South Africans (Rondganger 2023). This led to Gauteng Premier Panyasa Lesufi calling for soldiers to assist in combatting violence associated with zama zamas after the SAPS dispatched members in numbers to the relevant areas to quell the dynamics of violence and put a lid on illegal mining activities. SANDF Chief General Rudzani Maphwanya responded positively by stating that the military would be ready to deploy and 'flush them (the zama zamas) out, like rats out of the holes' (defenceWeb 2023a), but his approach has not been supported by analysts who cautioned that the military is at best a temporary measure and that it would be irresponsible for the SANDF to give people false hope that the military would root out the zama zamas. At the time of writing, about 3 300 SANDF are deployed under Operation Prosper at a cost of almost R500 million (Panchia 2023).

In a broader international context, one should understand that domestic deployments of militaries have previously been associated with autocratic and dictatorial regimes, but since the 9/11 events there has been a growing securitisation in many democracies with militaries being deployed where governments increasingly rely on their military forces for surveillance and the protection of their populations. At the same time, liberal democracies still acknowledge the difference between internal and external security and the distinctive roles of the police and military, although it should also be noted that the traditional divide between the military and police has become blurred in recent decades in the context of the emergence of new transnational risks and challenges (Esterhuyse 2019 4-5).

Much more can be reported on the details of the SANDF's internal deployments, but suffice it to say that the revival of internal deployments has confronted the SANDF with more critical trade-offs to be made in the distribution of its resources concerning external and internal deployments, as well as command and control structures and human resources and equipment deficiencies. Furthermore, several arguments have been raised by analysts and observers against domestic deployments of which the following are especially noteworthy (Esterhuyse 2019, 3):

- · Soldiers are brought in from the outside and do not have the same understanding as members of the police of local communities.
- The constitutional stipulation that the SANDF should 'protect the people' does not necessarily translate into internal or domestic military deployments.
- Since the Zuma presidency the SANDF has been confronted with long-term budgetary neglect and hence, the military has to deal with the challenges of institutional and operational paralysis.
- · Combating crime is police work per se, and with the exception of some Special Forces capabilities the SANDF is not geared for tackling law and order issues.
- · Calls for the domestic deployment of the SANDF are often rooted in and distorted by party political dynamics and interests.
- · Militaries are especially not structured, equipped and trained for the combating of crime in urban areas.
- The budget of the SAPS forms a much larger chunk of the national budget than that of the SANDF.

As far as the latter issue is concerned, South Africa's 2023/24 budget indicates that R112,1 billion has been earmarked for the 'police services', while R52,7 billion has been earmarked for 'defence and state security' (National Treasury 2023). Moreover, in the Department of Defence Annual Performance Plan 2023 it is indicated that the audited outcome of funding for regional security (external deployments) ran at R 886 billion, and for support to the people (domestic deployments) it was R 1 101 billion in 2019/20 (Department of Defence 2023). The above-mentioned data simply means more funding is allocated to the SAPS and the SANDF's internal operations respectively.

#### 6. Evaluation and conclusion

From the above analysis and discussion, five issues should especially be highlighted:

First, following the historic transition of 1994, South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy moved from an arena of conflict with its neighbours to one of regional relations based on the ideas of a common destiny, friendship and cooperation. This provided new prospects for the use of the military instrument, and towards the end of the Mandela presidency, the South African government and the SANDF's involvement in operations in the realm of peace and security became a hallmark of South Africa's post-1994 foreign policy dynamics on the continent (Du Plessis 2003 114). This underlies the SANDF's involvement in Lesotho, the DRC, Burundi and later in Sudan and Mozambique, as well as several smaller external operations that were not discussed in the preceding sections.

Second, even though the post-1994 South African government wished to identify South Africa with the promotion of human rights, peace and development on the African continent, its defence policies continued to commit the SANDF primarily to the safeguarding of the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The latter can indeed be described as the raison d'être for the establishment and existence of the SANDF since 1994. Because of this, the purchasing of new equipment for the SANDF was based on the South African Defence Review 1998, which stipulated that the specific force design required for South Africa should be a high-technology core force, sized for peacetime, but expandable to meet an emerging threat. Following the process of policy development, it was eventually concluded that the SANDF should be designed for its "primary object" and that it must execute its other functions—including operations in the realm of peace and security—through its collateral utility. However, this point of departure eventually proved to be highly problematic. Since 1998, the SANDF has featured prominently as an instrument in South Africa's foreign policy, but increasingly the secondary functions have become the SANDF's primary function. Some critics thus correctly argued in the late 1990s that the view in official defence circles (towards the end of the 1990s) that the SANDF should confine itself to the primary function and desist from involving itself in the secondary functions would over time become highly problematic.

Third, budgetary constraints increasingly posed a major challenge to the SANDF since 1994. Between 1995 and 1998 the defence budget went down and was cut by 11,1 per cent. More recently, the SANDF's predicament was very clear from the South African Defence Review 2015 which stated that South Africa at that point spent less than 1.2 per cent of GDP on defence—leaving the SANDF approximately 24 per cent underfunded in terms of its size and shape. To this end, serviceability and functionality became of great concern. What is alarming is that the trend of lower spending on defence has continued as data presented above show that spending in 2022/23 was 8,4 per cent lower than in 2021 and 21 per cent lower than in 2013. Of course, it should be understood that the country's ailing economy and low economic growth put severe pressure on government finances and necessitate lower state expenditure.

Fourth, the role and focus of the SANDF post-1994 have shifted to operations in the realm of peace and security. In 2023, the SANDF was the fifth largest troopcontributing nation in the UN's operation in the eastern DRC and it plays a key role in the SADC operation in northern Mozambique. However, considering the history of SANDF operations, a major problem is that the SANDF's deployments tend to be open-ended, resulting in protracted deployments with serious implications for the defence budget. At this point, it is even unclear what would constitute a favourable security situation in both northern Mozambique and eastern DRC. Moreover, political expectations regarding the support of the SANDF for the execution of foreign policy have remained unchanged, clearly coinciding with the commitment of the South African government to work towards a better and more peaceful continent. At the same time, there seems to be no plan to either opt for an adequate defence budget on the one hand or to alternatively scale down the level of political ambition on the other.

Fifth, border protection and support for the SAPS in internal operations have become of increasing importance in the SANDF's activities and responsibilities and can even be regarded as among its primary functions. What is clear however, is that the SANDF is too often used as a stopgap in South Africa's domestic security scene and this contributes to the predicament of the SANDF to function as a professional and wellequipped armed force with a clear mandate. There can be little doubt that the SANDF has become a hollowed-out institution and that stricter parliamentary oversight over the SANDF's external and internal deployments is imperative. Against this background, Vrey (2023, 1-20) correctly points out that two issues are having an impact on the growing footprint of the SANDF in South Africa's domestic security landscape: firstly, a declining capacity of the SAPS to police the country's domestic security landscape and secondly, a shift in political views that leans increasingly to domestic deployments or see the military as a handy instrument to assist or even step into policing roles and functions, when necessary. From this point of view, it could even be argued that political opportunism seems to characterise some of the calls for the SANDF's increasing domestic deployment, although communities also have expectations that the government will utilise all available means to their disposal, which increases pressure on the government to consider the deployment of the SANDF internally.

In conclusion, it can be argued that there is a clear mismatch between what has been and is currently expected from the SANDF at the political level on the one side and its budget and capabilities on the other. The challenge for the SANDF is that defence is still central to its raison d'etre, but it also has to be ready and responsive to political calls to assist in operations in the realm of peace and security in the region or the continent at large. In addition, the SANDF often needs to support the SAPS in delivering security services in a crime-ridden and fragile South African society. And all of this should be done with less than 1 per cent of the country's GDP. Hence, it is no wonder that the SANDF is often described as institutionally overstretched and has, in fact, for some time been in a critical state of ongoing decline.

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# Theories of War and the African Context: Whither Strategic Theory?

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
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#### **Abstract**

This article explores the state of strategic theory in relation to the African context. It argues that the dichotomy between war in the Global South and the Global North, combined with the shift towards critical security studies, has hobbled the development of robust strategic thinking relevant to war on the African continent. It combines a literature review of theories of war, that have sought to either explain the occurrence of war or how to fight and end it, with a scoping review of African strategic thinking to highlight this gap. It concludes with a call for greater African strategic thinking and propositions for what African strategy should entail.

### 1. Introduction

After the Cold War, an attempt to illuminate and counter the Eurocentric nature of Strategic Studies went astray. By arguing that Strategic Studies is irrelevant to the Global South, because the security challenges faced in these countries were different, two decades of debating 'what security is' took the fore, and the fields of Critical Security Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies became the 'better' fit for understanding war within the Global South. Furthermore, the theories that emerged have tended towards the critical as opposed to problem-solving. While useful in illuminating the power dynamics within the knowledge system of security thinking, Critical Theory has not been able to promote robust alternative theories that are able to explain and solve the



Barkawi (2016) argues that wars in the Global South have been relegated to the abnormal through the use of terms such as "small", "irregular", and "dirty wars." This is perhaps most evident in the work of Calwell (1994) who, writing for the British Colonial Empire conceptualised wars with colonies as 'small wars', because of the employment of 'irregular' tactics, organisation, and rules. His description of European and American war ('regular' war) is glaringly contrasted to his description of war in colonised spaces - the first is framed as civilised, rules-based, and orderly, and the second as 'peculiar' (suffice it to say his description of peoples in these contexts is blatantly racist) (Calwell 1994: 315-317). While some may try to argue that Calwell is a product of his time, this contrast in the narratives of war in the West and war in the Global South is pernicious, even today.

What would occur if this dichotomy between 'legitimate' (interstate) war and 'illegitimate' (intrastate) war was removed? This article argues that re-framing war and strategic thinking to remove this distinction between war and 'other' wars, would result in two important innovations in the theoretical literature:

- illuminating the arbitrary and misdirected barrier between Strategic Studies and other fields related to war
- · allowing scholarship from the Global South on strategy to emerge and gain traction

It does so by first providing a literature review on the theories of war. As the starting point of this analysis is not to assume a division between war in the Global North and the Global South, this literature review will engage both the literature within Strategic Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies. It is, however, primarily interested in problemsolving theories as opposed to critical theories. This state of the art will then be superimposed upon the African context to assess where the literature and practice have kept pace with one another, and where gaps remain. In doing so, it will illustrate that while some strides have been made towards including African experiences and voices



in Peace and Conflict Studies, this has been less evident in the field of Strategic Studies. As a result, African strategic thinking has not been sufficiently theorised, and African actors have been reliant on either irrelevant strategic theory or forced to improvise their approach to war. This improvisation is often framed in a manner that reaffirms the narrative of war in the Global South as 'irregular', as seen in the 'greed' theories of the 2000s and current narratives on private military actors. The article concludes with a scoping review of some contributions to strategic thinking on the continent and some propositions for what African strategic theory should do.

#### 2. Theories of war

This literature review is primarily interested in theories that have attempted to answer one of (or a form of) the below questions:

- a) What causes war?
- b) How do we prevent or end war, either through victory or creating peace?

The theories that have emerged in response to these questions are underpinned by a variety of ontologies and epistemologies. The primary division of concern in this literature review is that between positivist and post-positivist paradigms.

#### 2.1 What causes war?

The literature on the causes of war is vast. It originated within the positivist paradigm, seeking some universal explanation for war, and concluded within the constructivist and interpretivist paradigms, with an understanding that war is too complex a phenomenon to attribute to a single cause. The literature has also been divided between those explanations that advocate for structural explanations (war can be explained through structural processes such as the international system or societal structures) and those that promote individualist explanations (war can be explained through actors) (Demmers 2012). This article does not argue that one epistemology has produced better theories. Rather, valuable insights have emerged from a variety of epistemologies.

One of the first robust efforts to synthesise and categorise explanations of war is Waltz's book on The Man, State and War (Waltz 2018). Here, Waltz (2018) divided explanations for the causes of war into three images, the individual, the state, and the system. He concludes that the most convincing argument why war occurs is to be found at the system level, in international anarchy (a structural explanation of war). In this argument, we see the privileging of international war and the Westphalian state system, and therefore a restrictive explanation. This explanation, however, birthed a host of positivist and structuralist theories that would dominate explanations for war for decades, such as power transition theories and offensive and defensive realism (Lebow 2010). The core question of 'what causes war?' remained extensively theorised and debated, but largely unanswered within these theories.

Another foundational work came from John Herz's concept of the 'security dilemma' (Herz 1950). The security dilemma has served as the cornerstone for realist explanations of war for decades. The argument is that one actor's efforts to secure itself (within an anarchic international system) could create insecurity for another actor, triggering a security response and a cycle of escalation (Herz 1950). Born of a rationalist epistemology and a deductive logic, this simple but elegant explanation for war encountered empirical challenges. As Lebow (2010: 28) states, 'The security dilemma is ever-present and cannot account for variation in the frequency or intensity of warfare. Unit- and system-level theories alike require additional, auxiliary explanations, theories or propositions.'

In an effort to explain why the security dilemma led to war in some cases and not in others, a variety of theories emerged that sought to qualify and further explain these nuances, such as the balance of power and strategic culture theories (Barnett 2018: 162-165; Lebow 2010: 28-29). The field of strategic culture emerged, in this manner, to explain actors' behaviour using their attitudes towards the use of force as an explanatory variable (Barnett 2018: 162-165). Following several years of study and debate on this issue, the consensus appears to be that strategic culture can at least provide context to decision-making, and is at most one of many variables that influences decisions to go to war (Adamsky 2022). It is in strategic culture that we see some of the first movements towards constructivism within strategic studies.

Similarly, deductive theories that assumed decision-makers engaged in a rational cost-benefit analysis when going to war, were forced to explain 'irrational' decisions to go to war using concepts such as indivisibility, distrust, and miscalculation (Lebow 2010). While these theories opened up room for more individualist as opposed to structuralist explanations, they remained firmly in the positivist paradigm, assuming that humans adhere to and act according to set rules.

The above theories, founded in Realism and Strategic Studies, legitimately came

under fire in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century for being Ethnocentric, primarily concerned with the Western experience, and for distorting and erasing the experiences and voices of non-Western actors (see Acharya 2011; Ayoob 1995; Barkawi and Laffey 2006). This critique occurred in parallel with an epistemological shift from positivism to post-positivism. The two together shifted security theory towards Constructivism (as a middle-ground approach to security) and Critical Security Studies. The theories that emerged (such as human security, Critical Security Studies, and securitisation theory), however, were more concerned with redefining security than explaining the occurrence of war.

In an effort to confront this Eurocentric perspective of war, Ayoob (1995) investigated what was at the time referred to as the 'thirdworld' to highlight how the state formation process in the colonial world has provided the foundations for intrastate war in postcolonial states. This was an important contribution for elevating the experiences of the Global South in security studies, but in some ways, it cemented the notion that security experiences of the Global South were other than' those of the Global North, and permitted the dichotomy between external and internal wars to continue.

Throughout the Golden Age of Strategic Studies and into the post-Cold War era, a series of correlational studies, founded on an empirical as opposed to rationalist epistemology continued to engage the question of 'what causes war?' These studies, however, were similarly unable to produce a conclusive result (Lebow 2010: 58-62). One of these studies did give rise to the greed theory, which argued that war in the Global South was driven by opportunity for financing rebellions (i.e. 'greed') due to the high instances of war in states with factors such as high commodity exports rather than political grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Criticism for this theory was extensive, especially from the Global South. Laurie Nathan (2003), a South African scholar, challenged this theory's methodology and choice of proxies.

In addition, a variety of multi-disciplinary theories that fall under the broad church of Peace and Conflict Studies, have emerged to confront the question of what causes war. Some explanations for war centre around the role of the state and state formation in managing and creating conflict, respectively. The failed states thesis correlates violence and conflict to the absence of a functioning state (Rotberg 2003). This theory has been widely critiqued, however, for its stereotypical depiction of the non-Western world, exemplified in the seminal work that fueled the failed states narrative, Robert Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy, and for legitimising interventionism (Demmers 2012: 67-79; Duffield 2001; Kaplan 1994). It has also been challenged for being blind to the role of historical and colonial histories in state fragility (Ikpe 2007: 88). Ayoob's work on state formation (1995) provides some of this historical context.

There is also a division within the theories of causes of war between identity-based explanations and economic explanations (Sen 2008). Identity explanations for conflict can predominantly be found within the constructivist realm, but disagreement persists on the importance of elite manipulation versus social meaning in war and conflict (Demmers 2012). The greatest critique of identity explanations for war, however, is the manner in which popular discourse of identity-related conflicts reduced war in the Global South to 'tribalism'. It is interesting to note that similar narratives have not been applied to Western histories of identity-related conflict, from the Thirty Years War to World War II. Rather, western engagement in war is framed as the result of a rational cost-benefit analysis of the global geopolitical game for power.

Economic explanations for war emerged as a counter-explanation to identity and dominated in the late 1990s and 2000s. These explanations resurrected modernisation explanations for war, promoted resource-based arguments for war causation, and explored a multitude of ways in which economic indicators can be used to predict or explain war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Koubi et al. 2014; Khadiagala and Motsamai 2014; Stewart 2010). None of these theories have provided a convincing theory of war. The greed versus grievance debate also perpetuated the dichotomy of narratives between the Global North and Global South. Economic reasons for war in the Global North are framed within the rationality frame of realism and geopolitics, while economic drivers of conflict in the Global South were framed as 'greed' and 'warlordism'.

So, the question of what causes war has been approached from positivist and postpositivist epistemologies, from structuralist and individualist ontologies, using deductive and inductive logic, and from multiple disciplines. The question, however, remains unanswered. Currently, there appears to be a consensus that war can be caused by a variety of overlapping structural and proximate causes, and the mechanisms through which these causes lead to war are highly context-dependent.

# 2.2 How to prevent and end war

The need to understand the causes of war was driven, at least within the Peace and Conflict Studies field, by the assumption that understanding the cause of war can assist in ending it. This goal to end war stemmed from a normative imperative. On the other hand, realism did not seek to explain war to ensure its ending but to give statesmen the understanding and tools to navigate it. Any goal for preventing or ending war was linked to achieving victory and protecting interests. This goal occupied strategic theory for centuries. Strategy, however, is important for peace. The preoccupation with mediation and peacebuilding, while essential, has been erroneously disaggregated from strategy. Peace is a political goal, and while pacifists may disagree, force is sometimes needed to achieve this goal.

Strategy has often been defined along the intersection of political objectives and military force (Lonsdale 2016). In other words, strategy guides when and how to use force to achieve political objectives. It has also been defined using the formula of 'ends + means + ways = strategy' (Meiser 2017: 82). Classical strategic thinking is dominated by writers such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Modern thinking on strategic theory includes a large corpus of American and European twentieth century thinkers commenting on the Cold War experience. Exceptions can be found in the writings of guerrilla or revolutionary leaders in the Global South, such as Mao Zedong and Che Guevara. Noticeably absent in both classical and modern strategic thinking, is thinking stemming from the African continent. This does not indicate a lack of strategic thought or practice. After all, African history contains military thinkers who revolutionised or optimised armed forces for political gain, such as Shaka Zulu, Sunjata, and Menilek II (Reid 2012). Rather, strategic thinking on the African continent is less recorded and recognised due to the power dynamics within knowledge systems that have ailed most disciplines.

Underpinned by rationality and modernism, strategic theory of the 20th century approached this question of how to end war in a calculated, reason-based manner. As Freedman (2008: 24) indicates, 'It was an attempt to transform the exercise of political power by making it subject to the managerial revolution and so turn states into rational decision-makers, maximizing utilities.' The question of how to prevent war was first explored within the context of the balance of power. Realists were preoccupied with identifying the 'correct' balance of power to ensure international stability and reduce international war (Lebow 2010: 28-31). However, it was deterrence theory that came to dominate as the panacea for preventing war. Whether through nuclear arsenal, posturing, or other forms of political messaging, to prevent an actor from attacking you, you must make it clear that the costs would be too high (Lebow 2017: 3-11). Successful deterrence could manage conflict and avoid war, most infamously exemplified in the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction. Most applicable to international wars, the theory has even been applied to terrorism in recent years (Bowen 2004).

In relation to 'unconventional' war in the form of terrorism and insurgency, the scholarship on strategies of and in response to these forms of warfare has developed within its own pocket of strategic studies, often divorced from the high politics of traditional strategic thinking. First, modern writings stemmed from colonial rule and were fraught with the narratives of civilisation adopted by colonial powers, like that of Calwell above. In the Global South, written from the perspective of the insurgent, Mao Tse-Tung's work On Guerrilla Warfare created a template for revolutionary warfare, which compellingly linked the political to the military (Mao 2000). To provide the counter-insurgent's perspective, in 1964, Galula (2006) provided a systematic study of insurgency, to developing robust laws, strategies, and tactics for counterinsurgents. Similarities to Galula's work can be seen in the policies developed in the 21st strategy to counter-insurgency and terrorism during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. For example, Galula's first law of counter-insurgency states that the 'support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent and insurgent' (Galula 2006: 52). This is reminiscent of the famous 'winning hearts and minds' strategy of the US in Iraq.

Insurgency, however, is not stagnant. Strategies have evolved, and counter-insurgent strategies have been racing to keep up. Perhaps most prevalent today is the melding together of conventional and unconventional strategies, in what is termed 'hybrid war' (Hoffman 2007). The combination of the regular and the irregular, the conventional and the unconventional, is forcing greater communication between these two camps in strategic studies. Yet, studies on hybrid war remain largely occupied with case studies of relevance to the West, particularly Russia's use of this form of warfare. It is also being presented as something novel in warfare. But what would a study of war in the Global South reveal? The DRC, Sudan, and South Sudan have witnessed partnerships between government forces and irregular militia forces for decades. What strategic lessons can be garnered from these cases, particularly when one sees what a partnership between state and militia forces has wrought in Sudan?

Of course, the above theories focus on strategies of parties to the conflict. What of peace operations, whose aim is to support or, more lately, enforce peace? Liberalism underpins much of peacekeeping theory, through its foundations in collective security and its assessment of how to ensure peace through democracy (Williams and Bellamy 2021). Cosmopolitanism has driven some of the more recent peacekeeping innovations by supporting greater use of force and blurring the lines of impartiality in peace operations (Williams and Bellamy 2021). Bellamy and Hunt (2015) identify three trends in peace operations, that bring about their own challenges: the growth in protection of

civilian mandates, the 'robust turn' in peacekeeping that allows tactical use of force, and stabilisation operations that seek to reassert legitimate authority in a territory. These trends have been driven by innovations and lessons learned in the policy space, and less so by theory. The strategic theory of peace operations is, therefore, of a more ad hoc nature.

It is evident that strategic thinking has a robust history, but that this history is littered with issues of Eurocentrism and in certain cases, racism. This is relatively wellknown. But, instead of countering this challenge with strategic thinking from the Global South, security literature in and on the Global South has pivoted towards studying peacebuilding, mediation, human security, and other issues within peace and conflict studies and Critical Security Studies. Strategic studies on the continent have largely leaned towards case studies and attempts to apply the above to these contexts. While important, the African context requires strategic thinking to confront the complex conflicts and wars on the continent and provide theories that confront this reality.

### 3. The African context

In 2023 alone, there were 10 377 battles, 3 079 instances of remote violence or explosions, and 9 736 cases of violence against civilians by an organised armed group in the African continent (ACLED 2023). In 2022, Africa far outpaced other continents by the number of state-based armed conflicts, almost double that of Asia (the region with the second highest level of state-based conflict) (UCDP 2023). Beyond the state, non-state violence in the form of herder-pastoralist and inter-communal conflicts is also a pressing problem. The peacebuilding projects of the 1990s and 2000s have not succeeded in building lasting peace. Furthermore, the dynamics of violence and conflict are complex and shifting. New conflicts, or old conflicts with new iterations, have emerged in Ethiopia, Sudan and Mozambique. Recurring conflicts, such as that in South Sudan, the DRC and Mali, grow more complex and dynamic. Insurgencies are not clearly delineated between government and insurgents, often with dozens of militant actors active within one political space. Radicalisation is a pressing problem. Forty-eight per cent of deaths associated with terrorism occur in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2023). Meanwhile, the geopolitical terrain in the Horn of Africa is increasingly sensitive, with more extra-regional players seeking influence (ICG 2018; USIP no date). Robust and flexible strategic thinking is needed to confront these challenges.

Peace operations are also prevalent on the continent. Of the 64 multilateral peace operations across the world in 2022, 24 were located in sub-Saharan Africa, and of the ten largest operations, 8 were located in Africa (SIPRI 2023). Beyond the number of peace operations, Africa has also acted as the laboratory for several transitions in peace operations, including the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC, stabilisation missions in the DRC, Central African Republic, and Mali, and a hybrid AU-UN mission in Darfur. These innovations are driven by a combination of lessons learned in previous peace operations, increasingly complex conflicts, and multilateral politics. The prevalent trend in response to these, however, remains one of trial and error, rather than employing robust strategic thinking to confront these issues. Furthermore, the rise of violent extremism has resulted in a 'conceptual and practical muddle between peace and counter-terrorism operations' (Ismail 2013: 224). What is evident is that peace operations are increasingly engaged in hostilities as parties to the conflict, and therefore require sound strategic thinking and doctrine that can suitably confront the complex conflicts on the continent.

# 4. The problem of strategy in Africa

What does existing strategic theory provide that can assist in confronting these challenges, and where are the gaps? In classical strategy, the writings of Sun Tzu are likely the most relevant to the African context, in contrast to Clausewitz. Clausewitz pioneered thinking on war through a trinitarian conception of war. His theory identified three core elements of warfare, the government (associated with reason), the military (associated with probability), and the people (associated with passion) (Clausewitz 1943). This conception assumes the actors involved in war fall within the Westphalian conception of the state, where a social contract exists between the governed and governing, and the state holds the monopoly of force. In the postcolonial context, such an interpretation of war is problematic precisely because the social contract is limited to non-existent, and the state rarely retains the monopoly of force. So, while some of Clausewitz's concepts, such as friction in war, may be useful, the overarching explanation of war is limited in its ability to explain the African context. Sun Tzu, on the other hand, provides principles for warfare that are not restricted to a state-based understanding of war and are therefore more flexible in their applicability. These principles are multiple but focus on information, understanding one's enemy, and maximizing the comparative advantage (Mahnken 2019: 66). These principles, however, are quite broad and not sufficient to explain current realities.

Similarly, of the wide array of modern strategic thinking, the works of Mao and Guevara are likely most transferable to the African experience. However, they were a product of a specific setting (twentieth century revolutionary wars), that cannot translate fully to the current trends on the continent, where two-actor revolutionary wars are less common compared to dynamic, multi-actor, fragmented and complex conflicts that dominate the continent. Meanwhile, the strategic thinking that emerged in the West during the twentieth century, was pre-occupied with Cold War geopolitics. While important contributions such as deterrence, grand strategy, the paradoxical logic of strategy, the indirect approach, and more were made (Lonsdale 2016; Luttwak 2001), they are designed to explain the actions of and provide guidance to states engaged in conflict with other states. This is rare on the continent.

What is more common on the continent is warfare that would fall most neatly into what is termed insurgency, asymmetric warfare, or unconventional warfare. Since 9/11, there has been a growth of strategic thinking on these types of warfare, particularly within military institutions in the West (British Army 2009; US Army 2014). This thinking is by its nature geared towards advising American and European actors on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. Much of this thinking has been tested within the Global South, with little success, most famously in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Furthermore, offensive peace operations that encounter these forms of warfare, while on the rise, are not guided by a clear doctrine or 'theory of war' (Garcia 2018). There is consensus, however, that peace operations do not have the capacity and resources to apply these types of counterinsurgent strategies (Garcia 2018: 41).

To what extent then can African states, regional organisations, and the UN adopt the counterinsurgent and counterterrorist strategies developed in the West? Foreign engagements on the continent, as seen in foreign advisors, training and support to African states, are often reliant on these and other traditional strategic thinking that can be viewed as 'substandard and/or irrelevant' to this context (Barlow 2016; Loc 3287, 3289, 3768). Furthermore, the internationalisation of the African security context has the potential to worsen the security situation, as explained by Ismail (2013) concerning violent extremism and radicalisation. He states that 'the absence or non-inclusion of an indigenous African [...] perspective or counter-narrative about radicalisation and violent extremism uncritically fuses and conflates the strategic interests of major powers with the local realities in Africa' (Ismail 2013: 211). This conflation occurs in various ways. First, African political elites 'exploit international strategic concerns'

to advance political goals (Ismail 2013: 222). Second, this combines with the support provided by external actors who promote a militarised approach to counter-terrorism that erodes democracy and civilian control of the military (Ismail 2013: 226–227) Third, the presence and visibility of external actors, particularly from the global North, can trigger further frustration, anger, and violence (Ismail 2013: 227–228). At the same time, radicalisation on the continent is also thought to be supported by other external actors, such as Gulf states (Ismail 2013: 226).

Galula's (2006) work on irregular warfare is predicated on a stronger conventional force (a state-resourced military) combatting an irregular force. His work, however, does not consider the complexities of the post-colonial state, and its complex relationship with global power structures, that is often engaged in counter-insurgency. The structures, resources, and relationship with the society of the postcolonial state cannot be compared to that of the Western world. One example is the presence and exploitation of 'alternatively governed' ('ungoverned') spaces within these states (Ismail 2013: 223). Furthermore, the Hobbesian and Weberian notion of the state, whereby the state of nature is overcome through the formation of a social contract and the allocation of the legitimate monopoly of force to the state is a mirage in the post-colonial world. While the European Westphalian state built their internal legitimacy through engagement with external threats, the external formation of the African state has created a continual struggle for internal legitimacy (Dannreuther 2013: 137–146). Winning hearts and minds as a government of a state that is externally legitimised with a fractured social contract is no easy feat.

Compounding this challenge is the issue of resources. In some states, the state military can by no means be considered the 'stronger' actor (see Somalia and South Sudan). African states also rarely have robust military industries, requiring military contracts with external actors, which is often complicated and delayed by bilateral politics (Ndalolo 2024). This is one factor that has driven these states to engage private military contractors (PMC's), which are able to provide the necessary support and technologies at a faster rate (Ndalolo 2024). Even the recent study of private military contractors has been done through the lens of great power interests, particularly with the growth of the Russian Wagner group (see Marten 2019; Pokalova 2023). In popular and academic discourse, PMC's are often portrayed as malicious and less legitimate than national armies (Abrahamsen 2011). This is likely due to the pervasive nature of the Westphalian concept of the state having the only 'legitimate monopoly on the use of force'. Many African states, however, have never truly commanded this legitimacy

and their use of PMC's may be viewed as a form of strategic decision-making, as a way to maximise resources and power. Current strategic thinking does not provide the opportunity to engage these nuanced considerations for post-colonial states.

### 5. African strategic thinking

African actors must then look towards African strategic thinking, which has been given limited attention in the academic space. A few examples are illustrative. Executive Outcomes founder Eeben Barlow (2016) uses his experience in the private military space on the African continent to develop a theory of composite warfare that, notably, uses the term anti-government forces (AGF) to refer to non-state militant groups (as opposed to insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, etc.). This both allows for the inclusion of a multitude of types of warfare within this theory, as well as removes some of the normative and emotive connotations that traditional terms have given to non-state actors. His theory is also attached to what he identifies as the seven pillars of the state—namely, intelligence, law enforcement, armed forces, governance, economy, populace, and perception. This allows for an understanding of warfare that is able to provide a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of the postcolonial state and its interactions with warfare. Furthermore, his work makes note of the complex relationships with the external in the form of bilateral relations as well as multilateral actions for peace (Barlow 2016). Barlow's theory, however, still retains a dichotomous view of warfare between the state and anti-government forces, and does not sufficiently engage the complexities of states that have partnered with militant forces and spaces with a multitude of AGF or other types of local militias (e.g. self-defence militias) engaging in violent conflict.

It must be noted that the development of African strategic thinking does not mean throwing out the proverbial 'baby with the bath water'. It also entails 'speaking back' to traditional theory. British scholar Freedman's (2008: 30) analysis of the relationship between power and strategy concludes that power is 'the capacity to produce effects that are more advantageous than would otherwise have been the case'. Notably, Freedman (2008: 31) also criticises the dichotomy between the external and internal in strategic studies, noting that internal disorder makes one 'more vulnerable to external pressure'. Much has been raised around the question of 'African agency' in the global system, a guise for questioning how Africa can exert power. How have African state and non-state actors innovated power in a disadvantageous position of power, by every traditional measure thereof? Alao (2019) explores some of these questions in his book, A New Narrative for Africa: Voice and Agency, in which he highlights cases of African agency, including in the security sector. This includes regional innovations (such as ECOWAS), and successful community-based policing innovations (Alao 2019). While not necessarily pioneered by state actors, these innovations are inherently strategic. They entailed an actor successfully deploying force or the threat of force to achieve political objectives, and they did so with limited financial resources. Their ability to utilise nonmaterial resources (such as knowledge of context [Alao 2019: 109]), in addition to material resources (military force), to develop a feasible response to a threat embodies the 'ends + ways + means' definition of strategy.

Similarly, deterrence theory, framed as a (usually) bilateral engagement between two actors (usually states), is difficult to apply in the African context. The relationships between states, societies, militant groups, international actors and international organisations are far too complex to reduce to the current theory of deterrence. However, efforts to prevent violent conflict through conflict-early warning systems have been woefully inadequate. Is there space for regional organisations to strategically think about how to prevent escalation of conflict to violence using deterrence? In South Sudan, for example, rebellion is well-accepted as a viable path to power, due to the default power-sharing approach to peace (Theron 2022: 155-156). How can such rebellions be deterred, by making such an approach to power unviable and costly? Stabilisation missions are also on the rise. Stabilisation refers to peace operations that seek to reassert state authority in conflict zones (Williams and Bellamy 2021: 200). A critical part of re-establishing state authority requires deterring further rebellion. Have these missions strategically engaged this question? Can stabilisation missions in themselves send a signal to militant actors in other states of the risks of rebellion? Currently, this does not appear to be the case, and strategic thinking in these missions appear limited.

A good example of this 'speaking back' to traditional strategic theory can be found in Barlow's (2016) work. Clausewitz's concept of the centre of gravity is modified towards a 'trinity of gravity' in anti-government forces. Clausewitz developed the concept of the centre of gravity to identify that which should be targeted to strike a defeating blow to the enemy. His concept was formed by studying interstate wars in Europe and the following centres of gravity were identified (in order of importance): the army, the capital city, a key ally, the leader, and public opinion (Mahnken 2019: 63). Barlow argues that the centre of gravity of anti-government forces, aside from its early stages where the leadership may be considered the centre of gravity, is not made up of a single centre but a more complex and resilient trinity of gravity—the leadership, popular and moral support, and financial and other support (Barlow 2016). Another example is how Omeje (2020) acknowledges but also challenges Ganor's conceptualisation of terrorism for its strict boundaries between concepts such as terrorism, guerrilla warfare, combatants, non-combatants, and more, highlighting how these concepts are dynamic in many situations, such as where terrorism and insurgency combine, or where terrorist organisations transition into political actors.

Olonisakin's (2000) concept of 'peace creation' similarly speaks back to the dominant understandings of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Her extensive study of ECOMOG presents a new conceptual framework and model for peacekeeping. By combining peacekeeping and peace enforcement, she argues that peace creation should involve an integrated approach whereby the mediator uses peace operations not only to keep the peace after the agreement but also as a tool during mediation to enforce peace. Notably, she highlights the interdependence between the political and military components of peacemaking (Olonisakin 2000: 13). This speaks to the heart of strategy—the use of force for political goals. Olonisakin's work not only documents the, at the time, revolutionary approach to peace operations of ECOMOG, but provides a strategic framework to guide using force to make peace. While the use of force in stabilisation and enforcement missions has grown, the importance of maintaining the interdependence of the political and military has been lost. A case in point is the DRC. While a revolving door of enforcement and stabilisation deployments continues to turn (from the Force Intervention Brigade, to the EAC mission, to the current SADC deployment), these missions are not strategically used to find a political solution to the perennial crisis.

Similarly, approaching African strategic thinking in this manner ('speaking back') would help dismantle the dichotomy between conventional inter-state war and unconventional intra-state war, which has not produced relevant strategic thinking. For example, Garcia (2018) uses maneuvre theory from conventional strategic theory, to develop a new theory for offensive peace operations to achieve success, using pre-emption, disruption, and dislocation. Understanding that strategic thinking and concepts are not solely the purview of state actors, nor wholly the realm of the internal or external, nor only relevant if produced through the European experience of interstate war, is essential.

Certain themes emerge from this scoping study of African strategic thinking. First,

African strategic thinking stems from the experiences and experimentation that have occurred on the continent in the absence of robust strategic theory relevant to the context. Second, the history and complexities of the African state must be understood to both explain war and develop strategies to engage in war (as a state, regional organisation, or other non-state actor). Third, stringent conceptual frameworks and reductionist strategies are not fit for purpose in this context.

What then should African strategic theory do? To return to the original questions of this paper, how to explain war and how to end war (through victory or otherwise), strategic theory in Africa should expound on these questions. In doing so, it must be cognisant of the following:

- the realities of the configuration of the African state
- that states are not the only strategic (or legitimate) actors on the continent
- the complexity of war in Africa
- the blurred distinction between the domestic, regional, and international
- that Africa's security and strategic context is intricately entwined with global power dynamics, within an historical context of unequal power relations
- African epistemologies and indigenous knowledge systems

#### 6. Conclusion

While the critical turn in security studies of the 1990s and early 2000s played a pivotal role in opening up the space of strategic studies, the arbitrary division it created within the field of security studies has, in some ways, hampered the growth of strategic thinking from the Global South and Africa. This article has provided an overview of existing theories of war in order to problematise strategic theory in the African context. While important strategic innovations have emerged and continue to emerge in the strategic field, the complex strategic environment on the African continent requires a re-thinking of strategic theory and promotion of African-relevant strategic thinking. This is necessary not only to explain war on the continent but also to find solutions to it.

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# Demystifying the Season of Putsch in Africa's Sahel: **Gaining Insight into Niger's Dynamics**

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#### **Abstract**

In the past three years, the African continent has experienced a notable upswing in military coups, particularly in Nations like Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Guinea, Chad, and Mali. The Greater Sahel Region has emerged as a global focal point of concern, grappling with issues of inadequate governance, extremism, and violence. Despite the efforts of regional bodies such as ECOWAS, military takeovers persist, posing challenges to democratic processes and heightening the threat of increased terrorism. Since 2020, Niger, a landlocked nation that was once a French colony, has faced its 13th coup attempt, contributing to increased instability in West and Central Africa. Despite robust regional opposition, the junta in Niger persists in power, highlighting the difficulties of overturning a coup. This situation carries geopolitical implications, risking U.S. security assistance to Niger and prompting neighbouring countries to strengthen ties with Russia post-coups. The Secretary of State cautions about potential consequences, underscoring the region's reputation as the 'coup capital of the world'. The July 2023 successful coup in Niger not only jeopardises the country's progress under civilian leaders but also heightens the risks of insecurity, economic crises, and political instability. The Sahel, known as a hub of terrorism, faces increased concerns as Niger's strategic importance in countering extremism diminishes due to the coup. This event jeopardises Niger's standing as a democratic stronghold and a deterrent against jihad and Russian influence in the region, accentuating the broader challenge of stabilising the Sahel amid intricate socio-political and security issues. This article aims to illuminate the root causes and consequences of conflict and political instability in the region. Specifically, it seeks to address fundamental questions such as the factors leading to the current political instability and the repercussions of this conflict for Niger and the broader Sahel region. The answers to these questions offer insights into resolving the present challenge.

Keywords: Niger, Coups, Sahel, ECOWAS, Gabon, Mali, Burkina Faso

#### 1. Introduction

Over the past three years, there has been a notable surge in coups across the African continent, with military interventions occurring in Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Guinea, Chad, and Mali (Duzor and Williamson 2023). The most recent military coup in Gabon, announced on 30 August 2023, occurred just one month after a military intervention in Niger that ousted the president (Isilow 2023). Data compiled by Powell and Thyne (2011) indicate that out of the 54 countries in Africa, 45 have experienced at least one coup attempt since 1950. Sudan holds the highest number of coup attempts, both attempted and successful, with eighteen incidents recorded in Powell and Thyne's data (Isilow 2023). In contrast, the greater Sahel region, marked by five successful military coups out of eight attempts, has become the focal point of a global crisis. This African region is grappling with military takeovers in countries facing challenges of poor governance, extremism, violence, and related issues. The prevalence of military rule exacerbates threats to stability and peace for the Sahel's population of 135 million, escalating the costs of human displacement, which are already at a record high. Additionally, it deepens the risk of intervention by external authoritarian powers, as highlighted by the United States Institute of Peace (2022).

Alternatively, a recent military coup in Niger, a landlocked former French colony, represents the thirteenth attempt to overthrow a government in Africa since 2020, with ten of them succeeding and causing destabilisation in West and Central Africa over the past three years, as indicated by researchers (Demuynck and Böhm 2023; Hjelmgaard 2023). Niger's coup, the fifth since its 1960 independence, comes after warnings from regional leaders and international organisations like the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) about the growing trend of African governments being overthrown. This trend poses a threat to democracy and undermines efforts to combat terrorism. Following the July 2023 coup in Niger, ECOWAS declared its intolerance for further takeovers, imposing stringent sanctions and threatening military intervention to restore the democratically elected government.



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Abdel-Fatau Musah, the bloc's commissioner for political affairs and security, emphasised, The decision is that the coup in Niger is one coup too many for the region, and the organization are putting a stop to it at this time.' Despite the united response from most West African nations, the junta in Niger persists in power, underscoring the challenges of reversing a coup once it has occurred (Duzor & Williamson, 2023). Be that as it may, the recent successful military coup in Niger poses a significant threat to the country's progress under its civilian democratic leaders. It exacerbates Niger's vulnerabilities to insecurity, economic crises, and political instability, as highlighted by the Africa Center for Strategic Study (2023). Members of Niger's presidential guard detained democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum on 26 July 2023, asserting control over the government and suspending the constitution of the country with a population of 25 million. Protests against this unconstitutional seizure of power were forcefully suppressed. The motives behind the attempted coup remain unclear, but reports suggest it may have been instigated by the disgruntled departing head of the presidential guard who felt marginalised (Aftica Center for Strategic Studies 2023). Similar to other coups in the region, justifications citing concerns over security and poverty have been presented to legitimise this extraconstitutional action (Africa Center for Strategic Study 2023). Also, the political unrest in Niamey, the capital of Niger, raises grave concerns about the future of the Sahel, a region that has emerged as the global epicentre of terrorism (Demuynck and Böhm 2023). This area accounted for 43 per cent of terrorism-related deaths in 2022, surpassing the combined figures for South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. The Sahel faces a complex web of challenges, including inadequate governance, a lack of essential services, heightened competition for increasingly scarce natural resources, intercommunal tensions, escalating insecurity, and widespread displacement. Despite numerous international interventions over the past decade, the Sahel has witnessed a significant surge in terrorist violence (Demuynck and Böhm 2023). Until the recent seizure of power by a group of military leaders, Niger not only distinguished itself as the 'last bastion of democracy in the Sahel' but was also considered the final barrier against both jihadist influence and Russian sway in the region. In the face of deteriorating relationships with ruling military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso, Mohamed Bazoum's democratically elected government had emerged as a 'new preferred partner' for Western allies. Situated at the intersection of the primary terrorist hotspots in the Sahel and the Lake Chad regions, Niger plays a pivotal role in containing the expansion of terrorist groups. Any further deterioration in its political and security situation poses a significant risk of exacerbating the arc of instability that terrorists exploit (Demuynck and Böhm 2023). In contrast, the study utilised content analysis as its chosen methodology, concentrating on qualitative dimensions and depending on documentary evidence for gathering data. The decision to employ this method was mainly influenced by the qualitative nature of the study and the reliance on secondary data sources, underscoring the critical role of the content analysis process in the research. Against this context, the current investigation aims to address the following queries: (a) What factors contributed to the political instability? (b) What are the consequences of conflict and political instability in Niger?

# 2. Methodology of the Study

To fully comprehend the key factors driving the coups in the Putsch in Africa's Sahel, the research methodology employed a literature review approach, consulting existing research on Putsch, internet sources, books, and reports from international bodies on military coups. The study did not utilise any primary data sources. The data gathered was qualitatively analysed in an objective manner to investigate the underlying causes of Putsch in Africa's Sahel region. As Morris (2009) noted, drawing from an extensive range of diverse sources enables rich qualitative analysis, allowing for a broad, thorough examination of a phenomenon. It provides a comprehensive, in-depth exploration of the topic under study.

# 3. Conceptual underpinning: democratic backsliding theory

Democratic backsliding theory is the concept of the slow degradation of democratic norms, institutions, and practices within a system that's supposed to be democratic. It explains how an elected government can weaken the fundamental principles and checks and balances of democracy over time, usually through subtle and legal means, without completely doing away with democratic frameworks (Karolewski 2020; Bermeo 2016; Carothers and Press 2022). The coup in Niger, which is the sixth military coup in West Africa in the last three years and the country's fifth in the previous fifty years, is a noteworthy example of democratic backsliding in Africa (Reuters 2023; Annor 2023). This trend is part of a wider pattern of democratic backsliding across the continent, marked by the emergence of military rule and the weakening of democratic institutions and practices. Democratic backsliding theory suggests that the coup in Niger can be attributed to various factors, including politicians' failure to fulfil their promises, the effects of insecurity and unaccountable governance, and internal power struggles and political rivalries (Okechukwu 2023). These elements have caused a deterioration in democratic institutions and practices, culminating in a military takeover. The coup in Niger is also part of a broader pattern of military coups in the region, driven by the influence of external actors, including Russia and its paramilitary mercenary Wagner Group (Annor 2023). The situation has become more complex due to the involvement of external actors who have supplied support and resources to the coup leaders, hindering the efforts of democratic forces to reclaim control. The coup in Niger has underscored the difficulties faced by regional organisations like ECOWAS in stopping and addressing military coups. Despite attempts to prevent such coups and reinstate ousted presidents, the absence of a regional military force within ECOWAS has made it challenging to effectively counter the increase in unlawful seizures of power (Annor 2023). In essence, the Niger coup signifies a notable instance of democratic erosion across Africa, attributable to a convergence of internal and external influences.

# 4. A Broad Summary of African Coups

According to Toyin Falola 2022, Africa has experienced more coups and military interventions than any other continent during the 20th and 21st centuries. These coups predominantly began shortly after the independence movements of the 1960s. To date, there have been over 200 coups, both successful and failed, across the continent. Consequently, Africa is often characterised by frequent coups, with approximately 41 countries having faced either successful or unsuccessful attempts (Barka and Ncube 2012). Hassan Isilow (2023) suggests that the recent spate of coups in Africa can be attributed to various factors, such as the absence of democratic governance, leadership shortcomings, economic instability, military ambitions, and widespread discontent among the youth and general population. Within Africa, West Africa has been particularly prone to coups, representing 51.3 per cent of the continent's coups between 1960 and 1969, 49.5 per cent from 1970 to 1989, and 53.7 per cent from 1990 to 2010. Overall, West Africa has accounted for 104 of the 200 coups recorded on the continent (Barka and Ncube 2012). The resurgence of coups in Africa, particularly in West Africa, between 2010 and 2022 has been alarming (Suleiman and Onapajo 2022). This resurgence is linked to the failure of democracy to take root and flourish in the region (Falola 2022). Factors such as widespread corruption, lack of free and fair elections, and escalating security crises contribute to this issue, leading to public support for military interventions in politics. The contagious and concerning nature of these coups has prompted numerous calls for action from the international community, especially regional organisations like ECOWAS, to address this threat to democratic governance, security, and political stability. In response, ECOWAS has implemented various measures, including economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and suspending military leaders from international engagements. The resurgence of coups in West Africa has had significant political, economic, and security repercussions for ECOWAS. One clear consequence is the challenge to ECOWAS's ability to uphold democracy in the region. Scholars suggest that the frequent coups indicate ongoing democratic failures in West Africa (Barka and Ncube 2012; Falola 2022; Suleiman 2021; Suleiman and Onapajo 2022). These democratic shortcomings pose serious challenges for ECOWAS in its efforts to maintain regional peace and security. Additionally, there is criticism regarding ECOWAS's effectiveness in addressing coups, with some, like Brack (2022), arguing that economic sanctions tend to harm the populace more than the government. Thus, it is vital for ECOWAS to develop more effective strategies to mitigate coups in West Africa.

The occurrence of coups in Africa can be divided into three distinct waves, each with unique characteristics and consequences. The first wave emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s, aligning with the continent's decolonisation process. During this period, many newly independent nations experienced military interventions as they struggled with nation-building and creating stable governance structures. A notable example from this era is the 1963 coup in Togo, where soldiers led by Étienne Eyadéma (later Gnassingbé Eyadéma) overthrew President Sylvanus Olympio's civilian government. Eyadéma justified the coup by claiming it was necessary for political stability and economic development (Decalo 1976). This coup was significant as it was the first successful military overthrow in sub-Saharan Africa and marked the first assassination of a post-independence African leader. Consequently, this first wave led to an early reordering of Africa's post-independence political landscape (Atta-Asamoah 2023). The coups during this period were driven by the intense superpower rivalry of the Cold War and the rise of one-party states and dictatorships, prompting senior military officers to seize power. These coups were often violent, resulting in the deaths of twelve African leaders, extra-judicial killings, and widespread human rights abuses, especially in West Africa (Atta-Asamoah 2023; Duzor and Williamson 2023). Some coups were even praised for ending one-party states and lifelong presidencies (Atta-Asamoah 2023). For example, Nigeria experienced a series of coups in the mid-1960s,

starting with the January 1966 overthrow of the civilian government by young military officers, followed by a counter-coup in July led by General Yakubu Gowon. These coups were fuelled by ethnic and regional tensions and dissatisfaction with the civilian government's performance (Luckham 1971). Another significant coup occurred in Ghana in 1966, when Lieutenant-General Joseph Ankrah and the National Liberation Council ousted President Kwame Nkrumah, citing his government's authoritarianism, economic mismanagement, and abuse of power (Pinkney 1972). In Uganda, Prime Minister Milton Obote was overthrown in 1971 by a military coup led by Idi Amin, who claimed the need to fight corruption and restore order, though his regime later became notorious for its brutality and human rights abuses (Mutibwa 1992). These coups were driven by ethnic and regional tensions, ideological differences, economic challenges, and the pursuit of power, establishing a pattern of military interventions and contributing to political instability and authoritarian rule in many African countries during this era.

The second wave of coups in Africa began in the late 1990s and extended into the early 2000s, driven by the failure of African leaders from the 1980s, many of whom were military, to embrace democracy and address citizens' needs. This wave was primarily led by mid-level military officers who pledged to tackle economic mismanagement, unlike the first wave, which was led by senior military officers. While the motivations were similar to the first wave, the second wave saw fewer human rights abuses and accounted for only fourteen per cent of leader deaths. Despite this, these coups posed significant threats to African leaders and the continent's burgeoning democracy. In response, regional and continental norms were strengthened, leading to the Algiers decision on unconstitutional changes of government and the 2000 Lomé Declaration, which banned coup leaders from attending Organisation of African Unity summits and established a zero-tolerance policy against coups. These measures, along with the spread of democracy, significantly reduced the number of coups, marking the end of the second wave (Atta-Asamoah 2023). This period also saw a resurgence of military interventions in politics, particularly in West and Central Africa, driven by economic challenges, political instability, and weakening democratic institutions. Notable coups during this time included the 1999 coup in Côte d'Ivoire, where General Robert Guéï, who had been appointed leader of a military junta following President Houphouët-Boigny's death, overthrew the interim government of Henri Konan Bédié. Guéï claimed the coup was necessary for a fair electoral process but later annulled the 2000 presidential election results when he lost to Laurent Gbagbo (McGowan 2003). In the Central African Republic, a series of coups and counter-coups took place between 2003 and 2005. François Bozizé, a former military officer, seized power in March 2003 by overthrowing the democratically elected president, Ange-Félix Patassé. Although Bozizé initially promised democratic elections, he postponed them and consolidated his control (Mehler 2009). In Mauritania, a 2005 coup led by Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall overthrew President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, with the coup leaders citing corruption, poor economic management, and suppression of civil liberties as their reasons (Pazzanita 2008). These examples from the second wave of coups in Africa highlight the ensuing periods of instability, human rights abuses, and additional military interventions, underscoring the detrimental impact on democratic governance and regional stability.

Furthermore, the third wave of coups in Africa has been ongoing since 2021, with instances recorded in Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gabon. Unlike previous waves, the motivations behind these coups have been multifaceted and diverse. Some have been presented as efforts to restore democracy, while others have stemmed from concerns regarding democratic regression, constitutional violations, electoral fraud, deteriorating security, and growing anti-colonial sentiment (Atta-Asamoah, 2023). The coups in this wave have varied in their execution across different countries, with some orchestrated by elite presidential guards and others by the military. For instance, in Niger, after a decade of democratic governance since the 2010 coup, General Abdourahamane Tchiani led a military coup in July 2023, ousting President Mohamed Bazoum. ABC News (2023) reported that members of Niger's presidential guard detained President Bazoum inside his palace and announced on national television their seizure of power to address the worsening security situation and governance issues in the country. The ramifications of the July 2023 coup in Niger extend beyond its borders, generating tension in West Africa, particularly as the region has witnessed six coups in three years, posing a threat to hard-earned democratic advancements through an emerging trend of 'putschist-populist' politics (Melly 2023). Military intervention has been a recurrent feature in Niger's political landscape since gaining independence from France in 1960 (Aljazeera 2023). According to Choudhury (2023), the July 2023 coup in Niger reflects a blend of long-standing tensions and historical factors. He also noted that before the coup, allegations of electoral fraud and significant discontentment were prevalent against President Bazoum's government. Additionally, a failed coup attempt occurred in March 2021, just days before President Mohamed Bazoum's scheduled inauguration following his election. Neither the incumbent president nor the presidentelect were captured or harmed, and Bazoum's inauguration proceeded as planned (Chin and Kirkpatrick 2023). Nonetheless, President Bazoum remained in power until the July 2023 coup that ousted his government.

In September 2021, Guinea experienced a significant political upheaval when a military coup led by Colonel Mamady Doumbouya ousted the government of President Alpha Conde, citing reasons such as poverty and widespread corruption. Colonel Doumbouya assumed the role of interim president, pledging to facilitate a transition to democratic elections within three years. As part of the coup, he suspended the constitution, detained President Conde, and replaced regional governors with military commanders. Executive functions were temporarily transferred to the National Rally and Development, a body established by Colonel Doumbouya (Zulueta Fulscher and Noel 2021). Prior to this coup, Guinea's last democratic election was held in 2010, marking a historic moment since the country's independence from France in 1958 (Chin and Kirkpatrick 2023). President Alpha Conde gained notoriety for modifying Guinea's constitution in order to extend his tenure beyond the constitutionally mandated two terms. This alteration of the constitutional framework, coupled with President Conde's subsequent handling of the election process, significantly heightened political tensions within Guinea. According to Rosenje, Onyebuchi, and Adeniyi (2021), Conde's approach towards democratic principles, institutions, and culture was widely seen as disappointing and posed a serious threat to the consolidation of democracy. In October 2020, Conde pursued a third term in the presidential election after replacing the 2010 constitution with a new one in March 2020, effectively eliminating the two-term limit stipulated in the previous constitution (Boucher 2019).

In Mali, this led to the removal of French soldiers and sparked similar unrest in Niger. Following coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, foreign military groups like the Wagner Group have been employed to stabilise the nations. The third wave of coups in Africa has seen a shift in motives, with some aiming to reinstate democracy while others are driven by concerns about democratic decline, constitutional violations, fraudulent elections, worsening security, and growing anti-colonial sentiments. These coups have varied across countries, with some orchestrated by elite presidential guards and others by the military. They've mostly been relatively peaceful 'smart coups', executed with restraint, and ousted leaders have often been detained for differing periods before international pressure led to their release. The international aspect of these coups has focused on the involvement of external powers, often with an anti-imperialist tone, particularly against France. This has resulted in the expulsion of French troops from

Mali and similar tensions in Niger. Additionally, foreign military entities such as the Wagner Group have been deployed to ensure stability post-coup in Mali and Burkina Faso (Atta-Asamoah 2023).

Furthermore, from January 2022 to September 2022, Burkina Faso witnessed two successful coups. President Roch Marc Christian Kabore's government was overthrown in a military coup, leading to the installation of Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba as interim president. However, Damiba's tenure was short-lived as he too was ousted from his position by another military coup. Martin and Lebovich (2022) observed simmering discontent within the armed forces and tensions between the military and Kabore's democratically elected government for months leading up to the events. On January 24, soldiers detained President Kabore, dissolved the government and national assembly, suspended the constitution, and closed the country's borders, citing Kabore's alleged inability to address new challenges such as the escalating Jihadist insurgency, which had claimed thousands of lives (Munshi 2022). Eight months after Damiba's interim presidency began, another coup occurred on 30 September 2022, described by MacDougall (2022) as a 'coup within a coup'. Mutinous soldiers blocked roads near the presidential palace, and the state broadcaster RTB briefly went off the air (Maclean 2022). The ousting of Damiba and the dissolution of the interim government were announced on state television by Captain Ibrahim Traore, the 34-year-old leader of the coup, who promptly closed the country's borders and imposed a curfew (Rakotomalala and Chothia 2022). President Ali Bongo's rule in Gabon came to an end through a coup d'état on 30 August 2023. Just before the coup, he had been declared the victor of an uncontested election, aiming for a third term in power, which would have extended his family's six-decade-long rule. Despite being a stable autocracy, Gabon had experienced a failed coup in 2019 amidst a backdrop of both democratic and non-democratic changes across the continent. Similar to the CNSP in Niger, Gabon's military junta, known as the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions, announced plans to establish a transitional government. General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema was inaugurated as president on 4 September. However, the duration of this transitional period remains undetermined (Alexander Hudson and David Towriss 2023).

However, unlike previous waves, recent coups have largely been 'smart coups', executed with restraint and minimal bloodshed. Ousted leaders have often been detained for various durations before international pressure leads to their release. In Niger, the military's concern for the president's safety limited its involvement in quelling the coup, according to Sidikou Issa. While earlier coups often involved hidden

interventions by external powers, recent takeovers have carried an anti-imperialist tone, particularly directed against France. This sentiment led to the expulsion of French troops from Mali and sparked similar unrest in Niger. Furthermore, foreign military groups like the Wagner Group were deployed to stabilise Mali and Burkina Faso after coups, with similar expectations in Niger. The coup makers have defied regional and continental norms against unconstitutional changes of government and, in Niger's case, have avoided engagement with ECOWAS. The formation of a 'coup alliance' between Gabon, Niger, and Burkina Faso is significant. Following the coup in Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali pledged support for the junta and threatened retaliation against proposed military intervention by ECOWAS (Atta-Asamoah 2023).

### 5. The coup's dynamics in Niger

The coup in Niger involves complex dynamics that intertwine political, economic, geopolitical, and regional factors, altering the landscape of unity and democratisation in the sub-region. It brings to light profound issues rooted in the historical legacies of colonialism, governance challenges, and external influences such as the US War on Terror. This event underscores the vulnerability of democracy in Niger, highlighting concerns about governance, control over the security sector, and the absence of strong democratic institutions (Zambakari 2023b). The coup can be viewed as a response to economic disparities and a push for more control over Niger's resources. French colonialism has had a lasting influence on the political and economic landscapes of African countries like Niger, fostering deep-rooted issues such as corruption, inequality, and governance problems since their independence (Zambakari 2023b). Additionally, the coup has highlighted the vulnerability of democracy in West Africa, disrupting the stability and democratic progress that President Mohamed Bazoum's leadership had previously symbolised (Zambakari 2023a). Also, Niger's substantial resource capacity, especially its crucial role in meeting Europe's energy demands, notably for France, has underscored the strategic resource tensions in the region. As the seventh-largest uranium producer globally, Niger has been a significant supplier for France for many years. The coup has emphasised the urgent need for the international community to shift its approach towards the region, prioritising economic development and job creation over solely providing security assistance (Bociaga 2023; Zambakari 2023b). In addition, the coup has initiated a significant geopolitical moment for Africans, where the influence of the United States, Russia, France, and China is less critical than the actions of Africans themselves. Nigeria, the largest nation in the region, has taken a leading role in the crisis, with its new president, Bola Tinubu, serving as the current head of ECOWAS. The participation of regional organisations like ECOWAS and the widespread international condemnation highlight the complexities involved in addressing unconstitutional power seizures (French 2023; Zambakari 2023a). The coup has drawn attention to the strategic resource tensions in West Africa, with neighbouring juntas in Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso expressing their support for the Nigerien junta. The region is now at the heart of geopolitical interests, with major powers eager to secure access to these valuable resources for economic and strategic reasons. The response from ECOWAS and Western partners is vital, as it could include sanctions and affect trade agreements (Bociaga 2023). The coup has altered the dynamics of unity and democratisation in the sub-region, emphasising the necessity for Africans to lead their own processes. The engagement of regional bodies and international partners in crisis mediation underscores the importance of addressing the underlying grievances of marginalised groups, promoting inclusive governance, and fostering economic development. Additionally, the coup has highlighted the urgent need for the international community to shift its approach towards the region, prioritising diplomatic and humanitarian efforts over solely providing security assistance (Zambakari 2023).

# 6. The Underlying Factors of political Turmoil in Niger

First and foremost, Niger has a significant history of coup attempts, and this latest one marks the fifth successful takeover since the country gained independence in 1960. Recently, democratic institutions were jeopardised by a coup attempt in March 2021, just days before Bazoum's inauguration. The unending events serve as a disheartening reminder of the longstanding factionalism and power struggles that have afflicted both the military and political spheres in Niger in recent years, a destabilising factor that has been underestimated for a long time (Ataman et al. 2023). Analysts believe that the coup is indicative of an internal power struggle, particularly within Niger's security forces. For instance, the head of the presidential guard was appointed by the previous president, revealing divisions among the security forces, notably between Bazoum's supporters and those of the former president (Roll, 2023). While Bazoum led the country democratically, it was far from an ideal democracy. Opposition protesters were frequently imprisoned, and the weak economy kept the nation consistently ranking at the bottom of the UN's Human Development Index. Even the delay in announcing

Tiani's leadership after the coup suggests internal disagreements within the new junta (Roll 2023). Niger shares common challenges with its Sahelian neighbours, including issues of weak governance, insufficient state presence, inadequate infrastructure, and basic service provisions, especially in remote rural areas.

Conversely, Niger emerged as one of the remaining democracies in the Sahel region of Africa where disagreements on how to address Islamist insurgencies resulted in various power struggles, notably in Mali and Burkina Faso. Despite setting itself apart as a 'less problematic partner' for Western allies compared to its Sahelian counterparts, Niger still exhibits a range of structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities that could shed light on recent events and their potential consequences (Ataman et at. 2023).

Moreover, there is no question that the escalation of insecurity and the downturn in economic prospects have contributed to the country's fragility. Even with the surge in foreign troops, particularly from the US and France, and the presence of military bases in Niger, the leadership has failed to prevent insurgent attacks. Various insurgent groups, including Al-Qaeda, Islamic State affiliates, and Boko Haram operate within the country, leading to thousands of deaths and displacements over the past decade (Ajala 2023). In the face of Niger's crucial role as a key ally of Western nations in combating insurgency in the region, France's substantial investments in Niger's mining sector have added another layer of interest in security matters. In 2019, the US, despite facing protests, inaugurated a drone base in Niger, which, while aiding counterinsurgency efforts, carries the risk of making Niger a target for terrorists and exacerbating instability. In 2022, France and other European allies withdrew their forces from Mali, prompting a swift invitation from President Bazoum for them to relocate to Niger. This move faced opposition from the Nigerien military leadership and influential individuals within the country (Ajala 2023). In 2021, the World Bank reported that over 10 million people, constituting approximately 40 per cent of the population, were living in extreme poverty (Worldbank 2021). Niger, a landlocked nation in West Africa, is plagued by extreme poverty and consistently ranks at the lower end of the global Human Development Index (HDI). The country's severe desert climate and scarce water resources lead to persistent food insecurity, which are exacerbated by climate change effects like unpredictable rainfall and increasing desertification. These challenges form a vicious cycle, obstructing progress in living standards and sustainable development (UNDP 2023; World Food Programme 2022; IPCC 2022). Also, a notably high population growth rate has not only fuelled discontent among Nigeriens but has also created favourable conditions for the rise of violent extremism. Niger experienced its first terrorist attack in May 2013, marking the beginning of a series of incidents that have led to numerous casualties. A report by the Pentagon think tank Africa Center for Strategic Studies indicates a concerning trend in the Sahel region, with the number of violent events involving militant Islamist groups doubling to 2,912 since 2021 (Ataman et al. 2023). Deaths resulting from such attacks nearly tripled to 9,818 during the same period. The report, published in 2023, also highlights over 1,100 attacks on civilians by militants in the region, causing more than 2,080 fatalities (Ataman et al. 2023). The capital city of Niger, Niamey, has not been immune to these challenges.

Nonetheless, Bazoum's election in 2021 marked a relatively calm handover of power, bringing an end to a series of military coups that had persisted since Niger gained independence from France in 1960. However, there were indications that the military leadership in Niger felt they lacked government support in their efforts against militants, and Cameron Hudson, a senior associate at the Center for the Strategic and International Studies, suggested to CNN that a coup might be considered to address this perceived shortfall (Ataman et al. 2023). In addition to these internal concerns, Niger is grappling with the dual challenges of supporting refugees and facing a deepening economic crisis. The country currently shelters around 251,760 refugees, primarily from Nigeria and Mali, where a significant number have fled due to the security crisis in the region, as noted by the UN's refugee agency. To the contrary, the security situation appears to have improved under Bazoum's regime, particularly when compared to Niger's neighbouring countries. In 2022, 90 per cent of the violence related to Islamist extremism in the Sahel region was concentrated in Mali and Burkina Faso. Notwithstanding Niger's comparatively improved security standing, this might not promptly manifest as concrete benefits for, or be recognised as such by, local communities. This situation creates the potential for political and military leaders to exploit it as a narrative, framing and justifying a coup, as highlighted by Méryl Demuynck and Mathis Böhm (2023). Bazoum's official stance, actively advocating for increased deployment of international troops in Niger, has led to a growing rift in public sentiment. This dissatisfaction is thought to be connected to the population's unmet expectations of external forces. Experts underscore that 'the populations do not understand why the terrorist attacks continue, given the significant resources available to the French forces' (Demuynck and Böhm 2023), and this sentiment is aggravated by 'disinformation campaigns' portraying Western imperialism as the underlying cause of all issues. Some civil society figures and organisations have voiced their opposition to an increased international presence. One of the most prominent critics is the M62 movement, whose protests were frequently banned or forcefully dispersed under Bazoum's regime but have experienced a resurgence following President Bazoum's removal (Demuynck and Böhm 2023). Incidents like the blockade of a French convoy in Tera in November 2021, resulting in the death of three demonstrators, have indicated and likely intensified the public's dissatisfaction. Similarly, the prohibited march against Barkhane forces on 17 August 2022, highlights stronger anti-French sentiments and popular discontent than suggested by political discourse.

In addition to the factors mentioned earlier, two additional issues play a role in elucidating the recent coup d'etat. Firstly, the controversy surrounding Bazoum's ethnicity and legitimacy emerged during the preceding election campaign. Bazoum, hailing from Niger's ethnic Arab minority, faced scrutiny and was consistently characterised as having foreign roots. (Ajala 2023). Despite securing approximately 56 per cent of the vote and belonging to the same political party as former president Mahamadou Issoufou, this narrative didn't sit well within the predominantly larger ethnic groups constituting the military. The military, characterised by a focus on ethnic composition, was uneasy with Bazoum's background, even though Issoufou successfully navigated this dynamic to complete two presidential terms. Notably, military appointments adhere closely to ethnic lines in the country, as highlighted by Olayinka Ajala in 2023.

Secondly, the lack of a decisive response from regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the African Union to military power takeovers in Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali empowered the Nigerien military. For example, the lack of decisive action by ECOWAS and the AU against the military governments in Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali conveyed that there would be minimal consequences for unconstitutional government changes. This sense of impunity emboldened the Nigerien military to act similarly, assuming they could evade major repercussions for their actions (Cascais 2022; Punch 2023; DIIS 2023; Green 2023). ECOWAS leaders are now indicating a readiness to employ force to reinstall Bazoum if the coup plotters fail to reinstate him. Over the past four years, the region has witnessed seven coup d'etats, with three proving successful. Although leaders of ECOWAS and the African Union have issued threats of sanctions against these three nations, there has been limited action to dissuade other opportunistic military leaders (Ajala 2023). For example, Olayinka Ajala (2023) emphasises the necessity for more decisive and coordinated actions by regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the African Union. In particular, it is crucial to implement consistent and enforceable sanctions against coup leaders to prevent future unconstitutional changes in government. ECOWAS was commended in 2017 for its collective military intervention in Gambia, which compelled President Yahya Jammeh to step down after losing an election (Yusuf 2023). A similar coordinated military intervention by ECOWAS, as a last resort, could effectively deter coup plotters in the region (Reuters 2023). However, countries experiencing coups now consider their crises as internal issues and are defying the long-standing ECOWAS tradition of regional cooperation in establishing norms (Yusuf 2023). Furthermore, there is a need for enhanced diplomatic efforts, involving engagement with both coup leaders and affected populations, to tackle the underlying causes of political instability and prevent future military takeovers (Yusuf 2023). The African Union has already suspended six countries where military forces overthrew civilian governments, including four ECOWAS nations but additional action is needed at the AU level, with involvement from all key stakeholders and the highest political authorities (Yusuf 2023).

# 7. The repercussions resulting from strife and political unrest in Niger

While those who assumed control in Niamey asserted that they were addressing the escalating security challenges, there is uncertainty regarding their capability to more effectively suppress extremist violence compared to the previous democratically elected leaders. Historical evidence suggests that military takeovers often lead to a worsening of insecurity, as seen in the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, which resulted in an uptick in terrorist attacks. In the immediate aftermath of a coup, military juntas typically concentrate on consolidating their power in capital cities, diverting attention from counter-terrorism efforts and potentially creating a security vacuum that violent extremist groups may exploit in rural and peripheral areas (Demuynck and Böhm 2023). Nevertheless, elsewhere in the Sahel, the occurrence of coups has bolstered the regional affiliates of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Following coups in Mali in 2021 and Burkina Faso in 2022, both Al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates in the Sahel have experienced significant reinforcement due to a decline in international security assistance. The impact of these coups in the Sahel is further intensifying the spread of the Salafi-jihadi insurgency. This is primarily attributed to the diversion of security forces towards managing military juntas, the estrangement of international partners, and the mistreatment of civilians. The aftermath of the coups has resulted in the withdrawal of substantial French Forces from both countries, prompting the UN to conclude its decade-long peacekeeping mission in Mali by the close of 2023 (Karr 2023)). However, establishing a stable power base may pose a formidable challenge for the military junta in Niger. On 26 July 2023 unfolding events revealed internal divisions between the presidential guard and the army, which initially maintained loyalty to President Bazoum. This has raised concerns about potential disloyalty within the military ranks to the new rulers, posing a risk of further disruptions in the region (Demuynck and Böhm 2023). Furthermore, any significant worsening of the nation's security situation could provide jihadists with the chance to take control of a continuous region spanning from Mali to northern Nigeria in the Sahel. Niger, currently caught in the crossfire of various al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups in the Sahel and Lake Chad regions, holds the tenth position globally in terms of the impact of terrorism. Additionally, organised banditry along the Nigerian border may escalate into armed rebellion, creating a new front for terrorist organisations active in the country (Crisisgroup 2021). For instance, banditry in northwest Nigeria is driven by a mix of factors, including perceived injustice, governance deficits, weapon proliferation, and extreme poverty. This complexity makes it challenging to address the issue solely through security measures (Ojewale 2024; Ojo, Oyewole, and Aina 2023). Despite experiencing the largest increase in terrorism deaths worldwide in 2021, the nation witnessed an almost 80 per cent decrease in terrorist casualties in 2022 (Barnett, 2023). Sustaining these short-term improvements, attributed by some researchers to increased operations by Nigerien security forces against terrorist groups, may prove challenging due to the ongoing political crisis (Demuynck and Böhm 2023). Such a scenario could also have devastating ramifications for the coastal West African States, including neighbouring Benin, which experienced its worst year in terms of terrorist violence in 2022. Effective collaboration among Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso is crucial to address the threat posed by terrorist insurgents reportedly establishing themselves in Park W. This nature reserve, spanning the three countries, could serve as a rear base for these groups to further extend their presence throughout West Africa (Crisisgroup 2023).

Also, the military junta in Niger has defied a deadline set by the ECOWAS on 6 August 2023, to reinstate ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, risking the possibility of military intervention. In response to the junta's refusal to comply with the deadline, both regional and Western allies of Niger have announced a series of sanctions against the country. Niger, known as the world's seventh-largest producer of uranium—a radioactive metal extensively used in nuclear energy and cancer treatment—is paradoxically one of the world's poorest nations, receiving nearly \$2 billion annually in development assistance. According to the 2023 budget projections, out of Niger's total budget of 3,245 billion CFA francs (\$5.53 billion) for the fiscal year, approximately 342.44

billion francs were anticipated from external budget support and loans. Additionally, 978.47 billion francs were expected from project grants and loans provided by external partners. In sum, more than \$2.2 billion constituting around 40 per cent of its budget, was projected to come from external sources and will likely be affected by the sanctions. These sanctions were enforced on Niger following the coup, as reported by Moussa Aksar and Boureima Balima (2023). ECOWAS and the West African Monetary and Economic Union have implemented some of the most rigorous measures against Niger since the coup. The bloc has promptly halted all commercial transactions with Niger, frozen its state assets in the regional central bank, immobilised the assets of the state and state-owned enterprises in commercial banks, and discontinued all financial assistance from regional development banks. These financial sanctions may result in Niger defaulting on its debt repayments. The regional central bank cancelled Niger's planned 30 billion CFA francs (\$51 million) bond issuance in the West African regional debt market following the imposition of sanctions. Niger initially aimed to raise 490 billion CFA francs (\$834 million) from the regional debt market in 2023. ECOWAS sanctions also prompted Nigeria to cut off power supply to Niger on the 80-megawatt Birnin-Kebbi line, while Ivory Coast suspended the import and export of Nigerien goods. The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), closed its branches in Niger, citing operational risks. The European Union, a major contributor to Niger, has immediately suspended its financial support and security cooperation with Niger (Aksar and Balima 2023). The European Union has dedicated 503 million Euro (\$554 million) from its budget to enhance governance, education, and sustainable growth in Niger from 2021 to 2024, as stated on its website.

In contrast, France, a significant partner, has immediately halted development aid and budgetary support, urging a swift return to constitutional order. French development aid for Niger reached approximately 120 million Euro (\$130 million) in 2022, with expectations of a slight increase in 2023. France, which has 1,500 troops stationed in Niger, turned to the country after withdrawing counterinsurgency forces from Mali and Burkina Faso in 2021 and 2022, respectively. For instance, France's departure from Niger leaves a significant void in the fight against jihadism in the region. The French troops were a key component of the counterinsurgency efforts, and their absence will be felt. This could lead to a decline in the effectiveness of the operations against extremist groups (Asadu 2023). The security situation in the Sahel region is already precarious, and the departure of French troops could embolden extremist groups to launch more attacks. The region accounted for over 40% of extremist deaths

worldwide in 2022, and the French withdrawal could further destabilise the area (Asadu 2023).

The Dutch government, supporting development and security initiatives in Niger, temporarily suspended its direct collaboration with the government in the wake of the coup. The United States, a major contributor of humanitarian and security aid, has paused assistance programs exceeding \$100 million to Niger, urging the junta to reinstate the elected government. The U.S., which has about 1,100 troops in Niger operating from two bases, had previously warned that the coup might lead to a suspension of all cooperation. In fiscal 2023, the U.S. has provided nearly \$138 million in humanitarian assistance. Canada has suspended direct development aid and voiced support for ECOWAS' mediation efforts to restore constitutional order in Niger. The World Bank has halted disbursements until further notice, excluding private-sector partnerships, which will continue cautiously. Niger possesses one of the largest World Bank portfolios in Africa, amounting to \$4.5 billion, and has received \$600 million in direct budget support from the bank between 2022 and 2023 (Aksar and Balima 2023).

However, Abdallah Togola, an employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Niger, expressed that the current economic and financial sanctions are causing severe repercussions for the local population. Niger is facing increased humanitarian needs due to jihadist activities in its western and southeastern regions, as well as the impact of droughts and floods. Despite being a major uranium supplier, the country has faced exploitation of its resources under unfair terms by France. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), the recent post-coup restrictions could push 7.3 million people from moderate to severe food insecurity, particularly during the traditional 'lean season' between harvests. The imposed blockade lacks humanitarian exemptions, making it challenging for aid agencies to deliver essential supplies for their programmes. Some of these programmes may face suspension in the upcoming weeks, as highlighted by Boureima Balima and Philip Kleinfeld (2023). Aid groups are urging governments to release blocked supplies, but the junta is reluctant to import goods from neighbouring states, suspecting them of amassing troops for a potential military intervention, as reported by aid officials to *The New Humanitarian*.

### 8. Conclusions

In summary, the recent political turmoil in West Africa highlights the urgent necessity for regional entities like ECOWAS and the African Union to take decisive and proactive steps against military power takeovers. The failure to firmly address coups in Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali has not only emboldened the Nigerien military but has also established a risky precedent in the region. The frequent occurrence of successful coup attempts poses a serious threat to the stability and democratic advancement of West African nations. The lukewarm response from ECOWAS and the African Union, despite threats of force and sanctions, raises doubts about the effectiveness of regional bodies in preventing and resolving political crises. As the international community observes events in Niger and the broader West African region, these organisations must re-evaluate their strategies and take more assertive actions to discourage opportunistic military leaders. The recurrent coups in the past four years necessitate a more robust and coordinated regional approach to tackle the underlying causes of political instability. Inaction risks further undermining democratic values and governance structures in the region. The leaders of ECOWAS and the African Union must move beyond mere rhetoric and implement concrete measures not only to punish coup perpetrators but also to actively prevent the recurrence of such incidents. The credibility of the international community in promoting democracy and stability in West Africa depends on the effectiveness of regional responses to these challenges.

# 9. Way forward

The situation in Niger is intricate, necessitating a comprehensive strategy for a sustainable resolution. Possible approaches involve tackling root causes such as inadequate governance, poverty, and inter-communal conflicts. To achieve lasting results, it is imperative for the international community to assist the Nigerien government, deliver humanitarian aid, and ensure fair resource distribution, as emphasised by USAID (2023) and the UN (2023). Also, a potential resolution for the conflict in Niger involves negotiation. The citizens of Niger have endured persistent threats to their lives and well-being due to issues like weak governance and inter-communal conflicts, as noted by the UN (2023). The Nigerien authorities have actively worked towards resolving entrenched intercommunal conflicts in Ouallam and Banibangou, areas previously heavily impacted by violence, according to ACLED (2023). To enhance this negotiated approach, there is a call for increased international support to facilitate consensusbuilding among Niger's democratic stakeholders and to strengthen the involvement of regional and international organisations, as emphasised by Oluwatimilehin Sotubo (2023). Lastly, promoting community cohesion in Niger can be achieved through the implementation of conflict mitigation tools. In the local context, residents regard their village and regional chiefs as the most esteemed figures for resolving issues. Collaborating with these authorities, the Nigerien government can foster community unity and tackle inter-communal conflicts, as suggested by USAID (2023).

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# **Building the 'Russieafrique': Russian Influence Operations** Changing the Geopolitics in the Sahel

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
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### **Abstract**

This article examines the tools which the Russian Federation, as a master of influencing operations and unconventional political warfare, currently utilises in West Africa to strengthen its political, economic, military, and diplomatic ties with Sahelian countries, thereby altering the geopolitical balance and pushing out the so-called West from its historical sphere of influence. The research focuses on the case of the Republic of Mali, where a few years of efficient implementation of these tools led to the withdrawal



Keywords: Russia, Sahel, Influence operations, Information warfare, Informationpsychological warfare, Africa, influence operations, hybrid warfare, geopolitics

### 1. Introduction

The history of colonialism has led to a longstanding dominance of the Western Bloc, particularly France, in the Sahel and Maghreb regions. West African countries, including those in the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, are largely and traditionally regarded as part of the Western sphere of influence, characterised by mutual, robust economic and diplomatic ties. In their strategic documents, both France and the United States of America define North and West Africa as strategically important regions, especially in matters of security and stability (The Ministry of Defence of France 2013; Husted et al. 2023; U.S. Department of State 2022; U.S. Department of State 2023).

Following the 'Arab Spring' in Algeria (2010-2012) and the subsequent rise in terrorism and instability in North and sub-Saharan Africa, Russia began to deepen its security, economic, and political ties with long-term African partners. Initially focusing on North Africa and the Maghreb, Russia has expanded its engagement in West Africa and the Sahel, aligning with its foreign policy goals of strengthening the peace and stability in the region and ensuring the safety of transport corridors (Zherlitsina 2016). In its foreign policy, the Russian Federation has effectively re-established its influence in traditionally Western-dominated regions of North and West Africa. To achieve this, Russia utilises a vast array of instruments like political, hybrid, and information warfare.

Russia has effectively re-established its influence in traditionally Western-dominated regions of North and West Africa, employing a range of political, hybrid, and information warfare tools. This strategy has proven effective in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where the West was unable to react to such a competition



and challenge in the region. Western responses have been inadequate. By changing the geopolitical sphere of influence, Moscow not only benefits from the new economic ties and military contracts with Sahelian countries but also in the domain of global diplomacy. Russia's success in Africa has been particularly visible since the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019 and has been highlighted further during the conflict in Ukraine, where Moscow used its newly-established diplomatic ties with African countries to influence voting in the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and other specialised agencies of the UN (Mensah and Aning 2022).

The reasons for the failure of the Western Bloc in the Sahel and the strong leaning of the Sahelian states towards Russia are points of discussion among Western political elites, diplomats, and strategic foreign-policy experts, as well as the question of how to proceed and what to do next in West Africa. This research analyses the instruments of influence employed by the Russian Federation in Mali, and that, in the present or near future, will also include other Sahelian countries such as Niger and Burkina Faso. The results of the research thus help to understand what exactly led to the failure of the Western Bloc in the Sahel, and why the Russian Federation now dominates this region.

### 1.1 Methodology and limitations

For the purpose of better visualisation and detection of the tools of political warfare and instruments of hybrid and asymmetric warfare utilised by Russia to achieve its foreign-policy goals in the Sahel, this research uses strategic military analysis of PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure) domains, in which the researchers identified the usage of abovementioned instruments defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Aday et al. 2019) and (Bÿrziÿš (2014). Information about the usage of specific instruments of influence was gathered from primary and secondary literature, using open sources, as well as through field research or liaisons with local political figures in Mali and other Sahelian countries.

Even though the research generally refers to the utilisation of Russian political warfare and influence operations in the entire Sahel—as Russia focuses its foreign policy goals on most of the countries within the region of Sahel—due to limitations space, the analytical part will be limited to studying the situation in the most significant Sahelian country—the Republic of Mali.

# 2. Defining the instruments of influence and explaining its importance

The usage of tools of influence and political warfare by Russia in the Sahel has two primary objectives. Firstly, they are intended to change the policies of the Sahelian states in favour of the Russian Federation. It is primarily conducted by strengthening the political, military, and economic ties with Sahelian states, the provision of humanitarian aid, and investments in the local industrial sector. Strengtening the military ties with Sahelian partners is conducted by military cooperation in the military-capabilities building domain, as well as by military assistance in combat with terrorism provided by the Russian private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group (Africa News 2021; RAND 2023; Tůma 2022). Secondly, Russian political warfare and influence operations are intended to create conditions that will lead to a change in Western states' policies in the Sahel, ultimately resulting in a shift in the geopolitical sphere in the region in favour of Russia. To create such a result, Russia employs methods and tools of political warfare and influence the local Sahelian population and political elites, using them as a proxy to create unbearable conditions for the West to continue its policy in the Sahel.

To achieve its foreign-policy goals and geopolitical influence in the Sahel, Moscow utilises various instruments of influence and methods known from concepts of hybrid, asymmetric, and new-generation warfare. These tools are used by Russia to create or strengthen its political, economic, military, or other infrastructure in the target area (Karabulut 2016).

Discussed non-military and non-violent methods, nowadays utilised by various security entities under different definitions and names, are, in essence, the same instruments hidden under the term utilised by George Kennan in the era after the Second World War and before the cold war—political warfare. As Kennan (1948) stated: Political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. (. . . ) These means and operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures, and 'white' propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of 'friendly' foreign elements, 'black' psychological warfare, and even encouragement of

<sup>1</sup> This research will not discuss or distinguish in detail differences between definitions and concepts of hybrid, asymmetrical, irregular or new-generation-warfare, as they are interpreted differently by various authors – but focus more on specific non-violent tools and instruments that are used within these concepts of warfare, in order to achieve desired political goals.

underground resistance in target states.' These means of political warfare is that they are employed in times of peace (Kennan 1948). Russian leadership can therefore reach its political goals and desired political changes in target areas without the use of military power but with the use of non-military means. A notable example of employment of non-military influence tools by the Russian Federation is the operation during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. This influence operation, which primarily occurred within the realms of information space, social media, and traditional media, involved the strategic use of non-military instruments of influence. These tools were utilised tosway the Western population through the internet and social media, exploiting its emotions and struggles to achieve desired political changes in the USA (Corera 2020; Jonsson 2019).

The instruments of influence and non-military means used by Russia are not new phenomena. However, Russia had to adapt to a new operational environment in accordance with the revolution in information and communication technologies. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Russian military theorists have engaged in a debate about 'the new generation of warfare', non-military tools of influence utilised in the 'Colour Revolution', and the efficacy of the non-military means in warfare. Russian elites also realised the importance of information warfare and non-military tools in 1996, after Russia lost its first war in Chechnya mainly due to failures in the information domain. Since then, they have emphasised the importance of the information domain, information warfare, and focused on developing these capabilities.

In this context, February 2013 played an important role when the former Russian Chief of General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, presented his well-known 'Gerasimov Doctrine' (Jonsson 2019). Gerasimov promoted the concept of 'newgeneration warfare' in which victory is for those who can utilise non-traditional and non-military means to achieve their desired objectives (Corera 2020). Most of the tools described and analysed within this concept are related to information warfare, information-technical warfare, or information-psychological warfare. As Gerasimov (2016) stated: 'Information resources have become one of the most effective weapons. Their wide use allows in a few days to shake the situation in the country from within.' Former Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergei Ivanov adds, that 'the development of information technology has resulted in information itself turning into a certain kind of weapon (...) that allows us to carry out wouldbe military actions in practically any theatre of war, and most importantly, without using military power' (Jonsson 2019). Historically, Russia (formerly the USSR) has excelled in information-psychological warfare, particularly within the framework of the Komitet Gosudarstvennov Bezopasnosti (KGB) intelligence operations. Moreover, the conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 underscore the significant emphasis and focus the Russian security apparatus places on the informational domain and information warfare.

In relation to information-psychological warfare, Russia's security apparatus also specialises in cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare targets the cognitive functions of the adversary, undermining their morale and decision-making processes through manipulation and deception, utilising the information space as a medium. Contemporary Russian information-psychological warfare activities, rooted in the former KGB's concept of active measures and other influence tactics, predominantly employ disinformation, the creation of fake stories, negative propaganda, and emotional exploitation. The objective is to weaken adversaries by fostering distrust among the local population towards traditional leaders, partners, or structures (Corera 2020).

The 2014 conflict in Ukraine highlighted a novel phenomenon: the utilisation of private companies owned by Russian oligarchs to advance the objectives of the Russian political and security apparatus. Prigozhin's Internet Research Agency, a prominent entity established in 2014, aimed to fulfil both Russia's military and political goals. Similar trends were observed with the employment of private military firms, such as the Wagner Group and Redut, among others (Corera 2020; Jonsson 2019). Although the use of private military entities and enterprises to support military operations or influence political outcomes in target areas has historical precedent also in the West (e.g., U.S. PMC Blackwater), this represented a relatively new strategic milestone for Russia.

Table 1: Instruments of influence or political warfare known to be utilized by the Russian Federation to achieve its objectives

STRATEGIC DOMAIN	SPECIFIC INSTRUMENT OF INFLUENCE/WARFARE
Political	Targeted diplomacy and support of specific political actors or specific policies  Supporting proxies, oligarchs, warlords
Military	Military-economic diplomacy, evading and bypassing the sanctions, covert military support, export of military technologies, usage of private military companies and entities (connecting private and military sectors)  Usage of covert methods, clandestine operations, and secret services
	Usage of methods of Information Warfare

STRATEGIC DOMAIN	SPECIFIC INSTRUMENT OF INFLUENCE/WARFARE			
Economic	Economic diplomacy, economic leverage			
	Energy diplomacy, energy dependency, and exploitation of energet and natural resources sector			
	Supporting proxies, bribery, and corruption			
Social	Exploitation of cultural, ethnic, ethical, or ideological domains			
	Support of civil unrest			
	Exploitation of local religious organisations, NGOs and GONGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations, Government-organized non-governmental organizations)			
	Creating cultural centres and connections to Russia and Russian culture			
Information	Information-technical warfare activities—cyber operations, usage of Electronic Warfare, and other technologies			
	Information-psychological warfare activities—targeted disinformation campaigns, propaganda and fake news, cognitive warfare, social media manipulation, support of agitation and civil unrest, and exploitation of media			
Infrastructure	Creating Russian-based infrastructure and installations, leading to economic or other form of dependency			

**Source:** Authors, based on instruments of influence, political and hybrid warfare defined in (Bÿrziÿš 2014; Aday et al. 2019; Karabulut et al. 2016).

## 3. The Russian influence in the Sahel

As mentioned before, Russian involvement in North and West Africa was intensified during the first decade of the 21st century in connection with the deteriorating security situation in Africa, volatility of the local political regimes, and the regional economic and humanitarian crises. These regional events and dynamics, which began to be more visible after the Western military operation in Libya, appeared in the same period as the relations between the West and Russia started to deteriorate again, following the Russialed wars in Georgia and Ukraine (Smirnova 2019; Zherlitsina 2016).

The Western intervention in Libya, coupled with the security crises in Syria and Afghanistan, catalysed the proliferation of radical Islam and terrorism. This resulted in the penetration of terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State into the Maghreb and Sahel regions, extending their influence and operations into the border zones of Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria, and later into Burkina Faso and Niger. Local governments and their security forces were unable to control the new spread of terrorism and the security situation, and intensively cooperated with the West, predominantly France, to mitigate this threat. Subsequently, United Nations and European Union missions were established in Mali to assist in training and enhancing the capabilities of local armed forces to combat terrorism.

However, Western missions, led by France, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN), faced significant challenges and strategic failures, including ineffective communication with local regimes, an inability to stabilise a constantly deteriorating security situation, and a lack of understanding of the region's complex challenges. These shortcomings hindered their ability to respond effectively to the threats. The volatile security situation and the expanding influence of terrorist organisations slowly led to the deterioration of the already fragile economic and humanitarian situation, which then, after years of unsuccessful fight against terrorism with Western partners, led to changes on the local political scene (Mensah and Aning 2022).

In the Sahel, the local Armed forces started to question the political elites whether their policies in combating terrorism is effective, and finally these events served as a basis for further coups d'état in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In all three countries, newly-established military juntas quickly retook the power from traditional pro-Western leaders and started to re-evaluate the situation in the country, its domestic and foreign policies, and its international relations. The democratic West, along with local organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), strongly condemned the coups in these countries and imposed economic sanctions. However, these measures exacerbated the already dire socio-economic conditions of the population and further eroded their trust in traditional structures and historical partners (Cassalais 2022). As Zherlitsina (2016) explains, this situation, along with political changes and the reorientation of Russian foreign policy in response to the adverse effects of Western economic sanctions, created new opportunities for the development of political and economic partnerships between Moscow and the aforementioned West African states.

The Russian Federation, closely monitoring the afore-mentioned developments and the West's inability to improve the situation in the Sahel, began to strategically exploit the context to its advantage, initially focusing on Mali and subsequently extending its influence to Burkina Faso and Niger. Capitalising on the West's failures to manage the security situation, Moscow employed a sophisticated array of instruments of influence and political warfare targeting local populations and regional political stakeholders. This strategy aimed to position Russia as the primary and dominant partner in the region, thereby displacing traditional Western partners and structures. Since 2019, following its successes in North and Central Africa, Moscow has intensified its cooperation with African countries, organising 'Russia-Africa Summits' to further solidify ties between African leaders and the Kremlin. This initiative signalled to the Western Bloc that Africa was increasingly becoming a sphere of influence for Russia and its allies (Mensah and Aning 2022).

# 4. Russia implementing its instruments of influence in the Republic of Mali

After two coups d'état in 2020 and 2021, Colonel Assimi Goita took power as the leader of the new Malian military junta. Under intense diplomatic and political pressure from the West, predominantly France, to transit power after almost a decade of unsuccessful Western-led missions aimed at eradicating the threat of terrorism and aiding the local population, Colonel Goita received a proposal for assistance as an alternative to the inefficient Western activities from an old but new partner, the Russian Federation (Tůma 2022).

Russia's decision to develop relations with Mali, and establish a base for its influence operations in Bamako was logical. Among all Sahelian countries, Mali historically held the most significant partnership with the USSR. It was the epicentre of all the events described above and the first country in the Sahel where a military junta took over power. In Mali, Russia renewed its policy from the era of the USSR, aiming to assist the local government in eliminating the consequences of colonialism, restoring the national economy, and aiding in the security domain. Similar to the USSR, Russia, guided by ideological imperatives, acted as a donor of economic and military-technical assistance (Zherlitsina 2016). As Tůma (2022) well pointed out, in Mali Russia employed the same playbook and scenario successfully utilised in other African countries (e.g., Central African Republic, Sudan, Mozambique).

### 4.1. Information domain

Similar to other operational environments in Africa and elsewhere, Russian influence operations in Mali started with information-psychological warfare activities and specifically targeted propaganda and disinformation campaigns. These activities, aimed to influence and change the policy of the Malian leadership, as well as atmospherics and opinions of the local population, primarily focused on three objectives:

- to subvert the position of France, as the primary and key representative of the Western community in Mali
  - Russia renewed the idea that France still colonises Mali, portrayed it as a colonialist and imperialist country with paternalistic leadership, and misusing the Malian population for its own benefit. Russia's propaganda thus exploited old tensions and wounds of colonialism and paternalism, proving highly efficient in a country struggling with an unstable economy, poor education, humanitarian and security crises, as well as problems with the Tuareg community in the northern part, leading to challenges with its own national identity.
- 2. to build a positive image of the Russian Federation as a country that continues historically beneficial relations between the USSR and Mali Russia also presented itself as a country that brings to Mali humanitarian aid, military-technological aid, as well as various economic and infrastructural projects and investments which would ultimately help to restore the national economy.
- Supporting the deployment of 'foreign partners and instructors' from the private military company the Wagner Group in Mali to help in the combat against terrorism (Africa News 2021).

During the information-psychological campaign, the internet and social networks were used, as well as local activist groups in terrain. These tactics proved to be highly efficient for several reasons. First, the narratives used during this influence campaign were partially based on the truth. France was indeed assertive in its foreign policy, and it was definitely trying to shape Malian policy and politics in its image after the military junta

regained power. Many Malian political elites stated that French diplomats and politicians were offering them 'solutions', influencing decisions on specific government positions or suggesting choices for the Prime Minister and the President. This was exactly the colonialist and paternalistic approach that the Russian propaganda exploited in its information warfare campaign which together with the colonial history between Maliand France caused fury among Malian politicians and later a large part of the society. Secondly, Russian propagandists made promises of cooperation for the restoration of the national economy, the provision of substantial investments in infrastructure such as transportation and industry, and humanitarian aid.

Reports by the Rossiya Segodnya suggest that to disseminate the above-mentioned narratives and messages and to win the hearts and minds of Malians, Russian propaganda cooperated with local media such as ORTM, local internet media and radios, as well as social media in various local languages and dialects (Rossiya Segodnya Press Office 2023). Furthermore, Moscow utilised local activist groups like Yerewolo to organise rallies in support of the junta, against the France UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and in support of the new Russian-Malian partnership. During these rallies, Russian flags were often visible in the streets and media, again a silent cognitive message to demonstrate the new dominant partner in the region (Sangaré 2021; Châtelot 2022; ADF 2021; Whiteman 2023; Kristen and Keita 2023; Le Roux 2022).

Due to efficient informational-psychological instruments, such as disinformation campaigns, fake news and propaganda, support of the local activist groups, cooperation with the local media, as well as covert support to the organisation of the civil activist rallies against France and the UN, in support of the military junta regime and Russian partners, Russia created conditions for the exploitation of other strategic domains and areas, and later also to expand its influence operations to the neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger.

### 4.2. Social and political domain

The Russian Embassy in Bamako is believed to support the leaders of the Malian activist movement Yerewolo, as well as another youth activist organization GPM (Group of Patriots for Mali)<sup>2</sup>, in order to organize rallies and protests against the UN mission in

Mali, presence of France in the region, as well as numerous rallies in support of Russia. Even though there is no direct evidence to this support, Western diplomats in Bamako claim that the connection between these groups and the Russian Embassy in Bamako is evident. The leader of the Yerewolo, Adam Ben Diarra, was also sanctioned by the EU for instigating anti-Western and pro-Russian rallies (Africa News 2021; Kristen and Keita 2023; Le Roux 2022). The exploitation and utilisation of the local activist groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other local entities in support of desired policy changes are a few of the examples and manifestations of the influence operations.

Russia has also opened and invested in a Russian cultural and language centre in Bamako to promote its culture and to create a positive image among the young generation, as well as to increase student exchange programs between Malian and Russian educational institutions (Russky Mir 2023; Mironova 2023). This is not a form of direct manipulation or nefarious activity but rather a complementary and typical example of soft power, utilised alongside other methods of political warfare and influence operations.

The political domain is mainly represented by official diplomatic relations between the elites of Mali and the Russian Federation. The Russia-Africa Summits held in the Russian Federation in 2019 and 2023 showcased the warm relations between Presidents Assimi Goita and Vladimir Putin. The Russia-Africa summits have served as strategic platforms for Russia to explicitly articulate its foreign policy objectives in Africa. These events facilitate discussions on cooperation between African states and Russia at the highest levels of political and diplomatic engagement. From a political warfare perspective, these summits represent a key platform for Russia to extend its political influence at the highest echelons of power. The initiation of these summits in 2019 marks an unofficial milestone, signalling an increase in Russia's influence activities in the Sahel region. Numerous diplomatic and other governmental delegations visited Moscow and Bamako during these years, and their intensity is increasing each year, as mutual economic, military, and social cooperation is also being fortified (Kristen and Keita 2023). More interestingly, political influence is also manifested by the current Bamako view on the war in Ukraine, where Mali politically aids Moscow, for example, in the United Nations (Al Jazeera 2023).

Malicious influence in the political domain is also defined as support for regimes favouring oligarchs, various proxies, and other specific entities and individuals, especially those with a negative effect on security and stability. Even though mercenarysm in

<sup>2</sup> The Yerewolo movement, as well as GPM, are both Malian youth activist movements unified by the ideology of pan-Africanism, fighting primarily against colonialism and the French influence and supremacy.

Africa is nothing new, in this context the support of the Wagner Group and Yevgeniy Prigozhin and its PMC by both Moscow and Bamako cannot be left unmentioned. By permitting the presence and operations of the PMC Wagner Group on Malian soil to support anti-terrorism efforts, Bamako is indirectly endorsing and funding organisations that are sanctioned by the European Union and the United States for alleged human rights violations and breaches of international law.

One of the most significant aspects of political warfare and influence in this domain in Mali, and generally also in the Sahel, is the support of Moscow to Bamako in combatting traditional regional structures. This instrument of influence is probably one of the least visible, aggressive and direct, yet it has an immense impact on all other domains.

Moscow, through its Embassy in Bamako and mutual diplomatic ties, aids Bamako in breaking up relations with regional pro-Western partners and creating new partnerships with pro-Russian states and regimes. According to unconfirmed reports, Russia helped Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to create a new regional political, security, and economic organisation called the 'Alliance des États du Sahel (AES, or Alliance of Sahel States).' This organisation was established as a regional Sahelian platform to replace old pro-French and pro-Western structures such as ECOWAS (primarily economic but also a political union), and G5 Sahel (primarily a regional security platform), as well as the long-term MINUSMA (United Nations) mission in Mali (Ndounou et al. 2024; Frowd 2023; Nichols 2023; Al Jazeera 2023; Institute for the Study of War 2024). Russia exploited the distrust and dissatisfaction of local political elites to reject anything that was connected to France and supported Mali in creating new structure in the region—the AES.

As a good example, when another coup d'état in neighbouring Niger occurred, and the democratically elected president Bazoum and his family were captured by the local military junta, ECOWAS states discussed possible military action to free the detained president Bazoum and his family and to restore constitutional order in Niger. On these efforts, Moscow warned ECOWAS through its official state channels not to do so, which sharply contrasted with the efforts of the West and ECOWAS to restore power to democratically elected structures (TASS 2023, 13 September).

### 4.3. Military domain

Since the era of the USSR, Russian intelligence services—namely, the KGB—have

been one of the principal tools of influence in Russian political warfare and influence operations in Africa, with the aim of strengthening ties between Moscow and African countries, creating economically and politically advantageous incentives in favour of Moscow. Covert means of influence and covert operations of secret services are key, however hidden, elements of successful political warfare that create conditions for the implementation of other instruments of influence. In the context of Mali and Sahelian states, the involvement of Russian secret services—namely, the military intelligence service GRU—has been reported primarily in the context of the deployment of private military company the Wagner Group, contracts related to the deliveries of Russian military armament and equipment, as well as with other instruments of influence Seibt 2023, 20 September) and (Seibt 2023, 18 July).

The involvement of Russian intelligence services in influence operations, as well as any other diplomatic, economic, military, and paramilitary deals between Moscow and African states, is a traditional Russian modus operandi, due to the close connection between oligarchs and state structures in modern Russia. Drawing from the operational patterns of Russian intelligence, it is likely that many of the identified influence activities are managed through the Russian Embassy in Bamako and coordinated with both local and Russian intelligence services (Corera 2020; Jonsson 2019).

Since 2021, personnel from the Russian PMC Wagner Group have been deployed to Mali under an agreement to provide military assistance to the Malian Armed Forces. Approximately 1 000 'Russian instructors', as locals call them, specifically combat units as well as air-force technicians and pilots belonging to the private military company owned by the now-deceased Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, have been deployed to Mali. The essence and, at the same time, the perfection of 'hybrid warfare' is simple—the Wagner Group in Mali is not an official contingent of Russian military combatants and regular forces and does not have to comply with international humanitarian laws, laws of war, or any other international legal regulations in connection with armed conflict. The presence of PMC Wagner in Mali is officially denied, and their deployment is not publicly acknowledged.

The deployment of the Wagner Group in Mali is associated with three main objectives: (1) combatting terrorism alongside the Malian Armed Forces; (2) protecting the military regime; and (3) acting as military instructors and developing the military capabilities of the Malian Armed Forces in connection with large military contracts between the Russian and Malian Ministries of Defence. The Malian Armed Forces have purchased significant amounts of military armament, technology, and equipment

from Russia, and the Wagner Group is the entity which assists the local armed forces in developing capabilities to operate this equipment (Tůma 2022; Olszewski 2022; Stronski 2023; RAND 2023). The deployment of irregular forces through covert means under deniability, is a significant tool of hybrid, asymmetric, and political warfare that Russia utilised in Mali to achieve its political goals and objectives.

However, even nowadays, Malian authorities deny that the Wagner Group is on Malian soil, referring to official Russian military assistance. The Wagner Group is efficient because it helps the military junta to get the job done without the restrictions that standard military operations entail (such as rules of engagement, law of war, legislation related to prisoners of war and detainees, international humanitarian law, etc.).

Russia also typically spreads its global influence in the military-economy domain, in which it traditionally excels. The Russian state-controlled military-industrial complex, connected through various oligarchs to state structures, provides a solution for various state actors to secure their objectives using a trustworthy partner. In Mali, Russia signed a contract with the government of Bamako regarding the delivery of various armaments and military systems, as well as assistance in military capabilitiy building provided by the Wagner Group. For example, since 2021, the Malian Ministry of Defence has bought from Russia various types of Mi-type helicopters (traditionally Russia sells Mi-24), military radars, various types of small personal arms for infantry, as well as heavy weapons for the artillery. Most significantly, Mali, together with Russia focused on capabilities-building in the air domain, obtaining L-39 and Sukhoi jets, as well as various types of transport and attack helicopters for the Malian Armed Forces. This interconnection between the state sector (armament and military technologies delivery) and private oligarch 'grey zone' (private military company Wagner Group) proved to be a very effective solution. For both services, the Malian authorities have to pay a significant amount of funds from the state budget—U.S. official bodies estimate the amount to be around \$10 million per month—as well as the concessional rights for gold mining in Mali. The mentioned amount that Mali pays to Wagner is just for military assistance—Mali also has to pay for the mentioned contract regarding the delivery of Russian military armament and technologies (Tekingunduz 2023; Hanspal 2022; Oluwole 2023).

The military and security domains are the most visible spheres in which Russia highly efficiently pushed out traditional Western providers and offered seemingly better options for Mali. Russia exploited the needs of the Malian Armed Forces and the military junta, providing a full package of military equipment and technologies officially delivered from Russia, together with military assistance, military instructors, and capabilities-building service provided by the private military sector. Using other means and domains of influence—predominantly information and political—Russia ousted the traditional provider France, which led to the end of French-led military operations against terrorism. In 2023, other Western missions like EUTM (European Union Training Mission to Mali) and MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) were also shut down. Russia became the primary security provider to Mali, and Western military presence in the Sahel's biggest country vanished.

### 4.4. Economic and infrastructure domain

In the economic and infrastructure domain, Russia has formally signed various memorandums with Malian ministries, promising future investments and economic cooperation between the two countries. Most recently, Russia invested in the Malian mining sector by contributing to a new refinery for gold, which is the primary and most important source of income for the Malian state budget, as well as allegedly a principal source of funding for the deliveries of the Russian military equipment and the assistance and operations of the PMC Wagner Group. Over the past few years, the Malian state and its Ministry of Mining adopted various legislative acts (most recently in January 2024) that strengthen the state's control in this currently relatively privatised industry, where many Western companies have their companies and licences (concession rights). With the help of Russia, Mali has strengthened control over the gold mining sector, including artisanal gold mining sites, in order to maximise income from this crucial state resource. Building a joint refinery with Russian experts, where all Malian raw gold has to be sent to be refined, is the last step for Mali in absolute control of gold in the country, as well as control of its amount and export abroad. According to official sources, the planned refinery will have the capacity to refine up to 200 tons of gold per year (Akhtar 2023; Fasanotti 2022; Africa News 2024; Diallo 2023) and (TASS 2023, 29 July).

In addition to its substantial investments in the mining industry, Russia has significantly expanded its investments in Mali across various sectors. These include security (as mentioned above by the delivery of military equipment), education, transportation, energy, food production, and agriculture.

# 5. Conclusion and implications of Russia retaking the sphere of influence in the Sahel for security in the West

The analysis of Russian influence in the case of the Republic of Mali demonstrates that the Russian Federation has exploited all strategic domains to achieve its political goals in the Sahel and to engage in political warfare with Western powers. In recent years, Russia has employed a highly effective combination of both overt and covert political warfare means against Sahelian countries to strengthen its ties with African states and to challenge the influence of Western countries, particularly France, in the region. To this end, Russian state and non-state actors have utilised over 90% of the tools identified in the literature as instruments of hybrid, political, or asymmetric warfare.

As Mensah and Aning (2022) explained, 'the expansion of Russian military influence in West Africa and the Sahel will result in a setback for other global actors. The evident resentment for France in countries like Mali, Chad, and Burkina-Faso through mass protests calling for the exit of France will not only affect France's influence in these countries but the general influence of the European Union, the US, and other world powers.'

In the Sahel, Russia primarily focuses its influence on operations in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—states forming the new Alliance of the Sahelian States. Changing the traditional Western sphere of influence in the region leads to the following challenges for the Western Bloc:

### 5.1. Minimal control of the threat of the terrorism

In the last ten years, AQMI (Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb), JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) and the Islamic State have spread their control and influence in the Sahel, primarily in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, south of Mauritania, and Algeria. The zones of operations and influence of these mentioned terrorist armed groups are enlarging year-by-year, and Sahelian state authorities are unable to control this threat. Together with a slow increase in group capabilities, this poses a significant threat to Western countries, especially considering the fact that Sahel is one of the key regions for the migration route towards the European Union through Italy, France, and Spain.

Historical military and peacekeeping operations by France, Western countries, as well as the UN were primarily conducted to conceal and neutralise this threat. Since the West has ended military missions in 2022 (Task Force Takuba) and peacekeeping

missions in 2023 (MINIUSMA), the West lost control and situational awareness over the security situation in the Sahel region. The situation of terrorist armed groups in the Sahel creates a significant threat to the EU and the West, as well as a large intelligence and security gap for Western security apparatus.

# 5.2. Minimal control over the migration routes and smuggling routes towards Europe

Due to the lack of control by security entities and the unstable security situation, coupled with specific local tribal and ethnic structures, Sahelian states are traditionally used as key smuggling routes for weapons, narcotics, drugs, and persons to North Africa and then Europe.

The principal migration route which African immigrants use to reach the EU passes through Sahelian states. The lack of control in these regions, as well as the absence of information from the above-mentioned areas, creates an information vacuum, which can pose a significant security problem for Europe in relation to migrants, especially in connection to the current spread of terrorism in the Sahel. Similar to migration waves from Syria and the Middle East, after the wars on terrorism, individuals with connections or a history of interaction with terrorist armed groups pose a significant security challenge for Western societies. The lack of presence and reliable information from these regions leads to an inability to effectively assess the risk of immigrants coming to the EU and the West.

#### 5.3. Humanitarian crisis

The spread of terrorism, combined with the poor economic situation in the region, which is inhospitable to crop cultivation, has led to a large-scale humanitarian crisis in countries of the Sahel over the last decade. That often forces local inhabitants to cooperate with terrorist groups to earn money for a living and to feed their families or to directly join these groups. This crisis also leads to an increase in the number of immigrants trying to flee to urbanized areas or head north towards the European Union.

As the first responder supposed to help, the MINUSMA mission invested large amounts of funds in regional projects to mitigate this threat. After it was ended in 2023 by the decision of local military authorities, the humanitarian situation in the region

deteriorated, especially in northern Mali and rural areas of the Sahel. Along with the worsening of the humanitarian crisis, the West has also lost control over the situation in the region.

### 5.4. Diplomatic isolation of Sahel and deterioration of mutual relations with the West

All the above-mentioned factors have led to the diplomatic isolation of Sahelian states from their Western partners, as well as a deterioration of mutual, long-term beneficial relations. This affects all strategic domains and creates a problem in matters of security due to the lack of communication between the official Sahelian countries' state entities and their Western partners.

### 5.5. West lost the economic and investment possibilities in Sahel

Being replaced by the Russian Federation, Western countries have lost a vast amount of economic and investment possibilities in the region. Russia replacing Western companies in the mining sector, infrastructure, and industry development sector, as well as in the military-technology sector, causes significant economic losses for Western private and state entities for the next decades.

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# China's Enduring and Expanding Influence: The Quest for Centrality in Sub-Saharan Africa Political Economy

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#### **Abstract**

Beijing's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is enduring and expanding, even amid the present decrease in China's loans to the region. Three interconnected elements contribute to Beijing's escalating significance: 1) A strategic emphasis on centrality through connectivity integrates African nations into the Beijing sphere, solidifying its pivotal role in the regional production network, extending economic and geopolitical reach, and securing vital resources while building political support; 2) Establishing institutional arrangements that are largely accepted by many African governments enhances Beijing's appeal as an attractive partner; 3) Power asymmetry positions China as a pervasive actor in the African political economy, wielding tools like debt, financial, and trade dependencies, once exclusive to Western powers (Lendzoumbou 2024). These mechanisms synergistically sustain China's influence in SSA amid the current cascade of crises.

Keywords: China; SSA; connectivity; Western powers; power asymmetry; dependency

# 1. Introduction

China's economic miracle has endowed the nation with an expanding combination of hard and soft power, enabling it to project influence globally, particularly since President Xi assumed office in 2013 (Ho 2020; Yu 2016). Employing multifaceted strategies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of regional



and international financial organisations, Beijing extends its global reach through trade agreements, infrastructure development, financial aid, and military cooperation (Yalew and Guo 2020). Over 22 years, for instance, China has funded 20,985 projects in 165 low- and middle-income countries through grants and loans, totalling \$1.34 trillion (Parks et al., 2023). This allows Beijing and its enterprises to penetrate other societies, much like the ongoing and expanding influence that the US has wielded since the end of World War II. Along this trajectory, China has emerged as the foremost challenger to the US-led Liberal International Order (LIO), actively fostering global connectivity, shaping the global political economy, and disseminating its preferred norms (Owen 2021). This presence is particularly notable in the Global South, including SSA, where China's influence is steadily growing, providing various benefits (Abegunrin and Manyeruke 2020; Large 2021).

As Beijing's influence expands, it has been successful in promoting cooperation with African countries through China-led organisations and initiatives, including the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), BRI, BRICS, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, among others. In just two decades, China has become SSA's largest economic partner, excelling in trade, investment, infrastructure development, and financial assistance (IMF 2023a, 2; Large 2021; Sun et al., 2017, 9). Beijing has emerged as the largest individual country trading partner for SSA for 21 consecutive years, with the trade volume reaching US\$242,11 billion in 2023 (per GACC), up from less than \$2 billion in 1992. Additionally, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock reached \$40.68 billion in 2021 (GDP 2023). China's transformative infrastructure initiatives position it as a strong competitor and attractive partner for African governments. As rightfully said by The Economist (2022): When it comes to building big things in Africa, China is unrivalled. Beijing-backed firms have redrawn the continent's transport map'. For instance, when traditional donors declined to build the Tanzania-Zambia railway (TAZARA) in the 1970s, China financed its first, largest, expensive foreign assistance project which represents \$3 billion in today's money (The New York Times 1971). Throughout the past two decades, China has not only rivalled but surpassed the influence of former colonial powers in Africa, achieving this without resorting to warfare, military dominance, or employing conventional tools associated with assertive 'great power' diplomacy (Benabdallah 2020: 4).

Today, a cascade of crises indicates that the honeymoon phase of the China-Africa relationship might be ending. During the 2021 FOCAC, President Xi refrained from committing to finance hard infrastructures for the first time—a major issue area of China's emerging order (Xinhua 2021). This marked a noteworthy departure from previous patterns, signalling Beijing's newfound cautious approach and shifted focus (Carmody and Wainwright 2022). Consequently, Africa has witnessed a significant decline in China's loans, falling from \$28.5 billion in 2016 to a mere \$994.5 million in 2022 (GDP 2023). Furthermore, FOCAC's financial commitment experienced a rapid increase, starting at \$5 billion in 2006, reaching \$60 billion in 2015, maintaining the same level in 2018, and then declining to \$40 billion in 2021. Some analysts suggest that China's dominant position in Africa may be reaching its peak, potentially signalling a 'new normal' in their engagement (Alden and Jiang 2019: 656-657; Carmody 2023). Some observers interpret this as 'China's retrenchment' from the region (Sun 2021). Does the reduction of China's loans to SSA translate to China's disengagement with the region? How does Beijing perpetuate its influence on the region?

This article investigates the mechanisms underlying China's projection of influence in SSA and argues that China's commitment to the region is enduring, and its influence is poised to intensify in the future (Sun et al. 2017). China's infrastructure-centric economic strategy in Africa is portrayed as resilient, adapting to evolving economic dynamics (du Plessis 2016).

# 2. Building blocks of influence: China's grand strategy

China's grand strategy is multifaceted, with objectives spanning domestic economic growth and international geopolitical influence. This includes targets set at the second session of the 14th National People's Congress in March 2024, such as achieving GDP growth of around five per cent, creating twelve million new urban jobs, and promoting environmental sustainability domestically. Internationally, China aims to advance the BRI, advocate for multipolarity, and counter Western hegemony in favour of a new type of international relations (People's Daily 2024a). These goals underscore China's need for economic resources to sustain domestic growth, maintain its economic power, and challenge US hegemony by fostering an emergent global order.

China's quest for resources to sustain its rapid economic expansion, combined with the imperative to secure markets for its products, underscores the necessity of developing a comprehensive global geopolitical strategy and forging new alliances (Carmody and Owusu 2007: 505-506). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China is the world's second-largest oil consumer after the US, contributing to approximately 80 per cent of the global increase in oil consumption in 2023 (IEA

2023). China's surging petrochemical activity is reshaping global oil markets, driving demand for feedstocks like naphtha, LPG, and ethane. This expansion is set to increase by 850 kb/d in 2023 and 730 kb/d in 2024 (IEA 2023: 11). To meet its large appetite for energy and mineral resources, Beijing has turned to SSA resulting in an exponential rise of export of goods from the region, which more than quadrupled in nominal US dollar terms between 2000 and 2022. Metals, mineral products, and fuel account for approximately 60 per cent of the region's exports to China (IMF 2023a: 2). In 2022, China's oil imports from Angola alone exceeded \$20 billion in value (Batsani-Ncube 2023: 7). China's top five import sources in Africa include South Africa, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zambia, and the Republic of the Congo. Base metals and their products have experienced rapid growth in import value, reaching nearly US\$25 billion in 2022, primarily sourced from DRC, Zambia, and South Africa (CAETE 2023: 81). Chinese firms, including Huayou, Sinomine Resource Group, Chengxin Lithium Group, Yahua Group, and Canmax Technologies, invested over \$1 billion in lithium projects in Zimbabwe between 2021 and 2022. In July 2023, Huayou inaugurated a \$300 million lithium plant in the country (Chingono 2023). As such, Chinese investment in SSA is a strategic component of the 'go global' policy, aiming to transform Chinese companies into multinational corporations and establish a global order beneficial to China's interests (Carmody and Owusu 2007: 512).

Table 1: Global oil demand distribution by country (%)

Year	US	China	Europe 5 <sup>1</sup>	India
2021	20.4	15.5	7.6	5
2022	20	14.7	7.6	5.3
2023	19.8	16.2	7.3	5.4
2024	19.5	16.7	7.2	5.5

Source: International Energy Agency (2023: 62).

China's rapid economic growth over the past four decades has resulted in the accumulation of substantial foreign exchange reserves, reaching approximately \$3.25 trillion at the end of February 2024 (People's Daily, 2024b). As the world's second-largest economy, Beijing leverages its economic and diplomatic capabilities to extend its influence globally, primarily through infrastructure development and financing. Infrastructure, whether it be in the form of transportation, communication, military installations, and energy serves as a tangible manifestation of power, enabling Beijing to extend its influence, build up its capabilities, and shape the international economic landscape (Blanchard and Flint 2017; Goh et al. 2018; Ho 2020; Yu 2016: 3). This aggressive approach has prompted the US to transition from defensive to offensive strategies in response to China's international expansion. Notably, in 2021, the G7 introduced the Build Back Better World initiative as a counter to China's BRI, subsequently rebranded as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (Zhao 2021). Moreover, amidst the current cascade of crises and the resurgence of blocs reminiscent of the Cold War era, China engages in a multifaceted pursuit, drawing on the logic of (neo) realism, neoliberalism, and neo-institutionalism simultaneously (Ikenberry 2001, 2011; Mearsheimer 2001). It seeks dominance and centrality by augmenting its material capabilities, fostering interdependence through institutional arrangements, and exerting influence through the power structures inherent in institutions. Pursuing penetration into SSA is part of China's strategy, considering the region's abundant resources and increasing influence on the global stage, as described by Anthony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, as a 'major geopolitical player' (2021).

# 3. China's political economy in SSA and penetration of the region

The geopolitical landscape in Africa, historically shaped by Western powers has seen pervasive influence across various domains through financial assistance, trade, state-building, and the promotion of liberal democracy and economic reforms. This widespread Western influence is palpable across every facet of the African landscape, leaving virtually no area immune to penetration (See, for instance, Glen 2014). Economic dependence has facilitated the extension of power, reminiscent of the historical scramble for Africa. While Russia and China's attempts during the Cold War fell short, a significant shift has occurred since the twenty-first century, with Beijing rapidly increasing its influence in SSA, altering the geopolitical dynamics in the region.

China's rapid economic growth and increased demand for raw materials have led to a more than fourfold surge in SSA's exports in nominal US dollar terms from 2000 to 2022 (IMF 2023a: 2). China-SSA trade in goods rebounded post-COVID-19, totalling around \$221 billion in 2022 (GDP 2023). China's provision of zero-tariff treatment to 98 per cent of tax items for products exported by 21 least-developed African

<sup>1</sup> Europe 5 includes France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK.

countries likely contributes to the growth of China's imports of African agricultural food products. This is evidenced by an average annual growth rate of 11.4 per cent in recent years, positioning Beijing as the second-largest destination for these exports. Collaborative models in information technology services, including cross-border e-commerce, mobile payment, and cloud outsourcing, bring innovation to Sino-African economic and trade cooperation (CAETE 2023). Chinese investments in Africa, with the potential to reshape the region's global standing (Alden and Jiang 2019), reached \$4.99 billion in 2021, marking an 18 per cent YoY increase. The total stock of China's FDI in Africa reached \$44.19 billion, almost returning to pre-COVID levels. As of 2017, over 10,000 Chinese-owned firms operate in various sectors in Africa, overseeing almost 12 per cent, amounting to \$500 billion annually, and holding nearly 50 per cent of the construction market (Sun et al. 2017). Furthermore, Beijing actively promotes the development of the region through both financial and technical assistance. For instance, between 2013 and 2018, Beijing allocated 120.56 billion Renminbi (RMB) in foreign aid to the region (White Paper 2021).

Emerging as a primary financier of infrastructures in SSA, China has addressed the lag in investments for ports, roads, and railways, remedying operational inefficiencies. In the last five decades until 2006, China provided over \$44 billion in aid for 900 infrastructure projects in Africa (Foster et al., 2009). The impact is evident, especially in the realm of ports, where delays, often exacerbated by the inadequacies of the existing poorly equipped ports, far exceed the global average (UNCTAD 2023a: 7-8). Between 2000 and 2020, China constructed over 13,000 km of railways, 80 large-scale power plants, nearly 100,000 km of highways, 1,000 bridges, and 100 ports. Moreover, China's investments extend beyond physical infrastructure to include essential soft components such as 130 medical facilities, 45 physical activity centres, and over 170 educational facilities, significantly impacting the well-being and economic development of Africans (Hua 2022).

Recent years have seen substantial Chinese investments in technological infrastructure, with major companies like Huawei, Hikvision, ZTE, and China Telecom playing pivotal roles. From 2001 to 2007, Beijing's engagement in SSA primarily consisted of selling equipment to national incumbents through commercial contracts and intergovernmental financing. Chinese telecom companies supplied nearly \$3 billion worth of ICT equipment, focussing on Ethiopia, Sudan, and Ghana (Foster et al. 2009). Today, Chinese companies dominate in 5G patents and are responsible for over 70 per cent of 4G networks in Africa, challenging historical trends and the dominance of the US and its allies in undersea cable development (Bartlett 2023a; Munn 2020: 12). They have gained appeal in various African states due to their provision of cost-effective and innovative technology solutions. Notably, South Africa, Uganda, and Kenya have adopted Chinese cameras for border and public space monitoring. Zimbabwe has initiated a Huawei Smart Cities program, and Ethiopia has introduced 5G powered by Huawei (Bartlett 2023a). In Nigeria, Opera, a platform owned by Beijing Kunlun Wanwei Technology Co. Ltd, has expanded its influence by acquiring a local financial services company. This strategic move involves the application of Chinese technology and expertise to develop OPay, becoming a major network in the country. This influence is widespread, with over 1,500 enterprises in more than fifteen African states choosing Chinese partners for digital transformation by the end of 2021. Moreover, 29 countries have adopted smart government service solutions provided by Chinese enterprises (CAETE 2023: 87).

# 4. Centrality through connectivity: China's BRI

Infrastructure, whether it be in the form of transportation, communication, military installations, or energy can serve as a tangible manifestation of power, enabling Beijing to extend its influence, build up its capabilities, and shape the global political economy (Goh et al. 2018; Blanchard and Flint 2017). The infrastructures associated with the BRI play a crucial role in facilitating the circulation of goods, people, and capital key components of infrastructural power (Khalili 2017: 2), echoing the historical significance of the Silk Road. The BRI strategically focuses on creating a corridor, extending from the Red Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and reaching into central and southeastern regions, aiming to enhance connectivity and promote economic integration among African nations (Luft 2016:69). This aligns with the historical legacy of fostering exchanges and interactions across diverse societies (Liu and Dunford 2016:4). The Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, financed and constructed by China, is an example. While its primary goal is to enhance transportation in East, Central and West Africa, it also aims to facilitate trade and establish economic ties with Beijing through significant Chinese investment and products in SSA (Taylor 2020). These activities can be traced to the historical TAZARA railway project, which connected the Indian Ocean port with Zambia's northern copper belt. Of the total project cost of \$406 million, 52 per cent was intended to be covered by the proceeds from the annual sale of \$16.8 million worth of Chinese consumer goods in Tanzania and Zambia (The New York Times 1971).

China's provision of concessional lines of credit operates as a gateway for its companies, tying credit lines for the procurement of products, services, and occasionally labour from Beijing (Zhang 2020). This strategic approach, implemented through infrastructure-for-resources loans, not only expands Beijing's global construction companies but also ensures long-term resource supplies, especially in resource-rich countries (Alves 2013:209-210). According to Brautigam, Huang, and Acker (2020), Angola secures its loans from China with oil exports, representing 75 per cent of commodity-secured loans. This financing model has been extended to nine other countries, constituting 6 to 12 per cent of the overall loan commitment. In specific cases, such as Nigeria or Ghana, only a limited number of projects were financed through this method. Chinese banks have more broadly implemented this model in the Republic of Congo, the DRC, Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea, leading to the construction of at least 57 projects with resource-secured financing. While supporting African infrastructure development, this alignment of infrastructure financing in Africa also allows Beijing to address domestic contradictions related to capital accumulation (Huang and Lesutis 2023). The correlation between bilateral trade, lending disbursements, and the official bilateral debt owed to China by Angola, Kenya, Zambia, Cameroon, and Nigeria underscores the intricate economic relationships between China and these resourcedependent countries (IMF 2023a).

The internationalisation of the RMB has strengthened financial connections between Africa and Beijing, as evidenced by collaborative efforts in banking and securities supervision. By the end of 2022, regulatory cooperation was solidified through memorandums of understanding with financial regulators in eight African states. Progress in RMB global expansion is notable in increased local currency settlement and swap arrangements, with both China and African nations establishing financial institution branches in each other's markets. Key milestones include the China-Africa Cross-border RMB Centre and Settlement Centre, enhancing cross-border RMB trade and financial services for China-Africa industrial cooperation. In 2015, China established offshore RMB clearing banks in South Africa and Zambia, followed by the establishment of a similar bank in Mauritius in 2022. The Bank of China Johannesburg Branch, designated as the first RMB clearing bank in Africa, and fifteen additional branches across the continent, supported by local currency swap agreements totalling 73 billion yuan, significantly contribute to economic and trade cooperation between China and Africa (CAETE 2023). Recently, Bloomberg reported that the Bank of China plans to leverage its presence in Zambia to enhance trade using the RMB with both the southern African nations and other countries in the region (Hill 2023).

Amid global shifts, notably marked by the Ukraine conflict and the formation of distinct blocs aligning with the US bloc or alternative bloc, China's expanding geopolitical interest in Africa becomes apparent (Carmody 2023: 9). This growing interest is further shaped by the influence of bilateral trade, political alignment, and development finance patterns in Africa, setting it apart from the approach of Western countries and placing a distinct emphasis on wealthier African nations (Landry 2021). A concrete example of this influence is the One China Policy alignment, which has prompted numerous African nations to shift their stance, leaving Taiwan with just one ally, Swaziland (Abegunrin and Manyeruke 2020:13). This strategic alignment is reflected in UN General Assembly votes spanning from 2000 to 2021, where low- and middle-income countries consistently aligned with China 75 per cent of the time. Such alignment consistently results in substantial rewards, with, on average, a 10 per cent increase leading to a remarkable 276 per cent boost in aid and credit from Beijing (Parks et al. 2023). This is consistent with Stone et al. (2022) finding that China strategically deploys state-owned enterprises as instruments of foreign policy, particularly in executing infrastructure projects aligned with its initiatives.

Persistent concerns among African leaders revolve around the ownership of Chinese-built infrastructure, raising doubts about true African ownership (Corkin et al., 2008, 16). There are apprehensions that China's infrastructure projects might enhance its monitoring capabilities and access to information from African states. The African Union's IT unit detected data transfers to Shanghai, sparking espionage concerns (Le Monde 2018). Reuters reported Chinese hackers targeting the Kenyan government, infiltrating networks related to finance, the president's office, and intelligence agencies, with suspicions of seeking information on the country's debt due to increasing pressures since 2019 (Ross et al. 2023). Both claims were dismissed as propaganda and 'sheer nonsense' (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya 2023; Reuters 2023a).

### 5. Institutional arrangements: A community with a shared future or features?

China's influence in SSA is deeply rooted in a shared historical perspective, where concerns about colonialism and oppression resonate both among the Chinese and many Africans. This shared history fosters a sense of solidarity and mutual values centred around independence and sovereignty. During the FOCAC 2018, the Chinese president underscored these normative principles, outlining a 'five-no' approach that emphasises non-interference in African countries' development paths, internal affairs, and a commitment to providing aid without political strings or seeking selfish gains in investment and financing cooperation (Xinhua 2018). In this context, initiatives and organisations like FOCAC, BRI, and BRICS play crucial roles as platforms for normbuilding. Furthermore, the appeal of the Chinese development model is particularly potent for African governments that share affinities with China's governance system and social norms, as noted by Benabdallah (2020: 1). As China's involvement in African development continues to expand, the consensus on the attractiveness of its model forms a robust foundation for influence, remaining resilient even in the face of changes in infrastructure financing or increased Western investments (Tiboris 2019).

China strategically employs infrastructure projects to propagate and institutionalise its norms, projecting soft power and shaping the African landscape. In the realm of media and knowledge sharing, Beijing has employed both overt and covert tools to shape a positive image in Africa since the 1960s, expanding its efforts to establish influence (Alden and Alves 2008; Van Noort 2021). Chinese companies operating in Africa, both in government projects and small-scale ventures, pioneer new markets, providing access to products and services while promoting entrepreneurial values (Corkin et al. 2008: 4). Television and radio serve as crucial mediums for cultural exchanges, as seen in the establishment of CMG Africa and the Forum on China-Africa Media Co-operation. Last year, the National Radio Television Administration of China hosted the 5th Forum on China-Africa Media Co-operation, with participation from over 50 African states in the opening ceremony (CAETE 2023: 87-88).

Last year, Beijing financed the establishment of the \$40 million Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania in collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and six southern African liberation movements. Serving as China's inaugural political school outside its borders, it aims to enhance cooperation and shared experiences with its counterparts (Bartlett, 2023b). In a similar vein, the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC acts as the institutional embodiment of relationality, strategically strengthening China's 'relational power' with African political elites through initiatives such as 'host diplomacy' and 'cadre training'. These programmes involve sharing governance methods and rewarding political support, fostering continual growth, and deepening relationships (Eisenman 2023). China has built or renovated more than 15 parliament buildings across Africa, facilitating access to cross-party legislative elites for China through the long-term maintenance of these structures. This allows Beijing to extend its influence within key political institutions and establish direct connections with African political elites (Batsani-Ncube 2023). As of FOCAC 2021 and 2018, China committed to building or upgrading ten schools, inviting 10,000 high-level African professionals to seminars, providing 50,000 government scholarships, 50,000 training opportunities, and hosting exchange visits for 2,000 young Africans (Xinhua 2018, 2021). Social networks and people-centric relationships complement the impact of hard infrastructure projects in China's policy towards Africa (Benabdallah 2020: 3-4).

# 6. Asymmetric power relations: China's pervasive role in Africa's political economy

The prevailing structure of the African political economy perpetuates power imbalances in dealings with China, given the latter evident material capabilities and Africa's position in the global economy (Taylor 2015). While Beijing may not intentionally pursue debt traps, its financial practices may pose risks of debt, dependence, and reduced policy space for African governments (Carmody and Wainwright 2022: 2833). The greater the dependence, the more likely countries tend to support China's stance on international affairs (Ho 2020:11). African states refraining from public criticism and endorsing China's vision may be indicative of China's exercise of power (see Olewe 2021).

Trade between China and Africa is characterised by a significant imbalance. In 2022, for instance, Beijing exported US\$164.49 billion and imported US\$117.51 billion, with China primarily exporting manufactured goods to the region, while Africa mainly exported raw materials to China (CAETE 2023). The palpable economic dependence of the region on China is underscored by recent empirical research, suggesting that a potential deceleration in China's growth could have adverse effects on SSA. A mere one-percentage-point decrease in China's growth may result in an average growth reduction of approximately 0.25 percentage points in the region, with oil-exporting countries like Angola and Nigeria potentially facing losses averaging 0.5 percentage points (Abdel-Latif et al. 2023). This economic dependency is further compounded by the infrastructure developed by Chinese companies, adhering to Chinese standards, which fosters reliance on ongoing technical support and maintenance from China (Wieringen and Zajontz 2023: 1598).

China's portion of the external public debt in SSA increased to approximately 17

per cent in 2021 from two per cent before 2005 (Abdel-Latif et al. 2023). Al-Fadhat and Prasetio (2022: 5) suggest that the potential for a debt trap emerges from China's loan provision beyond countries' repayment capacities, control over strategic sectors fostering long-term dependence, and promotion of the RMB, enhancing control over the financial system.

However, rather than being passive, African countries hold significant bargaining power due to weak legal provisions in BRI agreements, allowing for renegotiations and amendments (Jones and Hameiri 2020; Wang 2023; Zhou 2020). This dynamic is exemplified by the recent shift in the governing regime in the DRC, underscoring the pivotal role of recipient countries in shaping China's grand strategy. The Sino-Congolais des Mines (Sicomines) agreement, initially signed during Joseph Kabila's presidency, underwent a comprehensive reassessment by President Etienne Tshisekedi after his election in May 2021. After eight months of intensive pressure on China to review what he perceived as imbalanced mining contracts, President Tshisekedi achieved success in January 2024 by signing an agreement that amended certain terms of their Sicomines copper and cobalt joint venture. As per the revised deal, both parties agreed that China would increase its investment in infrastructure projects in the DRC to up to \$7 billion, up from the initial \$3 billion outlined in the agreement. Additionally, Chinese investors Sinohydro and China Railway Group will now pay 1.2 per cent of royalties annually to the DRC while maintaining the same shareholding structure (Nyemba and Christensen 2024). Additionally, African states seek to reduce their reliance on China by triangulating between China, the West, and other emerging powers.

### 7. Chinese vs Western influence

Infrastructure deficits and the failure to benefit from the LIO have marginalised developing states, providing China and other emerging powers with the opportunity to penetrate and establish a non-liberal order (Abegunrin and Manyeruke 2020: 5; Gilpin 2021). Recently, Uganda sought to borrow \$150 million from China's Exim after the World Bank halted funding in protest of a new anti-homosexuality law (Reuters 2023b). During the 1950s and 1960s, over 70 per cent of the World Bank's lending focused on infrastructure projects, declining to 19 per cent in 1999 before rebounding to 30-40 per cent in the 2010s (Dollar 2016: 70). From 2007 to 2020, China's financial institutions alone provided 2.5 times more funding for infrastructure development in the region than all other bilateral financing institutions combined (Brautigam et al. 2022: 30).

Table 2: Measuring China's and the West's power in Africa


		China		
		High	Low	
West		soft infrastructure	security	
	High	trade	finance	
		high technology	cultural exchange	
		investment	governance	
			ODA	
	Low	hard infrastructure	economic transformation	
		Diplomacy	political governance	
			legal and judicial system	

Source: Author's compilation.

This table delineates key thematic domains in which both the West and China exert their influence across SSA. The labels 'High' and 'Low' are assigned to facilitate comparative analysis, indicating the relative influence of each entity within specific issue areas. Instances where 'High' and 'High' or 'Low' and 'Low' are noted signify significant influence, while comparisons involving 'High' and 'Low' represent varying degrees of influence between the two entities.

China's influence extends across every facet of the African political economy, significantly surpassing trade volumes with the US, France, and the UK. Even when combining the trade volumes of these incumbent powers, Beijing remains predominant (See Figure 1). For instance, in 2019, the European Union emerged as the secondlargest trading partner to SSA, following China (European Commission 2019). China's FDI stocks in Africa doubled from just under 2 per cent in 2004–2008 to over 5 per cent in 2014-2018, surpassing traditional sources like the UK and the US, which saw a decline from 17 and 15 per cent during the same period (Stephen et al. 2022 10). Chinese FDI flows to Africa have outpaced those from the US since 2013 (GDP 2023). ODA to SSA has significantly decreased, dropping from nearly 4 per cent of regional GDP in 2001-2003 to about 2.5 per cent in 2017-19. Despite a surge in 2020, aid inflows returned to pre-crisis levels in 2021, and the region experienced an 8 per cent decline in real terms in 2022, contrasting with the global increase of 15 per cent in ODA (IMF 2023b:3).

Figure 1: China, UK, US, and France trade volume to SSA



**Source:** The author compiled data from the Boston University Global Development Policy (GDP) Centre for the US and China, and from the Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) for the UK and France (December 12, 2023).

However, investors from the West have consistently been the primary contributors to FDI stock in Africa and provide the region's largest share of ODA. In the security, finances, cultural, and political ideology issue areas, the bloc wields stronger infrastructural power than China. Nevertheless, the long-term financial capacity of the US and its allies to rival Beijing remains uncertain. Beijing enjoys a tangible financial advantage, avoiding commitments it might struggle to fulfil, thanks to substantial foreign exchange reserves exceeding its central bank's holdings (Parks et al. 2023).

### 8. Conclusion

This article contends that China's presence in SSA is not only enduring but also evolving and expansive, as Beijing strategically leverage its material and diplomatic capabilities

to strengthen political and economic engagements with SSA nations. The reduced emphasis on loans is situated in a broader context of diversified influence, underscoring China's commitment to reshape the LIO and consolidate its role as a major player in SSA. While the extent of China's meticulously designed plan for penetrating African society and enforcing policies remains debatable, akin to other global powers, Beijing's overarching vision is to establish political and economic connections radiating from central China. As the leading official source of global development finance, China's annual aid and credit commitments to low- and middle-income countries reach approximately \$80 billion (Parks et al. 2023). Infrastructure financing in Africa is cautiously resuming. Crucially, geopolitical considerations compel China, with its persistent and robust political affinities in Africa, to remain engaged with the continent in a world increasingly shaped by geopolitics.

The escalating debt relationships between African nations and Beijing carry profound implications for China's lasting presence and influence in the region. While China's financial assistance may dwindle, the accrued debt remains, establishing a lasting predicament. This situation offers Beijing a powerful tool to shape the foreign policy narratives of indebted African nations (Lendzoumbou 2024).

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# Navigating National Interests: Exploring the Dynamics of Pakistan-South Africa Bilateral Relations

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### **Abstract**

South Africa occupies a strategic geographic position at the southern tip of the African continent, serving as a potential trade and investment gateway for countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. It is a key partner for Pakistan's Look Africa Policy. Pakistan and South Africa, bound by shared values and a focus on common interests since establishing diplomatic ties in 1994, have cultivated a long-standing partnership. However, a significant gap remains in the academic exploration of this relationship. This study delves into the politico-diplomatic, economic, and defence aspects of Pakistan-South Africa relations, employing the concept of national interest as outlined by Morgenthau and Neuchterlein. Employing a qualitative analysis, this study argues that high-level visits, the establishment of institutional mechanisms, and the formalisation of cooperation through Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) have significantly shaped the direction, facilitation, and governance of Pakistan-South Africa relations. This research highlights three key findings: despite frequent leadership-level exchanges and interactions between parliamentarians and policymakers, the relationship lacks the necessary vigour; while trade between Pakistan and South Africa has grown



steadily, Pakistan experiences a trade deficit with its partner; and defence collaboration remains a significant aspect of their relationship. This article posits that the existing Pakistan-South Africa bilateral relationship holds the potential to blossom into a more formalised and enduring strategic partnership, contingent upon the implementation of well-defined and practical initiatives.

Keywords: African continent; Pakistan; South Africa; national interest; bilateral relations

### 1. Introduction

Pakistan's geostrategic location offers a win-win paradigm for enhanced connectivity with African countries. Being the second largest continent, home to 54 sovereign states with a total population of 1.4 billion people, Africa boasts a US \$3.1 trillion GDP and hosts almost 25% of the natural global biodiversity and 30% of world mineral resources. Africa's potential as a growing region of economic activity is self-evident by the African Development Bank projecting GDP growth for the Continent at 4% average in 2023 and 2024 (Afgun 2023). Since 2000, Africa has emerged as an appealing hub for foreign investment, propelled by its notable growth rate, the burgeoning middle class, and abundant resources, particularly within the energy sector (Arnaud and Guennoun 2019). The major and middle powers such as the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, India, and Turkey have been cementing their footprints in the continent due to Africa's rising politico-strategic significance and strong economic growth patterns.

While Africa has long been a cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy, its engagement with the continent since the 1950s has been suboptimal, lacking dynamism and a well-defined long-term strategy. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate of Pakistan suggested that 'Pakistan should pursue an aggressive economic diplomacy so as to reap the abundant benefits as well as opportunities that exist in Africa' (Senate of Pakistan 2005: 9). Pakistan needs to revise its foreign policy approach and reignite its relations with Africa, both politically and economically (Hafeez and Sarwar 2014). Pakistani policymakers have shown their intent to improve connectivity and revitalise relations with Africa through the 'Look Africa Policy' launched in 2017. Primarily, this approach focuses on engaging with the ten leading economies in the African region, namely, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania. Additionally, three trading blocs have also been singled out for negotiations, aimed at establishing preferential trade agreements, including the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the East African Community (EAC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Ministry of Commerce n.d). This policy aims to foster constructive engagement with African countries across diplomatic and strategic levels, promoting closer political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation. In doing so, it positions Pakistan as an active participant in Africa's development (Altaf 2022).

In furtherance of this strategic shift, Pakistan also launched the 'Engage Africa Initiative' in 2019, which has since facilitated a range of collaborative activities. These include the Two-day Envoys' Conference in Islamabad on 27-28 November 2019; the first Pakistan Africa Trade Development Conference (PATDC) in Nairobi, Kenya, on 30-31 January 2020; the second PATDC and Single Country Exhibition at Lagos, Nigeria, on 23-25 November 2021; the third PATDC and Single Country Exhibition in Johannesburg, from 29 November-1 December 2022 (Ghauri 2023); the opening of five new embassies in Djibouti, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, and Uganda, the establishment of six new commercial sections in Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Senegal, Sudan, and Tanzania, concluding framework agreements, the establishment of Joint Working Groups (JWGs) and Preferential Trade Agreement, organising 'Look Africa Trade Forums' in major cities of Pakistan; the participation of TDAP in the 38th International Fair Khartoum, Sudan, and holding of sector-specific webinars (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 2020; Finance Division, Government of Pakistan 2021). In a briefing to the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee on October 24, 2022, Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined the state of Pakistan's relations with African countries. It was highlighted that:

Pakistan's Engage Africa initiative rejuvenated the trajectory of Pakistan's relations with the African countries. Prior to the Engage Africa policy, Pakistan had only 14 missions in 54 African countries. The COVID-19 crisis and the emergence of Africa as a vibrant emerging market laid the foundation for Pakistan's new pivot to Africa. Pakistan opened five new missions in Africa; relocated six commercial wings; appointed 26 Honorary Councils; established a Rs. 100 million Africa Fund; expanded bilateral consultations and made significant progress on visa abolition agreements and defence cooperation with a number of African countries. Pakistan's high-level engagements and delegation exchange with the African countries need to expand. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also underlined the need for expanding Pakistan's presence in UN Formed Police Units in Africa (National Assembly of Pakistan 2022).

The Look Africa Policy and Engage Africa Initiative demonstrate a renewed prioritisation of Africa within Pakistan's foreign policy strategy. Consequently, strengthening relations with African countries is emerging as a key focus of Pakistan's foreign policy operations (Paraiso 2021). However, Pakistan's engagement with Africa differs from one country to another as it pursues its national interests. The case of the Pakistan-South Africa bilateral relations exemplifies this phenomenon. This arises from the shared similarities and alignment of national interests between the two countries. South Africa is a key partner for Pakistan's Look Africa Policy. Despite the geographical distance, Pakistan and South Africa share a warm and multifaceted relationship built on mutual respect and a history as former British colonies. Since establishing formal ties in 1994, they have collaborated in the political, economic, and defence spheres. Regular high-level visits and a Joint Commission framework solidify their partnership. However, infrequent political interactions and trade imbalances hinder their full potential. A robust defence cooperation marked by the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and training programmes fosters security ties. Nonetheless, there is a dearth of scholarly inquiry into the bilateral ties between them.

Given this context, this article examines the dynamics of Pakistan-South Africa relations within the framework of their respective national interests. It will seek answers to the origin of their bilateral relations, the main focuses, achievements of these bilateral relations, as well as the challenges characterising them and how they can be effectively redressed. For this purpose, the article has been divided into four sections. Following this introduction, section two delves into the concept of national interest and explores how political, economic, and security factors intersect to influence a state's foreign policy goals and preferences. The third section discusses political, economic, and defence relations between Pakistan and South Africa, along with the role of the Pakistani diaspora in South Africa. The fourth section concludes the discussion by summarising the essence of the main findings. This study has utilised a qualitative approach, employing document analysis for data collection. Data for this study was drawn from a variety of sources, including public and private documents, academic publications (research articles and books), reports by think tanks and governmental bodies, news media (newspapers and internet sources), and statements made by officials from both countries.

## 2. Conceptual framework: National interest

National interest functions as both the cornerstone and the guiding principle in shaping a state's foreign policy. Regardless of geographical or military stature on the global stage, constructing foreign policy based on national interest is imperative for every state. The origin of the concept of 'national interest' as a tool in diplomacy can be traced back to the era coinciding with the development of the modern state system. This term originates from Latin, with the implication of 'it concerns, it makes a difference to, it is important with reference to some person or thing' (Beard 1934:20). As put by Morgenthau (1951: 241), 'it is not only a political necessity, but also a moral duty for a nation to always follow in its dealings with other nations but one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action: The National Interest.' The role of national interest holds considerable importance in the analysis of foreign policy (Morgenthau 1952; Marleku 2013). It has been and continues to be a crucial component in explicating the fundamental reasoning behind the actions of statesmen and states within a threatening international milieu. Statesmen and scholars have employed it to delineate the aspirations and objectives of sovereign entities within the global sphere (Neuchterlein 1976).

How states define their national interest is crucial because states act in their national interest. The fundamental aspects of national interest are territory and commerce (Beard 1934). Morgenthau's (1952:972) widely recognised realist perspective on national interest is founded on the premise that every nation endeavours to 'protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations'. He argues that national interest is characterised by power – namely political, military, and economic considerations. The primary force compelling states to pursue power is the international system's anarchic character. Osgood (1953) states, 'National interest is understood to mean a state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to the nation.' In Dyke's (1957) perspective, it entails 'the values, desires, and interests that states seek to protect or achieve in relation to each other'. Similarly, this concept encompasses the aggregate of all the values held at the national level (Frankel 1969: 103). Another scholar, Nuechterlein (1976: 247), describes it as 'the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment'. According to Cantor (1986: 51), 'the concept of national interest implies that there can be a coherent foreign policy representing interconnected national concerns'. On the other hand, Roskin (1994) contends, 'it seems crisp, clear, objective: what's good for the nation as a whole in international affairs'. Said and Lerche (1995:27) hold national interest as 'the general, long-term, and continuing purpose that the state, the nation, and the regime would all see themselves as serving at any given time'. There, the notion of 'national interest' is often understood as the fundamental objectives, the collective aspirations and guiding principles that shape a state's actions, policies, and decision-making processes over time.

Morgenthau (1962) categorises national interest into two tiers: the vital or primary, and the secondary. The vital component is the survival or identity of a state which is divided into cultural, political, and physical aspects. Delineating vital national interests is quite straightforward: they entail the security of a nation's sovereignty, safeguarding its institutions, populace, and core values. The foreign policy decisions of a country remain focused on enhancing its security. Even when it comes to going to war, they do not compromise or hesitate. On the other hand, secondary interests refer to the desires of individual states that they would undoubtedly prefer to fulfil, yet they are not willing to go to war over them. Defining these interests seems to be more challenging. Potentially, however, they can grow in the minds of statesmen until they seem to be vital' (Roskin 1994). They are influenced by decision-makers, party politics, public sentiment, sectional or group interests, and political and moral customs. While vital interests can be regarded as the overarching goals, secondary interests can be labelled as the objectives of foreign policy.

Nuechterlein (1976) has subdivided national interest into four categories, including defence, economic, world order, and ideological interests. Defence interests encompass safeguarding state security, governmental structure, and the populace against physical aggression stemming from external threats. Economic interests involve advancing economic prosperity through interactions with other countries. Interests regarding world order comprise maintaining global economic and political stability, ensuring national security, and supporting peaceful international commerce and citizen interactions across borders. Finally, ideological interests refer to safeguarding and advancing the collective values held by a state's citizens and perceived as globally beneficial

There is an ongoing debate whether the national interests are permanent or adjustable. Some interests, like sovereignty and survival, are non-negotiable and cannot be compromised, while others require regular review and reappraisal. According to the famous maxim of Lord Palmerston, 'We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and those interests it is our duty to follow' (Ward and Gooch 2012). Evans and Newnham (1998) believe in the changing nature

of national interest during different times, under different circumstances and with different policymakers leading a nation-state. Morgenthau also believes in the adjustable nature of interests. He deems that interest cannot have 'meaning that is fixed once and for all' (Morgenthau 1967: 8).

The notion of national interest is closely intertwined with a realist perspective on the study of international relations, prioritising security as the foremost objective (Humphreys 2015). Realists contend that a state's national interest and foreign policy are determined by its position within the anarchic international system. All forms of realism accentuate the importance of national interests and the pursuit of power (Khan 2022). Contemporary realists start from the premise that the national interest serves as a dependable compass for crafting well-informed policy decisions and conducting scholarly analyses of foreign policies (Naaz 2012). It is imperative for every state to identify its national interests and formulate its foreign policy to conduct relations with other states and to pursue those national interests. Therefore, within a realist framework, this paper examines Pakistan's relations with South Africa by delving into the political and economic aspects of national interests as put forth by Morgenthau and Neuchterlein.

### 3. Pakistan-South Africa relations

Pakistan and South Africa share a foundation of diplomatic cooperation and mutual respect, rooted in common values and strategic interests. 'Pakistan has voiced its opposition against apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. In view of Pakistan's support for the liberation struggle, strong bonds of friendship have formed and solidified between the two countries since 1994' (Department of International Relations and Cooperation n.d). These relations remained well below their potential and suffered from the lack of substantial political and commercial underpinnings (Khan 2019: 33). This necessitates a closer examination of their bilateral cooperation across politico-diplomatic, economic, and defence spheres, particularly in the wake of Pakistan's 'Look Africa Policy' and 'Engage Africa Initiative.'

# 3.1 Politico-diplomatic engagement

South Africa, situated at the southernmost point of the African continent, boasts a diverse landscape with two ocean coastlines. As the 'gateway to Africa', it connects

America, Europe, and Asia (Amir 2015). Its population, estimated at around 59.3 million, ranks 25<sup>th</sup> globally, making it a vibrant and populous nation (Amir and Khan 2021). South Africa holds vital influence in the Southern African region and within key African economic alliances such as the African Union, AfCFTA, SACU, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Being part of the G-20, the IBSA Dialogue Forum, and the BRICS Forum, it embraces a noteworthy political and economic role both within the continent and globally (Khan 2023). South Africa has been elected three times to serve on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Hendricks and Majozi 2021). Moreover, South Africa's engagement in both the SADC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) underscores its commitment to multilateralism.

The official bilateral relations between Pakistan and South Africa were not established until the end of apartheid in South Africa (Peter 2017). Pakistan set up a High Commission in Pretoria in December 1993. 'An exchange of notes on Establishing Diplomatic Relations in April 1994 led to the establishing of full diplomatic relations in April 1994 with High Commissioner Ismail Coovadia becoming South Africa's first High Commissioner to Pakistan taking up his position in July 1995' (Department of International Relations and Cooperation n.d). Relations were frozen following Pakistan's suspension from the Council of the Commonwealth in October 1999 (Rafique 2019). The suspension of Pakistan by the Commonwealth was lifted in May 2004, which facilitated the normalisation of relations with South Africa (Republic of South Africa 2006: 72). Subsequently, bilateral relations began to show improvement. Yet, 'both the nations needed to work closely to strengthen political, economic and social ties for benefit of the two countries' (Mavimbela 2009).

After 1994, high-level engagement between Pakistan and South Africa has taken the relationship to the next level. Both countries maintain regular diplomatic exchanges and engage in constructive dialogue aimed at enhancing collaboration across various sectors. Former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, visited Pakistan in 1992 and was bestowed with the prestigious honour of Nishan-e-Pakistan (Rafique 2019). On 11 May 1994, the late Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, accompanied by Asif Ali Zardari, embarked on a visit to South Africa to attend the inauguration ceremony of Nelson Mandela's Presidency. Mr Gohar Ayub Khan, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, visited South Africa in January 1998. In 1999, Nelson Mandela undertook a subsequent visit to Pakistan, during which he was accorded the honour of addressing a joint session of the parliament. In September 2012, Syed

Naveed Qamar, the former defence minister of Pakistan also visited South Africa. Since 1994, South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister, Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, made the first ever official ministerial-level visit to Pakistan in 2012. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan (2012), 'the visit was intended to provide an opportunity for close interaction and consultation on regional and global issues, especially on counter-terrorism and the conflict in Syria. It provided an opportunity to review the entire range of bilateral relations and ways and means to further consolidate these ties.' Former Pakistani President, Mamnoon Hussain, participated in the funeral proceedings of Mandela in 2013. Responding to Pakistan's diplomatic overtures, a delegation from South Africa embarked on a visit to Islamabad in September 2014 to engage in negotiations pertaining to the Extradition Treaty (Rafique 2019). Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, South African Defence Minister, visited Pakistan in March 2017. These bilateral high-level exchanges, while limited in scope, had contributed towards trust-building and setting the stage for mutually beneficial relationships.

Efforts were undertaken side by side to formalise the relationship through an institutional framework. The Pakistan-South Africa Joint Commission (JC) established in 1999 provided a formal platform for structured discussions at the Deputy Director-General level for bilateral cooperation. Its first session took place on 12—13 March 2007 in Islamabad, Pakistan, which set the direction of future relations between Pakistan and South Africa. According to a report of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs:

This event has triggered the normalisation of relations between the two countries after the long hiatus that had resulted from the temporary suspension of Pakistan from the Commonwealth. It can be expected that the outcomes of this first JC will contribute towards the improvement in trade and investment, and greater cooperation in a range of important areas ranging from science and technology to agriculture and security-related matters (Republic of South Africa 2007: 112).

According to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (2012: 57), 'In July 2011, South Africa hosted the second Joint Commission with Pakistan to strengthen the bilateral relationship.' The Third Session of the Joint Commission was convened on 15–16 April 2013 in Islamabad. The delegations of Pakistan and South Africa were led by Seema Naqvi, Additional Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, and Anil Sooklal, Deputy Director-General, Department of International Relations

and Cooperation (DIRCO) of South Africa, respectively. This session is regarded as a significant event in the context of Pakistan-South Africa bilateral relations because:

The agenda of the meeting covered prospective cooperation in Trade, Industry, Engineering, Energy, Agriculture, Health and Education. The two sides noted with satisfaction that the Joint Business Council would hold its first meeting in September/October, 2013 in Pretoria. They also agreed, in principle, to enhance the bilateral trade volume to over US \$1 billion by 2015. In view of the fact that South Africa excels technologically in Mining, prospects of cooperation in Mining Sector were discussed. The Pakistani side also handed over to South African side a MoU on Cooperation in the field of Health Sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 2013).

At the fourth session of the commission convened in November 2014 in Pretoria, consensus was reached to elevate the Joint Commission to the Deputy Ministerial level (Republic of South Africa, 2015: 49). As a follow-up, a review meeting also took place on 19 May 2016 in Pretoria to evaluate the progress of decisions made by Pakistan and South Africa during the fourth session of the Commission in 2014. Both parties deliberated and examined the full spectrum of mutual ties. A particular agenda point concentrated on easing visa restrictions, with a special emphasis on the community of over 100,000 Pakistanis residing in South Africa. According to a statement:

The two countries expressed satisfaction at the progress achieved so far and the strengthening of bilateral relations in all fields. Both sides also underlined the need of having frequent and regular interaction for further deepening of political, trade and economic relations. Satisfaction was also expressed at the high level contacts between the two countries in the defence and defence production fields. Both sides agreed to finalise MoUs and Agreements especially on Security related matters (High Commission for Pakistan, Pretoria 2016).

Pakistan and South Africa have reiterated to strengthen their institutional mechanism for cooperation by signing an agreement for the establishment of the Pakistan-South Africa Joint Commission in Pretoria on 25 November 2021 (Rao 2021). This document intended to 'provide an effective mechanism to review, monitor and expand cooperation in diverse areas' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 2021). The South

African minister, G.N.M. Pandor termed 'the signing of the document a milestone in Pakistan-South Africa relations. She stressed the need to add further substance to bilateral cooperation especially in the fields of Renewable Energy, Agriculture, Health and Higher Education' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 2021). Similarly, Mazhar Javed, Pakistan's High Commissioner to South Africa 'expressed the confidence that the Agreement will catalyze bilateral cooperative process, especially in terms of economic relations' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 2021). Former Pakistani envoy to South Africa, Najam-us-Saqib, commenting on Pakistan-South Africa bilateral ties, remarked that:

Pakistan enjoys strong ties with it, especially defence cooperation as the COASs from both countries visit each other regularly...and no Pakistani head of the state has paid a visit there in the last 15 years, except former President Mamnoon Hussain, who went there to attend the last rites of late Nelson Mandela. People in South Africa still remember the leading role played by Pakistan against the apartheid. However, the benefits of such cordial relationships are yet to be reaped (Institute of Policy Studies 2021).

The leadership of South Africa has expressed concern regarding the issue of Kashmir Pakistan and India. Nelson Mandela, former President of South Africa, held 'a clear stance on the [Kashmir] dispute' (Correspondent 2020). Mandela brought up the Kashmir issue during the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in September 1998 in Durban, by declaring that, 'the Kashmir dispute was a cause for concern for all of us and assured that NAM would extend all the strength that it has in settling the Kashmir issue' (Javed 2020). On 5 August 2019, the central government of India undertook the revocation of Indian Constitution Articles 370 and 35-A. These alterations have resulted in the deprivation of Kashmiris' legitimate identity (Correspondent 2020), the abolition of the autonomy of Kashmir, curtailment of its decision-making authority, and permission for the settlement of non-Kashmiri Indians in the region (Ellis-Petersen 2019). The DIRCO, while expressing its concern over these developments, stated that:

The issue of Jammu and Kashmir should be resolved bilaterally, and South Africa urges India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful means and exercise restraint and refrain from actions that could further exacerbate the situation and potentially destabilize the region. South Africa further appeals that the

freedom and rights of citizens be respected in line with international humanitarian and human rights laws (Monyela 2019).

Nkosi ZMD Mandela, Nelson Mandela's grandson, voiced his support by stating that, 'the struggle of the Kashmiri people is "our struggle" and the South African people send a message of peace and security to Kashmiris' (Web Desk 2021). Thumbumuzi Dlamini, step-grandson of Nelson Mandela also expressed that 'the Kashmir issue is a global one. India should step up and solve the Kashmir issue with Pakistan' (Web Desk 2021). Additionally, in his message on Kashmir Solidarity Day in 2022, Nkosi ZMD Mandela stated:

We express our unequivocal solidarity with the brave and courageous people of Kashmir and support their right to self-determination in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 47..... We will continue to support the Kashmiri people in their struggle until they win the struggle for self-determination and freedom. President Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela reminded us that 'as long as there is a single human being suffering anywhere in the world our struggle is far from over' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 2022)

Since the formal establishment of diplomatic ties, both states have engaged in exchanges at various levels, aiming for mutual benefit, identifying common objectives, and pursuing shared goals, which underscore the evolving nature of their political relationship. But active follow-up has been missing in the political spectrum for many years. Leadership-level exchanges and interactions between parliamentarians and policymakers have remained infrequent (Khan 2019). It necessitates tangible interventions. Both states should increase diplomatic exchanges and visits to fortify personal connections among political leaders. Regular high-level diplomatic dialogues are imperative to address political matters, regional interests, and global challenges. Convening Joint Commission sessions regularly is essential to enrich the bilateral relationship. Encouraging people-to-people exchanges, cultural interactions, educational initiatives, and scholarships can foster deeper mutual understanding between Pakistani and South African citizens. The formation of joint committees or task forces to address shared interests is crucial for promoting enhanced collaboration. Establishing a regular review mechanism is necessary to ensure the effective implementation of agreements and initiatives.

#### 3.2 Economic cooperation

South Africa is one of the top ten countries prioritised under Pakistan's 'Look Africa Policy' for promoting its economic linkages in diverse sectors. It boasts a diverse economy and stands as the foremost economic power on the African continent. In 2021, South Africa's GDP was worth \$790.625 billion with a growth rate of 4.91 per cent (Central Intelligence Agency n.d). South Africa views Pakistan as a significant market for business-to-business collaboration, solidifying its position as one of Pakistan's key economic partners on the African continent. 'Pakistan and South Africa bilateral relations offer an enormous potential for enhancing mutual annual trade' (Mavimbela 2009). According to Ambassador Mthuthuzeli Madikiza, the High Commissioner of South Africa to Pakistan, 'South Africa and Pakistan enjoy excellent and cordial bilateral ties and one of the top priorities is to expand economic relations for the mutual benefit of both countries' (Rafique and Khan 2020).

Pakistan seeks to tap into South Africa's vibrant market potential for expansion in its trade and investment (Khan 2018). The natural bounty of South Africa, from gold and diamonds to platinum and diverse minerals, fuels its economic potential and positions it as an important player in the global resource market. Its economy depends significantly on the mining, vibrant agricultural, and financial sectors. The stock exchange of South Africa ranks among the top twenty globally and serves as Africa's largest market (Khan 2023a). South Africa's primary exports include diamonds, gold, platinum, equipment, machinery, and a wealth of various metals and minerals. Major trading partners like India, the US, China, Germany, and Saudi Arabia contribute to its import market (Khan 2018). The top categories of South Africa's major import products include refined and crude petroleum, vehicles, machinery, equipment, electronic goods, chemicals, foodstuffs, textiles, and pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, Pakistan primarily exports textiles, apparel, paper, rice, leather garments, cement, electric fans, tractors, men's clothing, and woven cotton fabrics to South Africa. Pakistan's main import sectors from South Africa comprise coal, iron and steel, machinery and equipment, chemicals, paper and paperboard, vehicles, plastics, gems, and jewellery.

There has been a steady growth in Pakistan-South Africa economic cooperation, driven by mutual interests in trade and investment. Data indicates a positive trajectory in Pakistan-South Africa bilateral trade, with a significant increase from \$186 million in 2003 to \$1.052 billion by 2019 (Arif 2020: 3). Textile goods rank as one of Pakistan's leading exports to South Africa, despite facing significant tariffs imposed by SACU. Rice, instruments, and appliances, among other leading export items, are tariff-free,

while paper and paperboard exports face a relatively low tariff of two per cent. The most notable positive Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) between 2015 and 2019 is observed in exports of denim (203%) and men's or boys' cotton ensembles (73%). Tractors and electric fans diversify Pakistan's export portfolio. Until 2015, the export of cement to South Africa was a dominant product of Pakistan. However, it has experienced a steep decline of 51.7 per cent from 2018 to 2019 due to anti-dumping duties ranging between 14 per cent and 77 per cent imposed by the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC). Pakistani products have the potential to generate exports worth \$3.57 billion to South Africa. Pakistan's imports from South Africa are dominated by coal and metals, constituting a substantial portion of the overall trade between the two states. These imports are subject to tariffs ranging from zero per cent to 20 per cent (Amir and Khan 2021). Table 1, compiled by the authors using data from the *Trading Economics* databases, compares Pakistan-South Africa bilateral trade statistics from 2009 to 2022.

Table-1: Bilateral Trade Statistics

Year	Pakistan's Exports to South Africa (US\$ Million)	Pakistan's Imports from South Africa (US\$ Million)	Total Bilateral Trade (US\$ Million)
2009	191.00	266.00	457.00
2010	255.00	390.00	645.00
2011	285.00	378.00	663.00
2012	271.00	314.00	585.00
2013	289.00	288.00	577.00
2014	290.00	440.00	730.00
2015	223.00	483.00	706.00
2016	163.00	505.00	668.00
2017	172.00	1000.04	1172.04
2018	178.00	1000.24	1178.24
2019	179.00	1000.17	1179.17
2020	183.00	922.00	1105.00
2021	222.00	1000.74	1222.74
2022	237.00	1000.22	1237.22

**Source:** Pakistan exports to South Africa 2024 data 2025 forecast 2009-2022 from https://
tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/exports/south-africa and Pakistan imports from South Africa 2024 data
2025 forecast 2009-2022 from https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/imports/south-africa

These statistics indicate that the total value of Pakistan-South Africa bilateral trade in 2022 reached \$1 237.22 million, with exports of \$237 million and imports of \$1 000.22 million. It shows a trade deficit of \$763.22 million. Pakistan's highest export volume of \$290.00 million and import volume of \$1 000.74 million occurred in 2014 and 2021 respectively. It further reveals that the trade balance has consistently favoured South Africa since 2009, with 2013 being the only exception. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (2022), over the past 27 years (from 1995 to 2022), South African exports to Pakistan have increased at an average annual rate of 9.13%, while Pakistani exports to South Africa have shown an annual growth of 7.94 per cent.

The Pakistani government and business community are promoting Pakistan-South Africa trade through trade promotional activities, investment facilitation measures, and by establishing market access and distribution networks (Khan 2023a). In 2013, Eight MoUs were signed in a Joint Commission meeting to increase trade volume (Trade Development Authority of Pakistan 2022). Pakistan's 'Look Africa Policy' of 2017 and 'Engage Africa Initiative' of 2019 also aim at enhancing trade volume between African countries and Pakistan. Pakistan took part in the South Africa Investment Conference convened in South Africa on 18-19 November 2020 (Arif 2020). Pakistani industrialists and traders were urged to invest and bridge the existing trade gap with Africa during a virtual meeting of the Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI) and the Pakistan-South Africa Trade Federation (PSATF) held on 18 November 2020 in Islamabad (Ahmed 2020). Furthermore, the Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (RCCI) has concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with PSATF to enhance trade, boost exports, and nurture networking between South Africa and Pakistan (Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce 2020). The Pakistan government also announced the establishment of the Pak-Africa Trade Centre to provide a platform for chambers and the business community. At a meeting on 18 February 18 2021, South African High Commissioner Mthuthuzeli Madikiza and Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) President Mian Tariq Misbah agreed to jointly build a meaningful partnership between the private sectors of both countries to strengthen trade and economic ties (Correspondent 2021). The High Commissioner reiterated this commitment in his address to the business community at LCCI on 8 August 2023, and 'underscored the need for collaborative efforts to address challenges faced by the business community and enhance trade cooperation' (LCCI 2023). The LCCI President Kashif Anwar supported High Commissioner Madikiza's views, expressing optimism that enhanced bilateral economic relations despite the current trade imbalance favouring South Africa. He cited State Bank of Pakistan data showing a drop in bilateral trade from \$1.7 billion in 2021–22 to \$626 million in 2022–23, and highlighted the potential for collaboration in agriculture, textiles, manufacturing, technology, and pharmaceuticals (LCCI 2023).

Government officials, presidents of national chambers, and business leaders representing the member states of the SADC actively participated in the third Pakistan-Africa Trade Development Conference & Single Country Exhibition (PATDC & SCE) held in the year 2022. About 120 Pakistani companies took part in the conference, showcasing various key sectors of Pakistan's economy, with over 70% of participants hailing from the engineering and healthcare sectors. The event saw the participation of 59 delegates from 11 member states of SADC, alongside numerous other attendees from South Africa. It facilitated high-level Government-to-Government (G2G) interaction between Pakistan and the Southern African countries, laying the groundwork for strengthened trade and business connections (Ghauri 2023). Trade investments between Pakistan and South Africa are facilitated by business companies, which pinpoint investment prospects, offer market intelligence, and link potential investors with indigenous partners (Rashid and Ghauri 2020). They also assist exporters in establishing distribution networks to expand the reach of Pakistani products in South Africa (Trade Development Authority of Pakistan 2021).

On the other hand, various barriers, including intricate regulations, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers impede bilateral trade (Khan 2023a). Both the SACU and the SADC impose high external tariffs. The exporters to South Africa have to navigate its import regulations and protective regime, which impose substantial duties and taxes and non-tariff barriers (Trade Commission of Pakistan, Johannesburg 2022). Pakistan's primary export goods face tariffs varying from zero per cent to 40 per cent when entering South Africa. Noteworthy non-tariff barriers include anti-dumping duties imposed on Pakistani cement, sub-optimal banking channels, and intricate import licensing and product certification procedures. Pakistan has taken tariff-related measures to boost exports to South Africa, including implementing a further two per cent duty drawback on textiles in 2018 (Khan 2018), providing an 80 per cent subsidy for trade fair participation in Africa, and introducing a 4.4 per cent duty drawback on electric fans (Amir & Khan, 2021).

Pakistan and South Africa have a promising economic future together. Pakistan can expand its exports by focusing on new, high-demand products. Both countries should encourage business exchanges and regular trade meetings to strengthen ties. Pakistani

investors in South Africa can benefit from joint ventures. To improve trade efficiency, they should address logistical hurdles, simplify procedures, and reduce barriers like anti-dumping duties. Collaboration on technical expertise and economic knowledge can further boost economic growth, aligning with South Africa's focus on South-South cooperation (Correspondent 2020a).

#### 3.3 Defence collaboration

Defence and security cooperation remains a significant aspect of Pakistan-South Africa bilateral relationship, notwithstanding its complex nature. Exchanges of high-level military delegations, defence cooperation, joint military exercises, arms trade, and training programmes for military personnel have been the major contours of this cooperation. These relations are primarily driven by Pakistan's strategic interests in the international system (Khan 2023b). This relationship has evolved since the 1990s, reaching its zenith during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Pakistan Air Force Chief 2019). In September 2016, the two states committed to enhancing their defence ties, with South Africa announcing intentions to establish a Defence Attaché office in Islamabad (Press Information Department 2016). Later, the initial reciprocal exchange of defence delegations and mutual interactions played a pivotal role in propelling the momentum to enhance these ties from 2014/2015. Consequently, discernible indications emerged, illustrating an augmentation in bilateral cooperation across a wide array of domains. A snapshot of the initial interactions is given in Table 2 below (compiled by the authors).

Table-2: Reciprocal exchanges of defence delegations and mutual interactions

Sr#	Nature of Interaction	Venue	Year
1	Pakistan participated in the Africa Aerospace and Defence-2012 (AAD) Exhibition	Waterkloof Air Force Base, Pretoria	2012
2	The meetings between Vice Admiral Johannes Mudimu, Chief of the South African Navy, and Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Raheel Sharif, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJSC) General Rashad Mahmood.	Rawalpindi	2014
3	A visit of the Paramount Group from South Africa, led by Ivor Ichikowitz, to the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC).	Rawalpindi	2014

4	A meeting between the Chief of the South African Army, Lieutenant General Vusumuzi Ramakala Masondo, and Pakistan's COAS General Raheel Sharif, along with CJCSC General Rashad Mahmood.	Rawalpindi	2014
5	A Pakistani delegation, led by Rana Tanveer Hussain, former Minister for Defence Production of Pakistan, visited South Africa for five days.	Pretoria	2015
6	A three-day, first-ever visit by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff (CoAS), General Raheel Sharif, to South Africa since 1994.	Pretoria	2015
7	Visit of the Naval Chief of Pakistan, Admiral Muhammad Zakaullah, to South Africa.	Pretoria	2016
8	Pakistan participated in the Africa Aerospace and Defense (AAD) Exhibition 2016	Waterkloof Air Force Base (AFB), Pretoria,	2016
9	South African companies such as Denel SOC Ltd., Rheinmetall Denel Munition, and Turbomeca Africa participated in the International Defence Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS).	Karachi	2016 2018
10	General Solly Zacharia Shoke, Chief of the SANDF, visited Pakistan.	Islamabad	2017
11	Vice Admiral Mosuwa Hlongwane, Chief of the South African Navy, called on Pakistan's Naval Chief, Admiral Muhammad Amjad Khan Niazi.	Islamabad	2022
12	General Nadeem Raza, the former CJCSC of Pakistan, visited South Africa.	South Africa	2022
13	Pakistan participated in the Africa Aerospace and Defense Exhibition (AAD).	Air Force Base (AFB) Waterkloof, Pretoria	2022
14	General Rudzani Maphwanya, the Chief of the SANDF, visited Pakistan.	Rawalpindi	2022

Pakistan and South Africa have developed a formal framework to facilitate cooperation in the defence sector. On 27 March 2017 they finalised a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 'Defence and Defence Industrial Cooperation' at the government level, which involved forming a joint committee aimed at bolstering formal defence collaboration between the two states (Associated Press of Pakistan 2017). It is argued that 'this will pave the way for strengthening and diversifying through formal structures, collaborative programmes, exchange of information and training of the armed forces

officers and soldiers' (Peter 2017a). Khwaja Asif, Pakistan's former Minister for Defence, commenting on the scope of MoU stated as follows:

Acquisition of defence equipment as well as cooperation in Research and Development (R&D), transfer of technology, co-production or joint ventures in public as well as private sectors, also fall within the domain of the MoU. The cooperation between both the countries will help open new vistas in both defence and defence production sectors (Correspondents 2017).

The MoU also involved exploring potential partnerships between Heavy Industries Taxila and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex with South African defence vendors such as Denel Aviation or Paramount Group (Khan 2017). This arrangement can create new opportunities and reduce Pakistan's reliance on Western states (Siddiqui 2017). Emphasising the significance of this initiative, Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula, South African Minister for Defence and Defence Industry, also remarked that:

The importance of continuous cementing of relations in an effort to share knowledge and ideas can never be over-emphasised. As the South Africa National Defence Force (SANDF) we believe in empowering ourselves and others through collaborative partnerships and agreements (SA and Pakistan sign, 2017).

Following the signing of the MoU, the military leadership of Pakistan and South Africa frequently interacted. Lynne Brown, South African Minister of Public Enterprises, Mogokare Seleke, the Department of Public Enterprises' Director-General, and Zwelakhe Ntshepe, the CEO of the Denel Group visited Pakistan in 2017. It was a significant stride to find out the prospect of collaboration between Denel, the state-owned arms and defence manufacturer of South Africa, and Pakistani enterprises alongside its defence forces (Cruywagen 2017). Lynne Brown, reiterating the importance of Pakistan-South Africa defence relations, stated that:

The South African Government views the relations with Pakistan as of great significance and relevance in the current global dynamics. I believe that the defence sector remains one area in which our countries have more opportunities to explore cooperation. The partnerships will enable both countries to share experiences and transfer technology, as well as the know-how. These investment opportunities

are within the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence and Industrial Cooperation (Cruywagen 2017a).

In January 2019, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, former COAS, and South African High Commissioner Mr Mpendulo Jelemet met in Rawalpindi to discuss mutual interests, regional security, and Pakistan-South Africa relations (Inter Services Public Relations 2019). During the same year, a meeting took place between General Qamar Javed Bajwa and Lieutenant General Lindile Yam, the Chief of the South African Army. According to an official statement issued by the South African military, 'the goodwill visit is aimed at enhancing bilateral relations between the two armies, sharing ideas pertaining to cutting-edge defence technology and best practices employed by their respective defence industries' (Martin 2019). Similarly, General Qamar Bajwa accentuated that:

South Africa has a good technological base that we want to benefit from. Despite the geographical distance between Pakistan and South Africa, our thinking and understanding of world affairs are quite similar. Both South Africa and Pakistan have similar foreign policy outlooks. The opportunities for military-to-military cooperation are immense. Pakistan could be a potential arms supplier for South Africa, and businessmen in South Africa can also benefit from what is produced in Pakistan (Martin 2019).

On 24 October 2019, Air Chief Marshal Mujahid Anwar Khan, the former Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, and his South African counterpart, Lieutenant General Fabian Msimang, discussed defence cooperation and agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation, engage in the exploration of shared areas of interest, and cooperate on training facilities (Zahid 2019). On the other hand, Msimang lauded the professionalism of the Pakistan Air Force and its domestically manufactured equipment including JF-17, K-8, and the Super Mushshak ('Pakistan Air Force Chief' 2019). On 22 December 2019, the Pakistan Navy vessels MOAWIN and ASLAT embarked on an overseas deployment and arrived at Simon's Town, South Africa (Recorder Report 2019). It was followed by an encouraging interaction with the South African Navy's Flag Officer and Chief Magistrate with regard to the expansion of maritime security (Inter Services Public Relations 2019a).

General Rudzani Maphwanya, Chief of SANDF, paid an official visit to Pakistan on 27–28 July 2021. During his visit, he had meetings with the President of Pakistan

Arif Alvi, General Nadeem Raza, the then Chairman of the JCSC, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan's COAS, and Admiral Muhammad Amjad Khan Niazi, Chief of the Naval Staff. According to Inter-Services Public Relations (2021):

During the meetings both sides deliberated upon bilateral cooperation, security and prevailing regional environment. The dignitaries dilated upon measures to enhance the level and scope of military to military engagements between both countries and reaffirmed to continue to forge deeper ties. The visiting dignitary lauded the professionalism of Pakistan Armed Forces and acknowledged their sacrifices in fight against terrorism.

Furthermore, the President of Pakistan also underscored the significance of Pakistan-South Africa defence cooperation by stating that:

Pakistan and South Africa enjoy excellent cooperation in the field of defence which needs to be further expanded for the mutual benefit of the two countries. Pakistan wants to further enhance trade, investment and defence relations with South Africa. Pakistan attaches great importance to its ties with South Africa under its "Look Africa" policy and wants to increase the frequency of exchanges at military and political levels to further cement bilateral ties (Radio Pakistan 2021).

Pakistan has shown interest in the procurement of military hardware from South Africa ('Chief of the SANDF' 2021). This acquisition underscores Pakistan's commitment to modernising its armed forces and enhancing its strategic capabilities. As per reports from the South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) spanning the years 2000 to 2021, Pakistan has been the recipient of South African defence equipment over the years (https://www.sipri.org/databases/national-reports/South%20Africa). Accordingly, the main categories of this procurement have been Sensitive Major Significant Equipment (SMSE), Non-sensitive Equipment (NSE), General Services (GS), and Sensitive Significant Equipment (SSE). Table 3 below provides the Rand value of these transactions (compiled by the authors).

Table-3: Rand Values of Pakistan's defence imports from South Africa 2000-2021

Year	Type and Description					
[	SMSE	NSE	GS	SSE		
2000	2294000	39481000	23488000			
2001	1825000	43779000	2035000			
2002	19300000	10198000				
2003	8134000	49195000				
2004	5468698	95886133				
2005	8569087	21040850				
2006	18495.234	7023769				
2007	4278015	27195356	3267450	2121281		
2008	6862636	13806497	8953.151			
2009	550739	30409508	8551142			
2010		6608253	28005912			
2011		21363982	28093576			
2012		118118284	21749566			
2013		2427220		45173250		
2014	2612795	1926108				
2017				45173250		
2018		926168		10267865		
2019				65297006		
2020		15446238		66662643		
2021		7356616				

The exchange of military training programs is another aspect of Pakistan-South Africa defence cooperation aimed at enhancing their defence capabilities. A considerable number of members from the SANDF have received training from Pakistan. Similarly, the South African Army College reciprocated by providing training to the Pakistani military personnel. Pakistan's military officers attended Executive National Security Programme-2002 and 2003 and Joint Senior Command and Staff Course-2002 at training institutions of the SANDF (Lekota 2003: 55). On the other hand, officials from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs participated in the '13th Advanced Diplomatic Course' for African diplomats, which was conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of External Relations of Pakistan (South African Government 2003: 153).

Approximately 40 commanders from South Africa received training in counterterrorism tactics and special operations from Pakistani Special Forces in 2019 (Martin 2022). Moreover, Captain Caven Khoshi Matsho, a South African junior infantry officer, was the first to attend and complete an advanced commando course in Pakistan in 2020 ('Junior infantry officer' 2020).

Pakistan and South Africa's shared history and strategic interests have fostered strong defence cooperation. This is evidenced by their government agreements, military exchanges, and joint training programs. Both countries seek to collaborate in defence research and technology transfer. Opportunities exist for deeper cooperation in areas like technological advancement, peacekeeping missions, and counter-terrorism expertise sharing. However, the extent and nature of this partnership can be influenced by internal political and economic factors within each country.

#### 3.4 Pakistani Diaspora

The significant presence of the Pakistani diaspora in South Africa constitutes a crucial dimension of Pakistan-South Africa bilateral relations. Pakistanis constitute less than one per cent of South Africa's population. The Pakistani South African community traces its origins to labourers and migrants who arrived from British India in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Over the past decade, the influx of Pakistani nationals into South Africa has increased substantially. In 2010, the Pakistani diaspora in South Africa was estimated to be between 70 000 and 100 000 (Park and Rugunanan 2010). By 2019, this number had grown to approximately 100 000, out of a total of six million foreign nationals in the country (Malope 2019). By 2021, the Pakistani population in South Africa had reached 170 000 (Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development 2021). As of 2024, around 200 000 Pakistanis are residing in South Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan 2024). The number of workers who proceeded to South Africa for employment, as registered by the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BE&OE) during the Financial Year 2020-21 and 2021-22, was 22 and 46 respectively (Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development 2022). Most of the Pakistani diaspora reside in Cape Town, Johannesburg, Durban, and Grahamstown. Pakistanis formed their first community group, the South African Pakistani Association (SAPA), on 9 September 2009 with the aim 'to assist the Pakistani community living in South Africa and promote bilateral cooperation between South Africa and Pakistan in social, political, economic and in art & culture fields' (Park and Rugunanan, 2010). The Pakistan South Africa Association, with its central executive office based in Pretoria, operates 16 units across all provinces and maintains an active presence on social media, effectively representing Pakistanis throughout South Africa.

Singh (2015) investigated the arrival and settlement of Pakistanis in Verulam, a town on the North Coast of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, focusing on the prominence of Pakistani-controlled businesses in the area. Pillay (2010) argued that there is a growing trend of Pakistani immigrants acquiring citizenship in South Africa, focusing his Durban-based research on investigating the personal, social, and political factors shaping their pathways to citizenship. This study concluded as follows:

Pakistanis are satisfied with their personal decision to gain citizenship. They consider themselves privileged as they are able to live their lives as fully fledged South Africans without having to abandon their contact with Pakistan. The locals have treated them respectfully and have embraced their differences which have helped their assimilation to progress naturally with time. Furthermore, they stay abreast of current affairs and advocate the importance of political participation and all the social and political benefits in South Africa served as further motivations for them to gain citizenship. Pakistani citizens are educated and professional additions to South Africa and their greatest ambition is to make an impact in the country which they call their new home (Pillay 2010).

Most Pakistanis work in small-scale businesses, although there are a few highly successful Pakistani businessmen and a handful of large Pakistani overseas enterprises. Research indicates that Pakistani retailers concentrate on selling cell phone accessories and repairs, computer services, medical supplies, linens, leather goods, fabrics, and household items. In border and rural areas, Pakistanis also manage substantial grocery stores like 'Cash n Carry' outlets. In Johannesburg's Oriental Plaza, approximately onethird of the retail shops, predominantly rented from Indian South African owners, are now operated by foreigners, mostly from Pakistan (Park and Rugunanan 2010). According to the then commercial secretary at Pakistan's embassy in South Africa, 'The Pakistani community in South Africa, by and large, is associated with small-scale businesses, thus contributing positively towards the South African economy, in addition to providing employment to South Africans' (Malope 2019). The Pakistan South Africa Association, with its central executive office based in Pretoria, operates 16 units across

all provinces and maintains an active presence on social media, effectively representing Pakistanis throughout South Africa. Despite the presence of Pakistani expatriates in South Africa, cultural relations remain limited, indicating a need for enhancement. This can be achieved through initiatives such as promoting Pakistani films, dramas, and organising cultural events (Institute of Policy Studies 2021).

#### 4. Conclusion

This study reveals a complex picture of Pakistan-South Africa bilateral relations. Though formal ties began in 1994, their connection stretches back for decades. The shared interests bridge the geographic distance between the two nations. Cooperation has fostered a multifaceted relationship across political, economic, and defence spheres. Regular high-level visits and formal mechanisms like the 1999 Joint Commission and the 2021 Pakistan-South Africa Joint Commission facilitate and regulate bilateral collaboration. However, infrequent political engagement and limited functionality of the institutional mechanisms hinder the full potential of the relationship.

Pakistan and South Africa have witnessed steady growth in economic cooperation, driven by shared interests in trade and investment. However, Pakistan faces a trade imbalance in this relationship. Regulatory hurdles, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers pose significant challenges. Despite the strong bilateral relations, there remains significant scope to increase trade volume. Since the 1990s, Pakistan and South Africa's defence cooperation has evolved and grown, characterised by a robust connection between their respective defence establishments. This cooperation was further strengthened by a government-to-government Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 'Defence and Defence Industrial Cooperation' signed in 2017.

Despite a strong foundation of shared values and historical solidarity, Pakistan and South Africa's relationship holds significant untapped potential. Pakistan's recent 'Engage Africa' initiatives offer a chance to bridge the gap between political ties and substantial economic and defence cooperation. By working together on shared interests and overcoming current challenges, they can build long-term, mutually beneficial partnerships across various sectors. This collaboration could strengthen Pakistan's global position, economic growth, and national security.

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# Regulatory Compliance: A Crucial Governance Obligation in Advancing Accountable Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) under the AfCFTA Agreement

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#### **Abstract**

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), once fully implemented, provides the basis for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects to become the most appropriate means to facilitate and contribute to meeting the economic development goals of individual African states. However, the agreement emerges against the backdrop of chronic institutional governance failures in matters of public resource management, which continue to affect the service delivery mandate of governments in developing states. Therefore, any such project needs to guarantee accountable, efficient, effective, and result-driven outcomes. This is to safeguard against such initiatives not depriving citizens of benefitting. The article presents regulatory compliance as a crucial component in the role of private and public entities to assist governments to realise developmental goals through suitable joint venture projects.

A case study analysis presents the causal link between governance failures and incidents of governance interventions on such development instruments. The case study approach is appropriate due, largely, to its interpretive and inductive qualities. It uses South Africa as the primary real-life setting to appraise the issue, particularly as certain findings from the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption, and Fraud in the Public Sector, including Organs of State, expressed an opinion on instances where joint projects were to ensure that benefits equally accrue to



the citizenry. An ethics theoretical framework facilitates the exploration of the subject matter, more so, as regulatory compliance advances institutional integrity and ethical practices. Findings made also attest to certain limitations in matters of governance oversight. For example, the implementation of regulatory compliance strategies is a concerning part of project governance. Conclusions uphold that even with the extensive nature of regulatory compliance requirements, along with perceptions of the burdensome nature aligned to it, compliance management remains a vital governance component.

Keywords: African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), ethics, governance, Public-Private Partnership (PPP), regulatory compliance, service delivery

#### 1. Introduction

With the adoption of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement as central to advancing the economic development goals of African states, the initiative underscores the African Union's (AU) Agenda 2063 of ensuring the promotion of the economic transformation of the African continent under the slogan "The Africa We Want" (African Union 2022). The paper explains that the drive to give effect to the economic development of African states is also vested in the manner in which joint projects enable such endeavours. Notwithstanding increased concerns that project governance failures of capital-intensive joint ventures between the state and private entities are a worrisome reality (Bekker 2014), the economic growth challenges of developing countries allow for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects to provide the necessary means to facilitate the attainment of national development goals. Some of the areas of concern pertain to the disbursement of project funds in an unregulated environment, or the disregard of available legal instruments, as risk-mitigating tools. Irregularities of this nature find placement in case law, with specific reference to the nature and extent of malfeasance (wrongdoings by public officials), misfeasance (improper performance of a lawful act), and nonfeasance (failure or omission to perform an obligatory or compulsory act) (Mishra 2019; Naidoo 2022; O'Regan 2022; Farlam 2005).

Therefore, the extent to which infrastructure and/or resource projects are to facilitate the achievement of the outlined objectives under the AfCFTA agreement relies on the degree to which individual countries ensure the creation and sustainment of conducive investment environments informed by, among others, available legal instruments and enforcement resources aligned to it. This article appraises the emergence of the agreement within the context of the benefits of PPP projects to the socio-economic development goals of AU countries. Further relevance is drawn from the understanding of, specifically infrastructure projects, as involving "blended finance to enable the efficient execution of socio-economic infrastructure programmes and projects" (Development Bank of Southern Africa 2022 para. 2). Benchmarked compliance guidelines for joint venture projects follow best practice standards, with the attached Table 1 serving to highlight this actuality. The content derives from various legal instruments at a national, regional, and international level of, for example, Nigeria, South Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the G20 High-Level Principles on PPPs (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2022). The inclusion of these guidelines further contextualises the potential of the agreement, as well as finding support through the presence of appropriate legal frameworks at country and regional levels.

The exploration of the subject incorporates an inductive qualitative approach, which is focused on content analysis of official reports, legislation, academic studies, and media articles as the collective and primary basis of inquiry. The inclusion of case studies serves to give credence to the triangulation of information, with specific attention to describe the purpose, nature, and extent of joint projects over time. Particular attention is given to the South African context as various findings of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption, and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State (hereafter Zondo Commission) highlighted the extent of exploitation of joint projects to the detriment of good governance and stakeholder benefit. A rudimentary assessment of public interest in the testimonies delivered at the Commission reflected in the ever-increasing number of viewers on various broadcasting platforms, as new revelations emerged. This, as public access to the commencement and finalisation of the commission's task, aligns with the view that the entrenchment of transparency only serves to facilitate the means to strengthen "weakened institutions and corruption-enabling loopholes" (Madubela 2022, para. 3).

# 2. The Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

The AfCFTA not only represents the largest free trade area involving 55 member states

of the AU but also comprises eight regional economic communities brought together to create a single market for the African continent. This initiative was formalised on 21 March 2018 in Kigali, Rwanda, with the signed protocol, then involving 44 of the 55 African states, ratified on 30 May 2019 and effective since January 2021 (African Union 2018; 2023b). Besides the primary purpose of the agreement as geared towards enabling the free flow of goods and services across the continent, with the associated goal of enhancing the trading position of the continent on the global scene (African Union 2023b), it seeks to promote and attain sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development (Mene 2023). In so doing, the signed protocol, directing the creation of a single market, seeks to:

- Establish a liberal market through multiple rounds of negotiations
- · Move towards the establishment of a future continental customs union
- · Achieve sustainable and inclusive socioeconomic development, gender equality, and structural transformations within member states
- Enhance the competitiveness of member states within Africa in the global market
- · Encourage industrial development through diversification and regional value chain development, agricultural development, and food security
- · Resolve challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships (South African Revenue Service 2022, para. 4)

Part of the agreement involved the establishment of a Secretariat, currently headed by South African Wankele Mene as Secretary-General, under a four-year term (01 March 2020 to 31 March 2024). Since 17 October 2020, the Secretariat has been located in Accra, Ghana, having received an initial financial contribution of \$5 million to give effect to the stipulations under the trade arrangement. This was followed by the African Development Bank (ADB), through the African Development Fund, providing an additional \$11 million in 2019 (African Development Bank 2022a). As the African Union Summit of 2023 adopted 2023 as the "Year of AfCFTA: Acceleration of the African Continental Free Trade Area implementation" (African Union 2023a), the World Bank cautions that where the initiative seeks to lift an additional 30 million people out of poverty, its impact may not be uniform in terms of economic benefits that emerge from the initiative (Thomas 2022, para. 16-17). Nonetheless, international institutions, business entities, and scholars alike consider the initiative as best placed to ensure increased business opportunities and economic growth on the continent. Specifically, promotional views acknowledge that a successful implementation will create a "combined consumer and business spending of \$6.7 trillion by 2030 and \$16.12 trillion by 2050" (Signé 2022, para. 4). It is in this context that PPPs find contextual relevance.

#### 2.1 Opportunity landscape for PPPs

With the 36th AU Summit having outlined 2023 to focus on promoting business opportunities within the tourism, transport, business services, communication, and financial services sectors (African Union 2023c), such new economic opportunities bode well to facilitate investment in human capital (World Bank 2022), as well as reducing poverty on the continent (Abrego et al 2019). Most importantly, these business opportunities align with ongoing infrastructure development projects, with any such positioned as key catalysts to facilitate these targeted economic needs for African countries. This, as the post-Covid-19 period, created the necessity for governments to underpin their respective economic recovery plans through infrastructure development initiatives (Ramaphosa 2020a). The approval of a loan arrangement of \$50 million, involving the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), under its OPEC Fund and in collaboration with the African Finance Cooperation towards meeting the infrastructure needs in Africa, serves as a recent example (OPEC 2021). Concerning Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) investments, available data informs that while South Africa attracted an estimated \$826 million in 2021, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) topped the list of Sub-Saharan countries with \$1.1 billion PPI investments, covering three major projects (World Bank 2021a).

Even then, in the South African context, the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) highlighted that public sector infrastructure expenditure and estimates involved an estimated amount of R226 billion for the 2020-2021 financial year (Auditor-General of South Africa 2021a). This extends to the creation of South Africa's Infrastructure Fund, as announced by President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018, with an envisaged amount of R1 trillion earmarked for infrastructure projects (Development Bank of Southern Africa 2022). Following this proposal, was the launch of the estimated R84 billion social housing development initiative in Mooikloof, Pretoria, through a PPP model. It is one of many related endeavours to realise the country's growing housing infrastructure need, underpinned by the government's spatial integration development model (Ramaphosa 2020b).

National development plans of the respective African countries further bolster the significance and appropriateness of this continental initiative. As a point of elucidation is the case of Côte d'Ivoire, with its development plan for 2021-2025 emphasising the reconstruction of its economy as a key factor to ensure that the country sustains its post-conflict role in matters of economic, political, and security prominence in West Africa (The Africa Report 2021). The country is also one of the fastest growing economies in the West Africa region (Oluwole 2022), with the African Development Bank (2022b, para. 4) outlining that attention to strategic logistics infrastructure, expanded construction projects, and planned energy projects foresee a projected economic growth 6.8 per cent in 2022 to 7.2 per cent in 2023. Complimentary to this development is an increase in bilateral trade between South Africa and the Ivorian nation (South African Presidency 2022), which further translates into boosted business confidence.

An equally significant and associated development aligned to the implementation of the *AfCFTA agreement* is that the South African Revenue Service (SARS) has been assigned the responsibility of implementation agency for the preferential trade agreements (South African Revenue Service 2022). At best, this responsibility brings into context the significance, confidence, and contributory role South African public entities fulfil in advancing the aims of the AfCFTA initiative.

# 2.2 Understandings of PPPs in the context of socioeconomic development needs

Writings on PPPs are exhaustive in their description of the concept. For example, a basic search locates 13 000 scholarly publications on a single search platform on the subject. A general definition describes it as a long-term contractual relationship between public and private parties, awarded through a competitive tendering process (Zeidy 2020). An expanded definition used by the South African National Treasury expresses it as long-term contracts between the public and private sectors, intending to ensure the delivery of well-maintained, cost-effective public infrastructure or service, by leveraging private sector expertise and sharing risk with the private sector (South African National Treasury 2015, as quoted in Iwegbuna 2019; Zeidy 2020). The concept is also used to describe various contract types, such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) where private companies are involved in the financing, construction, and management of new

public assets (World Bank 2022).

Additionally, it is a contract between a public sector institution and a private party where the private party assumes the substantial financial, technical, and operational risk of the project (Farlam 2005). Moreover, it refers to any arrangement on a spectrum for alternative service delivery arrangements from a simple management contract to a complete concession for a private service provider (Viljoen 2019). In the South African context, the PPP model provides insight into the current administration's placement of infrastructure projects as a central pillar to advance economic and social goals under the National Infrastructure Plan 2050. Overall, the latter plan seeks to target a 30 per cent investment-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio with one-third thereof to be delivered by the government. Of importance is that the cost of delivering infrastructure needs is estimated to exceed R6 trillion between 2016 and 2040, with energy and transport to account for 72 per cent of the expenditure (South African Department of Public Works and Infrastructure 2022, 3). Available data from the South African National Treasury informs that with the introduction of PPPs in 1998, the country was able to register the successful conclusion of 31 PPPs. The overall value of these projects constituted R16.5 billion of the R947.2 billion demarcated for public-sector infrastructure spending (South African National Treasury 2017). Updated data for 2021 outlines that 34 PPPs were finalised, with a combined value of R89.3 billion (South African National Treasury 2021). Although the National Treasury recorded a decline in new PPP transactions from an estimated R10.7 billion in 2011-2012 to R5.6 billion in 2019-2020 (Hadebe, Likhanya and Pierce 2021), such projects remain central to the realisation of the set objectives under the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030.

#### 2.3 Implementation risks to AfCFTA and PPPs

While the post-COVID-19 period has seen the resumption and gradual improvement in economic activities globally, the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, for example, continues to manifest in different ways for African countries. Most evident are food security concerns due to higher energy prices, as well as price increases in basic food products at the consumer end (Vines 2023). These factors pose threats to the internal stability of countries if not managed effectively by governments, more so when the consequence of such international events translates into increased incidents of protests in some African countries. Associated economic pressures on governments may present in incidents of nationalist populism. The case of the Tunisian president

who is on record as blaming illegal migration into, and through, the Tunisian borders as an attempt to change the demographic characteristic of the Tunisian population, which in turn resulted in incidents of violence against Black Africans (Gaidi 2023), aligns with the reasoning.

#### 2.3.1 Associated risks to the AfCFTA protocol

The implications of not giving sustained attention to intra-state conflict indicators such as poverty, human rights violations, and disproportional development programs to benefit all sectors of society in respective AU countries, increase the potential of the continental agreement's primary objectives becoming undermined. For example, most national development plans give attention to youth development, more so as the continent's overall demographic profile consists of 70 per cent of young people under the age of 30 (Mulikita 2022), along with predictions of the number to increase to 75 per cent by 2030 (Perlotto 2019), youth disillusionment (World Economic Forum 2021) due to, among other, lack of access to employment opportunities, makes the sector attractive for recruitment by extremist groupings (Steiner 2022).

Adjoined to such realities are national and regional security threats, characterised by increased violent extremism, political instability, and transnational organised crime (Adeleke and Tayo 2022) as the three main risks to the implementation of the AfCFTA agreement. The interconnectedness of these three risks to national and regional security is reflected in, for example, the threat posed by jihadist groups in West Africa. This, as the fear of increased insurgencies across national borders, is accompanied by displacement of people and increased attacks on security forces, which in turn further weakens the available countering resources of West African States (de Rohan Chabot 2023). Compounding the problem even further is targeted kidnappings for ransom demands (Hoinathy and Fru 2022) by insurgency groups to finance terrorist activities. Presently, Nigeria ranks as the top West African country for such threats, with over 3 000 individuals kidnapped in 2021, involving either criminals, insurgents, or terroristassociated groupings responsible for such acts (Okoli 2021). The recent release of a French journalist and a United States of America (USA) aid worker in Niger, elucidates previous cases, involving a total of 25 foreign nationals that were abducted and held for ransom in the Sahel region since 2015 (Mamane, Tucker and Larson 2023, para. 27).

The impact of climate change complicates the stable outlook for African countries further, with increased periods of drought, as well as torrential rains affecting the ability

to guarantee sustained food production and access to it. Sub-Saharan African countries represent 95 per cent of rain-fed agriculture globally, with seven of the 10 countries most vulnerable to climate change located in Africa (Africa Development Bank 2019, paras. 2-3).

Risks associated with the overall lack of infrastructure in most countries in the spheres of Information Communication Technology (ICT), including resistance to adopting a zero-point tariff change to ensure the effective implementation of the *AfCFTA agreement*, add to the risk profile. In the case of ICT as a risk, it is regarded as a crucial impediment to the development prospects of states, with the need for an estimated \$3 billion annual investment to address the ICT shortcomings (Corrigan 2020).

#### 2.3.2 Risks to PPP projects

Available data informs that PPP projects tend to be managed in a high-risk environment, especially where African states experience the highest capital flight (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2005) with a figure of \$5 trillion attached to the matter since 1970 (Kozul-Wright 2022). Not only do fraud and corruption pose immense risks to the outcome of PPPs (Wood 2019), but the lack of attention on the matter of accountability (Suttner 2016), only serves to increase the risk appraisal of such projects. A particular aspect associated with this risk derives from either the absence or compromise of compliance controls. One of the fundamental principles that define the approval of any PPP project is premised on it being awarded through a competitive tendering process (Zeidy 2020). However, any deviation from this standard practice still warrants that pre-qualification and registration procedures be adhered to (South African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 2022a, 850). For this to happen and be sustained, requires a functional, effective, and competent public sector to enable an investment environment that is conducive to this venture (Montiel, 2006).

Even then, corrupt practices emerge through attempts to influence public officials in the form of payments of cash bribes (South African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 2022b, 701), with the intention for trusted accomplices to facilitate a particular outcome in favour of parties that were not supposed to legally benefit from such a transaction (Grobler 2020; Nyaungwa 2019).

#### 3. Some theoretical context

Available literature directs that even where regulatory compliance presents as common language use, it is still under-developed as a practice and business process application in the public sector (South African Department of Public Service and Administration 2022; Ensor 2021). As a root term, compliance also generates different meanings. For example, for the legal professional it would imply the need to obey the law. In the ambit of risk management, the concept emphasises matters of potential liabilities under the law (Giles 2016). Conjoined, regulatory compliance expresses a set of guidelines that the law requires organisations to follow. From an application perspective, it seeks to give effect to the principles of, among others, integrity and safety, as well as ethical behaviour in business processes and practices.

Institutional governance failures that result from non-compliance to set obligatory standards in finance resource management, bring into stark contrast the applicability of theories aligned to corporate governance. For example, a stewardship disposition upholds the view that those entrusted with giving effect to the PPP project, must ensure sustaining the legitimacy of the process, institutional integrity, public trust, and the legacy element of "value for money" (Soyeju 2013). The fact that the theoretical construct of the PPP concept implies such an expectation equally applies to the design and execution phases of such projects. Accountable leadership becomes a key requirement in managing the PPPs, to the extent that it aligns with the legal and ethical expectation of fulfilling a duty of care (Joubert 2017). This, as the virtue ethics theory, promotes moral excellence and good character as key principles. Case law provides clear examples of how ethics have become recognised as integral to corporate governance and business conduct in the delivery of legal judgements (Van Zyl and Visser 2016; Chuene, Demarthe and Mokoena 2020). Essentially, the moral character of a leader or public functionary is on equal footing with the technical acumen of the individual in matters of appointments and governance expectations (Pillay and Jones 2020).

The significance of an ethics-driven approach to project governance finds relevance in the volume of legal cases and incidents where misrepresentation of material facts (non-disclosure of conflict of interests, false statements, or omission of facts) becomes self-evident. The participatory characteristic of PPPs also aligns with the Participatory Governance Theory in matters of intrinsic value (or opportunity element) and the process element of participation. The intrinsic value or opportunity element explains how participatory governance assists stakeholders in achieving the ethics fundamental

of good for self and others. In this instance, "self" and "other" imply the public-private partnership, where the public partner, in the form of a government entity, also serves as representative of the public interest. The associated process element, in turn, denotes how accountable, efficient, effective, and result-driven outcomes are achieved (Osmani 2008: 2).

# 4. South Africa as a case study: reflection

Case Law argues that the mismanaging of PPP projects results in substantial harm to both municipalities and the public (Case Law 2018). In support is an assessment of the financial viability of most municipalities, where the largest portion of service delivery needs are concentrated and where PPPs are targeted, contrasting with best practice principles in matters of creditworthiness and availability of institutional skills to provide management and oversight (World Bank 2019). The AGSA's 2020-2021 municipal evaluation informs that in 81 per cent of such cases, the action only occurred after the said institution had issued notifications (Auditor-General of South Africa 2022). A close read of available literature on corruption and fraud at the municipal level, which constitutes the primary area where joint projects are approved and managed (Auditor-General of South Africa 2021a, 2021b; Department of Public Service and Administration 2019; 2021), clearly informs that regulatory compliance challenges persist. Hence, the use of case studies provides insight into the experiential knowledge of an incident, phenomenon, or event as it evolves over time, through descriptive and conceptual analysis (Corcoran, Walker and Wals 2004).

For social scientists, a focus on qualitative case studies assists in theory development, while also providing the basis for "lessons learned" (Rowley, 2002; George and Bennet 2004). The adoption of the method serves to complement the various sources of information used for purposes of triangulation (Kohlbacher 2006). Even where South Africa is placed as a single case, the number of similar incidents related to PPP projects over time, and which George and Bennet (2004: 18) refer to as a "class of events", validates the adoption and applicability of this descriptive approach. The reference to similar regulatory compliance challenges in the managing of PPP projects in other developing countries asserts the scholarly view that within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons, provide a stronger means of drawing inferences (Rowley 2002; George and Bennet 2004). Therefore, the attention given to various cases of compliance challenges in public entities over time, to date, provides further impetus to reflect on South Africa

as a case reference. With audit findings from the AGSA, the most appropriate included in its 2022-released report on municipalities covering the period of 2020-2021, outlines that identified non-compliance and fraud incidents resulted in material financial losses estimated at R3.9 billion (Auditor-General of South Africa 2022).

#### 4.1 The regulatory compliance framework on PPPs in South Africa

Some studies on PPPs in South Africa inform that the country had developed a robust policy and regulatory framework for such business initiatives, but with an inadequate level of PPP awareness and training, along with a lack of project management capacity to facilitate the expansion of such deals (Nyagwachi 2008). When operational, the country is not utilising PPP resources effectively, with limited PPP initiatives undertaken in certain infrastructure projects (Viljoen 2019). Furthermore, a continental assessment of the absence of specific legislation to address PPP initiatives highlighted that South Africa is not alone. This is evident in a 2017-benchmarked finding, informing that only about 30 African countries have adopted laws relating to PPPs (World Bank 2021b). It is common cause that countries with or without dedicated PPP laws are experiencing similar PPP challenges to attract PPP ventures (Vallée 2018). On regulatory-specific instruments, South Africa uses the Municipal Public-Private Partnership Regulations under the Local Government Municipal Finance Management (Act 6 of 2003), the Revised Public Finance Management Act of 2015, as well as the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework of 2000 as sectoral legislation in advancing PPP regulatory compliance (World Bank 2021b). The enactment of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2019, in turn broadened the strategic risk mitigation framework on infrastructure development (South African National Treasury 2019). At the time of writing, the envisaged Public Procurement legislation is still a work-inprogress (Metelerkamp 2022).

From a benchmark perspective, Nigeria becomes one of the many countries suited to draw significant correlations. At a glance, it is not only based on the country accounting for 64 percent of South African trade with West African countries (Adekoya 2021) but also due to some of the comparable characteristics to regulatory compliance risks and countering mechanisms (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2019; San 2020). The Nigerian environment adopted its Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act (ICRCA), passed in 2005, to cater for PPP projects through its Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC), as established in 2008.

Supportive legislation includes, among others, its Public Enterprises Privatisation and Commercialisation Act of 1999, the Public Procurement Act of 2007 that in turn brought about the Bureau of Public Procurement along with its adoption of the 2007 Public Procurement Regulations (Atoyebi and Samaila 2022).

#### 4.2 Specific risks associated with PPP projects in South Africa

The manner in which regulatory compliance is realised at the various levels of implementation, monitoring, and evaluation, becomes an issue of contention. The prevalence of corrupt practices, along with the absence of robust early warning systems (Irish-Qhobosheane 2022) to detect and deter comprising of such projects, remains a present threat to effective regulatory compliance. To elucidate this inference, the following aspects, directly related to the risk environment, become important to contextualise:

#### 4.2.1 The impact of organised crime and corruption

Most infrastructure projects in the country, with specific reference to the construction industry, have become targets for extortion. Consequently, cases of unethical practices become evident where, for instance, the issuance of payments determines project continuity, to the detriment of good governance practices and ethical conduct (South African Special Investigative Unit 2021; Jika, Nombembe and Hlangu 2022). As a result, an estimated 188 infrastructure and construction projects, valued at R72 billion, remain affected by such criminal acts (Irish-Qhobosheane 2022; Jika, Nombembe and Hlangu 2022). Hence the increased calls for decisive action in dealing with these crimes to promote inclusive growth (Ramaphosa 2020b). That the enactment of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2019 resulted from the extent of cable theft and the subsequent negative impact on the public purse, economic activities, and associated growth, is a positive development. Reported cases inform on the increased arrests of individuals, inclusive of public servants (Du Plessis 2022; Slater 2022) implicated in such criminal acts, with state and business entities declaring annual losses of R7 billion (Bloomberg 2022).

#### 4.2.2 Public procurement

Although the South African public sector has a dedicated Chief Procurement Officer

located in the National Treasury with the task of managing procurement reforms, maintaining the procurement system, and overseeing the government-private sector business interface (South African National Treasury 2020), continuous cases of tender fraud remain a constant focus area (Auditor-General of South Africa 2021a; Broughton 2022; Chelin 2021). In the cases involving COVID-19 procurement, the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) outlined in its final report that the total amount investigated amounted to R7.8 billion (Koko 2022). Compounding the situation further is the revelation that the procurement system is not only devoid of an overall digitised practice but also characterised by a decentralised process with the existence of 1 000 procuring entities. Most concerning is that the central procurement database consists of 1.7 million registered companies and only 1.2 million are properly vetted (Metelerkamp 2022).

#### 4.2.3 Absence of a proactive compliance management process

Adherence to regulatory compliance involves the adoption of a suitable approach. Despite having sufficient legislation and policy guidelines in place, adherence to regulatory compliance requirements remains a challenge. A holistic regulatory compliance management landscape requires a top-down compliance framework that is characterised by the presence of national and provincial legislation to ensure both business confidence and governance assurance of any PPP project. Legal instruments on joint ventures at the local government level require public officials to ensure that project governance controls allow for end-to-end quality assurance. Factors that must be included, involve the need to conduct assessments on design development and actual approval thereof by the relevant Accounting Officer or Accounting Authority. Congruent thereto is to appraise whether there are adequate capacity and skills in place at the level of the project developer, as well as those assigned to ensure the project is completed in time, on budget, and with the requisite initial specifications approved. Attentiveness to the interests and participation of various stakeholders becomes an additional and important consideration (Auditor-General of South Africa 2021).

# 5. Findings

An appraisal of a total of over 20 dissertations and theses, covering the period 2003 to 2022, collectively highlights the following conclusions on regulatory compliance of infrastructural joint ventures, notably:

- · PPP projects transcend all three tiers (local, provincial, and national government) of South Africa's administrative landscape.
- PPP projects in the water sector align with international studies that water infrastructure projects present the biggest financing and governance challenges (Khoza 2021; Khuzwayo, 2014; Makhari, 2016; Avello 2022; Pusok 2016).
- Institutional and regulatory administrative reform processes are not fully developed, with a legal and policy framework for municipal PPPs still fragmented (Mabuza, 2016), along with a need to attend to governance and accountable administration processes (Viljoen 2019).
- · The Mismanagement of funds, as well as non-compliance with design requirements associated with road construction PPP projects (Mugarura 2019).

#### 5.1 Benchmarked compliance guidelines

While most transactional arrangements and business practices adopt a risk-based compliance approach (Giles 2016), it becomes apparent that a best practice compliance approach becomes a second option that can be adopted concurrently with the former. Specifically, the intention of a compliance approach is by design aimed at being proactive, thus preventative and sustainable (Sadiq and Governatori 2013). Table 1 serves to underline this point.

As a governance standard and ethical value, accountability reflects an overarching aspect that permeates institutional governance challenges (Tandwa 2021). For example, consecutive audit outcomes on PPP projects reveal that in many cases controls over the infrastructure delivery process are not effective. As a consequence, deficiencies akin to inadequate planning, late completion of projects, increase in budgeted cost, poor building quality, and under- or non-utilisation of completed infrastructure assets (Auditor-General of South Africa 2021a) manifest in losses, fruitless and wasteful expenditure, as well as impacting business confidence negatively. The matter of accountability finds placement in the effectiveness of institutional leadership.

The enactment of the Public Audit Amendment Act of 2018 serves as a regulatory compliance instrument that enables the office of the AGSA to impose appropriate sanctions. As an outcome, some municipalities have already adopted consequence management policies as part of a governance framework under the national department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (Cogta). While such strategic initiatives remain commendable, their practical impetus at the levels of task execution becomes a continuous point of concern (Felix 2021; Mavuso 2022).

Public perceptions and/or reported cases of leadership's inability to address regulatory compliance management deficiencies compound the compliance problem. The body of knowledge on regulatory compliance attests that some of the major challenges government entities experience involve:

- (i) a lack of an organised approach to managing compliance
- (ii) compliance strategies are not followed through to the end to see benefits
- (iii) junior-level employees are assigned to project management positions with limited help to be efficient and effective
- (iv) entities that work separately from each other keep introducing new rules and regulations, which further complicates governance (South African Department of Public Service and Administration 2021, 4)

In the case of the AGSA, its 2020 reports stated that there was a need for action on accountability, especially since consecutive findings remain unresolved. To this end, the AGSA proposed that there is an urgent requirement for (1) sustainable solutions to prevent accountability failures, (2) ensuring consequences for accountability failures, (3) prioritising and improving the financial management of auditees, and (4) taking opportunities for progressive and sustainable change (Auditor-General of South Africa 2021b, 1).

A recent and commendable development in the regulatory compliance sphere on infrastructure projects has been the launch of the Infrastructure Build Anti-Corruption Forum (IBACF), jointly launched by the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure (DPWI) and the SIU. The objective is to monitor such projects with appropriate measures in place to detect and prevent corruption (Gilili 2022; Bulbulia 2022).

# 6. Proposals for consideration

Some of the most fundamental aspects related to the need to ensure that there are concerted efforts to reach the following goals are:

#### 6.1 Implement a dedicated compliance management programme

South Africa had the largest percentage of PPP initiatives compared to the SADC region from 1999 to 2019 (Khatleli 2020), making the need for efficient and effective management of such projects more significant. Hence, the extent of governance challenges in public sector entities justifies the need to embed compliance as a consistent practice, process, and standard.

Benchmarked guidelines and experiences provide the necessary motivation to facilitate a governance environment where sustainable approaches to regulatory compliance, anchor a disposition of "compliance by design" (Sadiq and Governatori 2013). Such a development seeks to promote the notion of a proactive outlook on governance instead of an over-reliance on oversight and assurance entities, like the AGSA, to notify deficiencies in obligatory responsibilities to legislative prescripts where such responsibilities locate in the Key Performance Areas (KPAs) of appointed officials. Ultimately, the role of oversight entities is to conduct work at the output end of projects. A dedicated programme would surely give attention to recommendations by the AGSA.

#### 6.2 Entrench a culture of accountability

The formalising of consequence management into institutional policies, accompanied by a culture of practice that characterises the approach as both punitive and corrective, is a crucial consideration in addressing accountability. The validation for consequence management locates in oversight reviews, informing that the absence of governance and accountability is akin to the lack of management structures (South African Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 2014). In the end, the objectives seek to (1) uphold organisational integrity through determined actions to minimise fraud and reduce instances of financial misconduct, and (2) enhance the quality of democratic accountability supported by a culture of transparency and professionalism in public institutions (Head 2012).

#### 6.3 Include a Code of Conduct on Joint Venture Projects

Establishing ethical standards affords all concerned parties to understand the importance of ensuring that project outcomes advance the development needs of governments.

The promotion of ethical standards also facilitates awareness of the legal instruments geared toward combatting corruption. The legislation directed at addressing corrupt practices promotes a "zero tolerance" disposition, directed at all parties concerned. As a deterrence, such legislation becomes a basis for public and private institutions to ensure that ethical conduct, practices, and processes are reflected in preventative strategies. An enforceable Code of Conduct aligns with such a process.

In support of the outlined proposals are collated findings and/or recommendations from the appraised academic sources as presented in the attached Table 2. Their applicability enunciates the South African situation on the issues assessed over time.

#### 7. Conclusion

Although slow, progress in operationalising legislative compliance requirements to promote confidence in the management of PPPs is evident. This, as the ability to attract infrastructure investment, relies on the extent to which sufficient attention is located in matters of institutional governance and requisite skills. As a necessity, it then becomes important for countries to ensure constant benchmarking, as part of a due diligence endeavour. The outcomes foreseen are to remedy issues of policy formulation and inherent obstacles to overcome, as well as determine the compliance systems that need to be in place to manage the overall lifecycle of PPP projects for the sustained benefit of a country's citizenry (Wood 2019; Yescombe 2017).

Equally, the notion of "fit for purpose" requires not only public officials to have the necessary technical skills to do the work, but also the moral compass of all role players entrusted with the stewardship responsibility of serving to improve the economic and social conditions of the citizenry, transcends the hierarchy of formal positions. The effective governance of PPP initiatives is a practical case in point that calls for the acceptance and creation of such an environment.

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Table 1: Regulatory Compliance Guidelines to PPPs

Country/Institution	Nigeria	South Africa	G20 High-Level Principles	SADC
Intention	PPP is promoted as a financial model with privatisation aimed at advancing PPP	Infrastructure investment is crucial to realising the National Development Plan with 21% of the GDP needing to grow to 30% in 2030	Focused on promoting integrity in privatisation and PPPs	Promoting optimal performance of PPPs through strengthening the overall process
Target	Seven Point Agenda	National Development Plan 2050	Nine governance principles	Recommendations on public engagement relating to PPPs
Governance	Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act (ICRCA) was passed in 2005 to cater for PPP projects through its Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (ICRC) established in 2008	The Revised Public Finance Management Act of 2015, as well as the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework of 2000 as sectoral legislation in advancing PPP regulatory compliance The Infrastructure Build Anticorruption Forum (IBACF), jointly launched by the DPWI and the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), along with the Public Audit Amendment Act of 2018 as remedial tools	Emphasis on risk management	Strengthen legislative framework

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Country/Institution	Nigeria	South Africa	G20 High-Level Principles	SADC
Key PPP principles promoted	Value for money Public interests important Output requirements Transparency Risk allocation Competition Capacity to deliver	Value for money Build and retain skills Integration of various public sector stakeholders in PPP governance	Principle 1: Define clear rationales and frameworks for privatisation and PPPs to reduce opportunities for corruption  Principle 2: Ensure transparency and public awareness to build accountability  Principle 3: Ensure that the sector's regulatory and competition frameworks are sound to prevent, detect, and respond to corruption risks  Principle 4: Ensure clear governance and integrity to address corruption risks  Principle 5: Use transparent methods to determine the modes of delivery, transaction, and valuation of assets to help combat corruption  Principle 6: Ensure a high standard of participants' integrity  Principle 7: Implement mechanisms to promote accountability, transparency, and competition in tendering and sale  Principle 8: Establish mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating privatisation and PPPs to promote transparency and accountability  Principle 9: Promote stakeholder scrutiny and enable access to information to enhance the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures (UNODC 2020: 2-6)	Ensure public engagement becomes a mandatory process Establish guidelines to cover the scope and procedure of, and approach to participation Pay attention to special groups

Country/Institution	Nigeria	South Africa	G20 High-Level Principles	SADC
Concerns	The ICRCA empowers ministries, departments, and agencies but is silent on other government entities that might be affected by such agreements  The legislation makes no mention of ownership of infrastructure assets by the private sector. There is no provision for unsolicited proposals nor provision for proper audit or review of public financial management, as well as an absence of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism (Soyeju 2013)	Still to establish a PPP Regulator, along with the need to build PPP capacities across public institutions (South African National Treasury 2017; 2020)	Despite the benefits of such initiatives for G20 countries, they pose inherent risks	As a cross-referenced point, the lack of public participation and interests of special groups correlates with concerns that SME access to PPP initiatives is still lacking in South Africa (Ramaphosa 2022)



Table 2: Selected and collated academic research findings and/or recommendations on PPP projects

			Significant findings and recommendations in matters of:		
Author	Brief source reference	Defined focus	A dedicated Compliance Management Plan	Entrenching a culture of accountability	A Code of Conduct on Joint Venture Projects
Albertus, R.W.	Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, August 2016	Information technology	Management and staff of the DOL failed in managing the performance of the consultants and, from the empirical findings, it became clear that critical risk factors were not taken into account (2016, 137).	A weak management structure in the public sector and challenges with maintaining skilled IS resources weakened institutional structures and created a major dependency on EOH/SIS resources (2016, 137).	Nepotism might be rife in the public sector but the private sector is not immune to this governance challenge, hence colluding with consultants has become the norm rather than the exception. Collusion has been to the detriment of achieving the goals and objectives of the organisation (2016, 136).
Binza, M.S.	Doctoral thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, January 2009	Local economic development	Recommend the development and enforcement of LED and PPP policies and by-laws (2009, 255).	In a bid to develop an appropriate PPP model, human resources must be given basic work, scientific knowledge, and skills (2009, 254).	
Brink, J.	M-Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, April 2006	Corporate governance	Recommendation number 1: Improved risk management—the manager's responsibility. Risk management in the public sector is a high priority and all government departments are expected to conduct regular identification of risks with subsequent risk-management strategies and fraud-prevention strategies (2006, 136).	Recommendation number 4: The public sector manager must be accountable. This legislation is seldom effectively enforced and too often threats of accountability are but idle words (2006: 140).	PPP as power-sharing involves a relationship that promotes a mutually beneficial sharing of responsibilities, knowledge, and risk and both parties bring something of value to be invested in or exchanged (2006, 125).

			Significant findings and recommendations in matters of:			
Author	Brief source reference	Defined focus	A dedicated Compliance Management Plan	Entrenching a culture of accountability	A Code of Conduct on Joint Venture Projects	
Dirane, P.	M-Dissertation, University of Pretoria, 29 November 2021	PPP projects	It is hereby recommended that a monitoring function should become a permanent feature of South Africa's PPP structure (2021, 74).	Recommends that a PPP Ombud should be established to investigate and make recommendations on matters that are PPP specific (2021, 72).	It is recommended that public officials who are involved with PPP projects undergo a thorough vetting process and/or lifestyle audit to ensure that no unlawful conduct takes place and to serve as a deterrent to would-be offenders (2021, 71).	
Igwebuna, J.C.	M-Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, April 2019	Housing sector	The lack of policy direction is primarily responsible for the unnecessary delays in the implementation of a PPP project cycle (2019, 189).  The testing criteria for PPP appraisal acceptability is onerous in comparison with other developing economies (2019, 207).	The inadequate capacities of the City of Cape Town (CoCT) to provide effective oversight for affordable housing developments is a key factor that is lacking (2019, 155).  The PPP projects in housing should have performance management measures and monitoring systems to strengthen accountability (2019, 250).	Ill-defined criteria for selection to the Bid Evaluation Committee is one of the problems of the procurement processes, which may in appointments to the committee based on nepotism, political interests, or for reasons that do not serve the interests of the success of the project and of the public (2019, 209).  Eradicating corruption in the CoCT housing tender processes will require strict law enforcement and policy amendments (2019, 248).	
Jabavu, S.W.	M-Dissertation, North-West University, November 2014	Social security	The aspects of risk assessment and risk allocation must be allocated rationally and placed at the most capable partner (2014, 124).	The choice of procurement process: Public procurement must be undertaken in accordance with the policies and procedures of an organisation and context-specific nature of the project (2014, 126).	The legal demands for equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency define the tender process to acquire a suited project partner (2014, 123-124).	

			Significant	Significant findings and recommendations in matters of:			
Author	Brief source reference	Defined focus	A dedicated Compliance Management Plan	Entrenching a culture of accountability	A Code of Conduct on Joint Venture Projects		
Khoza, R.B.M.	Doctoral thesis, Walden University, August 2021	Water infrastructure	The PPP concession period needs to incorporate best practice and practical strategies that include performance measurements and apply performance monitoring measures as best practice strategies to optimize concession period agreements and drive infrastructure financial value at post-concession termination (2021, 153).	Key elements that government needs to consider when infrastructure asset transitioned to public use, post-concession termination, is to guarantee that infrastructure retains value for money (2021, 155).	Incorporate performance measures of social value (2021, 151).		
Khoza, S.	M-Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, December 2021	Environmental	Risk exposures from previous projects such as the DEA's PPP project should be well documented and quantified from a central platform such as the PPP Unit to avoid future hindrances to effective, viable, and efficient PPP projects (2021: 87).	Contracts should also be discussed prior to signing to forge a way for collaboration, trust, and mutual agreement on the clauses (2021: 87).	Other information lacking in this study was a copy of the DEA'S PPP contract, which was alluded to as inflexible and one-sided (2021: 85).		
Mabuza, V.P.	Doctoral thesis, University of South Africa, August 2016	Business sector	Develop a monitoring mechanism for policy implementation (2016, 256).  PPP unit to develop a database for PPP projects (2016, 256).	Recommend the development of a policy to foster the use of SMEs in PPP projects: Government needs to introduce an incentive-based policy or a section in the existing policy that will make it mandatory for PPP firms to use SMEs during both the implementation and operational phases of PPP projects (2016, 255).	Award PPP firms that go an extra mile in using SMEs: PPP firms that surpass the minimum requirement on using SMEs should be awarded, while those that only strive to meet the bare minimum requirement should be penalised (2016, 255).		

		D 4 14	Significant findings and recommendations in matters of:		
Author	Brief source reference	Defined focus	A dedicated Compliance Management Plan	Entrenching a culture of accountability	A Code of Conduct on Joint Venture Projects
Madiriza, T.	Doctoral thesis, University of Pretoria, January 2022	Water infrastructure	Frequent monitoring and reviews of the PPP framework (2022, 347).	Review of the Treasury's Views and Recommendation (TVRs) process. To ensure that TVRs are responded to timeously, a period of three months is proposed (2022, 345-346).	Review of the grant system to improve water PPP attractiveness. This as the private partner will be guaranteed of a revenue source while delivering a service to residents (2022: 351).
Makhari, C.L.	M-Dissertation, University of Western Cape, June 2016	Water infrastructure	Results show that municipalities experienced compliance challenges on several measurable KPIs, with each municipality's performance differing from the other (2016, 60).	It is recommended that Water Service Authorities adopt performance strategies used by the CoCT to improve water service delivery (2016, 61).	Studies conducted in Ghana and South Africa indicate that PPPs have produced mixed results, with this study pointing to a need for some improvements in management for the benefit of households (2016, 59).
Makofane, T.S.	Doctoral thesis, University of Pretoria, February 2013	Black Economic Empowerment	It is recommended that a ceiling should be put on the number of times an individual should be eligible for BEE-related bids, especially if it involves huge sums of money (2013, 241).	There seems to be little emphasis on measures of managerial performance in terms of the results achieved (2013, 250).	In dealing with aspects of non- compliance, it is vital that a code of good practice is introduced. The effective implementation of a code of good practice would assist in curbing the high levels of graft and fraud (2013, 237).

			Significant findings and recommendations in matters of:			
Author	Brief source reference	Defined focus	A dedicated Compliance Management Plan	Entrenching a culture of accountability	A Code of Conduct on Joint Venture Projects	
Mashele, M.P.	M-Dissertation, University of Johannesburg, November 2020	Construction industry	It is recommended that no person should be allowed to participate in a PPP project without any knowledge of it to avoid PPP project delays and failures (2020, 183).	It is recommended that any student in a construction-related course should learn about PPP procurement systems in detail so that they know what is expected from them at the stage of implementation and execution of such projects (2020, 183).		
Mugarura, J.T.	Doctoral thesis, Stellenbosch University, April 2019	Road infrastructure	The PPP legal framework must be explicit on how the local government entities (Districts, Town councils, etc.) fit within the country's PPP system (2019, 288).	To avoid unnecessary PPP processes and delays, the team that approves feasibility studies should be the same one to approve a project for public procurement option or to provide a rejection decision, without having to send a project proposal to another team to conduct further evaluations. The approving team on feasibility studies must be knowledgeable in PPPs and public procurement (2019, 288).		
Naidoo, D.	M-Dissertation, University of Kwazulu- Natal, 2018	Water infrastructure	Some of the institutional weaknesses are SCM, procurement, skills deficit, and lengthy compliance protocols (2018, 63).	There must be aggressive campaigning of PPPs in terms of their benefits and applications, public servants need to be properly trained and provided with the best practice guidelines (2018, 64).	The stakeholders identified in the ethical clearance will benefit from this study as many do not know with certainty the perspectives of the other stakeholders (2018: 65).	

Author	Brief source reference	Defined focus	Significant findings and recommendations in matters of:		
			A dedicated Compliance Management Plan	Entrenching a culture of accountability	A Code of Conduct on Joint Venture Projects
Nugent, D.	M-Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, March 2020	Public schools in Western Cape	The major issues with public sector capacity involve a lack of suitably qualified and experienced officials to implement the complex projects contemplated, as well as the attitude to administration and compliance thinking where public sector PPP specialists generally buck the trend of the stereotypical risk-averse (2020, 163).	Officials need to be trained to look to the enabling aspect of policies to unlock the needs of their immediate environment and ensure that an appropriate level of compliance is undertaken balanced against the need to scale up delivery (2020, 169).	With the private partner carrying the full risk of the infrastructure through the funding model, this allows the public sector to limit their exposure to just the off-take agreement for the product (electricity). As a result, the infrastructure is never transferred to the public sector. Part of the solution is to ensure that the private sector complies with the norms and standards for school infrastructure (2020, 171).
Phungula, M.G.	M-Dissertation, University of South Africa, December 2008	Project management	As a part of its project management system, The Agency should issue fundamental policies, procedures, models, tools, techniques, and standards; train project staff in their use; and require their use on all projects (2008, 153).	The Agency should further mandate a reporting system that provides the necessary data for each level of management to track and communicate the risk, quality, cost, schedule, and scope of a project (2008, 153).	
Singh, I.	M-Dissertation, University of Kwazulu- Natal, 2019	PPP project monitoring and evaluation	The M&E unit in collaboration with the Executive Committee should formulate a strategic plan for M&E to be implemented at all levels within the project life cycle of department projects. The objective of the policy framework should offer departmental officials a guideline which implements, monitors and evaluates the project initiatives within the department (2019, 115).	EDTEA must take accountability and completely invest in training and development of all officials through expanding the training budget available within the department so that a constant human resource development framework is available (2019, 115).	

Author	Brief source reference	Defined focus	Significant findings and recommendations in matters of:		
			A dedicated Compliance Management Plan	Entrenching a culture of accountability	A Code of Conduct on Joint Venture Projects
Taruvinga, T.P.	M-Dissertation, University of Johannesburg, January 2017	Engineering sector	There are inconsistencies in the allocation of risks in South African PPPs (2017, 60).	Risks have to be managed by transferring them to the party with the ability to manage them at minimal cost (2017, 60).	For project success, risk must be allocated to the right party in a project (2017, 58).
Xhala, N.C.	Doctoral thesis, University of the Free State, 2017	PPP infrastructure financing	Recommend that public-sector institutions should develop and implement appropriate policies on risk management strategies, monitoring and evaluation, and project management (2017, 204).	Public-sector officials need to stimulate political, bureaucratic, and methodological support and increase political will by delivering projects successfully by improving project management practices (2017, 203).	Results demonstrated that the monitoring of agents' opportunistic behaviours needs to be standardised through adequate management of contracts to limit post-contractual opportunistic behaviour of agents (2017, 201).  The behavioural practices that manifest through agents undermine PPPs' significance in public infrastructure investment and development (2017, 202).

# **African Migrations Research: An Annotated Bibliography**

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#### 1. Introduction

Migration is increasingly becoming a widespread phenomenon; its associated complexities and implications for countries of origin, transit, and destination have become topical issues in academic and policy domains. The phenomenon has emerged as an inevitable part and reality of human existence. Currently it touches on diverse economic, social, cultural, and security components of people living in an increasingly globalised world (Dinbabo and Badewa 2020). Despite the complexities and challenges associated with migration, it continues to offer possibilities and opportunities for human and socio-economic development. Therefore, the need to better understand migration cannot be overlooked in light of growing local and international mobility.

Much of the migration movements in Africa occur within the continent, as opposed to previously held notions of Africans migrating mostly out of Africa (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). Thus the migration dynamics within Africa needs a great deal of attention. While data and analysis on migration within Africa are available from several key international organisations, think tanks, and institutions of higher learning, key gaps in the harmonisation and collection processes of data across countries still



occur, thus inhibiting evidence-based policy-making. This has led to growing calls for a new narrative on contemporary African migration that focuses primarily on intra-African migration and unravels the distortions as well as an improved understanding of the research and policy landscape (IOM 2020). This new narrative will contribute to informed decision-making on migration, and ultimately provide a basis for harnessing the potential of migration for regional integration and inclusive development in Africa.

Against this background, an appraisal of the current state of knowledge on migration in Africa is invaluable to academics and practitioners. This can be facilitated by an annotated bibliography—a list of citations on books, articles, and documents on the topic. Each citation is followed by a brief annotation(about 150 words)—a descriptive and evaluative paragraph on the topic under discussion. The purpose of the annotation is to inform the reader of the relevance, accuracy, and quality of the sources cited. It can also serve as a form of assessment of the current state of research, identifying the areas authors have concentrated or expounded on, as well as gaps or needs for further research.

This article takes stock of existing research on migration in Africa to identify gaps and future research needs. It does this through the presentation of an annotated bibliography of research that has been conducted on the respective pillars of the African Union (AU) Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (MPFA) (AUC 2018). The MPFA propounds the AU's stance on migration—if migration is well-managed, it can result in significant benefits for both origin and destination countries (AUC 2018; IOM 2020). The MPFA provides AU Member States and Regional Economic Communities with principles and guidelines to assist them in developing and implementing their own national policies based on their resources and priorities (AUC 2018). The pillars of the MPFA are:

- (a) Migration governance: Defined as the traditions and institutions through which authority in migration and nationality in a country are exercised, migration governance is the overarching objective of the MPFA. It emphasises the socio-economic well-being of migrants and society through compliance with international standards and regulations, security of migrants' rights, as well as a 'whole-of-government' approach to policy formulation and implementation (AUC 2018).
- (b) Labour migration and education: This pillar calls for 'the establishment of regular, transparent, comprehensive, and gender-responsive labour migration policies, legislations, and structures at national and regional levels' (AUC 2018: 4). It emphasises mutual recognition of qualifications, skills portability, and facilitation of the free

movement of workers. The foregoing has the potential to promote regional integration, migrants' integration and significant benefits in origin and destination societies, including brain gain, brain circulation, and remittances. Overall, the theme is categorised into four sub-themes. These are national labour migration policies, structures, and legislation; regional cooperation and harmonisation of labour migration policies; brain drain; and remittances.

- (c) Diaspora engagement: This pillar acknowledges the positive contribution that migrants make to their societies or states of origin, and thus seeks to foster the element of the migration-development nexus. It entails strategies, policies, and frameworks that promote diaspora participation in the development of their countries of origin and the continent at large. It includes return and the integration of diaspora members and citizens abroad, particularly in the context of 'migration and development' (outside the context of irregular or forced migration).
- (d) *Border governance*: This refers to 'a system of norms, institutions and the collaboration of states, society and non-state actors around border management' (AUC 2018: 5). Managing borders entails procedures and techniques for regulating the movement of people and goods across borders.
- (e) Irregular migration: Closely related to migrant smuggling and other international organised crimes including human trafficking, irregular migration is a growing concern that needs to be addressed. It could disrupt international stability and security, hence the need to strengthen transnational cooperation and legal frameworks around the issue. The pillar also addresses issues relating to the return and readmission of irregular migrants, the reintegration of persons back into their communities, victims' access to justice, and the identification and prosecution of perpetrators.
- (f) Forced displacement: This pillar pays attention to groups that constitute displaced people, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons. It articulates strategies for dealing with the foregoing, including crisis prevention and management, conflict resolution, as well as issues of protection, integration, and reintegration.
- (g) Internal migration: At the heart of the internal migration dynamics in Africa is the process of urbanisation as the region is regarded as the fastest urbanising continent. Rural-urban migration and the urbanisation process need to be managed effectively to avoid the potentially negative consequences of the phenomenon.
- (h) Migration and trade: Relating to this pillar, the framework highlights the growing relevance of the movement of persons for trade in Africa, particularly short-term migration. Key to facilitating the growth of trade across Africa and the attendant

migration will be the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area and AU Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence, and Right of Establishment. The success of these would have implications for trade, integration, and development in the continent.

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In addition to the eight MPFA pillars, the notion of migration diplomacy was added to the focus areas for the bibliography. Migration diplomacy, a term that is increasingly gaining traction in migration research, broadly refers to how migration issues intersect with international diplomacy. It refers to the use of diplomatic tools, procedures, and processes to manage cross-border population mobility (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). It 'draws on realist approaches in international relations to identify how the interests and power of state actors are affected by their position in migration systems, namely the extent to which they are migration-sending, migration-receiving, or transit states' (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019 113). Finally, articles which after thorough review did not fit into any of the above categories were grouped together and referred to as 'Others'. These include some articles which relate to the eleven cross-cutting issues in the MPFA (i.e. migration and development; migration data and research; human rights of migrants; principles of non-discrimination; migration, poverty, and conflict; migration and health; migration and environment; migration and gender; migration, children, adolescents, and youths; migration and older persons; and inter-state and inter-regional cooperation) (AUC 2018). They also include, among others, research on gendered dimensions of migration, categorisations of transit migration, migrationenvironment nexus, and drivers of human migration not covered in the pillars. In the following sections the report presents (a) objectives of the research; (b) the literature review; (c) the methodological approach used; (d) the bibliography; and (e) conclusions and specific recommendations.

# 2. Methodological Approach

The references included in the annotated bibliography cover journal articles published between 2011 and 2022. The methodology for article selection is explained below.

A systematic search (using search queries) in the Scopus and Web of Science databases was conducted on words related to migration in Africa. Searching for literature for this review required the use of varying keywords. Such a balance is necessary as some keywords may yield a large number of studies. Keywords in the search queries

included migrant, migration, human trafficking, forced displacement, asylum seeker, and Africa. The rationale for choosing these words is that there is hardly any article/document on migration in which 'migrant' or 'migration' will not be used as a word in the abstract. Put differently, any article on migration or even the migration pillars will almost certainly use the word 'migration' in its abstract. Six of the eight pillars have 'migration' as a keyword. Papers on remittances allude to migration in their abstracts. 'Africa' was included in the search query because not doing this would lead to the generation of several hits (from other regions) which would be unmanageable. The research team endeavoured to include documents written in French in the search query used for both databases. But this did not return documents written in French, except for a document written in both French and English. It is assumed that journals written in French are not indexed in the databases used.

The search in the Scopus and Web of Science databases generated 3 037 and 2 467 results, respectively. Both databases were merged and articles were further screened to remove duplicate entries. A total of 3 921 documents remained after this stage. The topics of the articles were read and any source whose title was not related to human migration was removed. This yielded 594 documents. The second stage in the article selection process entailed screening documents by reading the respective abstracts and applying a set of inclusion and exclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria comprised of: (a) articles that are empirical or based on theoretical research; (b) articles that provide insights on migration in Africa; (c) articles that provide insights on, or address any of the MPFA migration pillars, or migration diplomacy; (d) articles that are Afrocentric, that is, papers that have as their central focus migration in Africa; and (e) articles that are migration-centric, that is, papers that have as their central focus the issue of migration—however, they can also relate to other issues such as climate change, food or water security, or conflict—the main focus must be on migration. On the other hand, exclusion criteria applied to articles that (a) do not provide relevant insight into migration in Africa, do not address any of the MPFA migration pillars, or migration diplomacy; (c) are not Afrocentric and; (d) are not migration-centric. Any article which fell under any of the four exclusion criteria was ineligible and excluded. All topics and abstracts were inputted into a Microsoft Excel sheet for screening using the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The number of articles was reduced as follows:

The research team read the documents and topics of research and removed ineligible articles. Out of 3 921 documents, they excluded 3 327 and reduced the number of relevant documents to 594. The researchers read the abstracts of the remaining articles

and identified and removed ineligible articles. Out of the 594 articles, the research team found only 151 eligible. The full texts of the 151 documents were exported into Atlas. ti and read by the researchers. They excluded a further 21 articles after this process. Ultimately, 130 documents were used for the annotated bibliography.

This process enabled the team to identify 130 sources that form part of the annotated bibliography. The research team produced metadata on migration in Africa, which describes attributes that provide concise explanations of the contents of the dataset. The metadata summarised the basic information about the data, which made findings and working with particular instances of data easier. Major attributes included in the metadata are: the year, author/s, title, series/journal name, volume, issue, digital objective identifier (DOI), email address of the corresponding author, affiliation of the corresponding author, research type, coverage, and thematic focus. In general, the major sources of migration data were presented in both MS Excel and database/catalogue formats.

#### 2.1Methodology limitations

Some limitations of the methodological approach are similar to those encountered in any systematic search of databases. First, even though the methodology adopted a broad list of keywords in searching the databases, it is possible to have missed some important articles due to the profusion of words used in migration research. Second, there is the possibility of the databases omitting some studies due to inadequate referencing. Third, articles in journals that are not included in the databases used might also have been missed. Finally, despite the application of a strict methodological process throughout the study, the review team acknowledges the possibility of a degree of subjectivity due to the qualitative approach applied to the screening of documents.


# 3. General characteristics of articles in the annotated bibliography

This section presents an analysis of 130 articles included in the bibliography in terms of their general characteristics. These characteristics include: year of publication, method of research, study coverage or study boundary, and thematic focus (based on the thematic pillars outlined earlier). The study also analysed the number of articles available on open-access platforms (see Figure 1). The figure indicates that only 27 per cent of the articles included are open access, a clear indication that the majority of migration articles may not be readily available to individuals and institutions who

cannot afford the subscription fees for these articles and journals.

Figure 1: Number of open-access articles

# Open access (n = 130)




**Source:** Author's calculation

#### 3.1 Publication timeline

About 39 per cent of the total 130 documents were published between 2011 and 2016. From 2017, there has been a significant increase in the number of publications on migration in Africa, reflecting the increasing importance of the phenomenon. From 2017 to 2019, a minimum of 11 articles were selected for the bibliography. The number of selected publications peaked in 2020 and 2021, further reinforcing the growing attention paid to migration in Africa. It should be noted that the document search was conducted in March 2022 and potentially influenced the limited number of publications for 2022.

Figure 2: Number of articles per year




Source: Author's calculation

### 3.2 Method of research

The research methods adopted by the authors of the selected articles were categorised according to empirical research and desk-based research. The former refers to research that makes use of evidence-based data, collected either qualitatively or quantitatively from research sites. For the purpose of this bibliography, desk-based research is conceptualised as research conducted mainly using secondary data or based on a review of the literature. This study's analysis indicates that more than two-thirds (72 per cent) of the articles included are based on empirical research. This reflects the reliance on field data for most of the research on migration.

Figure 3: Method of research




Source: Author's calculation

# 3.3 Geographical focus

The research team categorised the articles based on the locale that the study focused on, or in which it took place. Multi-country studies involve two or more African countries. National studies deal with research conducted in only one country. Research conducted at the regional level includes research in the different regional economic communities in Africa, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the Horn of Africa (East Africa), and North Africa. The majority of articles are based on national studies (about 40 per cent). Furthermore, 35 studies cover the whole of Africa or sub-Saharan

Africa, 28 are multi-country studies, and 14 of the selected articles focus on the regional level.

Figure 4: Study coverage or study boundary



Source: Author's calculation

Figure 5: Articles by thematic focus

#### Articles by thematic focus 4; 3% ■ Border governance Diaspora engagement 16; 12% ■ Forced displacement Internal migration ■ Irregular migration 31; 24% ■ Labour migration and education 18; 14% ■ Migration and trade ■ Migration diplomacy ■ Migration governance 33; 25% Others

**Source:** Author's calculation

identity, citizens' migration desires, and

multi-stakeholder collaborations.

### 3.4 Number of articles by thematic focus

The number of articles in each thematic focus (and their percentages out of the total) is presented in Figure 5. The number of selected articles that correspond to the respective themes considered in the bibliography are as follows: migration governance (n = 31), labour migration and education (n = 33), diaspora engagement (n = 9), border governance (n = 4), irregular migration (n = 19), forced displacement (n = 8), internal migration (n = 7), migration and trade (n = 1), migration diplomacy (n = 3), and others (n = 16). Overall, Figure 5 is indicative of the consistency in the relevance of labour migration and education as a migration theme over the years. This corroborates the fact that most people migrate to take advantage of economic and job opportunities in destination societies. In addition, the total number of articles was influenced by the dominance of literature on remittances as a sub-component of the theme. Migration governance as a theme has steadily grown in importance over the years with over 80 per cent of the articles on the theme being published between 2017 and 2022. Irregular migration is also a major topical issue given the consistent prominence of the theme over the years. It is also noteworthy that about half of the research on irregular migration focused on West Africa or a West African country, perhaps due to the fact that the region produces a high number of migrants destined for Europe. Human trafficking and migrant smuggling, which are considered under the theme, are protracted challenges for Africa.

There are substantial publications on diaspora engagement, forced displacement, and internal migration although research conducted on these themes needs to increase given the relatively lower number of publications on these themes compared to others. Generally, however, there is a dearth of literature on migration and trade as well as migration diplomacy. The former is more surprising given the importance of trade for Africa's development. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that publications around the theme will increase in light of the establishment of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

# 4. Conclusion and future research directions

This section presents identified gaps for future research in the literature on migration in Africa. This is majorly based on the review of articles included in the annotated bibliography, including a synthesis of recommendations for future research in the respective articles. The foregoing is complemented by the researchers' knowledge and expertise in migration research in Africa. The study also suggests a range of research agendas/questions, as outlined in Table 1 below.

The work also identified future research needs to inform decision-making. The research gaps synthesised from the articles and complemented with the researchers' knowledge and expertise provide important inspiration and direction for future research. It is hoped migration researchers, policymakers, and practitioners, will find the resources shared in the article useful for their current and future research endeavours relating to migration in Africa.

Table 1. Future research directions (research agenda/questions)

Assessment of border management

mechanisms in some African nation-states.

Key thematic area	Focus areas of current research	Future research agenda/questions
Area Migration governance	The association and variance between national-level migration policies and regional-level migration policies.  The migration policy regime in some African states, and its implementation.  The influence of local politics and interests on national migration policies and practices.  Critique of bilateral and multilateral organisations' migration interests, politics, policies, and practices in Africa.  Relations of migration governance between bilateral and multilateral organisations on the one hand, and African nation-states on the other.  Examination of the protocols, frameworks and the common positions adopted by the African Union, and the Regional Economic Communities in Africa, as well	<ul> <li>The interplay of national interests in response to migration.</li> <li>The power relations between states and the notions which shape the international politics of migration.</li> <li>The barriers and opportunities inherent in bilateral, regional, and Africa-wide migration cooperation needs.</li> <li>How African countries navigate both internally and externally induced pressures and opportunities relating to international migration.</li> <li>How can we better understand migration policy decisions in developing host states?</li> <li>How does politics influence governments' immigration decisions in destination countries?</li> <li>How national, regional, and Africa-wide</li> </ul>
	as the assessment of their impacts and implementation challenges in promoting	migration regimes shape and are shaped by socio-economic considerations, including
	regional integration.	poverty, inequality and employment, citizen

integration and reintegration.

Labour migration and education	Assessment of the incorporation of migrants in the labour markets.     Assessment of the magnitude and impact of brain drain in Africa.     Examination of labour market conditions and outcomes of return migrants.     Impact of skilled emigration on the development and welfare of those left behind.     Examination of the effect of emigration on industrialisation.     Determinants and macro-economic impacts of remittances; impact of internal and international remittances on poverty and economic growth.     Examination of the remittances—financial development nexus; assessment of the association between remittances and institutions, and remittances and migrants' education.	Possibilities and barriers to developing comprehensive and transparent labour migration and education policies as well as mutual recognition of qualifications.  What institutional reforms are needed to unlock the potential of remittances in Africa? What are the drivers of brain drain in African countries? What is the potential of brain gain and brain circulation for Africa's development? How does technology as an intervening variable influence financial development affects remittances?
Diaspora engagement	Examination of the transformations in emigration and citizenship in African countries, including interrogating why some African countries embrace dual citizenship for emigrants and why others do not.      Assessment of diaspora return programmes and policies.      Role and impact of African diasporas in peacebuilding, economic growth, and development.	Improving the understanding of the policies and strategies that promote the diaspora to participate in the development of their origin countries.      The effectiveness of diaspora return programmes and their political implications. This should include more studies (both qualitative and quantitative) on how members of the diaspora experience temporary and permanent returns.

Border governance	<ul> <li>The politics and contradictions of border crossing and regional integration</li> <li>Assessment of the operationalisation of the ECOWAS Free Movement of Persons Protocol.</li> <li>Analysis of the regulation of migration at the border and migrants' experiences at borders.</li> <li>Analysis of the drivers of illegal migration.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Unpacking the mechanisms that encourage cooperation in developing techniques and strategies for better regulation of the movement of people and goods across borders.</li> <li>The implications of regional cooperation and integration on border practices, as well as the nexus between corruption, state capacity and border inefficiencies.</li> <li>An improved understanding of the role of</li> </ul>
migration	<ul> <li>Examination of the dynamics and organisation of human smuggling.</li> <li>Analysis of the effectiveness of legislation, policies, activities, and strategies against human smuggling and trafficking.</li> <li>Examination of the causes and consequences of irregular migration, including transnational human trafficking.</li> <li>Examination of the implication of the Free Movement of Persons Protocol on human trafficking.</li> <li>Assessment of the social and economic consequences of return in the context of irregular migration.</li> <li>Examination of the challenges and opportunities of reintegration for human smuggling and trafficking survivors.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>An enhanced understanding of how migration facilitators (migrant smugglers) operate, and their scale of operations.</li> </ul>
Forced displacement	<ul> <li>Analysis of the drivers of forced migration.</li> <li>Examination of forced displacement, refugee protection, and durable solutions.</li> <li>Assessment of the impact and experiences of refugees upon return to their home country; the question and meaning of 'return' in light of the dynamic context of uncertainty and multi-directional mobility.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Understanding of the drivers of forced displacements, as well as those factors that will likely help or hinder the displaced in terms of their socio-economic development.</li> <li>The impacts of peace agreements (or the lack thereof), crisis prevention and management, conflict resolution, and</li> </ul>

Internal migration	<ul> <li>Examination of internal migration trends in African countries, including the dynamics of migration processes.</li> <li>Analysis of rural-urban migration in some African countries.</li> <li>Association between internal migration, education, and wages.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>An improved understanding of the feedback loop between urban and rural areas and rural-urban interdependencies. Going beyond the myopic conceptualisation of urban migrants, assisting rural 'stayers'.</li> <li>A more nuanced understanding of the effects of the flow of ideas and knowledge that migration offers to sending areas, through clear conceptualisation and evidence-based research.</li> </ul>
Migration and	Assessment of the impact of regional	The implications of the recently
trade	openness (regional integration) on per	established African Continental Free Trade
	capita income.	Area (AfCFTA), the AU Free Movement
		of Persons Protocol, and other regional
		protocols on the free movement of
		persons on trade.
Migration and	Relations between states on the one hand,	The intersection of migration issues with
diplomacy	bilateral and multilateral relations between	international diplomacy, shifting the focus
	states and international organisations on	from the perspectives of North African
	the other, and how these relations influence	countries to migration diplomacy in other
	migration policies.	national and regional contexts in Africa.
Others	Assessment of the limitations of	The nexus between migration and food
	categorising mobile populations as 'transit	security.
	migrants'.	The migration-environment nexus
	Assessment of drivers of intra-regional	(including the impact of rural-urban
	migration in Africa.	migration on environmental resources).
	Gender dynamics of international	• The association between migration,
	migration in some African countries.	poverty, and inequality.
	Public perceptions of immigration policies	Migration diplomacy.
	in host countries.	The gendered dimension of migration.

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# **BRICS Expansion and Implications for Africa**

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### **Abstract**

The expansion of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) has become a focal point in global discussions, particularly regarding its implications for Africa. This article critically examines the multifaceted dimensions of the BRICS expansion and its implications for Africa across economic, political, and strategic realms. Drawing upon a comprehensive review of scholarly literature and expert opinions, the economic implications of the BRICS expansion, including opportunities for growth, investment, and development, as well as challenges related to trade imbalances and debt sustainability, are analysed. The article explores how the BRICS engagement influences regional power dynamics, international alignments, and global governance structures. The role of BRICS in advocating multipolarity and institutional, global governance reform is highlighted, while tensions and complexities within the bloc are considered. By synthesising diverse perspectives, the article offers insights into navigating the complexities of BRICS-Africa relations and provides recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to maximise the benefits of this evolving partnership while mitigating risks and vulnerabilities.

**Keywords:** BRICS, BRICS-Africa relations, Expansion, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa



### 1. Introduction

It is significant to state that the expansion of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) was not a sudden occurrence but a realisation of antecedent developments. The expansion of BRICS marks a turning point in the history of Africa as it creates room for African states to solidify their relations politically and promises to strengthen their economic relations and development. However, even though the US-led Western bloc is in support of the establishment and objectives of BRICS, the West is also in diverse trade partnership agreements with African states across the region. BRICS has been positioned as an anti-status quo roleplayer or competitor to the established order in the international and regional systems (Monyae and Ndzendze, 2021; Rewizorski, 2015; Stuenkel, 2015). In this regard, the issues of the West's trade partnership agreements across Africa require critical academic debate in light of BRICS's objectives. The BRICS bloc, initially comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and later joined by South Africa, has emerged as a formidable force reshaping the contours of global geopolitics and economics. Since its inception, BRICS has garnered considerable attention for its potential to challenge the dominance of traditional Western powers and advocate for a more equitable and multipolar world order. As BRICS expands its outreach, particularly in regions like Africa, it prompts a critical examination of the implications of this expansion for the African continent. This article delves into the multifaceted dimensions of the BRICS expansion and its implications for Africa, encompassing economic, political, and strategic facets.

Africa, with its diverse array of nations and burgeoning economies, occupies a central position in the discourse surrounding the BRICS expansion. The continent's rich natural resources, growing consumer markets, and strategic significance have made it a focal point for international engagement and investment. Against this backdrop, the increasing involvement of BRICS nations in Africa raises pertinent questions about the potential benefits and challenges for African countries. How does the BRICS expansion shape Africa's economic development trajectory? What are the geopolitical implications of BRICS-Africa relations? How does the BRICS engagement influence global governance structures, and what are the implications for African representation and agency within these frameworks?

By exploring these questions, this article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the evolving dynamics of BRICS-Africa relations, offering insights into navigating the complexities of this evolving partnership. Through an examination of scholarly

literature, policy reports, and expert opinions, it seeks to elucidate the opportunities and challenges arising from the BRICS expansion for Africa. It contributes to a deeper understanding of the interplay between BRICS and Africa and offers recommendations for policymakers, stakeholders, and future research endeavours in this field.

# 2. BRICS's Growing Role in African States

It is important for African states to factor in BRICS's quest for expanding its presence and influence over the politics and security matrix of neighbouring countries. Over the years, BRICS has steadily increased its presence in Africa and carefully crafted economic, political, and military linkages with African States to find its own space in the region. African states have reasons to be concerned about BRICS's undisguised thrust to constrain its leadership and status in Africa. On the one hand, Africa's geostrategic location and power make for its inevitable centrality. Paradoxically, however, Africa's extensive religious, linguistic, ethnic, and cultural diversities have led to greater distance between them. Heightened anxieties regarding national identities and sovereignty contribute to more significant discord with their more prominent neighbour in BRICS. In that context, bilateral issues of trade and transit facilities, ethnic overspill and migration, and, in more recent years, cross-border terrorism, have acquired such deep, emotive overtones that they continue to defy rational settlement.

On the other hand, BRICS comes with no baggage of historical memories and bilateral disputes. More importantly, BRICS is seen by many African states as an effective counterweight to Africa's preponderant power. This gives a certain edge on which BRICS can capitalise on the prevalent anti-African sentiment to build its own bridges of membership with these countries. Given these ground realities, BRICS's gradual encroachment into Africa's traditional sphere of influence has long-term implications for Africa's regional status, which Africa cannot ignore (Atif and Akbar, 2019). BRICS has, over the years, developed extensive socio-economic links with African states and has emerged as its largest economic cooperation. It signed an economic cooperation agreement with African states and has also assisted it in developing unilateral and multilateral cooperation with African states. BRICS has also steadily expanded its trade and economic cooperation with members in Africa, surpassing Russia and China as its largest aid donor to Africa (Guimei, 2024). Gradual reduction of aid and engagement by Africa, following the Russia/Ukraine war, left a void that BRICS was quick to utilise for its increased interaction with African States. BRICS has continued to play an important

role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of many African states by upgrading facilities and infrastructure (roads, buildings, hospitals) in African countries' war-affected areas (International Monetary Fund, 2011). Brics has also been actively collaborating with Africa in oil exploration and developing port and harbour facilities in Africa. BRICS has also built a steady political relationship with Africa, and has ever been willing to play the BRICS card to offset Africa. Africa remains particularly sensitive to BRICS's forays in South Africa given its strategic location on the southern border adjoining BRICS countries. BRICS's investment in infrastructural development in South Africa and India has been extensive (Africa Development Bank, 2013). It has also extended generous financial assistance to South Africa, and its annual aid has increased by 50 per cent. BRICS's growing links with members, which technically do not fall within Africa but abut Africa's sensitive eastern flank while also sharing borders with members of BRICS, cause deep concern in Africa. BRICS has, over the past few years, established extensive military linkages with significant arms sales and infrastructural development with members. South Africa remains BRICS's largest benefactor in the supply of defence equipment and technical assistance (Yola and Christine, 2013). BRICS has also assisted with the construction of naval bases, roads waterways, and oil and gas pipelines among members. BRICS is helping members with the establishment and advancement of radar and communications systems and refuelling facilities in Africa. Closely related to the expansion of BRICS's military and economic presence in its immediate neighbourhood is its relentless urge to secure the energy resources in the African region. BRICS members such as South Africa today are one of the largest consumers of energy, and as their needs grow, they are bound to compete for control and access to markets and resources. Africa remains concerned about BRICS's success in gaining exploration rights for developing natural gas fields in Africa. BRICS members are also engaged in the exploration and production of gas pipelines linking offshore platforms in Africa. India, which is expected to face a huge energy crunch in the years ahead, has yet to make any headway in accessing natural gas from BRICS. Deeply aware that BRICS's inroads into Africa's immediate States cut into its power base, Africa has sought to mend its fences with BRICS and taken manifold steps, even unilaterally, to strengthen its economic and political ties with members of African countries. Capitalising on the anti-status quo or competitor to the US-led Western bloc for many years, Russia and China have taken significant steps to engage with the governments of African States on a number of issues. These include bilateral trade, financial aid and assistance, and cooperation on curbing terrorism among others. Russia and China recently extended a line of credit to Africa (CCTV Africa, 2014). In recent years, BRICS's policies in African member states have also undergone a visible shift in its engagement with economic and political development. After realising that its deliberate distancing from the US-led Western bloc was benefitting some African states and the consolidation of its presence in Africa at the expense of the US-led Western bloc, the latter has, for the past few years, been engaged in improving its relations with Africa. BRICS's interests in African States are spread across various sectors including telecommunications, energy, agriculture, industry, IT, and education. In line with these priorities, BRICS has taken on a more active role in disbursing aid and building infrastructure. It is also assisting in building a transport corridor in African member states. The last meeting of BRICS in South Africa provided a further impetus to growing relations between the group and the African region. Even as South Africa accords the highest priority to its 'membership diplomacy' to maintain its preeminent position in the Southern African region, there is little doubt that BRICS's growing expansion and influence in its own backyard serves to heighten members' long term strategic and economic concerns vis-à-vis its giant members. More important, as long as BRICS keeps up its pressure on African States, there is little possibility of any alleviation in the subtle competition between BRICS and the US-Led Western bloc in Africa's membership in the foreseeable future.

# 3. BRICS's Engagement with Africa: Competing Dynamics

BRICS has also been actively engaging with its members in the African region, a strategically vital region in terms of BRICS's political and economic interests (Simon and Stevens, 2013). During the Cold War years, members of BRICS had chosen to stay on the margins and allowed its interaction with the African region to fall into a state of benign neglect (Simon and Stevens, 2013). The end of the Cold War and the altered geopolitical regional dynamics have seen members take several steps to engage more constructively with the African countries. BRICS's Global South policy signalled the members' desire to revitalise its economic and political interaction with the African region (Adam, 2013). Given BRICS's rapidly developing technological and economic capabilities, African States have also found it helpful to cooperate with BRICS to reap the benefits of extensive economic and technological linkages. Over the years, BRICS has forged strong economic ties with most African states. Russia, China, and India have already emerged as important trading and investment partners for members, especially in Africa. More importantly, BRICS members have steadily expanded its strategic presence in Africa. Over the years, BRICS members like China and Russia have also forged strong defence and naval ties with many African nations. It has a significant strategic relationship with South Africa and others. BRICS also signed a defence agreement with many African nations. BRICS members had signed a defence pact with many African countries and have been holding joint naval exercises as part of the new strategic partnership (Gaunt, 2010). BRICS has also been helping members to significantly increase their naval and air power. It is pushing for a naval base in many African countries, which would go a long way in augmenting its naval capability in the strategic region (BRICS New Delhi, Summit, 2012). Russia and China have been a keen player in Africa for historical reasons because of the existence of trade and investment linkages and the protection of its maritime interests (Mlambo, 2022). It is also viewed with a certain degree of fear by most African nations regarding its territorial claims on disputed boundaries (Sven, 2013). BRICS, on the other hand, has the advantage of not carrying any historical memories or baggage of bilateral disputes in the African region. Over the last decade or so, BRICS has steadily emerged as an important player in Africa, with many people in the region seeing it as a balancer against the US-led Western bloc. There is little doubt that the African states will have some interest in maintaining a geopolitical balance of power between BRICS and the US-led Western bloc to maximise their economic strength and security. This could well lead to a quiet competition between them over the expansion of their geopolitical influence and naval capabilities in the African region.

# 3.1. Economic Implications

The economic dimension of BRICS's expansion holds significant implications for Africa, offering both opportunities for growth and development as well as challenges to navigate. The deepening economic ties between the BRICS nations and African countries have been a subject of extensive analysis in scholarly literature, shedding light on the multifaceted nature of this relationship.

One prominent aspect of BRICS-African economic relations is the potential for enhanced trade and investment cooperation. According to Asuelime and Jethro (2013), the expansion of BRICS has led to increased trade flows between BRICS nations and Africa, particularly in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, and manufacturing. This trend is further supported by Africanews (2023), which emphasises the role of BRICS in providing alternative financing mechanisms for African infrastructure projects

through institutions like the New Development Bank. Such investments have the potential to catalyse economic growth, create employment opportunities, and foster industrialization in African countries.

However, the economic implications of BRICS's expansion also raise concerns regarding trade imbalances and competition with local industries. Research by Chen et al. (2024) highlights the challenges African economies face in balancing trade relations with BRICS nations, particularly China, which has emerged as a dominant trading partner for many African countries. The influx of cheap Chinese goods into African markets has raised concerns about the competitiveness of local industries and the sustainability of domestic manufacturing sectors.

Additionally, the issue of debt sustainability has come to the forefront of discussions surrounding BRICS-Africa economic relations. According to UNCTAD (2013), African countries have increasingly turned to BRICS nations for financing, often through loans and infrastructure projects. While these investments hold the promise of driving economic development, they also raise questions about debt vulnerabilities and the longterm sustainability of African economies. As BRICS expands its economic footprint in Africa, policymakers must carefully consider the implications of debt accumulation and strive for sustainable financing models prioritising long-term development objectives.

Another critical aspect to consider is the potential for technology transfer and knowledge sharing between BRICS nations and African countries. According to Walz et al. (2008), BRICS countries possess advanced technological capabilities in sectors such as information technology, renewable energy, and telecommunications. Collaborative ventures and partnerships between BRICS and African entities offer opportunities for technology transfer, skills development, and innovation diffusion. For instance, joint research and development initiatives in renewable energy could facilitate the transition towards sustainable and clean energy sources in Africa, contributing to both economic development and environmental sustainability.

Conversely, the economic implications of BRICS's expansion also entail challenges related to market access and trade diversification. Research by Oyewole (2023) highlights the need for African countries to diversify their export destinations and reduce dependence on primary commodity exports to BRICS nations. While BRICS markets offer significant potential for African exports, trade relations often remain concentrated in raw materials and natural resources. Diversifying export portfolios and enhancing value-added production capacities are essential steps for African countries to maximise the benefits of trade with BRICS nations and mitigate vulnerabilities to commodity price fluctuations.

Besides, the issue of infrastructure development emerges as a key driver and enabler of economic cooperation between BRICS and African countries. According to ElGanainy et al. (2024), infrastructure investment is crucial for enhancing connectivity, facilitating trade flows, and fostering regional integration within Africa. BRICS-led initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) have the potential to address Africa's infrastructure deficit and unlock economic growth opportunities. However, concerns exist regarding the sustainability, transparency, and governance frameworks associated with large-scale infrastructure projects, highlighting the importance of accountable and inclusive development strategies.

To conclude, the economic implications of BRICS's expansion for Africa are multifaceted, encompassing opportunities for technology transfer, market access, and infrastructure development alongside challenges related to trade diversification, debt sustainability, and governance. By leveraging collaborative partnerships, embracing innovation, and adopting sustainable development practices, African countries can harness the potential benefits of BRICS-African economic cooperation while addressing underlying vulnerabilities and ensuring inclusive growth.

# 3.2. Political and Strategic Implications

One significant aspect of the BRICS expansion is its geopolitical implications for Africa, particularly in shaping regional power dynamics and international alignments. According to Soko (2017), BRICS's engagement in Africa is driven by strategic interests, including access to natural resources, market expansion, and geopolitical influence. African countries, in turn, view BRICS as strategic partners in counterbalancing Western hegemony and fostering South-South cooperation. This alignment is evident in the increasing collaboration between BRICS and African regional organisations, such as the African Union (AU), in areas such as peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and sustainable development.

However, the geopolitical rivalries within BRICS present challenges and complexities for Africa. Research by Tran (2023) highlights the tensions between China and India within the BRICS framework, particularly concerning their competing interests and influence in Africa. These tensions can manifest in proxy conflicts, geopolitical manoeuvring, and economic competition, potentially exacerbating instability and insecurity in the region. Moreover, the divergent foreign policy priorities and approaches of BRICS members towards Africa challenge African countries in navigating their diplomatic engagements with the bloc.

Also, the issue of global governance reform is central to the political implications of BRICS expansion for Africa. According to Vyas-Doorgapersad (2022), African countries support BRICS's calls for reforming global governance institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities and enhance African representation. BRICS's advocacy for multipolarity and a greater voice for emerging economies resonates with Africa's aspirations for equitable representation and decision-making power in global governance forums. However, the divergent interests and priorities among BRICS members as well as the complexities of international diplomacy pose challenges to achieving meaningful reforms that address Africa's concerns.

One key aspect to consider is the evolving nature of security cooperation between BRICS nations and African countries. According to Carmody (2017), BRICS's engagement in Africa extends beyond economic interests to encompass security cooperation, including peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and maritime security initiatives. The BRICS bloc has increasingly positioned itself as a partner in addressing security challenges on the African continent, reflecting shared concerns about regional stability and conflict resolution. This cooperation is exemplified by joint peacekeeping missions, such as those in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where BRICS nations contribute troops and logistical support.

The strategic implications of BRICS expansion also raise concerns about potential power rivalries and competition for influence in Africa. Hagan (2023) also highlights the geopolitical dynamics between China and other BRICS members, particularly regarding their strategic interests and investments in African countries. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and infrastructure projects in Africa have drawn scrutiny from other BRICS nations, raising questions about competition for geopolitical influence and economic dominance. These dynamics underscore the complexities of BRICS-African relations and the need for African countries to navigate competing interests and power dynamics within the bloc.

Moreover, the issue of sovereignty and agency is central to the political implications of BRICS's expansion for Africa. According to the BRICS Summit's Declarations (2023), African countries seek to maintain autonomy and agency in their engagements with BRICS nations, ensuring that partnerships are mutually beneficial and aligned with

national development priorities. This requires African countries to adopt a nuanced approach in their diplomacy with BRICS, balancing the pursuit of strategic interests with safeguarding sovereignty and preserving political independence. By asserting agency and leveraging diplomatic channels effectively, African countries can shape the terms of engagement with BRICS nations and maximise the benefits of cooperation.

To put it briefly, the political and strategic implications of BRICS's expansion for Africa are characterised by a complex interplay of security cooperation, power rivalries, and sovereignty considerations. While BRICS's engagement offers opportunities for addressing security challenges, promoting regional stability, and fostering strategic partnerships, it also presents challenges related to competition for influence, geopolitical tensions, and safeguarding sovereignty. By navigating these dynamics with resilience and foresight, African countries can harness the potential benefits of BRICS-African relations while safeguarding their national interests and autonomy.

# 4. Implications for Global Governance

One significant implication of BRICS's expansion for global governance is the call for reforming international institutions to reflect the changing geopolitical landscape and accommodate the voices of emerging economies, including African countries. According to Cynthia et al. (2017), BRICS nations advocate for a more equitable distribution of power and decision-making authority in global governance structures, particularly in institutions like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). African countries align with BRICS in their calls for reform, seeking greater representation and participation in global decision-making processes to address the continent's unique challenges and priorities.

Nevertheless, the implications of BRICS's expansion for global governance also raise questions about the coherence and effectiveness of collective action within the bloc. Research by Darnal et al. (2023) features the divergent interests and priorities among BRICS members, particularly regarding their approaches to global governance issues such as human rights, climate change, and peacekeeping. These differences can complicate consensus-building and hinder coordinated action within international forums, limiting the bloc's ability to effect meaningful change in global governance structures.

In addition, the issue of institutional innovation and alternative mechanisms of global governance is central to the implications of BRICS's expansion for Africa.

According to Duggan et al. (2022), BRICS nations have established new institutions and platforms, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the BRICS Business Council, to complement existing global governance frameworks and address gaps in development financing and infrastructure investment. These initiatives offer African countries alternative sources of funding and cooperation outside traditional Westerndominated institutions, providing greater flexibility and autonomy in pursuing their development agendas.

One crucial aspect to consider is the role of BRICS in advocating for multipolarity and greater representation of emerging economies in global governance institutions. To Duggan (2022), BRICS nations challenge the existing hegemony of Western powers in shaping global governance norms and policies. African countries align with BRICS in their calls for a more inclusive and representative international order that accommodates the diverse interests and perspectives of the global South. This shared vision resonates with Africa's aspirations for enhanced agency and participation in global decision-making processes, particularly in areas such as peace and security, development, and environmental sustainability.

Also, the implications of BRICS's expansion for global governance also raise questions about the effectiveness of existing institutions in addressing contemporary challenges. In addition, Bas (2021) draws attention to the limitations of traditional global governance structures in accommodating the diverse interests and priorities of BRICS nations and African countries. This calls for innovative approaches and reforms to enhance the responsiveness, legitimacy, and effectiveness of global governance mechanisms in addressing pressing global issues such as poverty, inequality, and climate change.

The issue of South-South cooperation and solidarity is central to the implications of BRICS's expansion for Africa within the context of global governance. According to Stephan and Bas (2014), BRICS nations and African countries share common interests and challenges, including the pursuit of sustainable development, poverty alleviation, and social inclusion. This convergence of interests provides opportunities for collaborative initiatives and partnerships within global governance frameworks, fostering greater solidarity and collective action among developing countries.

The implications of BRICS's expansion for global governance underscore the need for inclusive, responsive, and effective mechanisms that accommodate the diverse interests and priorities of BRICS nations, African countries, and the broader

global South. By advocating for multipolarity, institutional reform, and South-South cooperation, BRICS nations and African countries can contribute to shaping a more equitable, inclusive, and sustainable global governance architecture that addresses the complex challenges of the twenty-first century.

### 5. Conclusion

The expansion of BRICS holds significant implications for the African continent across economic, political, and strategic dimensions. As BRICS extends its outreach to Africa, it presents both opportunities and challenges for African countries in navigating this evolving partnership.

Economically, BRICS's expansion offers avenues for growth, investment, and development through enhanced trade and investment cooperation. Initiatives like the BRICS New Development Bank provide alternative financing mechanisms for infrastructure projects, supporting economic growth and industrialisation in Africa. However, concerns about trade imbalances, competition with local industries, and debt sustainability underscore the need to carefully manage economic relations with BRICS nations.

Politically and strategically, BRICS's engagement in Africa influences regional power dynamics and international alignments. African countries view BRICS as strategic partners in counterbalancing Western hegemony and fostering South-South cooperation. However, geopolitical rivalries within BRICS, particularly between China and India, pose challenges and complexities for Africa, necessitating careful navigation of diplomatic engagements and power dynamics within the bloc.

Moreover, BRICS's expansion raises questions about global governance reform and the representation of emerging economies in international institutions. African countries support BRICS's calls for reforming global governance structures to reflect contemporary realities and enhance African representation. However, divergent interests and institutional constraints within BRICS complicate consensus-building and hinder coordinated action on global governance issues.

In navigating the implications of BRICS's expansion, African countries must adopt a nuanced approach that balances the pursuit of national interests with the imperatives of regional integration and collective bargaining. By leveraging opportunities for economic cooperation, fostering strategic partnerships, and advocating for inclusive global governance frameworks, African countries can maximise the benefits of BRICS's

engagement while addressing challenges and vulnerabilities.

BRICS's expansion presents Africa with a dynamic landscape of opportunities and challenges, shaping the continent's development trajectory and its role in the evolving global order. By embracing strategic foresight, diplomacy, and collaboration, African countries can harness the potential of BRICS-Africa relations to advance shared prosperity, stability, and sustainable development in the twenty-first century.

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# State Fragility and the Drivers of Insurgency in Nigeria Olugbemiga Samuel Afolabi PhD

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### **Abstract**

What drives insurgency in fragile states? Is insurgency sustenance a function of ideology, economy, or something else? These and other questions have confronted scholars and government officials since the advent of insurgency activities in Nigeria's Northeast region. These questions are germane as actions and inaction taken to eradicate insurgency and its disruptive actions have met with little success. Using primary and survey data, this article probes and contextualizes the factors that spawned insurgency activities in the region including its adaptive features. The purpose of the article is further to assess policy options that could help contain and eradicate insurgent activities in Nigeria.

Keywords: Ideology; State Fragility; Insurgency; Nigeria

### 1. Introduction

What drives insurgency in fragile states? Is insurgency a function of ideology or purely economic? Or is it tied to deprivations that are not just economic but reflective of different aspects of individual human existence within African polities? What happens when ideology might not fully capture the driving force of an insurgent that has metamorphosed and diffused, straddling several countries like Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region? In this article, I propose to foreground these key questions by examining different aspects of insurgency within the context of state fragility and other drivers. I do so because I think that examining these questions is helpful to understand the unending instability in contemporary fragile states that are faced primarily by unremitting antagonism, militancy, and insurgency due to low capacity, authority, and legitimacy within the overall ambit of inability to secure and provide for its citizens. The article anchors and explains the sociology of the insurgency in a charged ethno-religious region that sees Western education as an erosion of its cultural and religious foundations. Generally, I suggest that continuous insurgency problems in multi-ethnic postcolonial African states are situated within how best to approach increased livelihood, public education, diversity, and economic prosperity. The failure to address these challenges is often why insurgency persists, as exemplified in the Nigerian case.

Ideologies play a very important role in insurgencies. This is tied to the assumption that every human action, including insurgencies, has certain beliefs and driving principles which guide its operations and by which it operates to achieve a predetermined objective(s). In several ways, ideology influences the modus operandi of insurgencies (Medina & Sarkar, 2022).

The article uses primary and survey data gathered from questionnaires and interviews with three (3) groups, consisting of parents, former Boko Haram fighters, and community leaders. These groups were purposively selected because they form the structure from which the insurgent leaders originate and from which the followers are recruited. The purpose of this selection is to explain the contestations about ideology in insurgency and its long-term effects. I examine the primary variable of the work, which is to first understand what insurgency is as different from terrorism, as there appears some confusion about where to place Boko Haram between the two. A key variable in state fragility is then considered, followed by the examination of the underlying issues of fragility in post-colonial states. After this, I give a background of the Boko Haram



insurgency before examining its drivers within the purview of its sustainability and metamorphosis over some time in Nigeria. This is followed by the need for rethinking insurgency in post-colonial fragile states. The conclusion summarises and emphasises what needs to be done in policy terms.

# 2. Understanding Insurgency

What is insurgency? What categorises armed, non-state actors as insurgents? These questions are necessary given the various labels that have been ascribed to Boko Haram's violent activities in Northeast Nigeria. I begin this section by asserting that the activities of Boko Haram (BH) and its splinter group, Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), are insurgencies or insurgent groups rather than terrorist groups or organisations, even though insurgencies could adopt and use terrorist tools and tactics (Zenn, 2019; CIA, 2012; Merari, 2007). Given this reality, some scholars have argued that it is futile to distinguish between insurgency and terrorism (Mashimbye, 2022). Yet, it would be simplistic to assume there is no distinction and that both are the same. To resolve this confusion, it is therefore necessary that insurgency is conceptualised correctly and an explanation offered for what distinguishes it from terrorism. In doing this, ideological postulations of insurgency provide solid ground for a better understanding of the Boko Haram insurgent violence and disruptive activities, especially as is evident in the restive North-Eastern Nigeria.

Insurgencies, by their nature and ideology, are political first and then military, even though they may cloak their activities in humanitarian and religious garbs. In most cases, insurgencies seek to create a political order that would allow their ideology mostly religious—to flourish, initially through violence and militarily, and later through a designed political order. This, in essence, defines what Boko Haram represents and espouses in Nigeria. Therefore, insurgency is a "protracted political-military activity directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government and completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations" (Jones and Johnston, 2013:1). Indeed, insurgencies are synonymous with violence through which they, from a non-ruling platform, seek to challenge, change, and reconfigure the basis of authority of the state in their areas of operation to the form of their ideology. While rebellion might be the first building block of insurgencies through its ideological postulations, the shift to actual engagement in violent insurgent activities is nonetheless systemic and structural. Systemic, through the exploitation of societal causes and their incorporation into insurgent ideology; and structural, which entails who determines what, when, and who gets what. It is obvious from this that insurgent groups like Boko Haram seek to determine the political and economic configuration of a given space (Nigeria's Northeast) with its avowed commitment to destroying Western education, instituting its version of governance, and creating its own space and political institutions (Zenn, 2019). That is why Larry Cable (1993:231) viewed insurgency as "the armed expression of organic, internal political disaffiliation". Furthermore, it is instructive to note that insurgency can be seen in seven forms and, by operation, be classified as anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. This division speaks to the ideology of each insurgent group and what its ultimate goals are. Therefore, an insurgent group may take one or more forms but scarcely does a particular insurgency possess all the forms. It is also necessary to concede that insurgent forms may change due to the exigencies of time and the difficulties of waging insurgent wars. Thus, while insurgency becomes one when it combines political ends with military engagements to achieve its aims, the point must not be missed that at the heart of contention is power, specifically political power. The struggle for and the challenge of political power underlies virtually all insurgencies. In Nigeria, irrespective of the stories about its origins, Boko Haram (BH) was sufficiently minded about the control of political power and sphere of influence in terms of its ideological postulations and vision of political organisation (Zenn, 2019). Boko Haram's avowed decision and violent insurgent activities to control territory belie its ideological pursuits to create an Islamic state, inclusive of political structures, institutions, and the general way of life of those within its territorial space. As has been alluded to, three main factors necessary for continuous insurgency are: to what use and extent does terror feature in insurgent ideology and modus operandi; the drive for and the scale of recruitment of followers mostly drawn from the lower class of the society, and the relationship between the leaders, mostly drawn from the elites within the insurgents and followers; and third, insurgent organisation in terms of its infrastructure and acceptability by both passive and active followers. The active presence of the aforementioned factors has aided Boko Haram to flourish in conjunction with the conducive topography of the Lake Chad region for insurgent activities. As it is with Boko Haram in Nigeria, "the more vast a country, particularly in its rural areas, the more marginal areas there are in which revolutionary political activity can operate with minimal fear of government intervention" (Jones, 2008: 24). Therefore, in countries where State governance capacity is weak, authority is low or not respected, and legitimacy is generally disputed and/or acknowledged by few, insurgency is most likely to foster and flourish (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009; Jones, 2008). This has been the Nigerian experience of Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State of West Africa. In Nigeria and the rest of the Lake Chad countries, the seeming lack of state governance capacity, including the lack of effective policing of its borders, has led to the diffusion of Boko Haram insurgency and the helplessness of these states in combating it. The incapacity of each state contiguous to the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroun) influences and emboldens the Boko Haram insurgency to continue unabated. The questions of insurgency and state (in)capacity for effective governance cannot be dismissed lightly given the historical weakness of most states in Africa and Nigeria in particular, especially considering her population and landmass. The World Bank report (2019) alluded that most countries with low capacity will likely experience insurgencies, civil war, and acts of rebellion that may or may not metamorphose into insurgency. Insurgencies are therefore not only creations of religio-socio-economic factors but also of systemic and institutional disorders inherent in weak states. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the issue of state fragility in weak states, specifically in Nigeria and how it influences, aids, and emboldens insurgency.

# 3. Post-coloniality and State Fragility in Nigeria

Every state has its strengths and weaknesses. Yet, some states are weaker than others such that the capacity to govern becomes suspect. Such states are classified as fragile. Thus, state fragility is evidenced by a state's inability to rule and assert its influence over all the segments of its territory. It is important to note that fragility is both a process and a condition where a state does not have the capacity nor possess the ability to effectively manage its population and territory. A state must be seen as fragile to discuss state fragility. However, such descriptions of state fragility or fragile states are subject to accusations of being value-laden, without objectively examining the socio-cultural, economic and political environment of such states (Lewis and Wallace, 2015; Saeed, 2020). Examination of several factors that are not necessarily quantifiable might help reduce the contestation over the definition and description of which state is fragile. But then, how do we objectively determine fragile states? It is within this context that indicators or indices have been developed to measure the ability of a state to cater for and meet the basic needs of its people (Fund for Peace Index, 2018). Therefore, state

fragility speaks to the inability of states who are 'unable to meet [their] population's expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process' (OECD, 2008). This is in agreement with DFID's characterisation of state fragility evident in countries 'where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor' (DFID, 2005). Without prejudice to fragile states, a key inability is the lack of capacity to provide security to its population. This harkens to a lack of effective coverage of the state territory. Therefore, for Cilliers and Sisk (2013:2), state fragility is the 'low capacity and poor state performance with respect to security and development'. It is in line with the above emphasis on security that Engberg-Pedersen, Andersen, & Stepputat (2008:6) believe that state fragility is concerned with 'institutional instability undermining the predictability, transparency and accountability of public decision-making processes and the provision of security and social services to the population'. Given this definition, it can safely be said that the majority of African countries can be categorised as fragile states. Fragile state indicators like weak governance structures, porous borders, high poverty levels, poor public administration and services, wars of various kinds, and interminable conflicts are synonymous with African states (Marshall and Cole, 2009; European Report on Development, 2009). In real life, fragile states induce mass migration, allow transnational insecurity, condone organised crime, are seemingly helpless to stop violent crises and conflicts, and give room for insurgencies and terrorism. Common to all fragile states and aiding insurgencies are the presence of (1) a high level of poverty or the poor, (2) a high level of repeated or cyclical violence, (3) a high level (repeated experience) of economic exclusion and inequality, and (4) suffer from poor/weak governance (Cilliers and Sisk, 2013; Mcloughlin, 2012). What has been left unsaid by Cilliers and Sisk is that fragile states are prone to perennial conflicts that may or may not result in insurgency. When it results in insurgency, it may be linked to both internal and external influences. For instance, the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency was initially linked to internal influences, particularly exploiting Nigeria's inability to provide for its citizens and effectively rule its territory. So, while it started as a local insurgent outfit, it has since been influenced by external insurgent groups, sharing training, intelligence, and strategies with fragile countries ravaged by insurgent/terrorist violent activities. Therefore, violent conflicts and insurgencies have come to be synonymous with fragile states, particularly in Africa. It is indeed particularly important to note that countries that do badly on governance indicators have experienced more wars and social disruptions than those that have performed better on the same indicators (Fearon, 2010). It has, therefore, become imperative to know why African states are chronically fragile. In Nigeria, the focus of this paper, state fragility is high. The question is, could colonial origins of the modern state in Africa be said to be responsible for its fragility? This question becomes important, without prejudice to other contending reasons, that the state in Africa has been historically weak given that its emergence was without the input of and recourse to the people (Afolabi, 2014). This is why some scholars view the post-colonial state in Africa as weak (Alaye and Fakoya, 2024; Olaitan, 2004; Bayart, et al 1999, Clapham, 1996), while others see it as being prone to exploitation by different groups (Afolabi, 2020a, 2014; Osaghae, 2006), yet, others believe the post-colonial state can be plundered and constricted (Mimiko and Afolabi, 2012; McGowan, 2006; Olaitan, 2005), and, lately, captured (Bhorat, 2017; Report of the Public Protector, 2016; Wilson, 2001). While state capture is often used in terms of a state being held through corruptive means, it is not farfetched to posit that fragile states in Africa are being captured through insurgencies and other violent rebellious activities that have further limited the ability and resilience of post-colonial African states to fulfil its social contract obligation with its citizens. This therefore speaks to the fundamental defects inherent in post-colonial states that are seen as unrepresentative of the people and as such, are treated as an alien. With such an outlook and relationship with the people, the post-colonial states are bound to be weak, and subject to manipulations and challenges. This has played out in virtually all sub-Saharan African states.

In Nigeria, state fragility has been identified as a crucial factor in the emergence and proliferation of rebellious and insurgent groups (Jones and Johnston, 2013). The critical ability to govern effectively and provide qualitative services to its people has been lacking and becoming worrisome. As a measure of its governance indicator, the World Bank in its 2018 report noted that the country has the highest number of poor people with over 87 million living in poverty (The World Bank, 2018; Vanguard newspapers, 2018). With its colonial heritage, the Nigerian state has been traditionally weak and cannot enforce its rules over its territory. Challenges to its authority have marked its history, culminating in a three-year civil war from 1967 to 1970. Furthermore, all objective indicators have shown their inability and incapacity to meaningfully provide and meet societal expectations. As shown in the Fund for Peace fragility index (see CS Stats table), the Nigerian state fragility is perennial and predisposes it to insurgent activities. With twelve indicators including the security apparatus, it is obvious from the data that the country has an extremely high fragility status that continues to place it as one of the most fragile states in the world (Fund for Peace, 2018). This arguably

indicates that the country is prone to continuous insurgency and its related debilitating activities on an existing weak capacity, rendering the state weaker.

CS Stats										
2024	15th	96.6	8.7	9.6	8.3	8.9	8.0	6.6	8.3	8.9
2023	15th	98.0	9.0	9.6	8.6	8.8	8.1	6.7	8.2	8.8
2022	16th	97.2	8.9	9.3	8.9	8.3	8.0	6.6	8.5	9.1
2021	12th	98.0	8.8	9.6	8.8	8.6	7.7	6.5	8.4	9.3
2020	14th	97.3	8.7	9.9	9.1	7.9	7.8	6.6	8.1	8.9
2019	14th	98.5	9.0	9.9	9.4	7.8	8.1	6.9	8.0	8.9
2018	14th	99.9	8.9	9.6	9.3	8.0	8.3	7.2	8.3	8.9
2017	13th	101.6	9.2	9.6	9.2	8.0	8.6	7.2	8.6	9.2
2016	13th	103.5	9.7	9.9	9.4	7.7	8.8	7.4	8.8	9.4
2015	14th	102.5	9.9	9.8	9.9	7.6	8.8	7.1	9.1	9.1
2014	17th	99.7	9.5	9.5	9.8	7.3	8.9	7.0	8.8	9.0
2013	16th	100.7	9.5	9.4	9.8	7.5	9.2	7.3	8.8	9.3
2012	14th	101.1	9.2	9.8	9.7	7.5	8.9	7.6	9.1	9.1
2011	14th	99.9	9.1	9.5	9.6	7.3	9.0	7.7	9.0	9.0
2010	14th	100.2	9.3	9.4	9.5	6.9	9.3	8.1	9.4	9.1
2009	15th	99.8	9.4	9.6	9.7	6.6	9.5	8.3	9.2	9.0
2008	18th	95.7	9.2	9.3	9.4	5.9	9.2	8.2	8.9	8.7
2007	17th	95.6	9.2	9.5	9.5	5.4	9.1	8.5	9.1	8.7
2006	22nd	94.4	9.2	9.0	9.1	5.4	9.0	8.5	9.0	8.3

**Figure 1:** Nigeria's ranking on State Fragility Index (2006 – 2024) **Source:** Fragile State Index, Fund for Peace (2024)

The fragility index shows that the state would continue to experience grievance-based rebellions and armed challenges as other groups might join Boko Haram and ISWA to militarily challenge the Nigerian state. This is because, from the data and the figure shown, group grievances, security challenges, and factionalised elites top the critical factors that have consistently rendered the Nigerian state incapacitated. This has facilitated more grievances and security challenges, making the state's fragility more precarious and an ongoing dilemma for the country's rulers. It is important to note that factionalised elites have played an important role in Nigeria's state fragility, as those who lost power struggles (electoral or otherwise) often resort to actions that directly challenge state authority and legitimacy (Afolabi, 2020b).




Figure 2: Indicators Trend 2006-2024 Source: Fragile State Index, Fund for Peace (2024).

The Nigerian civil war, June 12 electoral debacle and the Boko Haram insurgency are some of the instances where elite conflicts and factionalised elites have contributed to the fragility status of the country (Babangida, 2025). Figure 3 shows the composite picture of the state of fragility in the Nigerian state.




Figure 3: Overall Country Fragility Status Source: Fragile State Index, Fund for Peace (2024)

However, more useful to the analysis of post-colonial state and state fragility would be the simpler data and analysis that focused on key indicators bordering on legitimacy, capacity, and authority. These three indicators encompass the key fragility index missing in the political context and its governance structures. For Nigeria, figure 4 represents a further confirmation of the abysmal level of state fragility.




Figure 4: Constellations of Nigeria's State Fragility

Source: Ziaja and Grävingholt (2023). Constellations of State Fragility (2.0.0)

With a measure of 0 to 1, signifying different levels of performance, 1 signifies excellence and 0 reveals deficiencies that depict the extreme fragility of a state. From the figure, it is evident that Nigeria's capacity for effective governance hovers around slightly above 0.1 and less than 0.2, signifying substantive deficiencies. The low capacity has been shown graphically in the number of poor people, the high crime rate, the lack of law and order, the multiple centres and organisations challenging state authority as a result of its perceived weakness, unemployment, and negative economic climate (The World Bank, 2018). A natural outcome of low capacity (0.1.5) is a high proportion of dissatisfied citizens that are easily recruited into rebellion generally, and insurgency (Boko Haram) in the Northeast of the country in particular. This happens when the state is 'incapable of controlling its territory, this weakness creates opportunities for insurgent groups to control these areas and challenge the state authority's rule' (Jones and Johnston, 2013:4). This is further buttressed by former president Buhari's assertion that 'the answer, at least in the case of Nigeria, is lack of social and economic inclusion'

(Buhari, Punch Newspapers, 6 April, 2019). This directly reveals the lack of state capacity to cater for its people, create economic opportunities and maintain its role as an arbiter. This also speaks to the Nigerian state's lack of resilience, magnifying its fragility.

In terms of legitimacy, the Nigerian state has suffered from a historic legitimacy crisis from the colonial to post-independence eras. While a long period of military rule has eroded legitimacy claims pre-1999, the post-1999 democratic period has not fared any better. With electoral contests often based on zero-sum and winnerstake-all, electoral outcomes are often disputed and little or no legitimacy is accorded the party that won. Most electoral contests are often said to be rigged, denying the winner's legitimacy (Afolabi, 2020; 2017; Ham and Lindberg, 2015). Even the 2019 general elections have raised legitimacy issues for the winner (Onuoha, 2019). Thus, the legitimacy rating has remained low, and many Nigerians are dissatisfied with the government in power. While legitimacy is primarily concerned with the acceptance of authority as lawful, flowing from credible elections and electoral outcomes (Election Integrity Project, 2015), the low legitimacy as reflected in the ranking (0.27 average) as can be seen in Figure 4, is not only related to flawed electoral outcomes but from perceived and actual incompetence of the state in meeting and addressing a large proportion of the populace, except the ruling elite. This has provided platforms to militant and insurgent groups like Boko Haram and justifications for their actions, as they have zero recognition of the rights and authority of the state. These justifications, it must be noted, are shared by the leadership of the insurgency (Boko Haram) and its followers, who are its foot soldiers, exploiting this key foundational variable (legitimacy) of the modern state to foster insurgency. This has been at the heart of the problem of Nigerian state fragility.

In terms of authority, signifying a state's right to issue orders and commands and the willingness of the people to obey them, there is not much improvement. Rather, a lack of authority, or better put, a lack of obedience to and recognition of state authority, has become associated with the country. With a less-than-average score of 0.43, the data shown in Figure 4 reveals that where the authority of a state is less than average, the tendency is for various groups to challenge, ignore, and resist state laws, regulations, and commands. In Nigeria, state authority is routinely ignored, challenged, and unenforced. In many cases, even the state is afraid to impose its authority, knowing it may be ignored, challenged, and/or not obeyed (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009). As had been demonstrated in several countries, lack of authority resulting from bad/poor

governance, electoral debacles, corruption resulting in failed or captured state, high poverty levels, economic problems and unattended to ethnic cum religious grievances, among other factors, can foment, encourage, and sustain wars and insurgencies. As has been argued, the Boko Haram insurgency as an insurgent group has benefited from Nigeria's State's low authority to launch and sustain insurgent activities.

It is therefore necessary to interrogate and pay particular attention to the origin and character of Nigeria's post-colonial state, which helps to explain its historical weakness in terms of legitimacy, capacity, and authority. The imposed nature of the post-colonial state, no matter the arguments to the contrary, makes the state alien and alienated from the people, robbing it of its connection to the mass of the people. The effect is that the state suffers from people's denial of its authority and legitimacy. In addition, military rule and electoral infelicities have further reinforced the alienation as the state is viewed as belonging to no one in particular, and thus, its laws and commands can and should be challenged, ignored, and disobeyed. While this is experienced in varying degrees across Nigeria, it has been exploited by Boko Haram to foster insurgency. Therefore, in Nigeria, state fragility is a derivative of a post-colonial state steeped in rent-seeking behaviour. This has been aptly demonstrated and shown in the thread that runs through post-colony, state fragility, and insurgency in Nigeria. While the Fund for Peace State Fragility Index is a Western construct, the Afrobarometer and Mo Ibrahim Governance Index ratings that are African-driven are similar to what the Fund for Peace ratings are for Nigeria, hence its use in this work.

# 4. Boko Haram: Towards an Understanding of Insurgency in Nigeria

The current insecurities and displacements in Northeast Nigeria started when a jihadist group, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram, led an armed rebellion against the Nigerian state. It was deeply rooted in religious fundamentalism and primarily directed at disrupting orthodox Western education and wiping away all vestiges of Western lifestyles in Northeast Nigeria (Olaniyan and Asuelime, 2017). Boko Haram, which started in 2002 and from its inception was more about radical religious teaching and condemnations, did not engage in violent activities at the beginning. However, its teachings were an extreme version of Islamism, and Western education was viewed as bad and a corruption of the religious and moral values of the society (Walker, 2016). However, after a security clampdown in 2009, resulting in the death of its chief ideologue, the organisation became violent and has since engaged

in a series of hit-and-run insurgent activities (Zenn, 2019; Adeniyi, 2012). Northeast Nigeria has remained its main theatre of operation, with Borno State being the epicentre of the insurgent campaigns and violence. Insurgency in the northeast has flourished as modern insurgency conflict stems from three basic realisations: (1) the recognition that many of the insurgency conflicts fought within states are no longer restricted within the confines of their states of occurrences but are diffusing into neighbouring states (towns and villages) to involve and affect surrounding states/regions (Chad, Niger, and Cameroun); (2) that while pursuing their locally-driven agenda, many of the modern insurgencies are also committed to regional expansion; thus most states contiguous to Nigeria are affected by the spread and attack of the insurgency; and (3) the increasing realisation that modern insurgencies are driven by religious fundamentalism that reject the concept of Western-styled educational and democratic values but advocate a theocratic system of government in their states and sub-regions as well as education that is defined by the insurgents. This is underpinned by states where state fragility is high, like Nigeria. Therefore, more than one million people have been displaced from their homes and are now known as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), residing in military-secured IDP camps. Of the over one million that are internally displaced, more than 60% are youths, with women and children accounting for over 80% of displaced persons (ActionAid Needs Assessment Report, 2019). The remaining are usually old men who are either too invalid or weak to be useful to the insurgents. This situation has had a deleterious effect on both formal and informal education opportunities, with access to education severely limited and public infrastructure severely damaged. More than 8,000 girls and boys have been recruited and used as child soldiers in different roles by armed groups (UNICEF, 2022). I now turn to what the drivers of the Boko Haram insurgency are.

# 5. Ideology Displaced? Understanding Drivers of Insurgency in Nigeria

The incidence of insurgency cannot be divorced from several factors that are mostly complex. A single explanatory factor cannot satisfactorily show why insurgencies spring up and what sustains them. Therefore, reliance on ideology as an explanatory factor or tool would not illuminate why insurgency persists nor demonstrate its resilience, unlike countries with 'extreme' fragility status (Jones and Johnston, 2013). Its predictive value is also zero as to why insurgency persists. As well, the incidence of insurgency in

fragile states cannot be divorced from the desperation to access and maintain power in Africa, especially political power that is reflective of its socio-religious and economic norms and values. It is becoming increasingly clear that the more fragile a state, which can be taken advantage of through a state's low/lack of authority, legitimacy, and capacity (state fragility), the more likely are rebellions and insurgencies to develop and flourish. But this is not all. Other reasons have been discovered to foster and sustain insurgencies. These are weighty and could be construed as further evidence of state fragility. It is necessary to bring these factors into bold relief to know and understand the drivers. For this paper, the following are the drivers of insurgencies in Nigeria:

### 5.1 Religious Ideology and Patriarchal Hierarchies

It is proper to start the discussion of the drivers with the most obvious and the most talked about in the sustenance of insurgency in Nigeria. While religious ideology played (Salafi-Jihadi ideology to be specific) and still plays a prominent role in the incubating phase and giving birth to insurgency in Nigeria, its role in sustaining it has remained peripheral as other contending realities have set in. Factors like financial needs, insurgent economy and daily life sustenance, ethnic differences between and among leaders and fighters, as well as continuing methods of prosecuting the insurgency, have shown that religious ideology does not last throughout an insurgency. Even though religious ideology was a powerful tool in recruiting followers with the promise of paradise (allijanah), economic factors became a stronger pull factor in the later years of the Boko Haram insurgency. From the respondents interviewed, while many are of the view that religious ideology plays a key role, the particular type of ideology that should drive the insurgency has also been a source of contention. Questions of whether it should be the extreme version of Salafi-Jihadi ideology as opposed to a more moderate one that builds relationships with 'liberated' communities have been a fundamental point of disagreement. The contention over ideology is reflected in what should be the modus operandi of the insurgent group, its military targets, its communal relationship with civilians, and back-channel dealings with the government. The inability to resolve basic and emerging issues/problems over ideology finally resulted in a split, with Islamic State West Africa emerging from Boko Haram in 2016 (Zenn, 2019). For example, Abubakar Shekau, who became the leader after the death of leader Yusuf, was excessively aggressive towards dissents within and without, with violence towards all including Christians, children, State and non-state actors, and non-cooperative Muslims. It was a marked shift from the initial pre-2009 non-violent proselytization ideology to full-blown insurgency. To those who endured this overt aggressive violence within the group, the ideology espoused by Shekau was problematic and eventually resulted in a coup and split. Even with its contentions over ideology, the point should be made that religious ideology still plays a prominent role in sustaining the ideology, though no longer the main recruitment tool for the insurgency. This has led some commentators to regard ISWA, with its more humane religious ideology approach to insurgency, as more a "peoples" champion (Hassan, 2018).

Even beyond the religious ideology explained above is the religious patriarchal hierarchies that feed into the insurgency vision of how societies should run and be governed. For virtually all those interviewed, the male-dominated community leadership have sympathies for Boko Haram, as most of the sentiment expressed by the group found ready recipients who share similar religious views and the corruptive influence of Western education. For many respondents interviewed, the issue/question is the undue emphasis on formal Western education as opposed to informal Qur'anic education that emphasises the dominance and prominence of the patriarchal hierarchy of societal ordering. The infusion of this core element of patriarchy into the Boko Haram insurgency initially won it many admirers and supporters but was frittered away under Shekau. But this is regained under ISWA civilian-friendly insurgent activities (Hassan, 2018). The ideology clashes within the insurgency within Boko Haram, resulting in a strategic manoeuvre by ISWA of being seen as civilian-friendly, also shows the degree of state fragility given its inability to reach the vulnerable and the problematic parts of the country (Maina, 2018). Having not felt the presence of the state, the poor of the country, Northeast Nigeria in particular, fell prey to Jihadi ideologies that suits their religious inclinations and helped sustain, in large part, insurgency in the region. The religious ideology stance of the driver of insurgency in Nigeria is consistent with other research works in this regard (Jones and Johnston, 2013; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002).

# 5.2 High Poverty and Low Economic Power

The high incidence of poverty in the Northeast has been identified as another factor that has kept the insurgency going. For most of the Northeast, particularly Borno State, the average family size is between 15-18 persons with an average income of 300-350 Naira, which is slightly less than a dollar (ActionAid Needs Assessment Report, 2019). According to the AAN report, 'the most vulnerable in the family are women

and children with the children (mostly males) susceptible to recruitment by Boko Haram and engagement for child labour (mainly street begging)'. As has been seen in the Northeast of the country, there is a high birth rate with parents unable to cater for the high number of children they have given birth to. Many of these children are primarily found in the streets begging, with only a few found productively engaged in education pursuits or vocational schools. The children that roam the streets readily provide Boko Haram the opportunity to recruit them as followers and foot soldiers. In many instances, the promise of free food, stipends in the form of financial tokens, and shelter have proved irresistible to these often hungry and homeless children (Sotunde, 2016; Mercy Corps, 2016). Likewise, the low economic and purchasing power in some instances has led parents to accept monetary gifts as the price for their children to be recruited into the Boko Haram insurgency. The Northeast has the highest number of poor Nigerians (The World Bank Report, 2018). Therefore, the higher the number of poor people due to state inabilities (fragility), the more the number of people that see the state as lacking the capacity to affect and regulate their conduct, which gives rise to disobedience of state authority. As state fragility becomes extreme, so does the tendency to challenge and, in some cases, ignore state legitimacy to issue commands and obey them. This has been compounded by the alienation of many people from the state due to 'an additional setback to poverty reduction and increased violent conflict' (World Bank Poverty and Equity Brief, 2009). Following this, the cost of insurgency has been high and pervasive, resulting in huge displacements, internal refugees, food insecurity, and deaths (WHO, 2017; WFP, 2016). In this manner, there is a mutual reinforcing relationship between state fragility, poverty, and low economic power/opportunities that has helped to sustain the insurgency in Nigeria and other poor states (Afolabi, 2015; Jones and Johnston, 2013; Le Bullion, 2001).

# 5.3 Ethnicity and Ethnic Support from The States Contiguous to Nigeria

The sustenance of the Boko Haram insurgency cannot be divorced from the shared ethnicity that is found in the states around the Lake Chad region. The Kanuri ethnic tribe is dominant in Borno State and other surrounding areas in Northeast Nigeria and the contiguous states of Niger, Cameroun, and Chad. While operating primarily from Nigeria, Boko Haram has operated in and found safe havens in these neighbouring states (Nkwi, 2013). Shared language, culture, religion, ethnic ties and solidarity has

been identified as key factors that have aided insurgency in the Lake Chad region with preachers from Nigeria found in these states spreading the Boko Haram Jihadi religious ideology and finding acceptance (Zenn, 2012). The cross-border support of the insurgency within the Lake Chad region is predicated on the idea of shared memory of the former Kanem-Bornu Empire, an Islamic Kingdom which territorially includes parts of modern-day North-Eastern Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Southwestern Chad, and South-Eastern Niger in the 19th century (Barkindo, 2014). Therefore, the receptive audience in these states of insurgent ideology and practice with their shared ethnicity is predicated on the visions of a resurrection of the empire through the Boko Haram insurgency. It should be noted that the Boko Haram insurgency did not spill over into the Lake Chad states as some scholars assume (Pieri and Zenn, 2017; Oluwadare, 2016). Rather, as can be deduced from the foregoing explanation, Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region was a coordinated and planned strategy to make use of existing ethnic ties, historical affinities, and geographical congruity in the region to sustain the insurgency (Elden, 2014). More importantly, all the states in the Lake Chad region share the extreme state fragility status. Niger, Chad, Cameroun, and Nigeria are among the states that are extremely poor, difficult to reach expansive territory and with poignant absence of government presence. In other words, the conditions in the four countries are conducive to insurgency, with Cameroon practically in the throes of civil war and armed insurrection. The other two states (Niger and Chad) do not fare better. In all, some parts of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria were once part of the Kanemi empire and inhabited by the Kanuris before they were split into four countries, and this has sustained Boko Haram through its diffusion throughout the region. The diffusion and sustenance of the insurgency, therefore, plays into the four states' extreme fragility status and other drivers identified in this study. Combined, ethnic solidarity and fragility shared by the four states have continued to support, provide cover for, and sustain the Boko Haram insurgency.

# 5.4 Porous Borders and Difficult Terrain

The issue of open and porous borders has plagued African states since the scramble for the continent by European powers. The untidy delineation, demarcation, and partition of the different parts of the continent into new states was done without recourse to existing ethnic, linguistic, and cultural affinities. As earlier said, the Lake Chad region is noted for ethnic, linguistic, and religious ties that transcend the European arbitrary state

system fostered in the region, making secured borders virtually impossible. International borders have simply been ignored (Hentz and Solomon, 2017). For example, the borders between Nigeria and Cameroon are so porous that people, especially itinerant preachers from both countries, can cross the border at will. Aside from the fact that there are no physical barriers, it is a common fact that there is hardly any government/state presence in the form of customs and immigration from both sides (Nigeria and Cameroon) to checkmate legal and illegal activities. This scenario is replicated at the Nigerian-Chad and the Nigerian-Niger borders, allowing for the free movement of persons and weapons (Elden, 2014). Thus, territorial proximity inclusive of porous borders among the four states provides the conditions for insecurity and the sustenance of the insurgency in the Chad region, which is made easier by the presence and mobility of the Kanuri ethnic tribe in the region (Starr, 2005; Buzan, 1991). Hence, it can be argued that the indiscriminate partitioning of the Lake Chad region has resulted in four states without borders.

As a corollary, a key driver identified by respondents and from literature is the existence of a rugged and difficult terrain from which insurgencies operate (Beckett, 2005; Jones and Johnston 2013). The Lake Chad region of Northeast Nigeria, within which the Sambisa Forest falls, provides the enabling territorial cover for Boko Haram insurgency. This cover is particularly important as Boko Haram insurgents often carry out attacks and retreat into the Sambisa Forest. For security agencies, the terrain is unfamiliar, difficult, and impenetrable. But for the insurgents, the rugged and difficult terrain serves as a home and training ground for foot soldiers while simultaneously providing a place of refuge and safety from security agencies. This also links insurgency to state fragility because as 'the state is incapable of controlling its territory, this weakness creates opportunities for insurgent groups to control these areas and challenge the state authority's rule' (Jones and Johnston, 2013:4). The combination of the difficult Lake Chad terrain, effects of climate change in the region and the Sambisa Forest have proved daunting in tackling Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, while at the same time sustaining and prolonging the lifespan of the insurgency (Doukhan, 2017; Hironaka, 2005).

# 5.5 Ill-equipped Military and Security Saboteurs

The Boko Haram insurgency has also continued due to the ill-equipped military and security saboteurs that are embedded in the Nigerian security institutions. It is common

knowledge, attested to by the respondents, that Boko Haram has sympathisers within and outside the Nigerian security outfits. For instance, several high-placed individuals have been alleged to be sponsors of Boko Haram's violent insurgent activities for personal Islamic and political gains (Taiwo and Wakili, 2015: 4). In Nigeria's Northeast alone, more than 100 prominent indigenes, with most of them from Borno state, are under a security watch-list for alleged involvement with and sponsorship of Boko Haram insurgency. Even within the official security agencies, especially the military, there are allegations of informants and saboteurs. Information about military strategies, movements and actions is mostly known to the insurgents. According to transcripts of an interview from one of the insurgents, security measures and the bombing of insurgents don't work because 'before their helicopter leaves, information has already reached us. Before the helicopter leaves any base, the information will reach us, and even where it will land if they bomb any place, they will only kill birds and animals, which are there. Also, on land, soldiers were sent to attack us. But before they come, information has reached us. We know how we will attack them and know all areas where they will follow' (Saharareporters, 2019).

Likewise, the Nigerian military is ill-equipped to combat insurgency due to a combination of factors including obsolete operational equipment, lack of experience, and low morale. To expatiate on this point, it should be noted that the Nigerian military has been conventional and has no profound knowledge of and arsenal to fight the Boko Haram insurgency. The poignant lack of military equipment, technology, and hardware has aided and served as part of the drivers of the insurgency. Even military equipment procurement has proved difficult. Also, as previously noted, the rugged terrain and mountainous environment of the Lake Chad region has provided extensive and expansive cover to the insurgency and its prolongation. The Nigerian military is relatively inexperienced and often unable to match the insurgents' suicidal activities. All these have graphically shown the ill-equipped nature of the security agencies in the fight against insurgency and why it continued unabated. Combined, these drivers have changed the narrative of insurgency from ideology to several factors that are essentially existential to the survival and sustenance of the insurgency.

# 6. Conclusion

Insurgencies are propelled and sustained by specific drivers. In examining what the drivers are, this article demonstrated that ideologies, especially religious ideologies,

played a crucial role in its emergence and sustenance. Yet, in practice, insurgent ideology differs from one group to another. In the case of Boko Haram, the adoption of the Salafi Jihadi ideology by its leadership was initially predicated on the rejection of Western education, its values, secularism, and democracy (Walker, 2012). In its place was the need to have an Islamic republic that would be administered by the Boko Haram sect. However, the article has shown that with time the BH insurgency ideology is essentially contested. The contestation of this ideology has led to a split in the sect and led to the emergence of the ISWA. More specifically, contesting ideologies have shaped each group's (BH and ISWA) modus operandi, insurgent-civilian relations, external relationships with other groups, and engagement with the Nigerian state. Understanding this dynamic is a crucial point to note when dealing with the insurgency.

However, central to the foregoing analysis sourced from primary sources and other data sets is the extreme status of Nigerian state fragility. With a very high fragility status confirmed by both the Fund for Peace and the DIE Constellation of State Fragility, Nigeria's low ratings on authority, legitimacy, and capacity have been the main instigator and driver of the insurgency. As an oil-dependent and primary commodity-producing status, Nigeria's ability to effectively rule over its territory is severely constrained and restrained to a few parts of the country, primarily the urban centres. Even in the urban centres, state capacity is limited; authority is challenged, ignored or disobeyed, and legitimacy is questioned due to the zero-sum nature of the electoral contest and fraud. In several places, primarily rural, where the presence of the state is less felt, the situation is worse. It was in such circumstances that Boko Haram grew and flourished. It is such areas that have continued to sustain the insurgency.

It is therefore essential to state that other drivers of the insurgency discussed in the article are tied to and indicative of the extreme state fragility status of the Nigerian state. Religious ideology and patriarchal hierarchies, high poverty and low economic power, ethnicity and ethnic support from states contiguous to Nigeria, porous borders and difficult terrain, and ill-equipped military and security saboteurs identified as drivers of insurgency in Nigeria point to its development, sustenance, and adaptive features. These drivers are crucial as they underline the state fragility components and make tracking, tackling, and subduing Boko Haram insurgency very difficult.

The article has made clear that insurgency in Nigeria is not limited to a single subsisting ideology but adapts to changing circumstances that are both internal and external. It is, therefore, incumbent on those involved in fighting insurgency in Nigeria to adopt strategies that recognise this distinction and seek ways to exploit this obvious

chasm within the insurgency. While all ideologies appeal to emotions and beliefs, they don't provide daily economic means of survival. Thus, at different stages of combating insurgency, specific measures that counter Jihadi religious ideology in its entirety should be adopted and pursued. A programme of deradicalization of this is necessary. Likewise, efforts should be made by the Nigerian state to institute measures that move it away from its fragile status. An increase in legitimacy through credible elections, increased capacity through a reduction in corruption and judicious use of resources, authority through effective security architecture, and provision of state services would be steps in the right direction. Effective policing of the borders should be of paramount concern. So also is the need to have the military better equipped to confront and subdue the insurgency. Foreign military assistance should be limited to tactical support and training rather than ground military campaigns that might not achieve much due to the rugged and difficult terrain they might not be familiar with.

Lastly, given the operations of different state and non-state actors in the region through combat, mediation, interventions, and other critical engagements, it is important to take into consideration the contesting ideologies within the insurgency, state fragility issues, and other noted drivers aiding and sustaining the insurgency when devising policies and programmes in the lake Chad region. Such strategies should include increasing state capacity, community stabilization, human and economic empowerment, containment of insurgent activities through kinetic and non-kinetic actions, including de-radicalization, transitional justice, and re-orientation of the affected communities towards mediation, respect for human rights of others and provisioning of access to justice. Understanding the contending narratives of ideology helps to situate insurgency and provide the context for policy actions to reduce or better still, eradicate the drivers of insurgency in Nigeria.

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Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2011	Abdi, C.M.	Moving beyond xenophobia: Structural violence, conflict and encounters with the 'other' Africans	Development Southern Africa	This paper examines conflict and cooperation between South Africans and Somali spaza shop owners in townships and informal settlements in the context of post-apartheid structural inequities. I argue that Somali and other poor newcomers suffer the same daily insecurity as the majority of the population. However, with the exception of the concerted killings, lootings and displacement of migrants in 2008–2009, this Somali case shows that contact between newcomers and local people is not always antagonistic and that newcomers are not passive victims of violence, but rather engage successfully in both competition and collaboration to cement their presence in these areas. I conclude that violence against migrants is rooted in South Africa's continuing structural violence and communal crisis, a condition characterised by tensions with compatriots as well as with newcomers. To solve the problem, attention must be paid to the persistence of this structural violence in the post-apartheid political dispensation	28	5	10.1080/0376835X.2011.623916	cabdi@umn.edu	Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota,	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	South Africa	No
2011	Whitaker, B.E.	The politics of home: Dual citizenship and the African diaspora	International Migration Review	In recent decades, more countries have started to recognize dual citizenship. Although overlooked in the literature, Africa is part of this trend with more than half of its governments now permitting their nationals to naturalize elsewhere while retaining home country rights. Why have some African countries embraced dual citizenship for emigrants, while others have not? We examine demographic, political, and economic data broadly across the continent and identify few clear patterns. We then explore the cases of Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya, finding that dual citizenship policies are driven as much by politics as they are by economic or security concerns	45	4	10.1111/j.1747-7379.2011.00867.x		University of North Carolina at Charlotte	Desk-based	Diaspora engagement	Multi-country		No
2011	Paoletti, E.	Migration and foreign policy: The case of Libya	Journal of North African Studies	This article provides a critical analysis on migration policies and trends across Libya. I focus on the relations between Libya and its Arab and African neighbours between the 1970s and 2010. In examining migration from the angle of international relations, I document the ways in which the regime has employed migration as a foreign policy tool to affect the behaviour of neighbouring countries.	16	2	10.1080/13629387.2011.532588	paoletti.emanuela@gmail. com	Somerville College, University of Oxford	Empirical	Migration diplomacy	National	Libya	No
2011	Baldé, Y.	The impact of remittances and foreign aid on savings/investment in sub-Saharan Africa	African Development Review	Migrant remittances reached \$21 billion in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 2008 according to the World Bank estimates. Despite these important flows, few macroeconomic studies have been conducted on this topic in SSA compared to other developing regions. The existing studies on the impact of remittances in SSA have been mostly in the form of case studies at the microeconomic level or reports. This study aims to fill this gap by investigating the impact of remittances on savings and investment respectively in samples of 37 and 34 SSA countries over the period 1980–2004. It also analyses comparatively the effectiveness of remittances and foreign aid in promoting savings and investment. OLS and instrumental variables (2SLS) with country fixed-effects are used as estimations methods. We find that both remittances and foreign aid positively and significantly influence savings and investment in SSA, meaning that contrary to most conclusions found in the literature, migrant remittances in SSA are not only and entirely spent in basic consumption needs. We also find that, although the volume and share of remittances are lower than foreign aid, remittances have more positive impact on savings and investment. Remittances, by being directly received by people in need and not by governments as intermediaries, would serve more households' interests and be more effective in favouring economic development than foreign aid. However, when efficiently used in a good institutional, political and economic environment, foreign aid can act as a complement to remittances by allowing vulnerable households to have income above the threshold subsistence's level so they (or migrants) can use a larger share of remittances for savings and investment purposes. Our results also suggest that remittances may have indirect positive effects on growth in SSA through savings and investment.	23	2	10.1111/j.1467-8268.2011.00284.x	yero.balde@unilim.fr	University of Limoges, France	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2011	Onuoha, B.	The state human trafficking and human rights issues in Africa	Contemporary Justice Review: Issues in Criminal, Social, and Restorative Justice	Internal factors in Africa which include limited autonomy of African states, the states' various degrees of lack of capacity, as well as inept and parasitic leadership make human trafficking and human rights abuses in Africa inevitable. Regardless of the connections suggested to exist between globalization and human trafficking, internal factors in Africa are more fundamental than globalization in explaining human trafficking and the associated human rights violations. Corruption and misrule brought about wars and crises, unemployment, poverty, and diseases, all of which acted as push factors in disposing victims to be trafficked. Internal factors were exacerbated by the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and were only deepened by the impacts of globalization. Any meaningful resolve to combat human trafficking and fight human rights abuses in Africa necessarily has to address the nature of state and the character of the leadership in the region	14	2	10.1080/10282580.2011.565973	browneonuoha@yahoo. com	Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria	Desk-based	Irregular migration	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2011	Iheduru, O.C.	African states, global migration, and transformations in citizenship politics	Citizenship Studies	Over the past three decades, relations between African emigrants and their home-states have been changing from antagonism to attempts to embrace and structure emigrant behaviors. This transformation in the conception of emigration and citizenship has hardly been interrogated by the growing scholarship on African and global migrations. Three of the most contentious strategies to extend the frontiers of loyalty of otherwise weak African states, namely dual citizenship or dual nationality, the right to vote from overseas, and the right to run for public office by emigrants from foreign locations are explored. Evidence from a wide range of African emigration states suggests that these strategies are neither an embrace of the global trend toward extra-territorialized states and shared citizenship between those at 'home' and others outside the state boundaries, nor are they about national development or diaspora welfare. Instead, they seem to be strategies to tap into emigrant resources to enhance weakened state power. The study interrogates the viability and advisability of emigrant voting and political participation from foreign locations, stressing their tendency to destabilize homeland political power structures, undermine the nurturing of effective diaspora mobilization platforms in both home and host states, and export homeland political practices to diaspora locations	15	2	10.1080/13621025.2011.549707	okey.iheduru@asu.edu	School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University	Desk-based	Diaspora engagement	Multi-country		No
2011	Singh, R.J., Haacker, M., Lee, KW., Le Goff, M.	Determinants and macroeconomic impact of remittances in sub- Saharan Africa	Journal of African Economies	This paper investigates the determinants and the macroeconomic role of remittances in sub-Saharan Africa. It assembles the most comprehensive data set available so far on remittances in the region; it comprises data for 36 countries for 1990 through 2008, and incorporates newly available data on the size and location of the diaspora. We find that remittances are larger for countries with a larger diaspora or when the diaspora is located in wealthier countries, and that they behave counter-cyclically, consistent with a role as a shock absorber. Although the effect of remittances in growth regressions is negative, countries with well functioning domestic institutions seem nevertheless to be better at unlocking the potential for remittances to contribute to faster economic growth	20	2	10.1093/jae/ejq039	rsingh9@worldbank.org	The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 20433, USA	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2011	Mitchell, M.I.	Insights from the Cocoa Regions in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana: Rethinking the Migration–Conflict Nexus		Although many scholars have noted the salience of mobility throughout the African continent, there has been little systematic investigation into the link between migration and conflict. Most scholarship has tended to see migration as primarily a by-product of conflict and not as a security issue in its own right. In analysing and contrasting the different migration—conflict trajectories across two similar case studies—Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana—this article attempts to develop an empirically informed theoretical framework for understanding the nexus between migration and conflict in Africa and to shed light on key intervening variables linking migration processes with violent outcomes.	54	2	10.1353/arw.2011.0035	matthew.mitchell@ queensu.ca	Department of Political Studies at Queen's University, Canada	Desk-based	Internal migration	Multi-country		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2011	Beauchemin, C.	Rural-urban migration in West Africa: Towards a reversal? Migration trends and economic situation in Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire	Population, Space and Place	Although Africa is still the continent with the highest urban growth in the world, this paper shows that, in some African countries, rural outmigration is tending now to decrease, or at least to stagnate, while urban outmigration is on the rise. These trends are so sharp in Côte d'Ivoire that the country is experiencing a pattern of counterurbanisation (i.e. the level of urbanisation is decreasing). Results are based on a proposed method to build a history of migration using retrospective data from national migration surveys. A review of literature is also provided on the potential explanations of the observed trends.	17	1	10.1002/psp.573	cris.beauchemin@ined.fr	INED-CEPED, Paris, France	Empirical	Internal migration	Multi-country		No
2012	Collyer, M., De Haas, H.	Developing dynamic categorisations of transit migration	Population, Space and Place	This paper considers the ways in which the dynamic nature of transit migration may be captured in categories that provide a basis for developing our understanding of the phenomenon but do not attempt to artificially pin it down. The first section re-examines common ways of categorising migrants and the second turns to existing research and activism around subjects of immigration in North Africa. The final section applies the common categorisations of the first section with the developing research considered in the second to examine the data that is available to enhance our understanding and possibilities of developing categorisations of transit migration. The conclusion sets out ways of advancing the research agenda on transit migration. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.	18	4	10.1002/psp.635	m.collyer@sussex.ac.uk	Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK	Desk-based	Others	Multi-country		No
2012	Sawadogo, W.R.	The challenges of transnational human trafficking in West Africa	African Studies Quarterly	A major challenge to good governance, transnational trafficking in human beings has been a serious problem for years in West Africa. Attempts to understand the phenomenon have then been initiated, which unfortunately have resulted in contradictory viewpoints amongst researchers and the impacted populations. Indeed, seen by some as a mere entertainment, a source of profit, or an abstract notion with no influence and no bearing upon their lives, transnational human trafficking is, in contrast, considered by others as a crucial preoccupation, a deadly reality that has drastically influenced their daily routines. Complex in its nature and forms, transnational human trafficking has raised deep divisions on issues of principles, theories, perceptions, and the strategy to address it; hence the necessity for domestic and international actors to pay serious attention on the phenomenon. My present work seeks to provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon, its causes and consequences while trying to draw out suggestions and recommendations which could contribute to better strengthen the West African regional security framework. In a word, governance in West Africa needs to be transformed into an effective cooperative framework where enhancing the dignity of human beings and their rights becomes a priority	13	44563			Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, UK	Desk-based	Irregular migration	Regional		Yes
2012	Shindo, R.	The hidden effect of Diaspora return to post-conflict countries: The case of policy and temporary return to Rwanda	Third World Quarterly	In response to the paucity of human resources in post-conflict societies, various agencies have implemented programmes to facilitate returns of qualified diasporas to their countries of origin. This paper examines the context in which diaspora return programmes have emerged and developed, and implications of the return programmes for post-conflict societies. It specifically looks at Migration for Development in Africa (mida) using the example of Rwanda. The paper demonstrates that the prime purpose of diaspora return programmes is to mitigate the effect of brain drain caused by migration from the South to the North. Furthermore, the paper argues that a secondary purpose of the programmes can be to secure a chance of return for diasporas who would like to return to their countries of origin but would like to stay away from the politics of these countries. In conclusion, the author suggests that diaspora return may increase the multiplicity of voices available in countries that tightly control dissident voices.	33	9	10.1080/01436597.2012.721232	reiko_shindo@yahoo.com	Department of Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK	Desk-based	Diaspora engagement	National	Rwanda	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2012	Batista, C., Lacuesta, A., Vicente, P.C.	Testing the 'brain gain' hypothesis: Micro evidence from Cape Verde	Journal of Development Economics	Does emigration really drain human capital accumulation in origin countries? This paper explores a unique household survey designed and conducted to answer this research question. We analyse the case of Cape Verde, a country with allegedly the highest 'brain drain' in Africa, despite a marked record of income and human capital growth in recent decades. We propose the first explicit test of 'brain drain' arguments, according to which the prospects of own future migration can positively impact educational attainment. Our most conservative estimates using individual specific variation in economic conditions at the destination indicate that a 10 pp increase in the probability of own future migration improves the probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling by nearly 4 pp for individuals who do not migrate before age 16. These findings are robust to the choice of instruments and econometric specification. Counterfactual simulations point to significant human capital gains from lowering migration barriers.	97	1	10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.01.005	catia.batista@tcd.ie	Trinity College Dublin, Ireland	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	Cape Verde	No
2012	Marchetta, F	Return Migration and the Survival of Entrepreneurial Activities in Egypt	World Development	The literature shows that temporary international migrants have a high propensity to opt for an entrepreneurial activity upon return, but the prospects of survival of these activities have not been explored. We address this research question using longitudinal Egyptian data. We find that entrepreneurs' migration experience significantly improves the chances of survival of their entrepreneurial activities, adopting econometric techniques that control for return migrants' non-random selection in unobservables. We resort to a bivariate probit model and a two-stage residual inclusion estimator, using the rate of population growth and the real oil price as alternative instruments for migration.	40	10	10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.05.009		CERDI – University of Auvergne, Clermont Ferrand, France	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	Egypt	No
2013	Jaji, R.	Somali Asylum Seekers and Refoulement at the Kenya-Somalia Border	Journal of Borderlands Studies	Asylum seekers in Africa, just as across the world, have not been spared from the politics of cross-border migration which has become more contentious in contemporary times. This is due to the prevailing security, economic, and cultural concerns that have seen migrants who bear certain racial, ethnic, national, and religious identities facing physical and legal barriers erected to curb their inflow. This paper argues that despite the general tendency in global political discourses to treat Africa as a monolithic entity, cross-border migration is equally contentious in Africa as it is in other parts of the world and is also connected to current global and regional politics in relation to local, context-specific concerns. The paper focuses on the forced return of Somali asylum seekers to Somalia by Kenyan authorities in January 2007 and is framed within the context of broader research conducted from 2006–2007 and in 2012 on refugees self-settled in Nairobi, Kenya.	28	3	10.1080/08865655.2013.862758	rjaji@sociol.uz.ac.zw	Department ofSociology, University ofZimbabwe	Empirical	Border governance	Multi-country		No
2013	Bakewell, O., Jónsson, G.	Theory and the Study of Migration in Africa	Journal of Intercultural Studies	This special issue presents a series of articles that examine different aspects of migration, drawing on evidence from the African continent. Their aim is not simply to provide new empirical material but also to offer fresh theoretical insights that can unsettle, challenge and refine existing theories that frame the emerging field of migration studies. By bringing together this collection of papers from Africa, our intention is to help redress the balance of research on migration that is heavily skewed towards the interests and preoccupations of the wealthier regions of the world. In particular, we argue that the basic concepts of migration and the hypotheses concerning linkages between these concepts have been largely developed on the basis of research and experience beyond Africa. As a result, in very general terms, the continent tends to be a consumer of theory, which is produced from the production-line of analysis of migration from Mexico to the USA, across the Mediterranean, to the Gulf, and so on. In Africa, migration theory has tended to be delivered as a package to be empirically tested and proven in the 'field'. But when it fails, it is taken back to the Western laboratory for further refinement before being shipped out again for another test run	34	5	10.1080/07256868.2013.827830	oliver.bakewell@qeh. ox.ac.uk	International Migration Institute, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford	Desk-based	Others	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2013	De Brauw, A., Mueller, V., Woldehanna, T.	Motives to Remit: Evidence from Tracked Internal Migrants in Ethiopia	World Development	Remittances are used by households for insurance, investment, and income. Flows from internal migrants are relatively understudied in Africa, where migrants are less likely to remit to their origin households. We use a unique matched migrant sample to study what drives the low remittance rates in Ethiopia. Descriptive statistics suggest remitters are positively selected in terms of wealth characteristics compared with the average tracked migrant. Limited skill transferability and liquidity largely explain low remittance rates in Ethiopia. Migrants are additionally motivated to remit as a form of self-insurance against own shocks to income and to protect their family's productive assets.	50		10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.04.008		International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, USA	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	Ethiopia	No
2013	Adams, R.H., Cuecuecha, A.	The Impact of Remittances on Investment and Poverty in Ghana	World Development	This paper analyzes the impact of internal remittances (from Ghana) and international remittances (from African or other countries) on investment and poverty in Ghana. It has three findings. First, when compared to what they would have spent without the receipt of remittances, households receiving remittances spend less at the margin on food. Second, households receiving remittances spend more at the margin on three investment goods: education, housing, and health. Third, the receipt of remittances greatly reduces likelihood of household poverty. These findings support the growing view that remittances can reduce poverty and increase investment in developing countries.	50		10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.04.009		Boston Institute for Developing Economies, Lexington, USA	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	Ghana	No
2013	Capuano, S., Marfouk, A.	African brain drain and its impact on source countries: What do we know and what do we need to know?	Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice	While there appears to be deep and growing concern for the brain drain from Africa, lack of adequate data has so far prevented a comprehensive analysis of its magnitude and its impact on source countries. Using original datasets on international migration, this paper addresses both issues. It shows that many African economies lost a considerable part of their highly skilled labor force due to migration to developed countries. The article also highlights that significant effort is still needed, in terms of data collection and empirical analysis, before drawing clear conclusions on the effects of the brain drain on Africa.	15	4	10.1080/13876988.2013.813122	a.marfouk@skynet.be	IAB, Institute for Employment Research, Nürnberg, Germany	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Multi-country		No
2013	Ezeoha, A.E.	Financial determinants of international remittance flows to the sub-saharan African region	International Migration	There is a general belief that Sub-Saharan Africa has the poorest record of international remittances because, due to deficiencies in the region's financial systems, a greater proportion of remittances passes through informal channels. This article examines the interactive impact of financial development on remittances to the region. Using a panel data covering 32 countries in the region from 1995 to 2009, it finds evidence of weak financial infrastructure constraining the flow of remittances. It also shows that the higher the level of a country's infrastructural development, the greater the impact on remittances. The article establishes that the impact of financial development and institutional quality is greater in emerging markets than in developing economies, implying that improving the financial system and institutional structures in Africa should be at the centre of the current policy efforts to optimize the benefits of remittances.	51	S1	10.1111/imig.12061		Rhodes University, Grahamstown	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2013	Osabuohien, E.S., Efobi, U.R.	Africa's money in Africa	South African Journal of Economics	Some studies contest that remittance induces 'careless spending'; others posit that it can promote economic development particularly through human and physical capital. This study observes that not much empirical work that examines the impact of remittance on human and physical capital in Africa has been carried out. The main objective of the study was achieved by using a sample of African countries. It was found that remittance impacts both human and physical capital positively and significantly, principally when it is complimented with sound institutions. In effect, institutions help to improve the linkage between remittance human and physical capital.	81	2	10.1111/saje.12012	stephen.osabuohien@ covenantuniversity.edu.ng	Department of Economics & Development Studies, Covenant University	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2013	Greiner, C., Sakdapolrak, P.	Rural-urban migration, agrarian change, and the environment in Kenya: A critical review of the literature	Population and Environment	The nexus between migration dynamics and environmental change has drawn the attention of many researchers in the recent past. While the majority of studies focus on the impact of the environment on migration decisions, less emphasis has been placed on the feedback effect of migration on the environment in rural sending areas. This article provides a critical review of this relationship by focusing on the rich literature on rural—urban migration of smallholder households in Kenya and its effects on rural environments. The article argues that there are distinct relations between migration, agricultural change and the environment. These are mediated in varying degrees by flows of remittances, loss of labor, socioeconomic stratification, gender dynamics, and cultural factors. Overly generalizing assumptions about these relations, however, fail to grasp their complexity. We propose employing a translocal perspective to enrich future analysis and enhance the understanding of migration—environmental interactions.		4	10.1007/s11111-012-0178-0	clemens.greiner@uni- koeln.de	Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology, University of Cologne, Germany	Desk-based	Internal migration	National	Kenya	Yes
2013	Mezger Kveder, C.L., Flahaux, ML.	Returning to Dakar: A Mixed Methods Analysis of the Role of Migration Experience for Occupational Status	World Development	This paper applies mixed methods to examine the occupational status of Senegalese return migrants and nonmigrants in Dakar and to explore the role of differential migration experiences for occupational outcomes. The analysis uses quantitative data from the MAFE-Senegal survey (2008) and qualitative semi-structured interviews with return migrants. While returnees do not seem to drop out of the labor market, they are overrepresented among the self-employed. However, self-employment is not necessarily associated with positive migration experiences. Rather than a choice, self-employment appears to be a "last resort" for individuals who were not able to accumulate capital or prepare their return.	45		10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.11.009		Institut National d'Etudes De mographiques, France University	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	Senegal	No
2013	Thomas, K.J.A., Inkpen, C.	Migration dynamics, entrepreneurship, and African development: Lessons from Malawi	International Migration Review	Using data from Malawi, this study situates the discourse on migration, entrepreneurship, and development within the context of Africa's social realities. It examines self-employment differences among three groups of migrants and corresponding group differences in agricultural and non-agricultural self-employment. International migrants are found to be more engaged in self-employment than internal migrants. However, our results suggest that previous findings on the development-related contributions of returning migrants from the West need to be appropriately contextualized. When returnees from the West invest in self-employment, they typically shy away from Africa's largest economic sector – agriculture. In contrast, levels of self-employment, especially in agricultural self-employment, are highest among returning migrants and immigrants from other African countries, especially from those nearby. We also underscore the gendered dimensions of migrants' contribution to African development by demonstrating that female migrants are more likely to be self-employed in agriculture than male migrants. Furthermore, as human-capital increases, migrants are more likely to concentrate their self-employment activities in non-agricultural activities and not in the agricultural sector. The study concludes using these findings to discuss key implications for policy and future research.		4	10.1111/imre.12052		Department of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University	Empirical	Others	National	Malawi	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2014	Landau, L.B., Amit, R.	Wither policy?: Southern African perspectives on understanding law, 'refugee' policy and protection	Journal of Refugee Studies	Global, regional and national refugee law and policy present important sites for contestation, agenda setting, normative pronouncements and symbolic action. But international and even domestic legislation seldom realize the promises of protection. In the kind of weakly legalized environments in which many self-settled refugees reside, progressive protection regimes may be far removed from the realities of refugees' lives. Drawing primarily on research from South Africa, this paper makes a two-part argument. The first highlights the narrow practical and analytical value of focusing on legal reforms and formal 'refugee' policy as determinants of protection, given that legal status and documentation have only limited practical protection effects. The second argument is that even in analysing refugee policy, we must grant considerable space for bureaucratic autonomy. The paper concludes with a dual call: first, to broaden our focus of refugee law and policy to include a range of other social and political policy fields so that formal commitments to refugee protection can be translated into practical protection; second, it asks analysts to take sub-national bureaucracies far more seriously as sites of policy formation and practice. Such a perspective requires introducing a spatialized, socialized and politicized understanding of institutional incentives and operations. Together these will offer a more realistic understanding of protection possibilities through policy and illuminate the practices associated with state actions relating to the displaced.	27	4	10.1093/jrs/feu005	loren@migration.org.za	African Centre for Migration & Society, University of the Witwatersrand	Desk-based	Forced displacement	National	South Africa	No
2014	Toma, S., Vause, S.	Gender differences in the role of migrant networks: Comparing congolese and senegalese migration flows	International Migration Review	This paper uses recent longitudinal data collected within the migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project to investigate gender differences in the role of migrant networks in international mobility. Furthermore, we compare Congolese and Senegalese migration streams to examine how the interplay between gender and networks varies across contexts of origin. We go beyond previous studies by considering the case of spousal reunification alongside other forms of migration: we separate the role of the migrant spouse from other network ties, as failing to do so overestimates the role of migrant networks in female mobility. We further find that Senegalese women are more likely than men to rely on geographically concentrated networks, composed of close kin and established abroad for a long time. Gender differences are much less pronounced in the Congolese case, which we relate to the more rigid patriarchal norms in Senegal, restricting female autonomy both in terms of mobility and economic activity.	48	4	10.1111/imre.12150		University of Oxford	Empirical	Others	Multi-country		No
2014	Nshimbi, C.C., Fioramonti, L.	The Will to Integrate: South Africa's Responses to Regional Migration from the SADC Region	African Development Review	This paper surveys frameworks of labour migration in southern Africa and determines South Africa's policy responses to inflows of migrants from seven neighbouring countries. Legislations, policy reports and scientific publications on migration were thoroughly reviewed and interviews and correspondence with key policymakers were conducted. Statistical analyses of data on foreign worker recruitments and permits issued by South Africa's Department of Home Affairs were also performed. The absence of a migration protocol in southern Africa suggests SADC Members have not implemented the African Union's migration policy basic guidelines. Two systems coexist in southern Africa that complicate migration governance: a South Africa-managed bilateral migration policy, and aspirations for a formal SADC-managed migration policy. Bilateral agreements between South Africa and neighbours have established a labour migration system that dims prospects for a regional migration policy. SACU Members could establish a two-tier policy to achieve free movement while maintaining managed migration policy outside SACU. An official multilateral migration governance mechanism would serve SADC better than the current ad-hoc measures.	26	S1	10.1111/1467-8268.12092	csnzed@gmail.com	Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation (GovInn), Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria	Empirical	Migration governance	Regional		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2014	Flahaux, ML., Beauchemin, C., Schoumaker, B.	From Europe to Africa: Return migration to senegal and the democratic Republic of Congo	Population and Societies	The MAFE surveys (Migrations between Africa and Europe) reveal a downtrend in return migrations, notably among migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo). A large majority of returns are spontaneous, rather than forced or encouraged by the host country. Only 16% of Senegalese migrants and 15% of Congolese reported returning home because of difficulties in Europe, including "problems with residence status". Decisions to return home are strongly dependent on the prospects of reintegration in the home country. Moreover, the barriers to immigration set in place by European countries tend to lower migrants' propensity to return home.	515	1	10.3917/popsoc.515.0001		University of Oxford	Empirical	Migration governance	Multi-country		Yes
2014	Britton, H.E., Dean, L.A.	Policy Responses to Human Trafficking in Southern Africa: Domesticating International Norms	Human Rights Review	Human trafficking is increasingly recognized as an outcome of economic insecurity, gender inequality, and conflict, all significant factors in the region of southern Africa. This paper examines policy responses to human trafficking in southern Africa and finds that there has been a diffusion of international norms to the regional and domestic levels. This paper finds that policy change is most notable in the strategies and approaches that differ at each level: international and regional agreements emphasize prevention measures and survivor assistance, but national policies emphasize prosecution measures. Leaders across the region have adapted these policy norms to fit regionally specific conditions, including HIV/AIDS, conflict, traditional leaders, and prostitution. Yet, national policies often fail to incorporate preventative solutions to address gender inequality, human rights, and economic development. Until appropriate funding and preventative measures are introduced, the underlying issues that foster human trafficking will continue.	15	3	10.1007/s12142-014-0303-9	britton@ku.edu	Political Science and Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, University of Kansas	Desk-based	Irregular migration	Regional		Yes
2014	de Brauw, A., Mueller, V., Lee, H.L.	The role of rural- urban migration in the structural transformation of Sub- Saharan Africa	World Development	Rural-to-urban migration is an inherent part of the economic development process, yet it is relatively understudied in sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, we attempt to describe the present state of rural-urban migration from several different angles. Migration rates are quite low in several countries, despite the fact that large proportions of populations continue to reside in rural areas, and that there are clearly several types of gains to migration. We offer a number of possible explanations for low migration rates. We make recommendations for improvements in research on rural-urban migration and migration policy in Africa	63		10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.10.013		International Food Policy Research Institute, USA	Empirical	Internal migration	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2014	Ruyssen, I., Rayp, G.	Determinants of Intraregional Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-2000	Journal of Development Studies	Despite great accomplishments in the migration literature, the determinants of South-South migration remain poorly understood. In an attempt to fill this gap, this paper formulates and tests an empirical model for intraregional migration in sub-Saharan Africa within an extended human capital framework, taking into account spatial interaction. Using bilateral panel data between 1980 and 2000, we find that intraregional migration on the subcontinent is predominantly driven by economic opportunities and sociopolitics in the host country, facilitated by geographical proximity. The role played by network effects and environmental conditions is also apparent. Finally, origin and destination spatial dependence should definitely not be ignored.	50	3	10.1080/00220388.2013.866218	ilse.ruyssen@ugent.be	Department of General Economics, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium	Empirical	Others	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2015	O'Reilly, C.	Household Recovery from Internal Displacement in Northern Uganda	World Development	Northern Uganda experienced violent conflict for over 15 years, resulting in the internal displacement of over 1 800 000 Ugandans. In the five years that followed a cease-fire agreement in 2006 nearly all the displaced persons returned home. The difference in the growth of consumption between returnee households and a comparison group of non-displaced households is estimated using propensity score matching. After an initial shock to consumption and assets upon return, returnee households experience a period of catch-up growth. These results contribute to understanding the dynamics of recovery from displacement and have implications for the policy response during recovery.	76		10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.07.011		University of Wisconsin – Stout, Menomonie, USA	Empirical	Forced displacement	National	Uganda	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2015	Whitaker, B.E.	Playing the immigration card: the politics of exclusion in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana	Commonwealth and Comparative Politics	Exclusionary rhetoric often emerges in the context of political competition in Africa, but why are anti-immigrant strategies used by politicians in some transitional democracies and not others? Drawing on broader comparative literature, this article proposes three conditions under which politicians are likely to 'play the immigration card': when the costs of immigration become concentrated for key interest groups; when embracing anti-immigration rhetoric will divide the support base of an opponent; and when the backing of anti-immigration groups is necessary to build a winning electoral coalition. A comparative case analysis of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana provides preliminary support for these hypotheses.	53	3	10.1080/14662043.2015.1051289	bwhitaker@uncc.edu	Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA	Desk-based	Migration governance	Multi-country		No
2015	Bolarinwa, J.O.	The ECOWAS free movement protocol: Obstacle or driver of regional integration?	Insight on Africa	The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment was approved by the ECOWAS heads of state and the government in Dakar on 29 May 1979. It was conceived as one of the bedrocks of regional integration efforts in West Africa in the firm belief that free movement of persons, goods, services and capital not only constitutes the fundamental basis for enhancing and consolidating the dividends of economic integration under the auspices of the ECOWAS but is also capable of influencing positively the harmonious development of social, economic and cultural activities within the sub-region. It is in the light of the above that this article examines the main elements and limitations of the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocols. It evaluates the degree to which the protocols have been implemented and identifies if they have served as a driver or an obstacle to regional integration in West Africa.	7	2	10.1177/0975087815580731	segunbolarinwa1985@ gmail.com	Nigerian Institute of Inter- national Affairs (NIIA) Lagos	Desk-based	Migration governance	Regional		No
2015	Uberti, S.D., De Lombaerde, P., Nita, S., Legovini, E.	Analyzing Intra- Regional migration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Statistical data constraints and the role for regional organizations	Regions and Cohesion	Africa has long been described as an immensely mobile continent and continues to be viewed in this vein (Amin, 1995; de Bruij n et al., 2001; IOM, 2005). The 2005 World Migration Report describes Africa as "the continent with the most mobile populations in the world" (IOM 2005: 33). In Western Africa, for instance, almost 4.4 million migrants moved in 2005 to another country of the Economic Community of Western Africa States (ECOWAS) (World Bank 2010). Compared to the overall international migrants in Western Africa (UNDP 2009), South-South (S-S) migration accounted for more than 50% in 2005 (ACP 2010: 5; Bakewell 2009). The volume of intra-regional migrations in Africa seems to be inversely proportional to the availability of statistical data. The shortage of both quantitative and qualitative data on migration (Gnisci & Trémolières 2006: 10; OECD/SWAC 2006: 18; Ratha & Shaw 2007; Zlotnik 2003: 2) and timely information on population movements, whether internal or international, is a major obstacle to the understanding of migration dynamics in Africa. Nineteen of the 56 countries on the African continent have either no data or just one census providing any information on migrant stocks from the 1950s (Zlotnik 2003).	5	2	10.3167/reco.2015.050204			Desk-based	Others	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2015	Beyene, H.G.	Are African diasporas development partners, peace-makers or spoilers? The case of Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria	Diaspora Studies	This study assesses the role of African diasporas in development, conflict resolution and peacebuilding in their countries of origin with specific reference to Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria between 1995 and 2013. Remittances from diaspora to developing countries' are three times larger than official development assistance (ODA). In relation to a country's/ region's population, it is revealed that migrants from Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria are less than the world, and sub-Saharan Africa. The adverse consequences of migration of skilled labour are more severe for small economies than for larger economies and the incentive to attract skilled human resources home is meager. About one-sixth of Nigeria's and Ethiopia's total inflows (export) and one-ninth of the total inflows of Kenya are from diaspora remittances. The estimated annual potential diaspora market that can be tapped by issuing bond for Nigeria is about \$6 billion, for Ethiopia and Kenya more than \$4 billion and \$3 billion, respectively. The Kenyan diaspora is well organized across the globe, attentive to and keenly participates in conflict resolution and peace-building affairs. Even though there are some efforts, the vast majority of Nigerian diaspora is not active in dealing with conflict resolution, peace-building and political affairs in Nigeria. Unlike Kenyan and Nigerian diasporas, most of conflict-generated Ethiopian diasporas' role is wrecking and escalating conflict.	8	2	10.1080/09739572.2015.1029714	hailayggg@gmail.com	Institute for Dispute Resolution in Africa, University of South Africa,	Empirical	Diaspora engagement	Multi-country		No
2015	Crush, J., Chikanda, A., Tawodzera, G.	The third wave: Mixed migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa	Canadian Journal of African Studies	Migration from Zimbabwe has recently been described as an archetypal form of "mixed migration" in which refugees and migrants are indistinguishable from one another. This paper argues that such a state-centred understanding of mixed migration oversimplifies a far more complex reality and fails to adequately account for the changing nature of Zimbabwean out-migration. Based on data from three separate Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) surveys undertaken in 1997, 2005 and 2010 at key moments of transition, the paper shows how the form and character of mixed migration from the country has changed over time. The country's emigration experience since 1990 is divided into three periods or 'waves'. The third wave (roughly from 2005 onwards) has seen a major shift away from circular, temporary migration of individual working-age adults towards greater permanence and more family and child migration to South Africa. Zimbabwean migrants no longer see South Africa as a place of temporary economic opportunity for survival but rather as a place to stay and build a future for themselves and their families.	49	2	10.1080/00083968.2015.1057856	jcrush@balsillieschool.ca	International Migration Research Centre, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Canada	Empirical	Others	Multi-country		No
2015	Hovil, L., Lomo, Z.A.	Forced displacement and the crisis of citizenship in Africa's Great Lakes region: Rethinking refugee protection and durable solutions	Refuge	This article explores refugee protection and durable solutions in Africa's Great Lakes region by examining conflict, displacement, and refugees in the light of the crisis of citizenship. Drawing on empirical data from nine studies across the region, we scrutinize the causes of conflict and displacement and refugee policies and practice in the region through the lens of citizenship. First, we argue that the continued plight of many refugees in the region without durable solutions results, at least in part, from an endemic and systemic inability of many people in the region to realize citizenship in a meaningful way. This inability, we argue, is a significant contributor to the continued forced displacement of millions of people, with many still refugees, even after living in the host states for over three decades. Second, we argue that solutions are failing because discussions about the root causes of refugee influxes and movements often fail to capture the intricately connected historical, political, social, economic, religious, and legal factors that engender displacement. We submit that full and equal enjoyment of the rights and benefits of citizenship by all, including access to citizenship for refugees, is one means of resolving displacement and providing durable solutions to refugees.	31	2	10.25071/1920-7336.40308	lucy@hovil.co.uk	International Refugee Rights Initiative	Empirical	Forced displacement	Multi-country		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2015	Vause, S., Toma, S.	Is the feminization of international migration really on the rise? the case of flows from dr congo and Senegal   Peut-on parler de féminisation des flux migratoires du Sénégal et de la République démocratique du Congo?	Population	Previous research, mostly focused on Asian and Latin American contexts, found that women are increasingly present in international migration flows, especially as independent economic actors. This article examines the extent to which these two trends can be observed in the African context. It uses data collected as part of the Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project in Senegal, DR Congo and several European countries. Discrete-time event-history analysis reveals only moderate increases in the likelihood of female migration over time, especially towards Western destinations, but no decline in gender gaps. The collection of rich retrospective information from both current and return migrants allows a more in-depth investigation of the nature of women's moves. Several indicators can be used to examine the extent to which women move autonomously or in association to their partner. While some evidence of a rise in autonomous female migration was found among the Congolese, no salient change was visible in Senegal. The findings were interpreted in light of the more rigid patriarchal system and traditional gender norms that characterize Senegal in comparison to DR Congo.	70	1	10.3917/popu.1501.0041	sophie.vause@uclouvain.be	Centre de recherche en démographie, Belgium	Empirical	Others	Multi-country		Yes
2015	Blunch, NH; Laderchi, CR	The winner takes it all: Internal migration, education and wages in Ethiopia	Migration Studies	Previous studies of migration have mainly examined international dynamics. Yet, internal migration is an important issue, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using the 2001 Ethiopia Child Labor Survey, a nationally representative household survey, this article examines internal migration in Ethiopia, focusing on the linkages among internal migration, education and wages. The results suggest that migrants are better educated and obtain higher wages than non-migrants, controlling for other factors (including education), and also obtain higher returns to their education. In other words, the more educated reap higher returns from their education as a main effect, as well as higher returns to their education from migration than non-migrants—that is, 'the winner takes it all'. This result should be of concern to policy makers in Ethiopia and elsewhere—especially in Sub-Saharan Africa—since individuals with low levels of education already are in a vulnerable group. The study therefore also discusses the policy implications of these results.	3	3	10.1093/migration/mnv008	blunchn@wlu.edu	Washington and Lee University, Lexington, USA	Empirical	Internal migration	National	Ethiopia	No
2015	Garcia, AJ; Pindolia, DK; Lopiano, KK; Tatem, AJ	Modeling internal migration flows in sub- Saharan Africa using census microdata	Migration Studies	Globalisation and the expansion of transport networks have transformed migration into a major policy issue because of its effects on a range of phenomena, including resource flows in economics, urbanisation, as well as the epidemiology of infectious diseases. Quantifying and modelling human migration can contribute towards a better understanding of the nature of migration and help develop evidence-based interventions for disease control policy, economic development, and resource allocation. In this study, we paired census microdata from 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa with additional spatial datasets to develop models for the internal migration flows in each country, including key drivers that reflect the changing social, demographic, economic, and environmental landscapes. We assessed how well these gravity-type spatial interaction models can both explain and predict migration. Results show that the models can explain up to 87 per cent of internal migration, can predict future within-country migration with correlations of up to 0.91, and can also predict migration in other countries with correlations of up to 0.72. Findings show that such models are useful tools for understanding migration as well as predicting flows in regions where data are sparse, and can contribute towards strategic economic development, planning, and disease control targeting	3	1	10.1093/migration/mnu036	andygarcia@gmail.com	Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA	Empirical	Internal migration	Multi-country		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2016	Ajide, K.B., Raheem, I.D.	The Institutional Quality Impact on Remittances in the ECOWAS Sub- Region	African Development Review	The paper seeks to examine the impactful role of institutions in attracting remittances inflow to ECOWAS region for the period 1996–2013. In a bid to achieve this key objective, a system generalized method of moment (GMM) is adopted on a panel dataset in which insightful outcomes emanate. The results reveal an appreciable impact of institutional infrastructures on the migrants' remittances in the region. More specifically, institutional measures of governance appear to act as a spur on remittances, but other institutional decompositions like economic and political governance structures constitute avoidable drags, judging by theoretical priors and statistical levels of significance. These results remain valid to the exclusion of the francophone countries from the original dataset. On the policy front, the overall target is for government to formulate policies that seek to address the symptomatic causes of low inflow of remittances into the region, with special focus on the institutional dimension of the governance framework. Among the auxiliary policy targets include those that would address the problems of dysfunctional institutions, as well as those that would deepen financial systems and engender improved growth of GDP per capita. The study also makes some suggestions for future enquiries.	28	4	10.1111/1467-8268.12224	i_raheem@ymail.com	School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent,	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Regional		No
2016	Norman, K.P.	Between Europe and Africa: Morocco as a country of immigration	Journal of the Middle East and Africa	In September 2013, the King of Morocco, Mohammed VI, made an announcement that startled the country's civil society: Morocco would be reforming its national migration policy. Specifically, he called for the drafting of a new comprehensive policy on immigration with the intention of providing a path to regularization for migrants, the majority of whom originate from West African states. Why did the Moroccan government suddenly change its approach to migration, and what consequences has this had for civil society and for migrants and refugees residing in Morocco? While explanations for the migration policy reform tend to focus on the role of the European Union, a secondary explanation is Morocco's desire to play a leading role in Africa, both economically and geopolitically. Using approximately fifty interviews conducted between January and April 2015 in Rabat, Morocco, this study analyzes the reform process and examines competing explanations, paying particular attention to regional power structures, bilateral relations between Morocco and its West African and European neighbors, and domestic decision-making apparatuses.	7	4	10.1080/21520844.2016.1237258	kpnorman@gmail.com	University of California, Irvine, USA	Empirical	Migration governance	National	Morocco	No
2016	Ecke, J., Saydee, G., Nyan, J.W., Donzo, K., Dolo, M.K., Russ, R.	The subjective and economic well-being of repatriated Liberian refugees from Ghana	Refugee Survey Quarterly	This article uses a mixed-method approach, drawing on both qualitative as well as quantitative methods to assess the well-being of former Liberian refugees after their return from exile in Ghana. This investigation, the only mixed-method research project on the under-researched topic of repatriations, conceptualises well-being of two kinds: emotional, subjective well-being which is measured through psychological self-assessment scales, and economic well-being which is measured empirically through proxy factors such as access to food and public services. The article's quantitative data demonstrate that the overall emotional, subjective well-being of Liberian refugees has noticeably increased after their return to Liberia, and cites ethnographic examples of how respondents feel less culturally alienated and mistreated after repatriation to Liberia than they had in Ghana. Nonetheless other data show that economic well-being measured by access to public services and other empirical criteria, has deteriorated substantially since their return. While many refugees hold positive views of repatriation, outcomes differ significantly based on age and gender. Finally, the authors argue that policy-makers should commission studies using a mixed-method approach to assess the outcomes of repatriation.	35	3	10.1093/rsq/hdw011	j_ecke@yahoo.com;	Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA	Empirical	Forced displacement	National	Liberia	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2016	Gordon, S.	Immigration policies that include or exclude: a South African public opinion study of immigration policy preferences	Social Dynamics	South Africa is a regional hub for migration on the African continent and is home to a growing documented international migrant community. Foreigners in the country, however, often face violations of their established rights and are the victims of abuse. This paper examines public support for policies that would exclude international migrants from the country. Data from the 2013 South African Social Attitudes Survey, a nationally representative opinion poll (N = 2739) of all adults in the country, are used. This poll found that many South Africans favoured restrictive immigration policies and opposed granting foreigners the same rights as citizens. Multivariate analysis is employed to discern determinants of this opposition. Respondents' perceptions of the population sizes of foreigners in their communities did not affect support for inclusion. It can be inferred, therefore, that the growth of the immigrant population has not provoked exclusionary attitudes in the country. Rather, results revealed, it is national pride (cultural versus political) and fears about the consequences of immigration that drive such attitudes. Programmes and policies designed to improve public perceptions of how foreigner impact society and the promotion of a nationalism characterised by inclusive multicultural civic patriotism may improve public support for the inclusion of international immigrants.	42	3	10.1080/02533952.2016.1238336	sgordon@hsrc.ac.za	Democracy Governance and Service Delivery Research Programme, HSRC, South Africa	Empirical	Others	National	South Africa	No
2016	Arestoff, F., Kuhn-Le Braz, M., Mouhoud, E.M.	Remittance Behaviour of Forced Migrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa	Journal of Development Studies	This paper looks at the determinants of South-South remittances. An original dataset of African migrants living in Johannesburg is used. As South Africa attracts both economic and forced migrants, we focus on the impact of the reason of emigration (violence versus economic concerns) on migrants' remittance behaviour. On the extensive margin, the results show that leaving a home country for reasons of violence decreases the probability of remitting to the home country. On the intensive margin, transferred amounts do not differ according to whether the migrant was forced to migrate or not. When the migrant has decided to remit, it is more his/her current conditions in the host country and traditional factors (income, education, sex, etc.) that determine the amounts transferred. Our results are robust when restricting the definition of forced migration.	52	6	10.1080/00220388.2015.1098628	melanie.kuhn1@yahoo.fr	FranceAgriMer, Direction Marchés, Etudes et Prospective, France	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	South Africa	No
2016	Mangala, J.R.	The African Union's diaspora diplomacy and policymaking: Operationalizing the migration—development nexus	Journal of the Middle East and Africa	Over the past decade, the question of migration has moved to the forefront of the international and African agenda. The African Union (AU) has emphasised its linkages to other key economic, social, and political issues, as well as its centrality to the project of continental integration and development. Against this backdrop and alongside the global and Africa-European Union dialogues on migration and development, the AU has adopted, since 2006, a number of policy instruments that outline a broad migration agenda which calls for a strategic engagement with the African diaspora. This article discusses the substance of the AU's diaspora diplomacy and policymaking, and assesses its efforts at operationalizing the migration-development nexus. The study is divided into three parts, the first of which discusses some theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the diaspora-development nexus. The second part undertakes a review of AU policy instruments and frameworks dealing with the African diaspora. The third part focuses on the implementation of the AU's diaspora agenda	7	2	10.1080/21520844.2016.1193686	mangalaj@gvsu.edu	Brooks College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Grand Valley, USA	Desk-based	Diaspora engagement	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2016	Hoxhaj, R., Marchal, L., Seric, A.	FDI and migration of skilled workers towards developing countries: Firm-level evidence from sub-saharan Africa	Journal of African Economies	This article investigates the determinants of the employment of foreign skilled workers by firms operating in Sub-Saharan African countries. We use cross section firm-level data on a large sample of foreign and domestic firms collected through the Africa Investor Survey 2010 by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. We find evidence of a strong complementarity between foreign capital inflows and the employment of foreign skilled workers. Our results also indicate that interventions in improving the working regulation and skilled workers immigration regimes may stimulate foreign skilled workers transfer by firms, and thereby foreign direct investments.	25	2	10.1093/jae/ejv022	lea.marchal@ed.univ- lille1.fr	University of Lille, Villeneuve d'Ascq, France	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2016	Brachet, J	Policing the Desert: The IOM in Libya Beyond War and Peace	Antipode	The war that took place in Libya in 2011 forced 1.5 million people to leave the country. Many of them, from sub-Saharan Africa, were helped to return to their countries of origin by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This paper questions the purely humanitarian nature of the IOM intervention with references to its activities before and after the conflict. It shows that this organisation has long participated in the implementation of European migration policies in Libya, and more widely in the Sahara, without being accountable to any people. Through the replacement of local politics by international crisis management, the Sahara is gradually integrated into a zone of international bureaucratic expedience. War and humanitarian intervention appear as contingencies in the progressive implementation of a global system of surveillance, spatial control and management of mobility in Africa.	48	2	10.1111/anti.12176	julien.brachet@ird.fr	Institut de recherche pour le développement, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France	Empirical	Migration governance	National	Libya	No
2016	Mberu, BU; Pongou, R	Crossing Boundaries: Internal, Regional and International Migration in Cameroon	International Migration	Internal and international migration increasingly continues to be of global importance for development policies and programmes, but the dearth of data on migration for African countries and the limited focus on the structural conditions that motivate migration from specific localities within the region remain glaring. In this study, we examine the patterns and drivers of migration in Cameroon, focusing on the dynamics of rural—urban migration, migrant circulation, regional economic migrants and refugees, international migration, brain drain and returns from emigration. Consequent upon regional conflicts and instability, we highlight the refugee problem in Cameroon and significant challenges in addressing it. Finally, we underscore the policy and research challenges necessary to harness the potentials of internal and international migration for national development.	54	1	10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00766.x		African Population and Health Research Center, Nairobi	Desk-based	Others	National	Cameroon	No
2016	Karikari, NK; Mensah, S; Harvey, SK	Do remittances promote financial development in Africa?	Springerplus	The paper seeks to establish whether or not remittances promoted financial developments and explore the traceable causality between remittances and financial developments in some countries in Africa. We examine the association between remittances received and how they affect the availability of credit to private sector, bank deposits intermediated by financial institutions and money supply. We also question whether the development in the financial sector causes higher levels or otherwise of remittances received. This paper uses data on remittance flows to 50 developing countries in Africa from 1990 to 2011 to explore the nexus. The study uses fixed effects and random effect estimations as well as Vector Error Correction Model method on the panel data. The study shows that remittances promote certain aspects of financial development to some extent and better financial system foster receipts of remittances. The effect of causality is seen in the short run and not in the long-run. The study alludes to literature that remittances could promote financial development in the short run and the development of the financial sector helps increase the propensity to remit via formal channels.	5		10.1186/s40064-016-2658-7	nanaquasi007@outlook.	University of Ghana Business School, Accra, Ghana	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes

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2017	Oette, L., Babiker, M.A.	Migration control á la Khartoum: EU external engagement and human rights protection in the Horn of Africa	Refugee Survey Quarterly	This article examines the European Union–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (the Khartoum Process), which is primarily aimed at combating human trafficking and smuggling in the region. It probes this partnership model in the field of external migration control from a human rights and refugee law perspective. Instead of being based on a human rights approach, the Khartoum Process has relied on a managerial, project-based approach to the complex realities of mixed migration in the Horn of Africa. The article uses Sudan as a case study, due to its critical role in the Khartoum Process. It identifies systemic weaknesses in Sudan's law and practice, which cast serious doubts on Sudan's ability to combat trafficking and smuggling in conformity with international standards, and its reliability as a partner in 'migration management'. It also shows how the Khartoum Process risks undermining the coherence of the European Union's external policy, particularly in respect of human rights protection in the region. These findings corroborate critiques of, and accentuate concerns about flawed partnership models and externalisation policies driven by imperatives of migration control. The article concludes by sketching out an alternative approach based on attention to context, process, and respect for human rights.	36	4	10.1093/rsq/hdx013	lo8@soas.ac.uk	SOAS, University of London	Desk-based	Migration governance	National	Sudan	No
2017	Dako-Gyeke, M., Kodom, R.B.	Deportation and Reintegration: Exploring Challenges Faced by Deportee Residents in the Nkoranza Municipality, Ghana	Journal of International Migration and Integration	The increase in deportations over the years has had adverse effects on immigrant families, communities, and countries of origin. Involuntary return, especially deportation, causes economic hardship, emotional distress, and family separation. Given the rising number of deportees in Africa and Ghana in particular, this study sought to explore the challenges that confront deportees in re-integrating into the Nkoranza Municipality of Ghana. Using a qualitative research design, 20 participants (19 males and 1 female) were purposively recruited for the study. In-depth interviews (IDIs) were conducted to gather data, which were analysed thematically. The findings of the study indicated that many of the deportees faced challenges, such as difficulty in accessing jobs, food and attendant health complications, and loss of personal belongings. Other challenges were negative perceptions and poor relationships, as well as inaccessible formal support services. Based on the findings of the study, implications are discussed.	18	4	10.1007/s12134-017-0526-0	mavisdako@yahoo.com	Department of Social Work, School of Social Sciences, University of Ghana	Empirical	Irregular migration	National	Ghana	Yes
2017	Nzima, D., Moyo, P.	The new 'diaspora trap' framework: Explaining return migration from South Africa to Zimbabwe beyond the 'failure-success' framework	Migration Letters	This article explores how South Africa-based Zimbabwean skilled migrants are dissuaded from returning home permanently. The study was conceptualised against the background that return migration has often been explained based on migrant failure or success in the host country. This failure-success dichotomy stems from the neo-classical economics theory of migration, the new economics of labour migration and the structuralist approach to return migration. Using a qualitative approach, this article challenges the failure-success theoretical position through an exploration of socio-economic factors in Zimbabwe and South Africa that deter permanent return migration. The article contributes to return migration theorising by introducing a new 'diaspora trap' framework which argues that permanent settlement is not always voluntary. Central to this involuntary permanent settlement is the social construction of migrants as successful in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean skilled migrants are thus entrapped in South Africa because of failure to live up to the 'success social construct,' and their inability to mitigate adversities in the host country.	14	3	10.33182/ml.v14i3.349	dnzima@gmail.com	Department of Sociology & Anthropology, University of Fort Hare, South Africa	Empirical	Diaspora engagement	Multi-country		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2017	Alfaro-Velcamp, T., McLaughlin, R.H., Brogneri, G., Skade, M., Shaw, M.	'Getting angry with honest people': The illicit market for immigrant 'papers' in Cape Town, South Africa	Migration Studies	South African Department of Home Affairs (DHA) officials 'seem to get angry with honest people', shared a Congolese immigrant from the Kivu region who now resides in Cape Town. Some DHA officials get money through illicit transactions for 'papers' and they become visibly frustrated with immigrants who try to obtain documents by lawful means. While there has been much focus on xenophobia associated with immigration in South Africa, there has been little attention paid to the illicit market in immigrant papers such as asylum seeker permits (Section 22 permits), refugee status permits (Section 24 permits), and work permits. These immigrant documents assist individuals—namely those who otherwise lack status, or 'papers', or both—to obtain abilities to work, travel safely, register themselves or their children for school, access non-emergency healthcare, and gain banking privileges. In providing an account of the market in immigrant papers, the article focuses on how these documents relate to status and survival. By purchasing papers in Cape Town, immigrants (referring to asylum seekers, refugees, and cross border migrants) aim to secure their legal status and gain productive agency in their lives. This paper is based on an ethnographic research methodology and participant observation, and shows how immigration challenges South Africa's post-apartheid, constitutionally-mandated, socio-economic rights and democratic aims and has fostered an illicit market in immigrant documents. This work furthers debates on immigration governance in the global south, corruption in state institutions, and the vulnerability of immigrants.	5	2	10.1093/migration/mnx022	Alfaro.velcamp@sonoma.edu	Centre of Criminology, University of Cape Town, South Africa	Empirical	Irregular migration	National	South Africa	Yes
2017	Kleist, N.	Disrupted migration projects: The moral economy of involuntary return to Ghana from Libya	Africa	This article contributes to the theorization of involuntary return and moral economies in the context of economic crisis and vulnerability prompted by restrictive migration regimes and conflicts. Drawing on fieldwork in a rural town in Ghana where international labour migration is an established livelihood, it analyses deportations from North Africa, Israel and Europe and emergency return from Libya following the civil war in 2011. The article argues that return to the home town, rather than being detained or stuck en route, constitutes a particular context precisely because migrants face family and community expectations upon their return. Involuntary return constitutes a disruption of migration projects when migrants return empty-handed, going from being remitters to burdens for their families. This creates conflicts and disappointments within family and the local community, especially in relation to norms of provision and gender ideals. The paper highlights three effects of the moral economy of involuntary return. First, that involuntary return does not constitute a priori termination of migration, as many involuntary return migrants migrate again, often in high-risk ways. Second, it discusses the ambivalence of reciprocity and interdependency in families. And third, it shows how involuntary return challenges dominant ideals of masculinity.	87	2	10.1017/S000197201600098X	nkl@diis.dk	Danish Institute for International Studies	Empirical	Irregular migration	National	Ghana	No
2017	Emser, M., Francis, S.	Counter-trafficking governance in South Africa: an analysis of the role of the KwaZulu-Natal human trafficking, prostitution, pornography and brothels task team	Journal of Contemporary African Studies	Determining the efficacy of available counter-trafficking strategies is just as important as understanding the phenomenon of human trafficking itself. This is so if anti-trafficking practitioners wish to make in-roads in preventing and combating human trafficking in South Africa. At the heart of the matter are the ways in which counter-trafficking governance is structured in the South African context. In this article we use the KwaZulu-Natal intersectoral task team, an unresourced agency of provincial government mandated to prevent and combat human trafficking, as a case study to analyse the '4P model' of counter-trafficking favoured in South Africa. We find that while such an integrated model has great potential, issues of institutional cooperation and coordination, pervasive public official corruption and budgetary constraints hamper its current impact and efficacy. We conclude that these issues must be addressed by South African policy-makers once legislation has been promulgated.	35	2	10.1080/02589001.2017.1309363	franciss@ukzn.ac.za	Department of Political Science, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa	Empirical	Irregular migration	National	South Africa	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2017	Odunayo, M.A., Asuelime, L.E., Okem, A.E.	South African policy on migration and its alignment with the UNO charter on refugee and asylum- seekers	Journal of African Union Studies	There is an increase in the tide of refugees due mainly to wars and insurgent activities in their home countries. The need for international treaties and agreements such as the United Nations and African Union's convention on refugees and asylum seekers to ensure their protection in the host countries is vital. As a microcosm of globalised effort in this direction, South Africa has engaged with this problem and provides strong support for the work of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. However, certain factors and events seem to point to the fact that the initial levels of support seem to have nosedived in the South African case as a host nation. This article investigates what needs to be done in advocating and lobbying for necessary actions that needs to take place at national and regional levels of South(ern) Africa so that the South African government may enact new or amend existing legislations and policies that promote and protect the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers in the country. This study uses a content analytical framework gleaned from international and local organisations that recognizes and keeps records on refugees and asylum-seekers in South Africa. Through the use of postmodern public administration and compliance based theories, we argue that South Africa though has pledged to maintain compliance with international and constitutional standards for refugee protection, the implementation of its supporting public policies leaves much to be desired.	6	1	10.31920/2050-4306/2017/v6n1a5	sisterfunmie@yahoo.com	Public Administration Department, University of Zululand, South Africa	Desk-based	Migration governance	National	South Africa	No
2017	Theodore, N., Blaauw, D., Pretorius, A., Schenck, C.	The Socioeconomic Incorporation of Immigrant and Native- born Day Labourers in Tshwane, South Africa	International Migration	It has been widely documented that unauthorised immigrants experience adverse economic incorporation in destination countries, particularly in the global North. Faced with restricted employment opportunities, many are drawn into informalising segments of the labour market where earnings are low and unstable. Much less is known about how immigrant workers fare in the informal economy of cities of the South. Using surveys conducted in 2004, 2007 and 2015, we examine the economic outcomes of immigrant and native-born workers who participate in the day labour markets of Tshwane, South Africa. In 2004 there were signs that foreign-born workers enjoyed modestly better outcomes than South Africa-born workers. In the latter periods, however, these advantages have disappeared and there are indications of a downward convergence of employment outcomes. The article concludes with a call for creating worker centres to regulate informal job markets for the benefit of workers, regardless of immigration status.	55	1	10.1111/imig.12311		University of Illinois at Chicago	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	South Africa	No
2017	Okey, M.K.N.	Does migration promote industrial development in Africa?	Economics Bulletin	This paper examines the effect of international migration on industrial development in Africa. Econometric estimations are implemented on a panel of 45 African countries over the period 1980-2010 using the generalized method of moment estimators and the migration dataset constructed by Brücker, Capuano and Marfouk in 2013. Our results suggest that on average, emigration affects industrial development in Africa positively and significantly during the period of interest. Both low-skilled and medium-skilled emigrants affect more industrial development. The results also reveal that international financial flows, business networks and scientific networks are the channels through which migration affects industrial development. African countries may benefit more from international migration by developing institutions that facilitate international financial flows, business networks and scientific networks.	37	1		mawusseo2000@gmail. com	University of Lomé, Togo	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2017	Mabera, F.	The impact of xenophobia and xenophobic violence on south Africa's developmental partnership agenda	Africa Review	The African agenda and regional integration form the core of South Africa's development partnership agenda. The wave of xenophobic violence that broke out in parts of South Africa in April 2015 has once again brought into sharp relief the daunting reality of xenophobia and its lingering undercurrents in the South African society. The conflation of xenophobia with Africaphobia renders an interrogation of Africa as the essence of South Africa's developmental focus. This paper argues that xenophobic violence is both detrimental and contrary to the central tenets of South Africa's development agenda and its diplomacy of Ubuntu. A series of shortterm and long-term policy recommendations are then put forward.	9	1	10.1080/09744053.2016.1239711	faith@igd.org.za	Institute for Global Dialogue associated with UNISA, Pretoria, South Africa	Desk-based	Migration governance	National	South Africa	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2017	Aduloju, A.A.	ECOWAS and free movement of persons: African women as cross- border victims	Journal of International Women's Studies	Existing literature has investigated the challenges of interstate border dispute, border conflict and their security and developmental implications for the West African sub-region. ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol of Persons was instituted to enhance the economic development of West Africa's citizens. However, studies have shown that the protocol has relatively aided trans-border trafficking in persons, drugs, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). However, vulnerability of trans-border women traders in the sub-region have received little attention. This study utilised both primary and secondary sources of data gathering in order to interrogate the provisions of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons vis-à-vis its operationalisation and incapacity to increase women's economic opportunity and empowerment in West Africa. Through field survey, twenty (20) interviews were conducted at the Nigeria-Benin border. The interviews targeted 14 purposively selected women traders at the border, two officials each of the Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Customs Service and the Nigeria Police Force. Moreover, observation method was employed to substantiate the interviews conducted. Data obtained were analysed using descriptive analysis. Consequently, this study discovered that women constituted more of trans-border traders on Nigeria-Benin border, and precisely in West Africa. In addition, they are vulnerable to extortion, intimidation and sexual harassment by border officials, which has impinged on their rights contained in the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons. The study showed that the protocol does not fully protect women (mostly the ones with low economic characteristics who constitute larger population of women at the border) and thereby having implications for their livelihood and survival. The study then concluded that while the problem faced by women on the Nigeria-Benin border persists, it has a huge impact on the credibility of ECOWAS to properly integrate the sub-region for development and for the		4		adulojutony@gmail.com	Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria	Empirical	Border governance	Regional		Yes
2017	Neumann, K., Hermans, F.	What Drives Human Migration in Sahelian Countries? A Meta- analysis	Population, Space and Place	The Sahel region has one of the most mobile populations in the world, with migration serving as a common household strategy to increase livelihood and social resilience. However, the Sahel region's population is extremely heterogeneous, and the processes and factors that contribute to migration are complex. Consequently, recent empirical studies yielded conflicting conclusions regarding the processes that drive migration. This study was designed to increase our understanding of the factors that drive migration in the Sahel region. We performed a systematic meta-analysis of English-language literature to synthesise the empirical evidence collected from 53 case studies covering eight Sahelian countries. We analysed the frequencies of a broad range of drivers that affected migration processes during the past three decades. Our results show that the primary impetus for driving migration is a combination of economic and social motivations, which together account for 80% of all drivers that were identified in the case studies. In contrast, only 11% of the identified drivers are related directly to demographic and/or environmental conditions. Moreover, we conclude that the majority of case studies do not explore causation among migration drivers, which clearly hampers our understanding of migration mechanisms taking place in the Sahel region. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.		1	10.1002/psp.1962	kathleen.neumann@wur.nl	Laboratory of Geo- information Science and Remote Sensing, Wageningen University, The Netherlands.	Desk-based	Others	Regional		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2017	Chort, I	Migrant Network and Immigrants' Occupational Mismatch	Journal of Development Studies	This article defines new measures of horizontal and vertical occupational mismatch based on the difference between the skill content of occupations in which individuals have a self-assessed productive advantage, and that of their actual job. It then investigates the impact of network use to find a job on occupational mismatch in the case of immigrants, using original survey data collected among Senegalese immigrants in four host countries. Estimation results show that migrants who obtained their job through the migrant network have a lower probability of negative vertical mismatch. By contrast, network use is not found to significantly affect horizontal mismatch.	53	11	10.1080/00220388.2016.1219344	isabelle.chort@dauphine.fr	Université Paris- Dauphine, PSL Research University, IRD, France	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	Senegal	No
2018	Chikanda, A., Crush, J.	Global Zimbabweans: Diaspora Engagement and Disengagement	Journal of International Migration and Integration	Since 2000, migration from crisis-ridden Zimbabwe has led to almost one million people leaving the country. The majority migrate to neighbouring South Africa and Botswana, and most of the research on the Zimbabwean diaspora to date has focused on South Africa and the UK. However, the Zimbabwean diaspora is now truly global in its distribution. This paper argues that more attention should therefore be paid to Zimbabweans in other jurisdictions in the Global South and North. Zimbabweans began migrating to Canada in increasing numbers after 2000, most as refugees but also as immigrants and students. Based on a survey of the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada, this paper focuses on their migration history, demographic characteristics and backward linkages with Zimbabwe. Given the interest in diaspora engagement in the global migration and development literature, it is important to understand the nature of these linkages in order to assess the potential for diaspora involvement in Zimbabwean development. The paper argues that under current economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe, this potential remains weak.		4	10.1007/s12134-018-0582-0	jcrush@balsillieschool.ca	Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Canada	Empirical	Diaspora engagement	National	Zimbabwe	Yes
2018	Zewdu, G.A.	Irregular migration, informal remittances: evidence from Ethiopian villages	GeoJournal	Although Ethiopia has seen a reduction in refugee flows over the past decade, documented and undocumented labour migration has significantly increased. International migration has changed from that born out of conflict to irregular migration mainly driven by economic reasons. The source of migrants has expanded from urban centres to include rural areas, making them an important source of low-skilled labour for the international labour market. Based on a qualitative study, this paper explores the process and pattern of Ethiopian migration to South Africa, an emerging destination in the global South. This migration corridor is increasingly characterised by its irregularity. The paper also reflects how migration patterns shape the pattern of remittance flow, along with the way in which migrants and their networks substitute the function of financial institutions engaged in the remittance industry. It also highlights the features of remittances utilisation in emerging rural migrant community in Southern Ethiopia.	83	5	10.1007/s10708-017-9816-5	girmadugna@yahoo.com	Department of Development and Governance, Wolkite University, Wolkite, Ethiopia	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	Ethiopia	Yes
2018	Dini, S.	Migration management, capacity building and the sovereignty of an African State: International Organization for Migration in Djibouti	Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies	This article analyses the activities of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Djibouti, and especially its capacity-building activities in the field of migration management. It ethnographically documents how these projects transform state sovereignty. It argues that this is done not only through the Djiboutian government's increased capacity to exclude undocumented migrants, but also through the renewed governance of the entry of national-citizens into the state territory. IOM's projects institutionalise a state of exception (Agamben) that produces both legitimate political authority and national citizenship in the receiving State. Such institutionalisation is finally embedded within an international mobility regime characterised by a 'sedentarist' narrative, targeting specifically African citizenship.	44	10	10.1080/1369183X.2017.1354058	sabine.dini@gmail.com	Faculty of Law, Political and Social Sciences, University Paris-13 Sorbonne-Paris-Cité	Empirical	Migration governance	National	Djibouti	No

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2018	Campana, P.	Out of Africa: The organization of migrant smuggling across the Mediterranean	European Journal of Criminology	How are human smuggling operations organised? This paper presents an empirical in-depth study of the structure and activities of a smuggling ring operating between the Horn of Africa and Northern Europe via Libya. It relies on a unique set of novel data sets manually extracted from an extensive police investigation launched after the 2013 Lampedusa shipwreck, in which 366 migrants lost their lives. The evidence includes wiretapped conversations on both sides of the Mediterranean. Using a number of network analysis techniques, this paper reconstructs the structure of the ring and investigates the determinants of coordination among its actors. This paper is the first work to offer a formal network modelling of human smuggling operations. It shows that, rather than being internalised within a single organisation, activities are segmented and carried out by localised and rudimentary hierarchies with a small number of high-centrality actors operating at various stages along the smuggling route. Coordination is more likely to occur vertically than horizontally, indicating that higher-level smugglers are largely independent and autonomous. There are also indications of competition among them. Finally, even in rings involved in the supply of a truly transational commodity, the local dimension still plays a crucial role. The implications for criminal justice responses to human smuggling are discussed.	15	4	10.1177/1477370817749179	pc524@cam.ac.uk	Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge,	Empirical	Irregular migration	Multi-country		No
2018	Sowale, A.O.	Economic Community of West African States' Protocol on Free Movement and the Challenges of Human Trafficking in West Africa	Insight on Africa	The article examines the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) protocol on free movement and the challenges of human trafficking in West Africa. It investigates the implication of ECOWAS protocol on the free movement on human trafficking in West Africa. The data used for the study were obtained through secondary sources. The finding shows that protocol on the free movement of a person is a precursor for the increase in human trafficking in West Africa due to border porosity. Based on the findings, it was suggested that the ECOWAS intensify more efforts with its member states to solve their economic problems as the vulnerability of human trafficking is from the low-performing economies in West Africa. In addition, it was also suggested that the ECOWAS should step up their effort to bring to account the perpetrators of human trafficking.	10	2	10.1177/0975087818776166	sowaleadetayo@gmail.com	International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria	Desk-based	Irregular migration	Regional		No
2018	Dithebe, M.V.E., Mukhuba, T.T.	Illegal immigration and the challenge of border control in South Africa	African Renaissance	This study explored the causes of and factors that engender illegal immigration and weak border control in Africa, with special focus on South Africa. The study addressed issues relating to territorial integrity, emphasising protection from illegal incursions and resource exploitation and sought ways to combat the menace. Qualitative evidence from semi-structured interviews of government officials and focus group discussions with South African respondents (aged 16-74) found that measures taken by the government are not effective enough to minimise the accelerating number of illegal immigrants in South Africa. The study's findings show that there is a need for international migration policies that will promote national interest, security and sovereignty. South Africa's migration policy must encourage regional integration that will help develop the economy, promote national interests, security and sovereignty while keeping geographic realities in mind.	15	2	10.31920/2516-5305/2018/v15n2a6		Department of Politics and International Relations, North West University, South Africa	Empirical	Irregular migration	National	South Africa	No

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2018	Raineri, L.	Human smuggling across Niger: State-sponsored protection rackets and contradictory security imperatives	Journal of Modern African Studies	In recent years, Niger has gained prominence as a hub for the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to North Africa and Europe. Urged on by European concerns, Niamey has adopted repressive measures to contain such migrations in the region. These, however, have largely failed, and have yielded unintended and unexpected results, which challenge policy predictions. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, the article suggests that contradictory security imperatives have brought about the de facto regularisation of human smuggling. As a result, protection rackets sponsored by the state through patronage networks have severely limited the impact of externally sponsored measures to counteract irregular migration.	56	1	10.1017/S0022278X17000520	rai_neri@hotmail.com	Sant'Anna School ofAdvanced Studies, Piazza Martiri della Libertà 33, 56127 Pisa, Italy	Empirical	Irregular migration	National	Niger	No
2018	Maher, S.	Out of West Africa: Human Smuggling as a Social Enterprise	Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science	Drawing on 18 months of ethnographic research in Senegal, this article focuses on the sociality of migrant facilitation. Although it has become relatively common in media and policy reports to suggest that irregular migrants are manipulated by greedy and unscrupulous human smugglers, this article shows how migrants in Senegal are often familiar with their handlers and are more likely to call them a friend (ami) than a criminal. Also, most migrants do not see themselves as "smuggled," which implies victimhood. Rather, they see themselves as making calculated choices to migrate based on a host of social factors. By exploring the relationships between handlers and migrants, this article reveals the social worlds of negotiation, assistance, and protection that feature prominently in West African migrant narratives and practices	676	1	10.1177/0002716217743935	stephanie.maher@wits. ac.za	African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS), University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa	Empirical	Irregular migration	National	Senegal	No
2018	Sambo, H	Understanding the effect of international remittances on undernourishment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A spatial model approach	Region et Developpement	This paper investigates the impact of remittances on undernourishment in Sub-Saharan Africa using panel data from 35 countries spanning the years 2001-2011. The panel Spatial Error Model (SEM) was used after taking into account the spatial interaction between countries. We find that remittances contribute to the reduction of undernourishment in Sub-Saharan African. However, the elasticity of calorie consumption to remittances is narrow. Moreover, the impact of remittances is more pronounced in intermediate income deciles countries than in the countries in lower income deciles and higher income deciles. Abstract This paper investigates the impact of remittances on undernourishment in Sub-Saharan Africa using panel data from 35 countries spanning the years 2001-2011. The panel Spatial Error Model (SEM) was used after taking into account the spatial interaction between countries. We find that remittances contribute to the reduction of undernourishment in Sub-Saharan African. However, the elasticity of calorie consumption to remittances is narrow. Moreover, the impact of remittances is more pronounced in intermediate income deciles countries than in the countries in lower income deciles and higher income deciles.		47		hamed.sambo@univ- paris13.fr	Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (CEPN), Université Paris 13	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2018	Pickbourn, L	Rethinking Rural-Urban Migration and Women's Empowerment in the Era of the SDGs: Lessons from Ghana	Sustainability	Women who migrate within national borders in Africa have been largely ignored in contemporary conversations about migration. This is partly due to the fact that internal migration, and in particular, rural—urban migration, has been viewed in a negative light in development theory and praxis. This leads to the perception that women who migrate within national borders are worse-off than they would have been otherwise and to a policy stance that seeks to discourage their migration. Drawing on field research in Ghana, I argue that while rural—urban migration gives women access to an independent source of income, the emancipatory potential of migration for women is limited by the official stance towards rural—urban migration and informality. Nevertheless, the decision by women to migrate represents an attempt to improve their life outcomes as well as those of their families, in the face of severely constrained options for doing so. Sustainable Development Goal 5 (SDG5)—promoting gender equality and women's empowerment—requires a different approach to women's internal migration. Rather than seeking to constrain women's mobility, policy and program interventions should be geared towards expanding women's freedom to choose whether or not to migrate—by expanding the options available to women who stay at home as well as improving migration outcomes for those who migrate	10	4	10.3390/su10041075	lpickbourn@hampshire. edu	School of Critical Social Inquiry, Hampshire College, USA	Empirical	Internal migration	National	Ghana	Yes
2018	Bello, PO; Olutola, AA	The enforcement of anti-human trafficking law in South Africa: a case of an aircraft without a pilot	Police Practice and Research	This article evaluates the effectiveness of current law enforcement efforts in combating human trafficking in South Africa. Based on a broader empirical doctoral study, it was discovered that as currently structured, the South African Police Service (SAPS) cannot be effective in the enforcement of anti-trafficking law in the country. Combating human trafficking among other things, requires a formidable law enforcement agency that is explicitly proficient in the modus operandi of the crime; the sophisticated cum dynamic nature of the forces and factors that fuel the illicit trade in a vacillating milieu. Unfortunately, academic writings on this observable position in South Africa are scanty. Therefore, an article of this nature is not just timely but urgent. Findings from the study (among others) revealed that a wide-gap exist in the capacity of the SAPS, and other relevant stakeholders, to enforce anti-trafficking law in the country. Hence, it was recommended that for a result-oriented approach, South Africa needs to establish a specialised law enforcement agency distinct from the regular police structure to enforce anti-trafficking law in the country.	19	3	10.1080/15614263.2017.1387783	olutolaaa@tut.ac.za	Department of Safety & Security Management, Tshwane University of technology, Pretoria, South Africa	Empirical	Irregular migration	National	South Africa	No
2019	Ajide, K.B., Alimi, O.Y.	Political instability and migrants' remittances into sub-Saharan Africa region	GeoJournal	This study uncovers the causal relationship between political instability (constructed using different indicators) and migrants' remittances on a panel of 22 countries from the sub-Saharan African region over the period 1994–2015. Using both the fixed effects and system of Generalised Method of Moments estimation techniques, the following empirical findings are established. First, the theoretical conjecture underpinning the belief in political instability as a factor driving migrants' remittance inflows receives a clear empirical support. Second, regime instability is found to exert a significant positive impact on migrants' remittances in the region. Third, remittance is also found to act as a shock-absorbing mechanism to macroeconomic fluctuations in times of political upheavals. Thus, it has been alleged as acting counter cyclically. Fourth, the impacts of other covariates (e.g. like income per head of home and host countries, interest rate differentials and foreign aid) are equally well supported. Last, the less politically volatile countries get more financial assistance from relatives living abroad than high politically volatile countries. On the basis of the foregoing, we suggest the need for government to identify and get to the root causes of the lingering political crises as remittance inflows and/ or foreign aid supports cannot completely clear the damages orchestrated by political instability.	84	6	10.1007/s10708-018-9942-8	haleemphemy480@gmail.	Department of Economics, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2019	Hines, A.L., Simpson, N.B.	Migration, remittances and human capital investment in Kenya	Economic Notes	This paper investigates the relationship between international migration, remittances, and human capital investment in Kenya. We use household-level data from the 2009 Kenya Migration Household Survey (which was part of the Africa Migration Project) to test our hypothesis and uncover a positive and significant relationship between the amount of international remittances a household receives and the amount of expenditures allocated to education (for all levels of education). We consider various robustness checks and find that our results hold up to various specifications, including an instrumental variable approach.	48	3	10.1111/ecno.12142	nsimpson@colgate.edu	Department of Economics, Colgate University, 13 Oak Drive, Hamilton, NY 13346.	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	Kenya	No
2019	Gnimassoun, B., Anyanwu, J.C.	The Diaspora and economic development in Africa	Review of World Economics	While the dominant collective belief asserts that brain drain is detrimental to the development of small economies, new studies hold the reverse view. This paper aims to study the role of the Diaspora in the economic development of low-income countries with particular focus on African countries. It analyses both the overall effect and the specific effect of emigration according to the level of education of emigrants. While the empirical results for all developing countries fail to establish an unambiguous relationship between the Diaspora and economic development, those concerning African countries establish a clear and unambiguous relationship. The African Diaspora, especially the high-skilled Diaspora, contributes positively, significantly and robustly to the improvement of income in Africa. These findings challenge the dominant collective belief. Improvements in human capital, total factor productivity and democracy are effective transmission channels of this impact. In addition, while high-skilled emigrants have an overall greater impact on economic development and democracy, those with a low level of education contribute more to remittances to Africa.	155	4	10.1007/s10290-019-00344-3	blaise.gnimassoun@univ- lorraine.fr	BETA – CNRS, University of Lorraine, France	Empirical	Diaspora engagement	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes
2019	Chitambara, P.	Remittances, Institutions and Growth in Africa	International Migration	Remittances have become an important source of external finance in many developing countries. This article examines the relationship between remittances, institutions and economic growth in a panel of 26 African countries over the period 1980–2014. We apply the fixed effects (FE) and the two-step system generalised method-of-moments (GMM) estimation methods. Our results show that there is a positive relationship between remittances and growth. We also find that institutions are an important determinant of economic growth. The interaction terms have a positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth. Thus, the growth effect of remittances is enhanced in the presence of strong institutions. Strong institutions are therefore germane in attracting greater remittance inflows to African countries. A clearer understanding of the channels through which remittance flows will enhance growth in African economies and may assist policymakers to craft appropriate policies. In particular, a policy environment that promotes strong institutions would serve to attract more remittances.	57	5	10.1111/imig.12542		Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ), Harare, Zimbabwe Published	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2019	Docquier, F., Iftikhar, Z.	Brain drain, informality and inequality: A search- and-matching model for sub-Saharan Africa	Journal of International Economics	This paper revisits the effect of brain drain on development and inequality using a two-sector model with formal and informal labour markets. Contrary to existing studies, we use a search-and-matching setting that allows to endogenise the employment structure and the wage differentials between different skill groups in the same sector, and between workers with identical skills employed in different sectors. Theoretically, the brain drain induces ambiguous welfare effects for those left behind as the potential loss/gain depends on the parameters of the model. We thus parameters our model on 33 sub-Saharan African countries and produce comparative results for each of them. We find that skilled emigration induces heterogeneous welfare losses for the low-skilled population. The size of these losses varies between 0.2 and 8%, and is influenced by the parameters of the production and education technologies. The results are fairly robust to identifying assumptions, to the inclusion of technological externalities, and to the endogenization of training decisions.	120		10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.05.003	frederic.docquier@ uclouvain.be	LISER, Luxembourg Institute of Socio- Economic Research, Luxembourg bIRES,	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2019	Bredtmann, J., Martínez Flores, F., Otten, S.	Remittances and the Brain Drain: Evidence from Microdata for Sub- Saharan Africa	Journal of Development Studies	Based on unique microdata from five sub-Saharan African countries that contain comprehensive information on both migrants and their households at the origin country, we investigate the effect of migrants' education on their remittance behaviour. Our results reveal that migrants' education has no impact on the likelihood of sending remittances, but a positive effect on the amount of money sent, conditional on remitting. The latter effect holds for internal migrants and migrants in non-OECD countries, while it vanishes for migrants in OECD destination countries once characteristics of the origin household are controlled for.	55	7	10.1080/00220388.2018.1443208	julia.bredtmann@rwi- essen.de	RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research, Essen, Germany	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Multi-country		No
2019	Borderon, M., Sakdapolrak, P., Muttarak, R., Kebede, E., Pagogna, R., Sporer, E.	Migration influenced by environmental change in Africa: A systematic review of empirical evidence	Demographic Research	BACKGROUND  Despite an increase in scholarly and policy interest regarding the impacts of environmental change on migration, empirical knowledge in the field remains varied, patchy, and limited. Generalised discourse on environmental migration frequently oversimplifies the complex channels through which environmental change influences the migration process.  OBJECTIVE  This paper aims to systematise the existing empirical evidence on migration influenced by environmental change with a focus on Africa, the continent most vulnerable to climate change.	41		10.4054/DemRes.2019.41.18	marion.borderon@univie. ac.at	Department of Geography and Regional Research, University of Vienna, Austria	Desk-based	Others	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes
2019	Bisong, A.	Trans-regional institutional cooperation as multilevel governance: ECOWAS migration policy and the EU*	Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies	Regional economic integration in West Africa establishes the framework for the movement of persons within the highly mobile region. Eighty-four per cent of the migratory movements is directed towards another country within the region. This article analyses the role of trans-regional institutional cooperation on intra-regional migration policymaking, exploring the role of the European Union (EU) in the formulation of regional migration policies in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) specifically in labour migration, refugee protection, and return/readmission. It examines the normative role of the EU in influencing policies of third countries and argues that in the case of ECOWAS, networks are increasingly important in enabling formal and informal diffusion. The article uses multilevel governance as the lens to examine migration governance between the EU and ECOWAS, concluding that power relations equally play a key role in trans-regional institutional cooperation. Included in this mix are bilateral agreements which stand between trans-regional and intra-regional institutional cooperation, exerting a strong influence on inter-institutional EU- ECOWAS	45	8	10.1080/1369183X.2018.1441607	amanda.bisong@giz.de	Institute of Development Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria	Empirical	Migration governance	Regional		No
2019	Moyo, I., Nshimbi, C.C.	Border Practices at Beitbridge Border and Johannesburg Inner City: Implications for the SADC Regional Integration Project	Journal of Asian and African Studies	Regarded not only as a line that separates South Africa and Zimbabwe to underline the interiority and exteriority of the two countries, as well as to control and manage migration and immigration, Beitbridge border effectively plays out the immigration debates and dynamics at the heart of the nation-state of South Africa. Based on a qualitative study of how migrants from other African countries are treated at this border and in Johannesburg inner city, we suggest that the harassment suffered by the migrants at the hands of border officials, including immigration officials, the police and army, is indicative of a larger dynamic that exists in the centre, which is represented by Johannesburg inner city. Such bordering and rebordering practices at the border and at the centre reflect negatively on the spirit and letter of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional integration project.	54	3	10.1177/0021909618822123	minnoxa.m@gmail.com	Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, South Africa Christopher	Empirical	Border governance	National	South Africa	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2019	Kah, H.K.	'Blood Money', Migrants' Enslavement and Insecurity in Africa's Sahel and Libya	Africa Development	This article examines how and why the pursuit of greener pastures in Europe and Libya has resulted in the enslavement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa by human smugglers, felonious gangs, disaffected groups and government officials in an uncertain and unhealthy desert setting in Niger and Libya. Many young men, women and children are easily traded, sexually abused, made to work for long hours without pay, abandoned in the wild and/or tortured to death. The messy governance system in several migrants' countries of origin and transit countries like Somalia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Sudan has fuelled migration, enslavement and insecurity. Those who have endured this brutish treatment recount frightful stories of the horrors of migration across the Sahel. Numerous calls for efforts to mitigate mass migration and human enslavement in the twenty-first century have apparently fallen on deaf ears. This phenomenon in Niger and Libya was investigated through a content analysis of victims' accounts and reports by humanitarian organisations and journalists. In fact, modern migrants' enslavement for cash through open purchase, sale and use for sexual pleasures have resulted in and still lead to many deaths today. Many African migrants who anticipate a better life in Libya or Europe have been trapped and persecuted by soulless individuals who want to make quick money through dehumanising, sexually abusing and killing them. Stable and sustainable governance is indispensable if we really want to address this problem and reinstate human self-possession in Africa's Sahara Desert.	44	1		henry.kah@ubuea.cm	University of Buea, Cameroon	Desk-based	Irregular migration	Regional		No
2019	Phakathi, M.	African union migration policies: A route to African unity?	Journal of African Union Studies	Using Diop's theory of Cultural Identity, this paper discusses the African Union's (AU) Common Position on Migration and Development and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment. The paper argues that, although these policies try to achieve the vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, they ignore fundamental issues such as creating a common African identity and an African consciousness. Unless an African consciousness or an African state of mind is cultivated these policies are not likely to succeed. The paper proposes that the education systems of African states must consciously inculcate pan-African values and teach an Afrocantric history in order to create a common African historical consciousness and argues that the AU must use indigenous African languages as official languages in order to show that it is serious about promoting pan-African values.	8	2	10.31920/2050-4306/2019/8n2a2	mlungisiphakathi@gmail. com	Department of Political Sciences University of South Africa, South Africa	Desk-based	Migration governance	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2019	Bayar, M; Aral, MM	An Analysis of Large- Scale Forced Migration in Africa	International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health	In this paper, human security-related causes of large-scale forced migration (LSFM) in Africa are investigated for the period 2011–2017. As distinct from the conventional understanding of (national) security, human security involves economic, public health, environmental and other aspects of people's well-being. Testing various hypotheses, we have found that civil and interstate conflicts, lack of democracy and poverty are the most important drivers of mass population displacements, whereas climate change has an indirect effect on the dependent variable. As a policy tool, foreign aid is also tested to see if it lowers the probability of LSFM. Our findings have implications for policy planning, since the conventional understanding of security falls short of addressing LSFM without taking various aspects of human security into account	16	21	10.3390/ijerph16214210	murat.bayar@asbu.edu.tr	Institute for Eastern and African Studies, Social Sciences University of Ankara, Ankara 06030, Turkey	Empirical	Forced displacement	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2020	Macdonald, A., Porter, H.	The Politics of Return: Understanding Trajectories of Displacement and the Complex Dynamics of 'Return' in Central and East Africa	Journal of Refugee Studies	By 2019, a record high of 79.5 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, and human rights violations (UNHCR 2020a: 2). In the decade leading up to this only a fraction of this number were able to 'return' or find a 'durable solution'. Multiple waves of displacement are common, and 'return' often involves far more complicated arrangements than the term suggests. Yet if 'return', as a one-directional durable solution is increasingly rare, the need to understand it in difficult and dynamic contexts of precarity and multi-directional mobility, is all the more urgent. This introductory essay reflects on what studies of return can tell us about the 'life cycle' of conflict and displacement dynamics in war-affected Central and East Africa, with particular focus on Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Uganda. 'Return' and the 'returnee' category is broad and includes former combatants, especially those involved in non-state armed groups. We survey the historical and conceptual background of 'return' and its growing prominence in international policy before introducing four areas in which the articles in this special issue contribute to our understanding of internally displaced person, refugee and combatant return dynamics: conceptualisations of home and mobilities; everyday negotiation of belonging; the relationship between return and 'cycles of violence'; and finally, the ways in which return shapes and re-shapes governance and public authority across settings.	33	4	10.1093/jrs/feaa118	anna.macdonald@uea.ac.uk	School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK	Desk-based	Forced displacement	Multi-country		Yes
2020	Norman, K.P.	Migration Diplomacy and Policy Liberalization in Morocco and Turkey	International Migration Review	This article examines the 2013 migration policy liberalisations in Morocco and Turkey to understand whether predominantly 'human rights-centric' or 'diplomatic' factors influenced domestic decisions to reform migration policies. It uses original interview data collected in 2015, as well as policy documents, to examine the two reform processes and their initial consequences for migrants and refugees residing in each host state. While the academic literature on migration has focused on human rights-centric factors to understand historic migration policy reforms, Turkey and Morocco's geopolitical and geographic positions between powerful neighbors to the north and important sending countries to the south mean that diplomatic factors are also key to understanding the incentives behind reform. This article's findings have important implications for scholars of international migration, demonstrating that while countries like Morocco and Turkey may implement liberal and inclusive policies if there are diplomatic and economic gains to be had from doing so, such policies may have little impact on the everyday lives of individual migrants and refugees residing in these states and may be subject to reversals if such states' geopolitical calculations change.	54	4	10.1177/0197918319895271	kpnorman@gmail.com	Rice University's Baker Institute, 6100 Main St, Houston, TX Texas 77005, USA	Empirical	Migration diplomacy	National	Morocco	No
2020	Sparreboom, T., Mertens, J., Berger, S.	The Labour Market Impact of Immigration in Three Sub-Saharan African Economies	Journal of International Migration and Integration	This paper estimates the effects of immigration on labour market outcomes of the native-born based on the skill cell approach pioneered by Borjas (QJE 2003, 118: 1335–137). Three economies are included in the first cross-country analysis of the labour market effects of immigration in sub-Saharan Africa based on this approach—Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa. We find limited effects of immigration on native-born labour market outcomes in these three countries, and results are sensitive to specifications and groups under consideration. Overall, an unfavourable effect on native-born labour market outcomes is more likely for workers with lower levels of education. In accordance with the literature, we find that the complementarity of workers as captured by an occupational dissimilarity index helps explain the results in some countries, but not in all.	21	4	10.1007/s12134-019-00707-7	sparreboom@ilo.org	International Labour Office, Geneva, Switzerland	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Multi-country		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2020	Adam, I., Trauner, F., Jegen, L., Roos, C.	West African interests in (EU) migration policy. Balancing domestic priorities with external incentives	Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies	Studies on EU–Africa migration cooperation often focus on the interests of the EU and its member states. But what do African states themselves seek to achieve with respect to migration policy? This article presents an in-depth look at Ghana and Senegal, two stable West African democracies, and assesses which types of migration policies they support, and why. We suggest that a distinction ought to be made between West African policymakers' more domestically-driven migration policy goals (to cooperate more closely with the diaspora or creating legal migration channels, for example) and internationally-induced ones (such as the reinforcement of border control capacities). Each type of policy interest is defended by an increasingly diverse set of national actors whose interests often – but not always – converge. This distinction should be considered as a continuum, as most West African migration policy preferences are driven by domestic as well as international factors, albeit to diverging degrees. Our findings demonstrate that migration policymaking in countries targeted by international cooperation can only be studied as an 'intermestic' policy issue, reflecting the dynamic interplay of international and domestic interests.	46	15	10.1080/1369183X.2020.1750354	Ilke.adam@vub.be	Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium	Empirical	Migration governance	Multi-country		Yes
2020	Gnimassoun, B.	Regional Integration: Do Intra-African Trade and Migration Improve Income in Africa?	International Regional Science Review		43	6	10.1177/0160017619874852	blaise.gnimassoun@univ- lorraine.fr	BETA—CNRS, University of Lorraine, Nancy, France 2	Empirical	Migration and trade	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2020	Dinbabo, M.F., Badewa, A.S.	Monitoring migration policy frameworks, treaties and conventions for development in Africa	Journal of African Union Studies	International migration has been stimulated by the growing trends of globalisation, and enhanced by combinations of economic, political, and social factors. Considering the myriad of challenges and opportunities of migration, the study reviews three bodies of practical and theoretical endeavours—migration policy frameworks, treaties and conventions in Africa, using a thematic analysis of secondary data. The Gates's model of effective implementation of social policies was employed toward monitoring of migration policies in Africa for effective and sustainable outcomes. While most migration policies in Africa provide comprehensive guidelines on collaborations toward border administration, uneven migration, migration data and development, migrant rights and inland migration etc., gaps exist in their implementations and relevance to African migration outcomes. Therefore, the study emphasised the significance of rigorous engagement among stakeholders in leveraging socio-economic opportunities in Africa and harnessing human mobility potentials for inclusive development and regional integration.	9	1	10.31920/2050-4306/2020/S9N1A2	mdinbabo@uwc.ac.za	Institute for Social Development, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa	Desk-based	Migration governance	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2020	Zanker, F.L., Moyo, K.	The Corona Virus and Migration Governance in South Africa: Business As Usual?   Der Corona-Virus und Migrationspolitik in Südafrika: Weiter wie bisher?	Africa Spectrum	The South African response in dealing with the Corona pandemic needs to speak to the realities of all people living in the country, including migrant and refugee communities. Reflecting on this in light of ongoing research on the political stakes of migration governance, we find that the virus response shows little change in the government agenda when it comes to dealing with refugees and other migrants. Veritably, we see that the pandemic may even be an excuse for pushing through already-aspired to policies. This includes the securitised agenda behind the sudden building of a border fence to close off Zimbabwe and the xenophobic-rhetorical clout behind the lockdown rules about which shops are allowed to remain open. The temporary stay on renewing asylum seekers permits counts as a perfunctory exception. We show that each of these developments very much play into politics as usual.	55	1	10.1177/0002039720925826	franzisca.zanker@abi.uni- freiburg. de	Arnold- Bergstraesser- Institut, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany	Empirical	Migration governance	Multi-country		No
2020	Whitaker, B.E.	Refugees, Foreign Nationals, and Wageni: Comparing African Responses to Somali Migration	African Studies Review	Host governments have responded to the migration of Somali refugees throughout Africa in recent decades in different ways. Kenyan policymakers have treated Somalis primarily as a security threat, imposing restrictions on them that especially target this group. In South Africa, where economic and political competition fuel xenophobia, Somalis are part of a larger foreign national population that is seen as having disproportionate economic influence. However, Somali Bantus have been welcomed in Tanzania, which granted them citizenship even as it limited the mobility and activities of other refugees. A comparative analysis suggests that the relative balance among security, economic, political, and normative considerations shapes the extent and scope of host government policies	63	1	10.1017/asr.2019.52	bwhitaker@uncc.edu	University of North Carolina at Charlotte	Desk-based	Migration governance	Multi-country		No
2020	Takyiakwaa, D., Tanle, A.	'We are Each Other's Keeper': Migrant Associations and Integration in Urban Africa	Urban Forum	While literature on migrants' associations is well documented in Europe, North America and South America, little is done on Africa's internal migrant associations in spite of their proliferation and role in dealing with migration and urban precarity. We ask how do migrant association facilitate the integration processes of their members in the host area and how has their role in the process changed over the years? Through a concurrent (convergent) triangulation research design, we survey 120 participants, interviewed 14 and content analyse (media) reports. We conclude that migrant associations are still relevant in engendering adaptive and supportive environment for migrants' integration. Even though these core objectives have not changed per se, the changing socio-cultural, economic and political surroundings of host communities and the needs of migrants requires that migrant association shift in their approaches to remain relevant.	31	1	10.1007/s12132-019-09373-5	dtakyiakwaa@yahoo.com	Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana	Empirical	Others	National	Ghana	Yes
2020	Palmary, I., de Gruchy, T.	The globalisation of trafficking and its impact on the South African counter- trafficking legislation	Critical Social Policy	This article was prompted by emerging and highly politicised debates in South Africa over the role of 'foreign influence' in policy-making. Whilst popular debates on this issue are often over simplified, it nevertheless seemed a relevant topic for migration policy-making given its cross-national focus. In this article, we therefore consider what influenced the development of South Africa's 2013 Prevention and Combatting of Trafficking in Persons Act (TiP Act) as just one example of migration policy-making. Using qualitative methods, we map the influences on the South African TiP Act, and highlight how these shaped the passing of the Act, as well as the form that it took. We describe three pathways of international influence that shaped and constrained the possibilities for the Act: the global system for the governance of trafficking, the globalisation of knowledge around trafficking, and the nature of diplomatic relations. Exploring these pathways, we interrogate and unpack the idea that policy-making takes place in isolation and exclusively at a national level. Instead, this article illustrates how policy-making around issues of trafficking, and migration, takes place amidst complex and unequal global relationships.	40	1	10.1177/0261018319829640	ipalmary@uj.ac.za	University of Johannesburg, South Africa	Empirical	Migration governance	National	South Africa	Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2020	Moyo, I.	On Borders and the Liminality of Undocumented Zimbabwean Migrants in South Africa	Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies	The historical continuities of the Zimbabwe–South Africa cross-border migrations provide a context in which such movements have continued, despite securitised borders, in post-apartheid South Africa. Based on a qualitative study of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in three places—namely, the Beitbridge border, South African border town of Musina and the city of Johannesburg, between December 2014 and March 2015, I argue that, securitising the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe leads to human smuggling, which places smuggled migrants in liminality and marginality, which in turn militates against the goal of free human mobility in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).	18	1	10.1080/15562948.2019.1570416	moyoi@unizulu.ac.za	Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zululand, South Africa	Empirical	Border governance	National	South Africa	No
2020	Adekunle, I.A., Tella, S.A., Subair, K., Adegboyega, S.B.	Remittances and financial development in Africa	Journal of Public Affairs	Despite the magnitude of remittances as an alternative source of investment financing in Africa, the financial sector in Africa has significantly remained underdeveloped and unstable. Finding a solution to Africa's financial deregulation problems has proved tenacious partly because of inadequate literature that explain the nature of Africa capital and financial markets which has shown to be unorganised, spatially fragmented, highly segmented and invariably externally dependent. We examine the structural linkages between remittances and financial sector development in Africa. Panel data on indices of remittances was regressed on indices of financial sector development in fifty-three (53) African countries from 1986 through 2017 using the Pooled Mean Group estimation procedure. We accounted for cross-sectional dependence inherent in ordinary panel estimation and found a basis for the strict orthogonal relationship among the variables. Findings revealed a positive long-run relationship between remittances and financial development with a significant (positive) short-run relationship. It is suggested that, while attracting migrants' transfers which can have significant short-run poverty-alleviating advantages, in the long run, it might be more beneficial for African governments to foster financial sector development using alternative financial development strategies.			10.1002/pa.2545	adekunle_ia@yahoo.com	Department of Economics, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2020	Vhumbunu, C.H., Rudigi, J.R.	Facilitating regional integration through free movement of people in Africa: Progress, challenges and prospects	Journal of African Union Studies	African regional integration has seen a multiplicity of efforts being made to overcome barriers that impede the free movement of goods and services. The free movement of people is one of the cornerstones and pillars of regional integration in Africa as it promotes tourism, intra-African trade, investment, labour mobility and skills circulation, employment creation and foster social integration on the continent. Although there may be identifiable achievements since the Abuja Treaty of 1991, such as the African Union Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment; African Charter on Human and People's Rights; and the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and the free movement of people, the continent is still confronted with a myriad of constraints. Using the African Development Bank's Africa Visa Openness Index; the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa's African Regional Integration Index, as well as qualitative analysis of a wide array of relevant reports and literature; this paper seeks to assess the collective progress achieved and challenges faced in facilitating regional integration through the free movement of people on the continent. The concept of free movement of people was used for conceptual analysis. The paper recommended strategic interventions at national, regional and continental levels, that may assist to accelerate the implementation of policy instruments meant to facilitate the free movement of people on the continent to accelerate African regional integration and create a 'continent with seamless borders' envisaged by the African Union's Agenda 206	9	2	10.31920/2050-4306/2020/9n2a3	cvhumbunu@gmail.com	School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa	Desk-based	Migration governance	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

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2020	Fernández- Molina, I., Hernando De Larramendi, M.	Migration diplomacy in a de facto destination country: Morocco's new intermestic migration policy and international socialization by/with the EU	Mediterranean Politics	This article examines Morocco's migration diplomacy by focusing on the New Migration Policy (NMP) it launched in 2013 as a destination country. It argues that the NMP serves the objectives of Moroccan foreign policy towards both Africa and the EU, as international socialisation by/with the latter remains a primary driving force for the country's migration policies. The main recent change in Morocco-EU socialisation has been a return from norm-driven role playing to an overt exhibition of rational choice and a transactional attitude around migration and border control practices – while role playing has been reoriented towards Africa and the wider international community.			10.1080/13629395.2020.1758449	I.F.Molina@exeter.ac.uk	Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK	Empirical	Migration diplomacy	National	Morocco	No
2020	Moyo, I., Nshimbi, C.C.	Of Borders and Fortresses: Attitudes Towards Immigrants from the SADC Region in South Africa as a Critical Factor in the Integration of Southern Africa	Journal of Borderlands Studies	South Africa attracts migrants from other parts of Africa, Asia, Europe, Australia and the Americas. However, the immigration debate within the country apparently revolves around immigrants from the other parts of Africa, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, and projects them as undesirable in a way best interpreted as discriminatory and exclusionary. This paper argues that this, coupled with South Africa's immigration legislation, policies and practices amounts to forms of bordering and exclusion that starkly contradict the country and its neighbor's aspirations for a regionally integrated Southern Africa. As one of the few SADC member states that have ratified the 2005 Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC, immigrants and cross-border movers from the SADC region ought to be treated well in South Africa. Not doing so militates against the goal of an integrated Southern Africa and the commitments South Africa has made to the continental agenda of establishing an African Economic Community.		1	10.1080/08865655.2017.1402198	minnoxa@yahoo.com	Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, South Africa	Empirical	Migration governance	National	South Africa	No
2020	Gignarta, TS; Guan, ZZ; Borojo, DG	The Impacts of Economic Freedom and Institutional Quality on Migration from African Countries	South African Journal of Economics	The previous empirical literature suggests that socio-economic conditions and demographic pressures are triggering factors of migration from Africa. We propose that economic freedom and institutional quality indicators of African countries are also important determinants of out-migration from Africa. Hence, we investigate the effect of economic freedom and institutional quality on migration flow from 44 African countries to major migration destination countries. Aggregate indicators are derived for the quality of institutions and economic freedom using principal component analysis. Controlling for source and destination countries' income levels, population size, cultural, historical and physical distance, our findings provide evidence that migration flow from Africa is significantly determined by the institutional quality and economic freedom indicators in African countries. Our results are strongly robust to different econometric techniques used to control for sample selection bias, zero-valued observations and endogeneity concern. Hence, improving institutional quality and maintaining economic freedom in African countries matters significantly to control out-migration from Africa.		3	10.1111/saje.12254	tade.soka@yahoo.com	School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University	Empirical	Others	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2020	Kamta, FN; Schilling, J; Scheffran, J	Insecurity, Resource Scarcity, and Migration to Camps of Internally Displaced Persons in Northeast Nigeria	Sustainability	For almost two decades, the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) in general and northeast Nigeria in particular have been subject to the insurgency of the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram. This region is also known for its poor environmental conditions that mostly manifest inland decertification and water scarcity. We analyse the impact of the insecurity and conflict on migration from the most affected rural areas of northeast Nigeria to Maiduguri. We also explore the role that water scarcity and land decertification play in the decision of local people to migrate. Data were collected by interviewing 204 internally displaced persons (IDPs) at the Bakassi IDP camp in Maiduguri between March and May 2019. Experts were also interviewed at various governmental, non-governmental, and international institutions in Abuja. Respondents at the Bakassi IDP camp came from Guzamala, Gwoza, Marte, Monguno, and Nganzai. Though insecurity created by the conflict between Boko Haram insurgents and government forces was mentioned by all respondents as the main factor that triggered migration, this study shows that the decision to migrate was also a function of other factors that differ between communities. These factors include the geographical location of the community, land ownership, the socioeconomic status of the migrants, access to water and land, and wealth. This study reveals that in some communities, it was possible for people to live with conflict if they were still able to practice farming or if they had additional sources of income such as small businesses. The decision to migrate was only taken when the practice of such activities was no longer possible and they had nothing to hold on to.	12	17	10.3390/SU12176830	baw1643@studium.uni- hamburg.de	Institute of Geography, Center for Earth System Research and Sustainability (CEN), University of Hamburg	Empirical	Forced displacement	National	Nigeria	Yes
2020	Sahoo, M; Sethi, N	Does Remittance Inflow Promote Human Development in Sub- Saharan Africa? An Impirical Insight	Global Economy Journal	This paper examines the relationship between human development, remittances and other macro-economic variables like life expectancy, human capital, FDI, inflation, economic growth and financial development by considering 31 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries during the period of 1990–2018. Kao and Fisher residual co-integration tests are applied to check the co-integration among the variables in the long-run. We apply fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and DOLS to show the long-run elasticity of explanatory variables on dependent variable. The result indicates that remittances have a positive and statistically significant effects on human development in SSA region. Similarly, government expenditure, human capital, inflation and economic growth have positive effects on human development in the region. Dumitrescu-Hurlin panel granger causality tests were observed such that there is a unidirectional causality between remittance and human development in SSA countries. However, human development and inflation rate show bi-directional relationship with each other. This paper suggests that public policies can be conceived to promote health, education and income, thereby encouraging and enhancing human development. Policymakers should also rely on other macroeconomic factors, such as government spending and financial development, to stimulate human development in SSA region.	20	4	10.1142/S2194565920500219	sahoomalayaranjan4@gmail.com	Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, National Institute of Technology, India	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2021	Souza, E.	Household gender dynamics and remitting behaviour in sub- Saharan Africa	International Migration	This paper examines how gender dynamics in different patriarchal societies shape remitting behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa. Data come from surveys conducted in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Uganda and Senegal. Results show that immediate family members, migrants with high earning potential and households with most financial needs are more likely to send or receive remittances and, on average, send or receive more remittances than contrasting migrants or households. Gender dynamics show that remitters are more likely to be married individuals, particularly men, which demonstrates the importance of conjugal family responsibility in remitting behaviour. Consequently, the bulk of evidence suggests altruism as the primary motive behind remittances, although results also point to insurance as a motivation. However, the altruistic behaviour seems to be driven by the responsibility to remit rather than mere concern for the non-migrating household members. This remitting pattern is much stronger in societies with high gender inequality than not.	59	6	10.1111/imig12833	souzaemma@gmail.com	Department of Population Studies, Chancellor College, University of Malawi	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Multi-country		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2021	Idemudia, U., Okoli, N., Goitom, M., Bawa, S.	Life after trafficking: reintegration experiences of human trafficking survivors in Nigeria	International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care	Purpose  Reintegration programs have emerged as part of the regimes of care for survivors of human trafficking. However, empirical analysis of the reintegration outcomes for survivors remains limited in the African context. Hence, this paper aims to examine the challenges and opportunities of reintegration assistance programs for survivors of human trafficking in Nigeria.  Design/methodology/approach  Drawing on qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, this study conducted semi-structured interviews with repatriated women who have accessed reintegration assistance in Nigeria, and data was analyzed using thematic analysis.  Findings  The findings suggest that while the reintegration programs might address the procedural aspect of reintegration, the achievement of substantive reintegration remains incomplete. This is because of the structural conditions of the context within which reintegration is supposed to occur.  Practical implications  There is a need to take seriously the distinction between the reintegration of survivors into a new community or a former community in the design of a regime of care for survivors of human trafficking in Africa. Crucially, the focus on procedural reintegration should not also divert attention away from the structural conditions and reforms needed to ensure survivors achieve substantive reintegration.	17	4	10.1108/IJMHSC-03-2021-0023		1	Empirical	Irregular migration	National		1 ^ 1
				Originality/value  This paper contributes to the limited literature on life after trafficking and demonstrates the strengths and limitations of reintegration programs as a regime of care for survivors of human trafficking. In addition, this study empirically grounded the theoretical distinction between different aspects of the process of reintegration.										

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2021	Carciotto, S.	Making Asylum Seekers More Vulnerable in South Africa: The Negative Effects of Hostile Asylum Policies on Livelihoods	International Migration	In post-apartheid South Africa, migration policies and legislation have left critical issues such as social cohesion and integration unsolved. Furthermore, the inability to reconcile the national interest of maintaining borders' integrity with respecting moral and legal obligations has placed the asylum system under tremendous stress. Drawing from secondary sources, as well as qualitative interviews, this paper explores the development of new asylum policies aimed at curtailing asylum seekers' right to work in South Africa. The study's findings provide support for the conclusions of earlier research that highlights the consequences of hostile policies and practices for asylum seekers' livelihoods. The author argues that curtailments on asylum seekers' right to work will have many possible socio-economic ramifications. In the immediate term, the legislation seeks to inhibit asylum seekers from engaging in self-employment, while in the long run it may achieve the undesired effect of producing more precarious forms of livelihood.	59	5	10.1111/imig.12788		Institute for Development Studies, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa	Empirical	Migration governance	National	South Africa	No
2021	Iwuoha, V.C., Mbaegbu, C.C.	Border Governance and Its Complications in West Africa: What Can Be Learned from Constructivism?	Society	Neither the ECOWAS Common approach nor single-country unilateralism offers consistent and dependable systems for effective migration governance in West Africa. Both approaches derive from neo-realist and neo-liberal frameworks and produce incoherent, contradictory, and conflicting migration systems which adversely affect the quality of transborder mobility, governance, and security. Using the case of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin, this article applies social constructivism to argue for a third approach to migration governance: one in which neighboring or bordering states implement flexible, coherent, and hybrid migration systems based on the specificities of their cultural, political, and economic needs, while adapting to the common regional approach and foregoing their distinct unilateralism. The constructivism-based approach focuses on four dimensions underpinning exclusively flexible and mutually acceptable migration standards: (i) joint transborder security and policing; (ii) joint rehabilitation of dilapidated and porous transboundary areas; (iii) bilateral harmonisation of immigration laws and policies; and (iv) protection of immigrants' social rights.	58	4	10.1007/s12115-021-00622-7	casmir.mbaegbu@unn. edu.ng	Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria	Desk-based	Migration governance	Multi-country		No
2021	Yeboah, T., Kandilige, L., Bisong, A., Garba, F., Kofi Teye, J.	The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and Diversity of Experiences of Different Categories of Migrants: A Qualitative Study	International Migration	While studies have drawn attention to the operationalisation, and implementation challenges associated with the ECOWAS free movement protocol, our understanding of how different categories of migrants experience the protocol is far more limited. Drawing on data from interviews conducted with 23 ECOWAS migrants living or travelling to Ghana, immigration officials and a trade union representative, this paper examines the diversity of experiences of ECOWAS migrants in relation to the free movement protocol. The findings suggest that the experiences of ECOWAS nationals in areas such as awareness and knowledge of provisions in the protocol, border crossing, processes of acquiring residence and work permits and renewing permits, and rights of establishment differ remarkably by dimensions of social difference. The gender, social class and nationality of migrants are fundamental and shape the experiences of ECOWAS migrants in divergent ways. These findings have important implication for policies seeking to promote free movement in West Africa.	59	3	10.1111/imig.12766		Bureau of Integrated Rural Development, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana	Empirical	Migration governance	National	Ghana	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2021	Kanayo, O., Anjofui, P.	Migration Dynamics in Africa: Expectations and Lived Experiences of Immigrants in South Africa	Journal of Asian and African Studies	International migration has continued to increase over the years. As people relocate to seek opportunities, their hopes and aspirations for a better life become a driving force. The extent to which their expectations are achieved is not documented in South Africa. This paper examines the expectations versus experiences of international immigrants in South Africa using Cameroonian and Democratic Republic of Congo immigrants residing in Cape Town. A qualitative approach with snowball sampling selected key informants from Cameroonian and Congolese nationalities in Cape Town. Results suggest that most immigrants did not meet their expectations for migrating, due to migration policy limitations of the host country exempting them from opportunities. The results align with both the capability approach theory and Lee's model of migration. Most of the immigrants showed despondency but do not prefer the option of returning to their home country. This is because they have not attained their goals for migration. The paper recommends that policy discussion between the South African government and stakeholders has become imperative to obtain an informed perspective on the dynamics of migration.	56	3	10.1177/0021909620934840	Kanayo.Ogujiuba@ump. ac.za	School of Development Studies, University of Mpumalanga	Empirical	Others	National	South Africa	Yes
2021	Flahaux, ML.	Reintegrating After Return: Conceptualisation and Empirical Evidence from the Life Course of Senegalese and Congolese Migrants	International Migration	The study of reintegration after return is often disconnected from research on the intention and the realisation of return. This article develops a new conceptual framework linking the intention and realisation of return with the reintegration process. This framework is used to study the cases of Senegalese and Congolese migrants through a mixed-methods approach. Quantitative data from the Migration between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project, which collected the life stories of migrants and return migrants in origin and destination countries, are combined with qualitative interviews with returnees. In line with the conceptual framework, the analyses highlight the role of migrants' projections about their potential reintegration for return as well as the importance for reintegration of the preparation of return. Besides the importance of migrants' aspirations, they also emphasise the role of external factors, such as family and context in origin and destination countries.	59	2	10.1111/imig.12705		Institut de Recherche pour le D?eveloppement, Laboratoire Population Environnement D?eveloppement, Aix- Mar- seille Universit?e, Marseille	Empirical	Others	Multi-country		No
2021	Adugna, F., Deshingkar, P., Atnafu, A.	Human Smuggling from Wollo, Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia: Askoblay Criminals or Enablers of Dreams?	Public Anthropologist	Sensationalist accounts of human smuggling from Ethiopia towards Saudi Arabia allege that operations are controlled by criminal networks that converge in a variety of illegal markets posing a threat to national security. Such convergent narratives construct Ethiopian human smuggling as an organised criminal business that extracts profits from and inflicts violence on vulnerable people seeking a clandestine passage to work in the Gulf States. Our ethnographic research in Wollo, Ethiopia, challenges these narratives by showing that smuggling networks are developed through personalised relationships, based on co-ethnic bonds rather than extended and complex criminal networks. Smuggling has emerged in a particular context of surveillance and enforcement and the motives of smugglers are complex, making simple characterizations difficult. Smuggling is enabled by ethnic links on either side of the border where earnings from facilitation boost incomes in an otherwise impoverished context	3	1	10.1163/25891715-03010003			Empirical	Irregular migration	National	Ethiopia	No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2021	Adekunle, I.A., Tella, S.A., Ogunjobi, F.O.	Remittances and the future of African economies	International Migration	African nations have, with the passage of time, over-relied on remittance inflow to augment domestic savings for growth and development. Although remittance—both as a viable investment financing option and as a growth complementary factor—helps drive growth and development, concerns of fading altruism exist. As regards altruistic giving, decreasing external financing options might overwhelm growth and development. We argue that the altruistic connection, which has been the bedrock of sending remittances to African countries, could eventually fade into oblivion. We assigned numerical weights to establish the influence of remittances on the future of African economies. We took cognizance of endogeneity of regressors and accounted for cross-sectional dependence. We found a positive relationship between remittances and financial development besides the influence of exchange rate, technological change, inflation and population on the latter. African governments, donors, investment partners and the society at large should be concerned about fading altruistic connections from old and young African migrants. Altruism could be a springboard to the diversification of external capital sourcing and creation of a migrant policy that puts Africa at the forefront of development ahead of seeking increased worker remittances from abroad			10.1111/imig.12951	adekunle_ia@yahoo.com	Babcock Business School, Babcock University, Ilishan- Remo, Nigeria	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2021	Tawat, M., Lamptey, E.	The 2015 EU-Africa joint Valletta action plan on immigration: A parable of complex interdependence	International Migration	In 2015, as the 'refugee crisis' unfolded, the European Union negotiated deals respectively with Turkey and many African countries to stem the influx of asylum seekers. But comparatively little has been said about its African deal, the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP) and its impact. Using migration policy theories, this article shows that the African deal, embodied in the concept of 'shared responsibility', amounts to a special kind of interest, complex interdependence. Specifically, while parties held onto their interests (territorial integrity for the Europeans and economic development for the Africans), there was a new sense, especially on the part of the Europeans, that both parties needed each other's help (cooperation) to advance these interests. As a result, concrete measures such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund were formulated. Looking at their 'effects', these measures have been positive in most policy domains.			10.1111/imig.12953	mahama.tawat542@gmail. com	Malmö Institute for the Study of Migration, Diversity and Welfare, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden	Empirical	Migration governance	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes
2021	Hirsch, A.	The African Union's Free Movement of Persons Protocol: Why has it faltered and how can its objectives be achieved?	South African Journal of International Affairs	In January 2018, the African Union (AU) agreed to establish the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfcFTA) to the free flow of goods and services within Africa. Simultaneously, the AU adopted a protocol supporting the free movement of persons between the countries of Africa. Both are considered necessary for the successful social and economic development of the countries of the African continent. As of January 2021, 54 countries had signed the AfcFTA and 35 countries had fully ratified, whereas 33 countries had signed the Free Movement of Persons (FMP) Protocol and only four countries had fully ratified. Yet, barriers against migration within the African continent have been falling. This article analyses the reasons for the slow adoption of the protocol, looks at how the free movement agenda is progressing despite that, and suggests ways of moving the protocol and its agenda forward.	28	4	10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788	alan.hirsch@uct.ac.za	Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa	Desk-based	Migration governance	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2021	Parent, N.	Commitments to forced migrants in African peace agreements, 1990–2018	International Journal of Human Rights	This article presents data on peace agreement commitments towards forced migrants on the African continent (excluding MENA) from 1990 to 2018, resulting from the analysis of 177 peace agreements responding to the search queries 'Africa (excl. MENA)' and 'refugees and displaced persons' on the Peace Agreement Database (PA-X). This article presents preliminary results from four thematic categories: (1) return, reconstruction, rehabilitation, reintegration, and resettlement (5R); (2) provision commitments; (3) rights and law; and (4) land and property. Initial probing and statistical testing of the data revealed several trends. Notably, most 5R commitments were made towards the return of forced migrants. From twelve provision variables, physical protection was the most common provision commitment, followed by relief support. Where commitments to laws and rights related to forced migration remained relatively low, these results suggest that peace agreements in this region seldom take a rights-based approach to displacement. Commitments to land and property compensation and restitution were also marginal, confirming that these issues remain occluded within the realms of conflict termination and the transition towards peace. A brief discussion of these results is followed by an outlook of future research pathways.			10.1080/13642987.2021.2007079	nicolas.parent@mail. mcgill.ca	Department of Geography, McGill University, Montreal, Canada	Desk-based	Forced displacement	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes
2021	d'Orsi, C.	Migrant smuggling in Africa: Challenges yet to be overcome	African Journal of Legal Studies	This paper focuses on the plight of smuggling of migrants in Africa. Migrant smuggling has been documented along at least five major and several smaller routes in Africa. In my study, I investigate whether current legislation and policies are effective in curbing the practice of smuggling in Africa. To evaluate the success rate of these measures, I am comparing figures over recent years to establish whether there has been a decrease in the number of migrants smuggled throughout the various regions of the continent. In my work, I argue that migration can be better managed but it cannot be stopped. In this framework, in Africa, the current migration policies and cooperation efforts intended to eradicate the practice of smuggling of migrants have given mixed results	13	4	10.1163/17087384-12340076	cristianod@uj.ac.za	Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa	Desk-based	Irregular migration	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No
2021	Bisong, A.	Invented, invited and instrumentalised spaces: conceptualising non-state actor engagement in regional migration governance in West Africa	Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies	This paper analyses the engagement of non-state actors (NSAs) in regional migration policy processes in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It identifies four categories of NSAs – non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), academia and the media—as the key actors engaged in regional migration governance processes in West Africa. The paper adopts a social constructivist approach and a multilevel perspective, drawing on interviews, surveys and an extensive analysis of ECOWAS policy documents. The paper argues that invented, invited and instrumentalised spaces for engagement between state and non-state actors in ECOWAS manifest in a complex web of regional and national interests contributing to regional migration governance from 'below'. Regional migration governance from below consists of transnational societal networks characterised by the interactions of NSAs across borders to influence policies and practices at the regional level. The analysis reveals that NSA engagement results in reinforcing regional policies, policy diffusion through regional processes and circumventing restrictive national agendas through adopting innovative regional approaches. These results contribute to strengthening the institutional framework for regional migration governance in West Africa.			10.1080/1369183X.2021.1972570	Amanda.bisong@gmail.com	Faculty of Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands	Empirical	Migration governance	Regional		Yes

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2021	Barnabé, A.Y., Paul, N., Chrysost, B.	Do Remittances Spur Financial Inclusion in Africa? a Multi- dimensional Approach	Economics Bulletin	The objective of this paper is to examine the effect of migrant remittances on financial inclusion in Africa using a multi- dimensional approach. Our sample consists of 21 countries over a period from 2004 to 2018. We adopted a Pooled Mean Group (PMG) to capture the short- and long-term dynamics of the impact of migrant remittances on financial inclusion. From this work, the following results have emerged. (i) migrant remittances have a positive long-term effect on financial inclusion; (ii)migrant remittances have a positive long-term effect on access to financial services. Specifically, the remittances have a negative effect in the short term and a positive effect in the long term on the number of banking branches; and (iv) the remittances have a negative long-term effect on the use of financial services. More specifically, the remittances increase the number of depositaries with financial institutions in the long term but has a negative effect on the number of borrowings. These results are robust using a GMM system. Several implications flow from these results. To better benefit from remittances, it would be appropriate for financial institutions to offer ranges of products that are adapted to the recipient households in the use of financial services	41	2		abbayadou@gmail.com	University of Dschang	Empirical	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes
2021	Attoh, F., Ishola, E.	Migration and regional cooperation for development: ECOWAS in perspective	Africa Review	The phenomenon of migration involves the movement of people from one milieu to another. Different reasons underscore this movement by people such as escape from conflict, quest for greener pasture, search for employment, and coercion from criminal syndicates. This paper focuses on the dynamics of intraregional migration in West Africa. The importance of migration within West Africa is emphasized in the region's development agenda, Vision 2020, which places importance on regional resource development. Ease of migration is central to harnessing the region's human resource potential for development ends. At inception, migration within West Africa was governed by the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons, residence, and establishment adopted in 1979. Within this framework, migration is considered as an integral element in the economic integration of the region. Hence, the protocol provides the right of entry for 90 days, residence and establishment for citizens of ECOWAS member countries. The ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration adopted in 2008 currently governs the migration process in the region. In interrogating migration governance in West Africa, this paper identifies challenges, such as, defective state capacities and continued underdevelopment, protectionist policies, language, colonial vestiges, such as, currency, among others, as factors militating against the successful exploitation of the region's productive population for development ends.	13	2	10.1080/09744053.2021.1943146	eishola@unilag.edu.ng	Department of Sociology, University of Lagos, Lagos, Nigeria	Desk-based	Migration governance	Regional		No
2021	Aniche, E.T., Moyo, I., Nshimbi, C.C.	Interrogating the nexus between irregular migration and insecurity along 'ungoverned' border spaces in West Africa	African Security Review	The 'coloniality', porosity, and 'ungovernability' of borders in West Africa, have engendered undocumented migration, in which most people engage to visit their kin and for economic reasons such as herding, farming, fishing, hunting, and trading. This occurs concurrently with human smuggling, human trafficking, gun-running, terrorism, and money laundering. The rise in these cross-border criminal activities and the resultant insecurity have put irregular migration into the mainstream of political and academic conversation, generating national, regional, and global concerns. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the nexus between irregular migration and insecurity along 'ungoverned' borders in West Africa, based on a review of relevant literature on migration, security, and governance in scholarly journals, books as well as relevant reports, newspaper, and media accounts. The overarching question which this raises and is addressed in this paper is: How does the coloniality and porosity of ungoverned borders in West Africa engender and/or entrench cross-border insecurity? Addressing this question suggests the need to provide sufficient governance mechanisms that involve both state and non-state actors in order to reduce the ungoverned spaces in this part of Africa.	30	3	10.1080/10246029.2021.1901753	anicheet@fuotuoke.edu.ng	Department of Political Science, Federal University Otuoke, Otuoke, Nigeria	Desk-based	Irregular migration	Regional		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2021	Natter, K.	Ad-hocratic immigration governance: how states secure their power over immigration through intentional ambiguity	Territory, Politics, Governance	This article conceptualises the term ad-hocratic immigration governance to capture how states intentionally use policy ambiguity as a tool to secure their power over immigration. It does so by analysing the flexibility, pragmatism and informality with which Moroccan and Tunisian authorities have governed immigration since the turn of the 21st century. Drawing on over 100 interviews and in-depth policy analysis, the article shows that Moroccan and Tunisian authorities have privileged executive politics, exemption regimes and case-by-case arrangements on immigration over parliamentary law-making. It demonstrates how the intentional ambiguity created by such ad-hocratic governance allowed Morocco's monarchy and Tunisia's young democracy to respond to external and bottom-up demands for more immigrant rights while at the same time securing the state's margin of manoeuvre over immigration. Such theorisation of ad-hocracy sheds a novel light on how immigration is governed not only across North Africa and the Middle East but also in their European neighbourhood.			10.1080/21622671.2021.1877189	k.natter@fsw.leidenuniv.nl	Institute of Political Science, University of Leiden, Leiden, the Netherlands.	Empirical	Migration governance	Multi-country		Yes
2021	Souza, E.	Labour market incorporation of immigrant women in South Africa: Impacts of human capital and family structure	Population Studies	This paper examines the labour market incorporation of African-born immigrant women in South Africa using data from the 2011 Census. It investigates women's labour force participation, employment prospects, and access to formal employment, assessing how human capital and household factors explain labour market decisions. Results underscore significant challenges to immigrant incorporation in South Africa. Not only are immigrants less likely to participate in the labour force than black South African women, but for those who participate, employment levels are lower. Although immigrants have an employment edge over South Africans once individual and household factors are held constant, immigrants are over-represented in informal jobs. Returns to human capital are also lower among foreign than South-African-born women. Together, these results suggest a segmented pattern of incorporation for immigrant women in South Africa. Results by national origin emphasise the importance of egalitarianism and co-ethnic community characteristics in structuring women's labour force participation.	75	1	10.1080/00324728.2020.1838601	souzaemma@gmail.com	University of Pennsylvania	Empirical	Labour migration and education	National	South Africa	No
2022	Gordon, S.	Mass Preferences for the Free Movement of People in Africa: A Public Opinion Analysis of 36 Countries	International Migration Review	The African Union (AU) has identified opening borders to cross-national mobility as a prime strategic goal, and AU leaders have heralded regional free movement as a vital tool for economic growth and skills development on the continent. Little, however, is known about the level (or determinants) of public support for opening borders in the AU. This article examines public preferences for free movement among 36 African countries. Using data from the sixth round of the Afrobarometer Survey (N = 53,935), the analysis presented here shows a remarkable degree of variation in mobility-related preferences both within and between nations, and explores whether a utilitarian model of attitude formation can explain mass preferences for open borders across African countries. Investigating both macroand micro-level determinants of public attitudes toward border control, the article shows that the utilitarian model had greater explanatory power at the macro-level than at the micro-level. In addition, some support was found for identity-based predictors (e.g., nationalism versus cosmopolitanism) of support for free movement. These outcomes point toward a new way of understanding public attitudes toward regional integration in Africa. The article concludes by discussing future avenues of public opinion research toward mobility rights on the continent and beyond.	56	1	10.1177/01979183211026243	sgordon@hsrc.ac.za	Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) University	Empirical	Migration governance	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2022	Akanle, O., Kayode, D., Abolade, I.	Sustainable development goals (SDGs) and remittances in Africa	Cogent Social Sciences	Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are the most ambitious development frameworks to assist in driving inclusive development globally. This is particularly so regarding Africa. Several efforts have been made to achieve development in Africa but more efforts are needed to achieve desired results. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), which used to positively impact development on the continent, have been on the decline even as African governments continue to struggle with development efforts. Current poverty alleviation efforts and development financing strategies have focused on the role of remittances in achieving development on the continent given sustained and appreciable increase in remittances and their abilities to reach/impact households. More studies are, however, needed to sufficiently understand how remittances affect, and will continue to affect, development in Africa, particularly within the framework of SDGs. Remittances are very relevant to SDGs particularly in achieving goals 1–6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 17 in Africa. It is against this background that this article examines the possibilities and potentials of remittances in driving development and achieving SDGs in Africa.	8	1	10.1080/23311886.2022.2037811	yakanle@yahoo.com	Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, South Africa	Desk-based	Labour migration and education	Whole of Africa (Africa-wide)		Yes
2022	Nwozor, A., Oshewolo, S., Olanrewaju, J.S., Bosede Ake, M., Okidu, O.	Return migration and the challenges of diasporic reintegration in Nigeria	Third World Quarterly	Nigeria is among the countries in Africa with the largest emigrant population as well as an impressive pool of annual remittances. Despite the importance of remittances in the matrix of national development, they are no substitute for the expertise and skills needed to drive the various sectors of the economy. Thus, since 1999, successive Nigerian governments have emphasised return migration as an important strategy to mainstream its diaspora into national development. In this vein, diverse policy efforts have been initiated to ensure its actualisation. The paper interrogates the continued currency and feasibility of return migration in the face of transnationalism and diasporic integration dilemmas. The paper uses qualitative data generated from primary and secondary sources to critically examine Nigeria's migration architecture. It finds that return migration is fraught with several integration dilemmas for returnees as they are confronted with adjustment crises on return. The paper contends that the transnational character of the Nigerian diaspora necessitates the adoption of policy options that recognise the universality of their contributions and thus do not require their relocation to the country.			10.1080/01436597.2022.2026216	agaptus.nwozor@bowen. edu.ng	Department of Political Science and international relations, Bowen university, Iwo, Osun State, Nigeria	Empirical	Diaspora engagement	National	Nigeria	No
2022	Aniche, E.T.	Borders, migration and xenophobic policies in West Africa	Africa Review	The 1979 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol, or Article 59 of the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty, encapsulates the terms and conditions for a visa-free and borderless economic community. It is geared towards decolonising the colonial borders and encouraging economic activity. But despite the ratification of the Protocol, documented and undocumented migrants continue to be expelled, blocked at borders and prevented from doing business, and suffer other xenophobic mistreatment, within the sub-region. The member states of ECOWAS have implemented anti-immigrant policies, from which Community citizens are rarely exempted. The article argues that the political class in the various states in the sub-region has nurtured and exploited a xenophobic consciousness, which has prevented the growth of class consciousness and protects their power base. The xenophobic policies of West African states have also created the necessary conditions to impede the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol.			10.1163/09744061-20220121	anicheet@fuotuoke.edu.ng	Department of Political Science, Federal University Otuoke, Otuoke, Nigeria	Desk-based	Migration governance	Regional		No

Year	Authors	Title	Source title	Abstract	Volume	Issue	DOI	Email address of corresponding author	Affiliation of corresponding author	Research type	Thematic focus	Coverage	Country (if national)	Open Access
2022	Boersma, M., Koch, DJ., Kroon, L., McDougal, D., Verhoeff, G., Wang, Y.	Learning in migration management? Persistent side effects of the EUTF	International Migration	This study contributes to the existing literature on the unintended effects of migration management programmes beyond migration. By combining a structured literature review with fifteen in-depth interviews with diplomats, consultants, and researchers—all involved with the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the largest migration management programme since 2015—this study examines why policymakers do not always learn from unintended effects. The paper identifies four unintended effects: increased border guard violence; increased organised crime of smugglers and undermined livelihoods; exacerbation of poor governance in recipient countries; and legitimation of governments with limited legitimacy. While officials involved in the EUTF recognise the occurrence of these unintended effects, the EUTF insufficiently addresses these effects. This study analyses the technical, institutional, and ideological limits to learning that prevent migration management instruments such as the EUTF from effectively mitigating unintended effects.	0		10.1111/imig.12965	louisekroon99@gmail.com	Independent Researcher, Viersloot 47, 1261 LK, Blaricum, the Netherlands	Empirical	Migration governance	Multi-country		No
2022	Olakpe, O.	Views on migration partnerships from the ground: Lessons from Nigeria	International Migration	What is the current situation of migration partnerships and governance and how has it evolved? The perceived rise in migratory movement of African migrants towards Europe created legal and policy chain reactions in Europe focused on stemming irregular migration. These changes include the establishment and externalisation of an EU-led migration governance in Africa and increased EU-African political engagement through migration dialogue and partnerships. This study investigates the state of play of EU-Africa migration partnerships to unpack lessons learned on transnational migration governance, using Nigeria as an example (The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.)			10.1111/imig.12974	oreva.olakpe@gmail.com	Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada	Empirical	Migration governance	National	Nigeria	No

## **Book Review:**

## 'The Dead Will Arise': A Review of These Potatoes Look Like Humans: The Contested Future of Land, Home and Death in South Africa

(uMbuso weNkosi, Johannesburg: Wits University Press 2023)


## Masilo Lepuru

School of Social Sciences, Humanities & Arts, University of California

This book locates the debate about the historical injustice of land dispossession within the realm of African spirituality. This is reminiscent of the 'spirit' of *Chimurenga* against the Rhodesians in Zimbabwe which has resulted in the restoration of the land to the Zimbabweans as the rightful owners of the land of their ancestors.

Bethal, a white-owned farm on which African labourers were violently exploited and killed, is the case study to discuss the relationship between the land, violence and the law in South Africa. These African workers were forced to plant and harvest potatoes under dehumanising conditions. The logic behind this violent imposition of the regime of slave labour on the farms is the racist notion that blacks are not human. When these humans who look like potatoes died they are not buried properly on these 'white farms'. It is this sense that because of this lack of dignified burials, their bodies come back while other workers are labouring. For 'the potatoes that looked like humans' (p. 27) are actually humans who were denied their humanity both while they were alive and dead by the violent white farm owners.

The book has a prologue and seven chapters. These are well-structured and coherent, thus making this book a worthwhile read. The prologue is entitled 'Emazambaneni: The land of terror' which is about the origin of the book and the centrality of violence, law, and social order. The violence of the white social order through the imposition of the law of the white settlers is captured by one of the workers who wrote a letter



'The spectre of the human potato' is the first chapter which provides the historical context of the Bethal scandal of the 1940s and 1950s and the overview of all the chapters of the book. The chapter also introduces concepts and themes which inform the entire book. The conceptual framework in this chapter comprises among other things the native question, paternalism, and the eschatological eye. WeNkosi captures the overarching theme of the book by stating that 'in writing about Bethal and the brutality in this land, my aim is to reveal how land ownership and private property (such as the farm) are linked to violence and contestation' (p. 16).

Chapter 2 ('Whose eyes are looking at history'?) is about the politics of history and methodology in historical research. WeNkosi posits that the victims of violent land dispossession look at their condition through what he calls 'the spiritual eye', while white settlers look at it through the paternalistic eye as European conquerors and white supremacists. According to weNkosi (p. 33), the Indigenous people as victims of violent land dispossession use a spiritual eye to look at their land and regard the land as 'the first and last destiny for their spirit. To create a home and be buried in the land is a spiritual activity.' Most significantly, 'the spiritual eye can see the spirits of the dead' and thus captures 'the demand of the dead for freedom' (p. 34).

The third chapter ('Bethal, the house of God') discusses the history of Bethal as a product of white settler colonialism and the labour regime of violent exploitation which was introduced by white farmers. It also discusses the famous investigation conducted in Bethal by 'Mr Drum', Henry Nxumalo, to expose the violent exploitation and deaths of black workers on the farm. In line with the theme of violence, law, and the land question, weNkosi captures the structural essence of white settler colonialism to this day by stating that 'therefore, the violence they inflicted was intended to thwart a future violent revolt by the Black people, to keep them docile, to prevent them from contesting the land' (p. 75). White settlers live in fear of being attacked by the 'natives' who want their land back. The violence they use is aimed at securing their future as white masters in South Africa.

Chapter four ('Violence: The white farmers' fears erupt') discusses white anxiety and the native question. To capture its libidinal economy, weNkosi states that 'the use



of violence on South African farms reflected an anxiety about the future in a country where white people are a minority' (p. 93). He concludes this chapter by dealing with the fundamental question of white settler colonialism, the antagonism between the native and the settler who according to Fanon (1963 p.28) 'are old acquaintances'. WeNkosi affirms this by stating 'much more important, however, is that while the farmers positioned themselves as owners of the land, the same land was occupied by workers and families who regarded it as their home. They would die and be buried on the land' (p. 96). As 'old acquaintances' the farmers as settlers and the workers and families as natives had already met in the late 1600s when the Indigenous people asked Van Riebeek the fundamental ethical question 'and to say the land is not big enough for both, who should give way, the rightful owner or the foreign invader'? (Troup 1975: p. 53). This fundamental question of historical justice is yet to be answered to the satisfaction of the Indigenous people.

The fifth chapter ('These eyes are looking for home') discusses how the violence of white settler farm owners seeks to negate the collective identity of the Indigenous people and denyies them the foundation to have a society. But despite being subjected to the ontological violence of being called 'kaffirs' by paternalistic white settlers, weNkosi (pp. 113-114) states that 'beyond the national and global resistance that was already shaking the South African landscape, there was one thing that always bothered the farmers: the Black farmworkers recognised the farm as their home.' The penultimate chapter ('Bethal today') discusses the interconnection between the history of Bethal and its consequences for the present generation of workers. It also underscores the fact that the current generation of workers still regards Bethal as their home. They are haunted by the living past of their ancestors. WeNkosi encapsulates this by stating that 'in considering all the farms in northern Bethal, where the labour tenants speak of encountering many unmarked graves, I cannot help but wonder whose ancestors those are. These are living dead beings...' (p. 120).

The last chapter ('Our eschatological future') discusses the relationship between violence and the future. It underscores the persistent antagonism between the workers and farmers who regard the land as their home. It highlights the fact that white settlers use violence to dispossess the Indigenous people and retain the land. It also focuses on the spiritual link between the land and justice. WeNkosi affirms this by stating that 'those who died remained on the land and were resurrected; they came back looking like potatoes...an encounter with spirits that refused to be forgotten and demand justice' (p. 132).

The book makes an opportune intervention into the land question in the so-called post-apartheid era, by stating that 'this spiritual future always refers us to the past. As we discuss land expropriation without compensation, there is need to look into the meaning of land beyond its material value' (p. 133). 'The ontology of invisible beings' and 'triadic ontology' (Ramose 1999) which centre the inextricable connection between the living, the living-dead and the yet-to-be-born should inform the debate on the land and national question: 'those who do not retaliate through violence are in the space of nothingness or invisibility' (p. 136). Thus, all 'the dead will arise' (Peires 2003) because 'even the ancestors are fighting for the land' (p. 132).

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